Commit Graph
413 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bchanot 794dfd9d0b test(workspace): R2 measurements of the shipped core module next to the TypeScript it replaces
Load, sheet handle + index data, zone.click, draft.restore,
archive.import, archive.snapshot and the linear memory, printed for
RUST.md, with order-of-magnitude budgets; the frozen N-1 TypeScript
runs the same inputs for comparison.
2026-10-14 00:30:55 +02:00
bchanot 6891f9ea25 feat(supabase): publish gate on the Rust core's sheet.check, fail closed
publishSheetVersion(client, versionId, validate) takes the core's
sheet.check (the package never loads the module itself); anything but a
publishable verdict refuses publication before the RPC: invalid_shape,
not_publishable (same message as before: first error code), and
validator_unavailable when the core cannot run. Tests run on the real
Node core; the shape case now asserts the closed kind instead of any
throw. The package no longer depends on @faunosteo/domain.
2026-10-14 00:29:03 +02:00
bchanot 21906c4358 feat(domain): R2.2 report migration, rebase, sheet snapshot and layered archive reading in Rust; draft restore and archive import operations
migrateReportV2ToV3 / readReportDocument (version read on the raw value,
JS truthiness kept, a malformed mapped path still fails the read),
rebaseReportOnSheet (??= labels, archived names first-match),
buildSheetSnapshot / assertSnapshot (raw depth, shape, caps in UTF-16 and
UTF-8, integrity), readArchiveDocument (layered: report first, wrapper,
snapshot gate, sheet invariant, unsupported_envelope origin quirk).
Checked against 84 cases frozen from the TypeScript and 765 Zod verdicts
(one declared difference: L1, a lone surrogate reads as U+FFFD), the
ported report and archive suites and the 612 legacy leaves. Facade:
draft.restore (content kinds invalid / unsupported_version, rebase_failed
never a content kind), archive.import (incompatible_version with found,
no_attachment), archive.snapshot.
2026-10-14 00:28:02 +02:00
bchanot 6c0533c1da feat(workspace): R2 facade operations for the editor rules, the publish check and the sheet index data
Free ops: sheet.check, report.new, report.add_observation,
report.remove_observation, report.move_observation, vertebra.select.
Sheet ops: index_data, zone.click, zone.add_sides, zone.remove_at,
vertebra.initial, vertebra.sync, finding.toggle. Input contracts exported
to TypeScript; a JavaScript index that names no position removes nothing
in the filters and is refused by the move (the TypeScript swap would have
written a hole). Shipped module 999 KB raw, 319 KB gzip (budget 600 KB).
2026-10-14 00:19:20 +02:00
bchanot 3639c8778e feat(domain): R2.3 editor rules in Rust — zone click chain, reducers, finding toggle, vertebra selection, report operations
zoneInteraction (decision + reducers, collectVertebrae concatenated-key
dedup, syncVertebrae Map order), FindingsTreePicker.toggleLeaf (clicked
leaf by position, parents first-wins), VertebraPicker toggle/all/none and
the store's newReport/add/remove/move, checked against 49 cases frozen
from the TypeScript (41 byte-equal, 8 equal up to key order: contract
order replaces insertion order, D-R11) and the 13-case service suite.
Typed error kinds where the TypeScript would throw or corrupt a list.
2026-10-14 00:17:22 +02:00
bchanot 0c47d0f837 feat(domain): R2.2 sheet integrity rules, publish check, SheetIndexData and SQL conformance in Rust
The 21 rules of validateSheetDocument ported with identical codes,
severities, paths and messages (frozen from the TypeScript on 26
conformance fixtures), createEmptySheetDocument, the publish check
(strict shape then rules), and the index data React reads once (positions
with Map semantics, names, spine ids, finding-path keys). The fixtures
also carry the codes private.sheet_document_issues returns: a cargo test
generates supabase/tests/011_sheet_conformance.sql and refuses drift
(PGlite 12/12 files, real stack 446/446). .prettierignore keeps the
byte-exact oracles and generated fixtures out of pnpm format.
2026-10-14 00:17:21 +02:00
bchanot 343d6f4c1f feat(workspace): R2.4 core runtime — lazy load, poison on trap, offline re-instantiation, per-generation sheet handles
packages/core-wasm: browser-safe CoreRuntime (synchronous calls once ready;
a WebAssembly.RuntimeError poisons the instance, the call answers internal,
a fresh instance comes from the kept compiled module and a glue record
imported in advance; at most 3 recoveries per page; retry after a load
failure), SheetSession (handle rebuilt per instance generation, never
called on a dropped one; invalid_sheet without poisoning), Node source.
crates/wasm: SheetHandle (sheet held in the module memory). Two builds:
pkg/ shipped without trap exports (checked), pkg-proofs/ for the trap
tests; BUILD_STAMP (hash of the Rust sources) refused when missing or
stale by the vitest global setup instead of skipping. Failure envelope
carries a numeric found version; compact JS-number output.
2026-10-14 00:12:04 +02:00
bchanot 22fea8736d feat(domain): Rust sheet index and loaded sheet (bundle payload → document, migration map, positions)
Lookups follow the TypeScript index: by-id maps keep the last duplicate as
new Map does, spine annotations and finding paths take the first match as
Array.find does; a document without a main view cannot be indexed.
2026-10-14 00:05:26 +02:00
bchanot ee0700887f feat(domain): R2.1 Rust contracts of the sheet, report and archive documents
Sheet document v2, report v3 / v2 / identity, migration map, sheet snapshot,
branding, PDF labels and archive envelope ported from the Zod schemas with
their exact semantics: strict objects where Zod is strict, optional fields
absent (never null), nullable fields required, integers as JavaScript
numbers, UTF-16 caps, hand-checked patterns, url crate for .url(), lone
surrogate escapes read as U+FFFD (L1, owner confirmation pending).
Fields in Zod schema order (PDF labels in the engine dictionary order):
the curated and legacy sheets, the demo report and the three frozen
archive envelopes print byte for byte as their Zod / attachment form.
ts-rs types regenerated; plan rev 2 after three plan challenges.
2026-10-14 00:04:01 +02:00
bchanot 3114d67959 test(tests): R2 freeze — archive envelopes of the three golden reports and the frozen N-1 reader
Envelopes exported by the TypeScript domain before the Rust switch (FR, no
logos, fixed export time) are the semantic oracle of the switch (D-R11:
key order may change, values may not). The shipped Zod schemas are copied
verbatim under packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1 (develop 1a7ee7d) so a rollback
reader stays testable after packages/domain is deleted at R5.
2026-10-13 23:53:12 +02:00
bchanot 1a7ee7d9ac Merge chore/dev-lan-access into develop
ci / rust (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / check (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / docker (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / supabase (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-10-13 23:24:12 +02:00
bchanot 9cee85752e chore(memory): LAN access validated on computer and phone 2026-10-13 23:24:11 +02:00
bchanot 30737549a2 chore(memory): LAN firewall applied by the owner, refusals verified from another device 2026-10-13 23:23:18 +02:00
bchanot e633169a00 fix(workspace): LAN exposure via host firewall — the Supabase CLI forces 0.0.0.0, so PostgreSQL / Studio / raw Mailpit close by UFW rules on the LAN interface; gateway reduced to Mailpit behind basic auth on 54325
Owner run: the CLI prints 'All services bind to 0.0.0.0' and ignored the
rootless daemon's default address; the gateway could not share 54321/54324
with 0.0.0.0 listeners. Now: Kong serves the API directly; the DEV gateway
serves only Mailpit with basic auth on <DEV host>:54325; ENVIRONMENTS.md §3
gives the exact UFW rules (interface-scoped deny on 54322-54324, two cases
by current UFW state), rollback and impact; dev:net-check proves the
allowed surfaces from a distinct Docker network (5/5 OK) and prints the
refusal checks to run from another device, since a rootless container's
traffic to the host is delivered locally and cannot see the LAN firewall.
LRN-053 corrects LRN-052.
2026-10-13 23:01:19 +02:00
bchanot a8edd59059 chore(memory): LRN-052 rootless port restriction and permission trap, journal 2026-10-13 22:38:54 +02:00
bchanot 3e48b0d848 chore(workspace): DEV least-privilege exposure — nginx DEV gateway (API on the LAN, Mailpit behind basic auth), network check from a distinct origin, loopback default for the rootless daemon documented
The Supabase CLI publishes 54321-54324 on every interface with no bind
option. Design: the rootless daemon binds published ports on loopback by
default (~/.config/docker/daemon.json {"ip":"127.0.0.1"}, owner action,
not applied), and the DEV gateway (Compose service dev-gateway, profile
dev, container faunosteo_dev_gateway) re-publishes only the API (Kong) and
Mailpit behind HTTP basic auth on FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST; Studio and PostgreSQL
stay loopback (SSH tunnel for Studio). pnpm dev:gateway generates the Mailpit
credentials (gitignored; htpasswd 644 because the rootless container user
cannot read a 600 file, hash only). pnpm dev:net-check probes from a
throwaway container on its own Docker network: app, API health, REST 401,
Mailpit 401/200, PostgreSQL and Studio closed. Gateway proven on alternate
ports (health 200, password login 200, Mailpit 401 / 200).
2026-10-13 22:38:40 +02:00
bchanot 5a12596195 chore(memory): R1 validated and merged, identity and environments, LAN rule — BDR-049, journal, TODO 2026-10-13 22:07:00 +02:00
bchanot dd4c35c061 chore(workspace): DEV origin on the private network — scripts/dev-env.sh (FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST detected or set), Supabase CLI wrapper, pnpm dev on the LAN address, config.toml URLs via env(); ENVIRONMENTS.md (identity Faunosteo / faunosteo.com, DEV / STAGING / PROD, exposure table, owner procedure)
The owner tests from other devices of the private network: every test
surface is addressed by the machine's LAN address, never 127.0.0.1 or
localhost, never hard-coded. scripts/dev-env.sh decides the host once
(hostname -I, FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST override, production hosts refused);
scripts/supabase.sh exports it for every CLI call (pnpm db:*, pnpm supabase)
because config.toml now reads api.external_url (mail links), auth.site_url
and studio.api_url with env(); scripts/dev.sh = pnpm dev on that origin,
pnpm dev:offline keeps the local tool alone; dev-lan.sh removed.
Verified: GoTrue API_EXTERNAL_URL and Studio SUPABASE_PUBLIC_URL on the LAN
address, a signup mail linking to http://<lan>:54321/auth/v1/verify, the
four published ports answering from a separate Docker network, and the
10-step procedure in headless Chromium at the LAN origin with every request
URL audited (no 127.0.0.1 / localhost).
2026-10-13 22:06:25 +02:00
bchanot f5865f073f Merge feature/step-08-files-foundation into develop
ci / rust (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / check (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / docker (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / supabase (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-10-13 21:59:54 +02:00
bchanot 5cfb6f1456 Merge feature/rust-r0-foundation into develop
ci / rust (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / check (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / docker (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / supabase (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-10-13 21:59:46 +02:00
bchanot 4804827bd7 chore(supabase): LAN development — API external URL and site URL on the host address so confirmation mails link to the network 2026-10-13 21:51:38 +02:00
bchanot edf1145c81 chore(supabase): LAN development — private-network redirect URLs for auth links, pnpm dev:lan (Vite on 0.0.0.0, Supabase by the host address) 2026-10-13 21:36:39 +02:00
bchanot 0b9b9f0530 chore(memory): Step 8 / R1 delivered — BDR-048, LRN-051, EVAL-019, journal, TODO check-offs 2026-10-13 20:20:55 +02:00
bchanot 40ae453f84 chore(supabase): ceiling comments aligned, prefix patterns built once, cross-account residuals named in STORAGE.md 2026-10-13 20:20:19 +02:00
bchanot 6a9657ce1e fix(supabase): per-account byte budget at begin (64 MiB of bytes present), pending claims charged at the cap, unsized objects ignored in the pending term, partial index on pending claims
Fourth audit (PASS, residual MEDIUM): one account could hold real bytes
during the grace with no bound. begin_avatar_upload now refuses rate_limited
when the caller's objects under its two prefixes plus one cap exceed
private.account_byte_budget(); pending claims count one 5 MiB cap each
(the declared size is not enforced by the upload); an object without a size
does not cancel its claim. pgTAP (plan 140): landed upload charged once by
its bytes, per-account budget refusal. STORAGE.md names the residuals
(colluding accounts at their budget, filesystem quota) and the musl ndots
detail.
2026-10-13 20:15:18 +02:00
bchanot 273914d825 fix(supabase): ceiling measured on bytes present in the bucket plus pending claims without bytes; confirm fails closed on an unsized object; cleartext host must start with a letter
Third audit (BLOCK 1): counting terminal rows while queued let begin spam
pin the ceiling with declared sizes. The ceiling now sums storage.objects
sizes of the bucket (whatever the row's state) plus the declared size of
pending_upload rows whose quarantine object has not landed: a claim dies
with its row, a present object counts whatever its row says, no full scan of
the assets history. confirm_asset_upload treats an object without a size as
upload_missing. pgTAP (plan 138): rejected rows without bytes weigh nothing,
pending claims fill, superseded claims vanish, present bytes fill, unsized
object refused. Worker: a single-label cleartext host must start with an
ASCII letter (0X… hex forms refused, test added); STORAGE.md names the
native-run search-domain residual.
2026-10-13 20:07:22 +02:00
bchanot 369478576e test(supabase): deactivated-account upload check uses a fresh quarantine key (the real stack forbids direct storage deletes) 2026-10-13 19:59:39 +02:00
bchanot c386a08b0b fix(supabase): second security pass — ceiling counts queued purges, confirm refuses more than declared, upload predicate needs an active account; worker cleartext host check strict
Re-audit findings: the ceiling now also counts terminal rows whose keys still
wait in the purge queue (contract wording kept honest, residual named);
confirm_asset_upload refuses an object larger than the declared size;
can_upload_avatar_object joins profiles.active; pgTAP covers the null
sha256 guard on a live lease, the three service_role revocations, the
queued-purge accounting and the deactivated-account upload (plan 137).
Worker: cleartext http only for localhost, a dotted-quad loopback address or
a non-numeric single-label name (numeric and hex hosts refused, tests added).
2026-10-13 19:58:54 +02:00
bchanot cd2dbb3b79 fix(supabase): security pass on the files foundation — ceiling counts live bytes only, confirm checks the account, null sha256 refused, browser RPCs one role; worker: cleartext only on loopback or a service name, no env proxy, key ownership cross-check, no library text in logs
Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every
non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no
disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing
else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a
deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256;
begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL
over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service
name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids;
backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and
the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked
before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).
2026-10-13 19:49:58 +02:00
bchanot 62eb4e5d82 docs(docs): Step 8 / R1 — files foundation, worker loop, avatar: CLAUDE, DEPLOY (.env.worker, CSP), SUPABASE, RUST, TEST_STRATEGY, WORKSPACE, IDENTITY §5, design README, plan as-built note, CHANGELOG; R1 plan and verifier contract 2026-10-13 19:39:52 +02:00
bchanot 0c6053c174 feat(workspace): real-stack avatar e2e, compose worker service, STORAGE.md contract
packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts (pnpm e2e:avatar through
scripts/avatar-e2e.sh: worker container on the Supabase network, 5 s sweep,
no quarantine grace; a fresh account per run): clean upload and owner-only
download (Bob, anon, quarantine key, direct final-key write refused),
replacement purged after the grace (queue clock shifted through psql), late
bytes through a still-valid signed upload URL swept, hostile and corrupted
uploads rejected with closed codes, removal with the purge queue drained.
Worker: the Storage API answers a missing object with HTTP 400 and
statusCode 404; normalised to 404 so a purge of a never-written key is acked.
docker-compose.yml: service worker under the worker profile (read-only,
cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, 512m, 1 cpu, 64 pids, .env.worker, external
Supabase network). docs/development/STORAGE.md: the implementation contract.
2026-10-13 19:39:51 +02:00
bchanot 0410af0c35 feat(worker): R1 job loop — claim, download, sandboxed decode, clean upload, commit, purge sweeps
Keyed parent on ureq 3 (rustls + ring, bundled roots), no async runtime:
config from the environment (secret never printed, JWT expiry logged), JSON
line logs with a field allowlist (child stderr escaped and truncated), strict
key validation before any URL, Backend trait over PostgREST RPCs and Storage
objects with closed error kinds, one job per claim with the STORAGE.md §3.4
mapping (content codes, processing_error on signals / timeout / overflow,
Broken stops the loop with exit 20, a refused commit deletes nothing), sweeper
(expire pending, purge queue, quarantine leftovers), per-stage watchdog
(exit 21), WORKER_ONCE for tests, run --check extended. 11 loop tests on a
fake backend and decoder; sandbox tests and seccomp derivation unchanged
(the child still makes the same 7 syscalls); image 11.6 MB.
2026-10-13 19:32:38 +02:00
bchanot 926dd7df8c feat(app): profile photo — avatar upload in Mon compte, photo in the sidebar, drawer and top bar
packages/supabase assets module: closed AssetFailure kinds, begin / quarantine
upload (upsert off) / confirm / remove, own-row state read with an explicit
column list, download under the SELECT policy. App: client transport (magic
byte sniff, never SVG, createImageBitmap, canvas 1024 px, JPEG 0.9, 5 MiB
cap), AvatarSection (preview, save, 1 s polling up to 30 s, rejection and
failure messages per closed code, removal with confirmation, in-flight row
resumed at mount), auth store blob URL revoked on change and sign-out,
AvatarCircle in UserBadge and the top bar link to Mon compte (D3), FR/EN
strings, fake client extended, 27 new tests (app 300).
2026-10-13 19:32:37 +02:00
bchanot 614887470c feat(supabase): files foundation — assets table, private buckets, avatar policies through assets, purge queue, browser and worker RPCs
Migration 20261013100000: asset_status enum, public.assets (server-built keys,
lease token, closed rejection reasons), seven private buckets (avatars open with
cap and MIME list, six closed), storage.objects SELECT/INSERT policies for
avatars evaluated through assets, private.object_purge_queue fed by status and
delete triggers (48 h / 1 h grace), storage ceiling, RPCs begin_avatar_upload /
confirm_asset_upload / remove_avatar (authenticated) and claim_avatar_jobs /
complete_avatar_job / reject_avatar_job / mark_quarantine_purged / claim_purges /
ack_purge / claim_quarantine_leftovers / expire_pending_uploads (service_role),
explicit revokes and column grants. pgTAP 010 (125 checks: allowed and denied
twins, policy census, stale lease, supersede, removal, leftovers, cascade,
ceiling), 001 census extended, database.types.ts regenerated from the real
stack, schema-types test counts input arguments only.
2026-10-13 19:32:15 +02:00
bchanot 3f1105bf39 chore(memory): R0 correction delivered — BDR-047, LRN-050, EVAL-018, journal, TODO R0.11 check-offs and CI/CD follow-ups, verify contract 2026-10-13 10:09:49 +02:00
bchanot 496f54990a fix(ci): types drift gate fails closed on a git error and sees untracked files whatever the git config
The ci.yml step assigns git status to a variable before testing it (a git
failure now fails the step, as scripts/check-all.sh already did); both gates
pass --untracked-files=all; the rust-check.sh comment names the real gate.
2026-10-13 10:09:15 +02:00
bchanot 073b25e52b docs(docs): gate stages (drift, advisories), native exposure note, CI target wording, check:all in WORKSPACE and TEST_STRATEGY 2026-10-13 09:46:07 +02:00
bchanot e58c7be362 fix(workspace): gate fixes after the security pass — warn-only advisories, drift gate sees new files, PATH guard appends, literal rm path, prctl arguments as unsigned long
check-all.sh gains a warn-only cargo deny check advisories stage (no nightly
job runs yet) and the ts-rs drift gate uses git status --porcelain so a new
untracked type file fails too (same in ci.yml); rust-env.sh appends an
absolute ~/.cargo/bin only; wasm-build.sh removes the literal
packages/core-wasm/pkg; the worker passes the unused prctl arguments as
c_ulong and its SAFETY comments no longer claim the kernel checks them.
2026-10-13 09:46:06 +02:00
bchanot 6e2bbec4b0 docs(docs): Ubuntu native development, Docker for services and isolation, separate VPS; pnpm check:all; CI status
RUST.md §1 (three environments, native install recipe, what stays in Docker
and why), §4 (pre-merge gate, workflow files prepared and never run), §5.8
(native run numbers against the builder image), §6; CLAUDE.md stack row,
commands, map, workflow rule; README quick start and verification; DEPLOY.md
CI status; WORKSPACE.md; TEST_STRATEGY.md; CHANGELOG; review Annex C.1
addendum of 2026-10-13.
2026-10-13 01:19:15 +02:00
bchanot 981a66f33b ci: workflows kept as prepared material, marked never executed; script paths under scripts/
No runner, secret or registry exists on the forge; the three files map onto
the stages of pnpm check:all so a future runner calls the same scripts.
2026-10-13 01:19:15 +02:00
bchanot 2d573883e5 fix(worker): SAFETY comments state the invariants the code checks; WebP stride by checked arithmetic
The [gated <date>] markers read as an approval stamp: replaced by plain
SAFETY comments giving, for each of the seven unsafe sites, the FFI contract
and where the surrounding code establishes it (buffer length and stride
checks, non-zero size and non-null output before from_raw_parts, single
WebPFree, prctl integer arguments with the return code checked, the two
negative hooks compiled with test-hooks only). The stride is now computed
with checked_mul instead of width * 4.
2026-10-13 01:19:14 +02:00
bchanot f2cf93668e chore(workspace): native Rust toolchain as the primary path, builder image as the reproducible alternative
scripts/rust-check.sh and scripts/wasm-build.sh (moved from docker/) run
natively on the user-level rustup toolchain pinned by rust-toolchain.toml;
scripts/rust-env.sh puts ~/.cargo/bin on PATH for non-interactive shells.
Root scripts: rust:check and wasm:build native, rust:check:docker and
wasm:build:docker through docker/rust-run.sh, check:all = scripts/check-all.sh,
the whole pre-merge gate in one command (rust check, types drift, wasm build,
pnpm check, application image, worker:test, worker:image started read-only).
The native check now runs the worker's unit tests (cargo test --workspace);
the sandbox tests stay feature-gated and Docker-only.
2026-10-13 01:19:13 +02:00
bchanot bd9c7d1968 chore(memory): R0 closed for owner validation — BDR-046, LRN-049, EVAL-017, journal, TODO R0 check-offs and follow-ups 2026-10-13 00:54:36 +02:00
bchanot 47d84161f5 ci: release-images — advisory gates in a job without secrets, image job runs no third-party code before login, fresh config dir via GITHUB_ENV, run-id builder name, empty digest refused, cleanup order; docs: SAFETY markers consistent, iCCP fixture comment 2026-10-13 00:53:46 +02:00
bchanot 3af2861be7 fix(worker): iCCP-bomb proof asserts the content-rejection property (either content code); docs(docs): RUST.md worker and release workflow wording after the second security pass 2026-10-13 00:37:33 +02:00
bchanot a8b644a515 fix(worker): second security pass — content-only rejection codes (resource_limit, explicit list), negative proofs of the seccomp argument filters, PR_GET_DUMPABLE self-check, strict WebP chunk structure, iCCP-bomb fixture, separate test target cache; ci: release-images builder actually used (job-level DOCKER_CONFIG, --builder), literal cleanup path, token scoped to the login step, npm advisories gate, digests from build metadata 2026-10-13 00:36:30 +02:00
bchanot 11813f5560 fix(worker): security audit of R0 — no core dumps, tkill/tgkill limited to SIGABRT on self, mmap without PROT_EXEC, Broken outcome for a broken child environment, frame vs canvas check, unsafe denied with local allows, sandbox tests and derivation on the release profile (syscall marker); wasm proof exports behind a feature; ci: release-images hardened (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral builder, env secrets + logout, ref gate, pinned checkout) 2026-10-13 00:18:53 +02:00
bchanot 9d3e0294e2 docs(docs): RUST.md with the R0 proofs, DEPLOY image deploy by digest + CSP note, workspace/test strategy/packages/CLAUDE.md, CHANGELOG; chore(memory): TODO R0 2026-10-13 00:01:27 +02:00
bchanot 4833fd29ef ci: rust job through the builder image, worker test stage and runtime start, nightly advisories, manual digest-tagged release-images workflow; CSP proof script 2026-10-13 00:01:26 +02:00
bchanot 3970cdca52 feat(worker): sandboxed decode child skeleton — rlimits, traced seccomp allowlist, pure-Rust decoders, libwebp in the child, parent RIFF check, musl image with test stage 2026-10-13 00:01:26 +02:00