fix(worker): security audit of R0 — no core dumps, tkill/tgkill limited to SIGABRT on self, mmap without PROT_EXEC, Broken outcome for a broken child environment, frame vs canvas check, unsafe denied with local allows, sandbox tests and derivation on the release profile (syscall marker); wasm proof exports behind a feature; ci: release-images hardened (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral builder, env secrets + logout, ref gate, pinned checkout)
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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
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# CONTRACT — Rust R0 foundation (whole phase, for the fresh verifier)
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- date: 2026-10-13 | flow: ad-hoc phase (owner go 2026-10-12, BDR-045) | branch: feature/rust-r0-foundation (base develop = 5fec065)
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- status: active (amended 2026-10-13 after verifier pass 1: criteria 10 and 14 oracles counted comment lines; CHECKs tightened, no code change)
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- spec: docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md (Part III, Annex B, Annex C), docs/development/RUST.md (what was built and proven)
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- evidence logs (runs made by the orchestrator on this host, readable): /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/{pnpm-check.log,worker-test-build-5.log,worker-image-build-2.log,builder-build-2.log}
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## REQUEST (owner brief 2026-10-12, condensed — IMMUTABLE)
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Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned Rust and dependencies; reproducible Docker builder (no Rust on the VPS); native and WebAssembly compilation; working TypeScript bindings; JSON contracts compatible with the current data; first wasm size and performance measurements; applicable security and isolation tests; CI integration; development and deployment documentation. The seven proofs run in the real environment where possible (serialisation, wasm panics, musl, seccomp verified experimentally; a proof that cannot be obtained is reported, not assumed). Compatibility: the React app, Report v3, PDF v2/v3, Supabase, the interfaces and the existing tests stay unchanged; the frontend does not load the module. No migration of anatomy, PDF or business validations (R2–R5); no avatar business processing (R1). Everything dockerised; production images built in CI and pulled by the VPS; live deployment unchanged; no tag or merge into main.
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## ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
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1. Workspace with exactly three crates, toolchain pinned identically in the three places.
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CHECK: grep -c '"crates/core", "crates/wasm", "crates/worker"' Cargo.toml; grep -c 'channel = "1.99.0"' rust-toolchain.toml; grep -c "FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm" docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile; grep -c "FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24" crates/worker/Dockerfile; ls crates
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EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; core wasm worker
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2. wasm-bindgen crate and CLI locked to one version, refused up front on mismatch.
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CHECK: grep -c 'wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129"' Cargo.toml; grep -c "WASM_BINDGEN_VERSION=0.2.129" docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile; grep -c 'lock_version" != "$cli_version"' docker/wasm-build.sh
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EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1
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3. The core takes ids, time and bytes as inputs: no I/O, clock or env in crates/core/src, lint-enforced.
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CHECK: grep -rn "std::fs\|std::env\|std::time\|SystemTime\|Instant::now" crates/core/src | wc -l; grep -c "disallowed_methods = \"deny\"" Cargo.toml; grep -c "std::fs::read\|std::env::var\|SystemTime::now" clippy.toml; grep -c "^serde\|^serde_json\|^ts-rs" crates/core/Cargo.toml
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EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; >= 3 ; 3
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4. JSON contract: preserve_order and float_roundtrip enabled; the JavaScript number formatter and the pretty formatter exist with their unit tests.
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CHECK: grep -c '"preserve_order", "float_roundtrip"' Cargo.toml; grep -c "pub fn js_number\|pub struct JsPrettyFormatter\|pub fn to_js_pretty\|pub fn pretty_js_round_trip" crates/core/src/json.rs; bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test -p faunosteo-core --locked 2>&1 | grep -E "^test result" | head -2
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EXPECT: 1 ; 4 ; two lines "ok. 10 passed" and "ok. 2 passed"
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5. Report contract types mirror the Zod rules: optional fields skipped when None, nullable field plain Option, Unresolved = literal true; committed ts-rs types equal a fresh export.
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CHECK: grep -c 'skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none"' crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; grep -c "pub version_id: Option<String>" crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; grep -c 'ts(optional, type = "true")' crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts --locked 2>&1 | grep -c "test result: ok"; git diff --exit-code -- packages/core-wasm/types && echo SAME
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EXPECT: 5 ; 1 ; 1 ; >= 1 ; SAME
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6. Browser facade exposes exactly core_version, call, panic_for_test, recurse_for_test; the loader never imports pkg statically; every proof file skips when pkg is absent.
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CHECK: grep -c "^pub fn core_version\|^pub fn call\|^pub fn panic_for_test\|^pub fn recurse_for_test" crates/wasm/src/lib.rs; grep -c "^import .* from '../pkg" packages/core-wasm/src/index.ts; grep -l "describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)" packages/core-wasm/tests/*.test.ts | wc -l
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EXPECT: 4 ; 0 ; 4
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7. The wasm proofs pass on the built module (byte equality with JSON.stringify on the four documents, number corpus, Zod readers, panic and stack traps, fresh-instance recovery, size budget).
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CHECK: ls packages/core-wasm/pkg/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm; corepack pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "Tests |Test Files"; grep -c "float_roundtrip\|memory access out of bounds\|wasm-unsafe-eval" docs/development/RUST.md
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EXPECT: file exists (built by the orchestrator; if absent run `pnpm wasm:build` first) ; "4 passed" and "14 passed" ; >= 3
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8. Worker process model: plain main without an async runtime; decode checks the environment, then the thread count, then rlimits, then seccomp, before reading input.
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CHECK: grep -c "tokio" crates/worker/Cargo.toml; grep -n "vars_os().next().is_some()\|sandbox::apply(\|read_to_end(&mut input)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs | head -3; grep -n "ensure_single_thread()?;\|set_rlimits(limits)?;\|install_seccomp()?;" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | head -3
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EXPECT: 0 ; the three lines appear in that order (env check line < sandbox line < read line) ; the three calls appear in that order
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9. seccomp allowlist is the traced set plus the abort path, denies every file and process syscall, and was derived and proven on the musl binary.
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CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 13 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-5.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
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EXPECT: 7 ; 7 ; 0 ; both lines present
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10. The keyed parent never decodes: spawn.rs and webp_check.rs use no image decoder; output capped at 512 KiB; the RIFF check allowlists four chunk types and refuses the rest.
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CHECK: grep -c "image::" crates/worker/src/spawn.rs crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 512 \* 1024" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c 'b"VP8X", b"VP8 ", b"VP8L", b"ALPH"' crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc))" crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs
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EXPECT: 0 for both files ; 1 ; 1 ; 1
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11. libwebp confined to the child and its version controlled: FFI only in decode.rs with SAFETY comments, minimum 1.6.0 checked by a test and by `run --check`.
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CHECK: grep -l "libwebp_sys::" crates/worker/src/*.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY:" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION: (u8, u8, u8) = (1, 6, 0)" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c "the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough" crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs
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EXPECT: crates/worker/src/decode.rs only ; >= 4 ; 1 ; 1
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12. Test hooks never ship: release build without features; the runtime image is distroless static, non-root, with `run --check` as its command.
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CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-2.log
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EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; exit=0
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13. Frontend, live deployment and database untouched; the existing suites still pass.
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CHECK: git diff --stat 5fec065..HEAD -- apps/app Dockerfile docker-compose.yml docker/nginx.conf docker/entrypoint.sh supabase packages/domain packages/anatomy packages/pdf packages/supabase | wc -l; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log; grep -E "apps/app test:run:\s+Tests|packages/pdf test:run:\s+Tests|packages/anatomy test:run:\s+Tests" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log
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EXPECT: 0 ; exit=0 ; 278, 137, 130 passed
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14. CI: rust job before check through the builder image with the types drift check; docker job builds the worker test stage and starts the runtime image read-only with every capability dropped; advisories nightly; release-images manual only and deploys nothing.
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CHECK: grep -c "needs: rust" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -c "docker/rust-check.sh\|git diff --exit-code -- packages/core-wasm/types" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -c -- "--target test\|--read-only --cap-drop ALL" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -v "^#" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml | grep -c "^ workflow_dispatch:"; grep -v "^#" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml | grep -cE "^\s*(push|pull_request|schedule):|ssh |scp |compose (up|pull)"; grep -c "cron:" .gitea/workflows/rust-advisories.yml
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EXPECT: 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1
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15. Docs: RUST.md carries the seven proofs with numbers and the hypothetical list; DEPLOY.md carries the prepared digest procedure and the CSP note while the live procedure stays; CLAUDE.md, WORKSPACE.md, TEST_STRATEGY.md, packages/README.md, CHANGELOG updated.
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CHECK: grep -c "^### 5\.[1-7]" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "^## 7. What stays hypothetical" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "^## Image deploy by digest (prepared at R0, not yet applied)" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "docker compose up --build -d" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "wasm-unsafe-eval" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "pnpm rust:check" CLAUDE.md; grep -c "crates/worker" docs/development/WORKSPACE.md; grep -c "Worker sandbox" docs/development/TEST_STRATEGY.md; grep -c "core-wasm" packages/README.md; grep -c "Rust foundation, plan R0" CHANGELOG.md
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EXPECT: 7 ; 1 ; 1 ; >= 2 (live procedure kept) ; >= 2 ; >= 1 ; >= 1 ; 1 ; >= 1 ; 1
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16. No secret and no credential in the new files; the worker's env check and the CI secrets usage are the only places naming keys.
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CHECK: git diff 5fec065..HEAD | grep -E "^\+" | grep -Ei "eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}|sk_live|service_role_key *= *\"[^\"]+\"|password *= *\"" | wc -l; grep -c "secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml
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EXPECT: 0 ; 1
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@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
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# Production images, built in CI and identified by digest (D-R13, owner amendment of
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# 2026-10-12): the VPS pulls them and never compiles. Manual only (workflow_dispatch), never
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# on push: no publication or promotion of a production image without an explicit run and
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# a validation. Nothing here deploys; DEPLOY.md "Image deploy (prepared)" is the runbook.
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# a validation. Nothing here deploys; DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest (prepared at R0, not
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# yet applied)" is the runbook.
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#
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# Hardening (security audit of R0): the dispatch input is a typed choice re-validated in
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# the shell through an environment variable (never interpolated into a script); secrets
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# reach the shell through env only, the registry login lives in a per-job DOCKER_CONFIG
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# removed at the end; images are built by an ephemeral buildx builder with its own cache,
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# so nothing a PR build left in the daemon's cache mounts or volumes can reach a release
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# image; the RustSec advisories gate runs before any push; only main and develop may be
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# released; the checkout action is pinned to a commit.
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#
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# Secrets expected on the forge: REGISTRY (host, e.g. the Gitea container registry of this
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# forge), REGISTRY_USER, REGISTRY_TOKEN (write:package scope). Images are pushed as
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@@ -14,25 +23,55 @@ on:
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inputs:
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sheet_bundle:
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description: 'SHEET_BUNDLE for the app image (none = production default, draft = preview)'
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required: false
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default: 'none'
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required: true
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type: choice
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options:
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- none
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- draft
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default: none
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jobs:
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images:
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if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || github.ref == 'refs/heads/develop'
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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env:
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SHEET_BUNDLE: ${{ inputs.sheet_bundle }}
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REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}
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REGISTRY_USER: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}
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REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
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NAMESPACE: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
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GIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Registry login
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run: echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}" | docker login "${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}" -u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}" --password-stdin
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- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
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- name: Validate the dispatch input (the shell trusts the env value only after this)
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run: |
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case "$SHEET_BUNDLE" in
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none|draft) ;;
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*) echo "refused SHEET_BUNDLE value" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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- name: RustSec advisories gate (release only; CI runs it nightly)
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run: |
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docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker
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bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo deny check advisories
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- name: Ephemeral builder with its own cache and a per-job Docker config
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run: |
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echo "DOCKER_CONFIG=$(mktemp -d)" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
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docker buildx create --name "faunosteo_release_$GIT_SHA" --driver docker-container --use
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- name: Registry login (token from env, never on the command line)
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run: printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login "$REGISTRY" -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin
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- name: Build and push the application image
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run: |
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image="${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}/${{ github.repository_owner }}/faunosteo_app:${{ github.sha }}"
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docker build --build-arg SHEET_BUNDLE="${{ github.event.inputs.sheet_bundle }}" -t "$image" .
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docker push "$image"
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echo "app: $(docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' "$image")" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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image="$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/faunosteo_app:$GIT_SHA"
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docker buildx build --push --provenance=false --build-arg "SHEET_BUNDLE=$SHEET_BUNDLE" -t "$image" .
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echo "app: $(docker buildx imagetools inspect "$image" --format '{{json .Manifest.Digest}}')" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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- name: Build and push the worker image
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run: |
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image="${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}/${{ github.repository_owner }}/faunosteo_worker:${{ github.sha }}"
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docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t "$image" .
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docker push "$image"
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echo "worker: $(docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' "$image")" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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image="$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/faunosteo_worker:$GIT_SHA"
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docker buildx build --push --provenance=false -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t "$image" .
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echo "worker: $(docker buildx imagetools inspect "$image" --format '{{json .Manifest.Digest}}')" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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- name: Logout, remove the builder and the per-job Docker config
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if: always()
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run: |
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docker logout "$REGISTRY" || true
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docker buildx rm "faunosteo_release_$GIT_SHA" || true
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rm -rf "$DOCKER_CONFIG"
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@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ publish.workspace = true
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crate-type = ["cdylib", "rlib"]
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path = "src/lib.rs"
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[features]
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default = []
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# The R0 trap proofs (panic_for_test, recurse_for_test): built for the proofs, never for the
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# module the application ships (docker/wasm-build.sh passes it until R2 wires the real loader).
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proofs = []
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[dependencies]
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faunosteo-core = { path = "../core" }
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wasm-bindgen.workspace = true
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@@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ pub fn call(op: &str, input: &str) -> String {
|
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/// R0 proof: on wasm32 a panic is a trap (panic = abort), reaching JavaScript as a
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/// `WebAssembly.RuntimeError`; the caller re-instantiates the module.
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#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn panic_for_test() {
|
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panic!("deliberate panic for the R0 proof");
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}
|
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||||
/// R0 proof: exhausting the shadow stack traps instead of corrupting memory.
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#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn recurse_for_test(depth: u32) -> u32 {
|
||||
recurse(depth)
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}
|
||||
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||||
#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
|
||||
#[inline(never)]
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fn recurse(depth: u32) -> u32 {
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let mut frame = [depth; 32];
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@@ -29,9 +29,10 @@ libc.workspace = true
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crc32fast = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
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# The worker owns I/O (it is the process boundary), so the core's disallowed_methods lint is
|
||||
# off here; unsafe is allowed for the libwebp FFI only, each block carries a SAFETY comment.
|
||||
# off here. unsafe stays denied crate-wide; the libwebp FFI and the prctl call carry a local
|
||||
# #[allow(unsafe_code)] with a SAFETY comment each (forbid would not allow the local override).
|
||||
[lints.rust]
|
||||
unsafe_code = "allow"
|
||||
unsafe_code = "deny"
|
||||
|
||||
[lints.clippy]
|
||||
unwrap_used = "deny"
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@@ -19,13 +19,14 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/
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cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked \
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&& cp target/release/faunosteo-worker /faunosteo-worker
|
||||
|
||||
# The tests run against the musl binary that ships, inside the default Docker seccomp
|
||||
# profile (the inner filter is allowed by it). strace serves the allowlist derivation.
|
||||
# The tests and the derivation run on the release profile (LTO, panic = abort) plus the
|
||||
# test-hooks feature, inside the default Docker seccomp profile (the inner filter is allowed
|
||||
# by it): the binary under test differs from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only.
|
||||
FROM base AS test
|
||||
RUN apk add --no-cache strace
|
||||
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
|
||||
--mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_target_musl,target=/w/target \
|
||||
cargo test -p faunosteo-worker --features test-hooks --locked -- --test-threads=4
|
||||
cargo test -p faunosteo-worker --release --features test-hooks --locked -- --test-threads=4
|
||||
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
|
||||
--mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_target_musl,target=/w/target \
|
||||
sh crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
|
||||
# review (the abort path is expected there).
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
|
||||
bin=target/debug/faunosteo-worker
|
||||
cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --features test-hooks --locked
|
||||
bin=target/release/faunosteo-worker
|
||||
cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --features test-hooks --locked
|
||||
work=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
|
||||
fixtures="png jpeg webp big-jpeg big-png"
|
||||
@@ -18,15 +18,22 @@ fixtures="png jpeg webp big-jpeg big-png"
|
||||
for kind in $fixtures; do
|
||||
"$bin" fixture "$kind" > "$work/$kind.bin"
|
||||
# `env -i`: the child refuses a non-empty environment; `--no-seccomp` keeps the rlimits
|
||||
# and prints the marker where the filter would be installed.
|
||||
# and makes one sched_yield where the filter would be installed (strace cannot read the
|
||||
# child's memory once PR_SET_DUMPABLE is 0, so the marker is a syscall, not a string).
|
||||
env -i strace -f -qq -o "$work/trace.$kind" "$bin" decode --no-seccomp \
|
||||
< "$work/$kind.bin" > "$work/$kind.webp"
|
||||
awk 'found { print } /SECCOMP-MARKER/ { found = 1 }' "$work/trace.$kind" \
|
||||
awk 'found { print } /sched_yield\(/ { found = 1 }' "$work/trace.$kind" \
|
||||
| sed -E 's/^[0-9]+ +//; /^(\+\+\+|---)/d; s/^<\.\.\. ([a-z0-9_]+) resumed>.*/\1/; s/\(.*//' \
|
||||
| grep -E '^[a-z0-9_]+$' >> "$work/traced.raw" || true
|
||||
done
|
||||
sort -u "$work/traced.raw" > "$work/traced.txt"
|
||||
"$bin" print-allowlist | sort -u > "$work/allowed.txt"
|
||||
if [ ! -s "$work/traced.txt" ]; then
|
||||
echo "== NO SYSCALL TRACED AFTER THE MARKER: the derivation is broken, not the allowlist" >&2
|
||||
echo "== tail of the png trace:" >&2
|
||||
tail -n 40 "$work/trace.png" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "== syscalls traced after the sandbox marker"
|
||||
cat "$work/traced.txt"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ fn map_image_error(error: ImageError) -> Reject {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Encodes an RGBA buffer as lossy WebP through libwebp (D-R4: C confined to this process).
|
||||
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
|
||||
pub fn encode_webp(rgba: &[u8], width: u32, height: u32, quality: f32) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Reject> {
|
||||
let expected = (width as usize)
|
||||
.checked_mul(height as usize)
|
||||
@@ -164,6 +165,7 @@ pub fn encode_webp(rgba: &[u8], width: u32, height: u32, quality: f32) -> Result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Version of the libwebp linked into this binary, as (major, minor, revision).
|
||||
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
|
||||
pub fn libwebp_version() -> (u8, u8, u8) {
|
||||
// SAFETY: a pure getter of the FFI without arguments or side effects.
|
||||
let packed = unsafe { libwebp_sys::WebPGetEncoderVersion() };
|
||||
@@ -235,8 +237,11 @@ impl TestHooks {
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
|
||||
fn run_after_sandbox(&self, stdout: &mut dyn Write, stderr: &mut dyn Write) -> Option<i32> {
|
||||
if !self.seccomp {
|
||||
// Marker for crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh: syscalls after this line
|
||||
// are the ones the filter must allow.
|
||||
// Marker for crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh: one `sched_yield`, a syscall
|
||||
// the decode path never makes, right where the filter would be installed. The
|
||||
// syscalls after it are the ones the filter must allow. (A string marker is not
|
||||
// readable by strace once PR_SET_DUMPABLE is 0.)
|
||||
std::thread::yield_now();
|
||||
let _ = stderr.write_all(b"SECCOMP-MARKER\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
match self.action? {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ pub const ENCODE_FAILED: i32 = 16;
|
||||
pub const OUTPUT_FAILED: i32 = 17;
|
||||
pub const INTERNAL: i32 = 18;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Codes that judge the content (the upload is refused); every other non-zero code means
|
||||
/// the child's environment is broken and the parent must alert rather than reject.
|
||||
pub fn is_content_rejection(code: i32) -> bool {
|
||||
(INPUT_TOO_LARGE..=OUTPUT_FAILED).contains(&code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Stable name of an exit code for logs and tests.
|
||||
pub fn name(code: i32) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match code {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
use std::fmt;
|
||||
|
||||
use seccompiler::{BpfProgram, SeccompAction, SeccompFilter, SeccompRule, TargetArch};
|
||||
use seccompiler::{
|
||||
BpfProgram, SeccompAction, SeccompCmpArgLen, SeccompCmpOp, SeccompCondition, SeccompFilter,
|
||||
SeccompRule, TargetArch,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::limits;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@ impl std::error::Error for SandboxError {}
|
||||
/// derivation run of the test stage); a release child always passes `true`.
|
||||
pub fn apply(limits: &Limits, seccomp: bool) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
ensure_single_thread()?;
|
||||
disable_core_dumps()?;
|
||||
set_rlimits(limits)?;
|
||||
if seccomp {
|
||||
install_seccomp()?;
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +95,20 @@ pub fn apply(limits: &Limits, seccomp: bool) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// No core dump of the child: a dump would hold the uploaded photo (personal data) and
|
||||
/// could fill the VPS disk (SIGABRT under `RLIMIT_AS`, SIGSYS, SIGXCPU all dump by default).
|
||||
/// `PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0` is the kernel-side stop, `RLIMIT_CORE 0` the belt.
|
||||
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
|
||||
fn disable_core_dumps() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
// SAFETY: prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) takes no pointer and changes only this process.
|
||||
let rc = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) };
|
||||
if rc != 0 {
|
||||
return Err(SandboxError::Rlimit("PR_SET_DUMPABLE".to_owned()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
rlimit::setrlimit(rlimit::Resource::CORE, 0, 0)
|
||||
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Rlimit(format!("RLIMIT_CORE: {error}")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every syscall name the filter allows, for the derivation script and the tests.
|
||||
pub fn allowed_names() -> Vec<&'static str> {
|
||||
ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
@@ -137,12 +155,46 @@ fn set_rlimits(limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builds the BPF program: allow the listed syscalls, kill the process on anything else.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Argument filters on the abort path and on `mmap`: `tkill`/`tgkill` may only send SIGABRT
|
||||
/// to this very process (the child is single-threaded, so tid == pid), never a signal to the
|
||||
/// keyed parent or a sibling; `mmap` may not map executable memory.
|
||||
pub fn build_filter() -> Result<BpfProgram, SandboxError> {
|
||||
let rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
let pid = u64::from(std::process::id());
|
||||
let sigabrt = u64::try_from(libc::SIGABRT).unwrap_or(6);
|
||||
let prot_exec = u64::try_from(libc::PROT_EXEC).unwrap_or(4);
|
||||
let mut rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.chain(ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
.map(|(_, number)| (*number, Vec::new()))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
let seccomp_err = |error: seccompiler::BackendError| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string());
|
||||
let eq = |index: u8, value: u64| {
|
||||
SeccompCondition::new(index, SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword, SeccompCmpOp::Eq, value)
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)
|
||||
};
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_tkill,
|
||||
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, sigabrt)?]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
|
||||
);
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_tgkill,
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, pid)?, eq(2, sigabrt)?])
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)?,
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
let no_exec = SeccompCondition::new(
|
||||
2,
|
||||
SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword,
|
||||
SeccompCmpOp::MaskedEq(prot_exec),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)?;
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_mmap,
|
||||
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![no_exec]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
|
||||
);
|
||||
let filter = SeccompFilter::new(
|
||||
rules,
|
||||
SeccompAction::KillProcess,
|
||||
@@ -150,9 +202,7 @@ pub fn build_filter() -> Result<BpfProgram, SandboxError> {
|
||||
target_arch()?,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))?;
|
||||
filter
|
||||
.try_into()
|
||||
.map_err(|error: seccompiler::BackendError| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))
|
||||
filter.try_into().map_err(seccomp_err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn install_seccomp() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@ use crate::{exit_codes, webp_check};
|
||||
pub enum ChildOutcome {
|
||||
/// A 512 × 512 WebP whose container passed the parent's check.
|
||||
Produced(Vec<u8>),
|
||||
/// The child refused the input with one of its exit codes.
|
||||
/// The child refused the input with one of its content exit codes (12 to 17).
|
||||
Rejected { code: i32, name: &'static str },
|
||||
/// The child could not even start properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox
|
||||
/// failure, internal error): the confinement environment is broken, not the upload.
|
||||
/// R1 alerts and stops on this outcome instead of rejecting the job.
|
||||
Broken { code: i32, name: &'static str },
|
||||
/// The child died from a signal (SIGSYS 31 = seccomp, SIGABRT 6 = allocation failure,
|
||||
/// SIGXCPU 24 = CPU limit, SIGKILL 9 = the parent).
|
||||
Signalled { signal: i32 },
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +34,8 @@ pub enum ChildOutcome {
|
||||
Failed(String),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A finished child run.
|
||||
/// A finished child run. `stderr` is text the child controls (up to 4 KiB): never logged
|
||||
/// raw by R1, control characters escaped and the field allowlist applied (LRN-044).
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct ChildRun {
|
||||
pub outcome: ChildOutcome,
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +129,11 @@ impl Spawner {
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(error) => return failed(format!("wait: {error}")),
|
||||
Err(error) => {
|
||||
let _ = child.kill();
|
||||
let _ = child.wait();
|
||||
return failed(format!("wait: {error}"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
let _ = writer.join();
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +159,11 @@ fn classify(status: ExitStatus, output: Vec<u8>) -> ChildOutcome {
|
||||
Ok(_) => ChildOutcome::Produced(output),
|
||||
Err(issue) => ChildOutcome::Failed(format!("output refused: {issue}")),
|
||||
},
|
||||
Some(code) => ChildOutcome::Rejected {
|
||||
Some(code) if exit_codes::is_content_rejection(code) => ChildOutcome::Rejected {
|
||||
code,
|
||||
name: exit_codes::name(code),
|
||||
},
|
||||
Some(code) => ChildOutcome::Broken {
|
||||
code,
|
||||
name: exit_codes::name(code),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,13 +79,20 @@ pub fn inspect(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<WebpSummary, WebpIssue> {
|
||||
if !ALLOWED_CHUNKS.contains(&&fourcc) {
|
||||
return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if dimensions.is_none() {
|
||||
dimensions = match &fourcc {
|
||||
b"VP8X" => Some(parse_vp8x(payload)?),
|
||||
b"VP8 " => Some(parse_vp8(payload)?),
|
||||
b"VP8L" => Some(parse_vp8l(payload)?),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let declared = match &fourcc {
|
||||
b"VP8X" => Some(parse_vp8x(payload)?),
|
||||
b"VP8 " => Some(parse_vp8(payload)?),
|
||||
b"VP8L" => Some(parse_vp8l(payload)?),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// The canvas (VP8X) and the frame (VP8 / VP8L) must agree: a container whose frame
|
||||
// disagrees with its canvas is not something the encoder produces.
|
||||
match (dimensions, declared) {
|
||||
(None, Some(size)) => dimensions = Some(size),
|
||||
(Some(canvas), Some(frame)) if canvas != frame => {
|
||||
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
chunks.push(fourcc);
|
||||
offset = end + (size & 1);
|
||||
@@ -164,11 +171,25 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_square_vp8x_file_passes() {
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &[0; 20])]);
|
||||
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 20];
|
||||
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
|
||||
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)]);
|
||||
let summary = expect_square(&bytes, 512);
|
||||
assert_eq!(summary.map(|s| (s.width, s.height)), Ok((512, 512)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_frame_disagreeing_with_its_canvas_is_refused() {
|
||||
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 10];
|
||||
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
|
||||
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&256u16.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(inspect(&bytes), Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn metadata_chunks_are_refused() {
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"EXIF", b"x")]);
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +198,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn wrong_sizes_are_refused() {
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(511, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &[0; 20])]);
|
||||
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(511, 512))]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
expect_square(&bytes, 512),
|
||||
Err(WebpIssue::Dimensions {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ if [ "$lock_version" != "$cli_version" ]; then
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cargo build -p faunosteo-wasm --release --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --locked
|
||||
# `proofs`: the R0 trap exports; dropped when R2 builds the module the application ships.
|
||||
cargo build -p faunosteo-wasm --release --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --locked --features proofs
|
||||
|
||||
out=packages/core-wasm/pkg
|
||||
rm -rf "$out"
|
||||
|
||||
+38
-14
@@ -89,9 +89,13 @@ a plain `main` (no async runtime, no thread), so `decode` installs its
|
||||
sandbox in a single-threaded process:
|
||||
|
||||
- `decode`: refuses a non-empty environment; checks `Threads: 1` in
|
||||
`/proc/self/status`; `RLIMIT_AS` 512 MiB, `RLIMIT_CPU` 10 s soft / 12 s
|
||||
hard (soft = hard made the kernel SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp
|
||||
allowlist installed with TSYNC, `KillProcess` on anything else; then reads
|
||||
`/proc/self/status`; disables core dumps (`PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0`,
|
||||
`RLIMIT_CORE 0`: a dump would hold the uploaded photo); `RLIMIT_AS`
|
||||
512 MiB, `RLIMIT_CPU` 10 s soft / 12 s hard (soft = hard made the kernel
|
||||
SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC,
|
||||
`KillProcess` on anything else, with argument filters: `tkill`/`tgkill`
|
||||
may only send SIGABRT to the child's own pid (never a signal to the keyed
|
||||
parent or a sibling), `mmap` may not map `PROT_EXEC`; then reads
|
||||
≤ 5 MiB on stdin, sniffs the format (JPEG, PNG, WebP), decodes with
|
||||
`image::Limits` (sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF
|
||||
orientation, `resize_to_fill` 512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) through
|
||||
@@ -100,11 +104,16 @@ sandbox in a single-threaded process:
|
||||
- the parent side (`spawn::Spawner`, used by the tests now and by R1):
|
||||
`env_clear`, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the
|
||||
child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit
|
||||
(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}`, `Signalled{signal}`, `OutputOverflow`,
|
||||
`Timeout`, `Failed`). The parent **never decodes**: `webp_check::inspect`
|
||||
parses the RIFF container only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`,
|
||||
`ALPH`; canvas size from the headers; any `EXIF`, `XMP `, `ICCP` or unknown
|
||||
chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4).
|
||||
(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes 12 to 17,
|
||||
`Broken{code}` when the child could not even start (usage, non-empty
|
||||
environment, sandbox failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the
|
||||
upload), `Signalled{signal}`, `OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
|
||||
parent **never decodes**: `webp_check::inspect` parses the RIFF container
|
||||
only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; canvas size from the
|
||||
headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `,
|
||||
`ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
|
||||
child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw
|
||||
(LRN-044).
|
||||
- `run --check`: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which
|
||||
variables are set, the linked libwebp version, refused below 1.6.0). A
|
||||
plain `run` does nothing before R1 and says so.
|
||||
@@ -116,7 +125,9 @@ sandbox in a single-threaded process:
|
||||
`print-allowlist`.
|
||||
|
||||
Image: `crates/worker/Dockerfile`, stages `build` (release, static),
|
||||
`test` (sandbox tests + `scripts/derive-seccomp.sh`), `runtime`
|
||||
`test` (sandbox tests and `scripts/derive-seccomp.sh` on the **release
|
||||
profile** with the `test-hooks` feature, so the binary under test differs
|
||||
from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only), `runtime`
|
||||
(`gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot`, `USER nonroot`, `ENTRYPOINT
|
||||
/faunosteo-worker`, `CMD run --check`). Measured 2026-10-12: image 8.7 MB (one static
|
||||
binary), `run --check` exits 0 with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL
|
||||
@@ -134,9 +145,15 @@ binary), `run --check` exits 0 with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL
|
||||
started once with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL`.
|
||||
- `rust-advisories.yml`: nightly and manual `cargo deny check advisories`,
|
||||
out of the blocking path on purpose.
|
||||
- `release-images.yml`: manual only; builds and pushes `faunosteo_app:<sha>`
|
||||
and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` to the registry of the `REGISTRY` secret and
|
||||
prints their digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
|
||||
- `release-images.yml`: manual only, on `main` or `develop`; the dispatch
|
||||
input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable;
|
||||
the RustSec advisories gate runs first; an ephemeral `buildx` builder with
|
||||
its own cache builds the images (nothing a PR build left in the daemon's
|
||||
cache mounts or volumes can reach a release image); secrets reach the
|
||||
shell through env only, the login lives in a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG`
|
||||
removed at the end; `actions/checkout` pinned to a commit. It pushes
|
||||
`faunosteo_app:<sha>` and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and prints their
|
||||
digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
|
||||
|
||||
Not measured here: the forge runner's cache behaviour and cold build times
|
||||
(the runner was not available from this host). The builder image build took
|
||||
@@ -196,8 +213,8 @@ static binary.
|
||||
neither `brk` nor `mprotect`; no `futex` in a single-threaded decode. The
|
||||
allowlist is that set plus the abort path (`rt_sigaction`,
|
||||
`rt_sigprocmask`, `getpid`, `gettid`, `tkill`, `tgkill`, `exit`).
|
||||
- Proven on the musl binary that ships, inside Docker's default seccomp
|
||||
profile: 13 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
|
||||
- Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
|
||||
Docker's default seccomp profile: 13 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
|
||||
`inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits` (4096²), dimensions 32 px
|
||||
and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty
|
||||
environment refused, `--violate` → SIGSYS 31, `--flood` → output cut,
|
||||
@@ -249,6 +266,13 @@ CHROME=<chromium binary> bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh # §5.5 (playwright-core
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. What stays hypothetical after R0
|
||||
|
||||
- Follow-ups from the R0 security audit, owned by R1 unless stated: base
|
||||
images pinned by digest in the three Dockerfiles (today by tag, as the
|
||||
existing `Dockerfile`); a verification decode of the child's output in a
|
||||
second sandboxed child (the RIFF check validates the container, not the
|
||||
bitstream); the shared BuildKit cache mounts of the CI builds (the
|
||||
release workflow already uses its own builder); `actions/*@v4` tags in
|
||||
`ci.yml` (pre-existing practice) to pin by commit at Step 27.
|
||||
- The browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (static glue URL with a
|
||||
cache-busting query under Vite, or a Worker per instance) is designed, not
|
||||
built: R2 builds and tests it.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user