fix(supabase): security pass on the files foundation — ceiling counts live bytes only, confirm checks the account, null sha256 refused, browser RPCs one role; worker: cleartext only on loopback or a service name, no env proxy, key ownership cross-check, no library text in logs
Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256; begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids; backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).
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@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ Step 8 = R1: `assets` table as the authority over user files, eight private buck
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CHECK: pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase exec vitest run tests/db/pgtap.test.ts 2>&1 | grep -E "^ +Tests "
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EXPECT: Tests 11 passed (11)
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2. Exactly three policies are created by the migration (assets own-row SELECT, avatars read, avatars upload), the two Storage ones pin the bucket literal, and no UPDATE / DELETE policy exists on storage.objects.
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CHECK: grep -c "^create policy" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql; grep -c "on storage.objects" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql; grep -cE "for (update|delete)" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql
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EXPECT: 3 / 2 / 0
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CHECK: grep -c "^create policy" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql; grep -c "on storage.objects" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql; grep -cE "^ for (update|delete)$" supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql
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EXPECT: 3 / 2 / 0 (the policy command clause is a line of its own; `select … for update` row locks inside functions are not policies)
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3. The owner's column grant on assets excludes every lease and quarantine column.
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CHECK: sed -n '/^grant select ($/,/to authenticated;/p' supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql | grep -c "lock_token\|quarantine_key\|locked_at\|attempts"
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EXPECT: 0
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@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Step 8 = R1: `assets` table as the authority over user files, eight private buck
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CHECK: grep -n "from('assets')" -A2 packages/supabase/src/assets.ts | grep -c "'\*'"; grep -rn "SERVICE_ROLE\|service_role" apps/app/src packages/supabase/src | grep -v database.types | wc -l
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EXPECT: 0 / 0
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11. The Node gate is green with the new tests (supabase package 37, app 300).
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CHECK: pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "^ +Tests "; pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "^ +Tests "; pnpm typecheck > /dev/null 2>&1 && pnpm lint > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo GATE_OK
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CHECK: pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "^ +Tests "; pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "^ +Tests "; ./node_modules/.bin/pnpm typecheck > /dev/null 2>&1 && ./node_modules/.bin/pnpm lint > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo GATE_OK
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EXPECT: Tests 37 passed (37) / Tests 300 passed (300) / GATE_OK
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12. The avatar transport refuses SVG by content and the UI section exists with the mockup's elements (change, save, cancel, remove, processing), strings in both dictionaries.
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CHECK: grep -c "svg" apps/app/tests/unit/account.avatarTransport.test.ts; grep -c "'account.avatar\." apps/app/src/i18n/fr.ts; grep -c "'account.avatar\." apps/app/src/i18n/en.ts
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@@ -55,4 +55,5 @@ Step 8 = R1: `assets` table as the authority over user files, eight private buck
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EXPECT: every count ≥ 1
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## FILE SCOPE
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supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql, supabase/tests/{001_schema,010_files_foundation}.sql, packages/supabase/{src,tests,package.json,vitest.e2e.config.ts}, apps/app/src/{account,components/account,components/shell,state/authStore.ts,i18n}, apps/app/tests, crates/worker/**, Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, deny.toml, docker-compose.yml, scripts/avatar-e2e.sh, package.json, docs/**, CLAUDE.md, README.md, DEPLOY.md, CHANGELOG.md.
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supabase/migrations/20261013100000_files_foundation.sql, supabase/tests/{001_schema,010_files_foundation}.sql, packages/supabase/{src,tests,package.json,vitest.e2e.config.ts}, apps/app/src/{account,components/account,components/shell,state/authStore.ts,i18n}, apps/app/tests, crates/worker/**, Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, deny.toml, docker-compose.yml, scripts/avatar-e2e.sh, package.json, pnpm-lock.yaml (zod importer entry), docs/**, CLAUDE.md, README.md, DEPLOY.md, CHANGELOG.md, .claude/tasks/** (TODO plan and this contract), .claude/memory/** (registries).
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- revision 2 (2026-10-13, after verifier pass 1 ECARTS(4), all oracle/scope): criterion 2 third grep anchored to the policy clause; criterion 11 lint via the binary path (the literal `pnpm lint` is intercepted by a sandbox output wrapper); FILE SCOPE widened to the lockfile and the tracking files.
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@@ -117,21 +117,29 @@ impl Config {
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}
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/// `http(s)://host[:port]`, no path, no whitespace; a trailing slash is dropped.
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/// Cleartext `http://` is accepted only where the key cannot leave the machine:
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/// loopback, or a single-label host (a Docker service name on the compose network).
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fn parse_url(raw: String) -> Result<String, ConfigError> {
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let url = raw.trim().trim_end_matches('/').to_owned();
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let rest = url
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.strip_prefix("http://")
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.or_else(|| url.strip_prefix("https://"))
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.ok_or(ConfigError::Invalid(URL))?;
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let (secure, rest) = match (url.strip_prefix("https://"), url.strip_prefix("http://")) {
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(Some(rest), _) => (true, rest),
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(None, Some(rest)) => (false, rest),
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(None, None) => return Err(ConfigError::Invalid(URL)),
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};
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let host_ok = !rest.is_empty()
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&& rest
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.chars()
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.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '.' | '-' | ':' | '_'));
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if host_ok {
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Ok(url)
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} else {
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Err(ConfigError::Invalid(URL))
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if !host_ok || (!secure && !cleartext_allowed(rest)) {
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return Err(ConfigError::Invalid(URL));
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}
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Ok(url)
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}
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/// Loopback addresses and single-label names (no dot) may use plain HTTP.
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fn cleartext_allowed(host_port: &str) -> bool {
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let host = host_port.rsplit_once(':').map_or(host_port, |(h, _)| h);
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host == "localhost" || host.starts_with("127.") || host == "[::1]" || !host.contains('.')
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}
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fn seconds(
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@@ -201,6 +209,31 @@ mod tests {
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move |name| map.get(name).cloned()
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}
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#[test]
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fn cleartext_http_is_limited_to_loopback_and_service_names() {
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for ok in [
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"http://127.0.0.1:54321",
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"http://localhost:54321",
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"http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000",
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"http://kong",
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"https://abc.supabase.co",
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] {
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assert!(parse_url(ok.to_owned()).is_ok(), "{ok}");
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}
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for bad in [
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"http://abc.supabase.co",
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"http://10.0.0.5:8000",
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"ftp://x",
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"http://",
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] {
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assert_eq!(
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parse_url(bad.to_owned()).err(),
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Some(ConfigError::Invalid(URL)),
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"{bad}"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn defaults_apply_when_only_the_required_variables_are_set() {
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let cfg = Config::from_vars(vars(&[
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@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ impl HttpBackend {
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.timeout_global(Some(Duration::from_secs(30)))
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.timeout_connect(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))
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.max_redirects(0)
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// Never route the service key through a proxy picked up from the environment.
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.proxy(None)
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.http_status_as_error(false)
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.user_agent("faunosteo-worker")
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.build()
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@@ -89,9 +89,13 @@ fn validated_keys(job: &Job) -> Option<&str> {
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.bucket_id
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.bytes()
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.all(|b| b.is_ascii_lowercase() || b.is_ascii_digit() || b == b'-');
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// Shape, then ownership: both keys must embed this job's owner and asset ids, so a
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// mismatched row can never make the worker write or read another account's key.
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if !bucket_ok
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|| keys::validate_object_key(&job.object_key).is_err()
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|| keys::validate_quarantine_key(quarantine_key).is_err()
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|| !keys::belongs_to(&job.object_key, &job.owner_id, &job.asset_id)
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|| !keys::belongs_to(quarantine_key, &job.owner_id, &job.asset_id)
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{
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log::error("job_invalid_keys").asset(&job.asset_id).emit();
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return None;
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@@ -248,9 +252,11 @@ fn transport_failure(stage: &str, job: &Job, error: &BackendError) -> JobEnd {
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.asset(&job.asset_id)
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.stage(stage)
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.code(error.kind());
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// The library's error text (URI fragments, server bodies) stays out of the logs:
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// the closed kind and the HTTP status are the record.
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match error {
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BackendError::Status(status) => line.http_status(*status).emit(),
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other => line.detail(&other.to_string()).emit(),
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_ => line.emit(),
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}
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JobEnd::LeftForLease
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}
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@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ pub fn validate_any_key(key: &str) -> Result<(), KeyError> {
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}
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}
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/// True when a (valid) key's owner and asset segments are exactly these ids.
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pub fn belongs_to(key: &str, owner_id: &str, asset_id: &str) -> bool {
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let mut segments = key.split('/');
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segments.next();
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segments.next() == Some(owner_id) && segments.next() == Some(asset_id)
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}
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/// The asset id embedded in a valid quarantine key.
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pub fn asset_id_of_quarantine_key(key: &str) -> Option<&str> {
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validate_quarantine_key(key).ok()?;
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@@ -140,6 +147,10 @@ mod tests {
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assert_eq!(validate_any_key(key).err(), Some(*expected), "{key}");
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}
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assert_eq!(asset_id_of_quarantine_key("quarantine/a/b/upload"), None);
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let key = format!("profiles/{U1}/{U2}/avatar.webp");
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assert!(belongs_to(&key, U1, U2));
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assert!(!belongs_to(&key, U2, U1));
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assert!(!belongs_to(&key, U1, U1));
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assert!(!is_uuid("10000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000"));
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}
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}
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@@ -99,10 +99,11 @@ fn claim_pass(
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match backend.claim_jobs(1) {
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Ok(jobs) => jobs,
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Err(error) => {
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log::warn("claim_failed")
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.code(error.kind())
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.detail(&error.to_string())
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.emit();
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let line = log::warn("claim_failed").code(error.kind());
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match error {
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crate::backend::BackendError::Status(status) => line.http_status(status).emit(),
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_ => line.emit(),
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}
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return Ok(0);
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}
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}
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@@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ fn failure(call: &str, error: &BackendError, report: &mut SweepReport) {
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let line = log::warn("sweep_failure").stage(call).code(error.kind());
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match error {
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BackendError::Status(status) => line.http_status(*status).emit(),
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other => line.detail(&other.to_string()).emit(),
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_ => line.emit(),
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}
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}
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@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ granted to the one role that calls it. Business refusals raise SQLSTATE
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| RPC | Effect | Refusals (message) |
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|---|---|---|
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| `begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb` | locks the caller's `profiles` row (`for update`); checks the type and the size; rate: at most 10 rows created by the caller in the last hour, every status counted; global ceiling: `sum(declared_size)` of non-deleted rows below `private.storage_ceiling()` (10 GiB); supersedes the caller's `pending_upload` / `uploaded` rows (→ `deleted`); inserts the row; returns `{"asset_id", "bucket_id", "quarantine_key"}` | `unsupported_type`, `too_large`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full` |
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| `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void` | own `pending_upload` row with a `storage.objects` row at `(bucket_id, quarantine_key)` whose `metadata->>'size'` is within the cap → `uploaded` | `not_found` (unknown or not own), `invalid_state` (not pending), `upload_missing` (no object yet), `too_large` (object over the cap: the row is deleted) |
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| `begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb` | locks the caller's `profiles` row (`for update`); checks the type and the size; rate: at most 10 rows created by the caller in the last hour, every status counted; global ceiling: the bytes that can exist (`declared_size` of in-flight rows, `byte_size` of clean rows; rejected and deleted rows never count) below `private.storage_ceiling()` (10 GiB); supersedes the caller's `pending_upload` / `uploaded` rows (→ `deleted`); inserts the row; returns `{"asset_id", "bucket_id", "quarantine_key"}` | `unsupported_type`, `too_large`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full` |
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| `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void` | active account; own `pending_upload` row with a `storage.objects` row at `(bucket_id, quarantine_key)` whose `metadata->>'size'` is within the cap → `uploaded` | `not_found` (unknown or not own), `invalid_state` (not pending), `upload_missing` (no object yet), `too_large` (object over the cap, a guard the bucket cap already enforces: the row stays pending and expires after 24 h) |
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| `remove_avatar() returns integer` | every `profile_avatar` row of the caller in `pending_upload` / `uploaded` / `clean` → `deleted`; returns the count; logs `asset.avatar_removed` | none (0 rows is fine) |
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`auth.uid() is null` → `42501` on all three.
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@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ metadata chunk), hashes it and uploads it.
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| Variable | Required | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `SUPABASE_URL` | yes | | origin of the stack (`http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000` from the Supabase compose network, `http://127.0.0.1:54321` natively) |
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| `SUPABASE_URL` | yes | | origin of the stack (`http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000` from the Supabase compose network, `http://127.0.0.1:54321` natively). Cleartext `http://` is accepted only for loopback or a single-label host (a Docker service name); any other host must be `https://`, the service key travels in the headers |
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| `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` | yes | | the service key; never printed; the JWT `exp` claim, when the key is a JWT, is logged at start and warned about 30 days ahead |
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| `WORKER_ID` | no | `worker-<pid>` | tag of every log line |
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| `WORKER_POLL_SECONDS` | no | `2` | idle interval between claims |
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@@ -195,8 +195,11 @@ libwebp exits 18.
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| upload clean | `POST <url>/storage/v1/object/<bucket>/<key>`, `Content-Type: image/webp`, `x-upsert: true` (idempotent on retry) |
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| delete object | `DELETE <url>/storage/v1/object/<bucket>/<key>` (a missing object counts as done: HTTP 404, or the HTTP 400 with `statusCode` 404 this Storage API version answers) |
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Every call: 30 s global timeout, 5 s connect timeout, no redirect follow,
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Every call: 30 s global timeout, 5 s connect timeout, no redirect follow, no
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proxy (the environment's `HTTP_PROXY` is ignored on purpose),
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`http_status_as_error(false)` so each status is classified by the caller.
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Log lines carry the closed error kind and the HTTP status, never the library's
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error text.
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Keys are validated (§1.4) before any URL is built.
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|
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### 3.4 One job
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@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ function expeditePurges(): void {
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/** Purge entries still queued for an account (served entries are acked, hence deleted). */
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function queuedPurges(userId: string): number {
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if (!/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/.test(userId)) throw new Error('userId is not a uuid')
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return Number(psql(`select count(*) from private.object_purge_queue where object_name like '%/${userId}/%'`))
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}
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@@ -317,8 +317,12 @@ begin
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if v_recent >= 10 then
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raise exception using message = 'rate_limited', errcode = 'P0001';
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end if;
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select coalesce(sum(a.declared_size), 0) into v_used from public.assets a
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where a.status <> 'deleted';
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-- Only rows whose bytes can exist count: in-flight rows by the declared
|
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-- transport size, clean rows by their output; rejected and deleted rows are
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-- purged and never ratchet the counter.
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select coalesce(sum(case when a.status = 'clean' then coalesce(a.byte_size, a.declared_size) else a.declared_size end), 0)
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into v_used from public.assets a
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where a.status in ('pending_upload', 'uploaded', 'clean');
|
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if v_used + declared_size > private.storage_ceiling() then
|
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raise exception using message = 'storage_full', errcode = 'P0001';
|
||||
end if;
|
||||
@@ -349,6 +353,7 @@ as $$
|
||||
#variable_conflict use_variable
|
||||
declare
|
||||
v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
|
||||
v_active boolean;
|
||||
v_row public.assets;
|
||||
v_size bigint;
|
||||
v_found boolean;
|
||||
@@ -356,6 +361,10 @@ begin
|
||||
if v_actor is null then
|
||||
raise exception 'authentication required' using errcode = '42501';
|
||||
end if;
|
||||
select p.active into v_active from public.profiles p where p.id = v_actor;
|
||||
if v_active is distinct from true then
|
||||
raise exception 'account inactive or unknown' using errcode = '42501';
|
||||
end if;
|
||||
select a.* into v_row from public.assets a
|
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where a.id = asset_id and a.owner_id = v_actor for update;
|
||||
if v_row.id is null then
|
||||
@@ -413,9 +422,12 @@ comment on function public.remove_avatar() is
|
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revoke all on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) from public, anon;
|
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revoke all on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) from public, anon;
|
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revoke all on function public.remove_avatar() from public, anon;
|
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grant execute on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) to authenticated, service_role;
|
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grant execute on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
|
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grant execute on function public.remove_avatar() to authenticated, service_role;
|
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revoke all on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) from service_role;
|
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revoke all on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) from service_role;
|
||||
revoke all on function public.remove_avatar() from service_role;
|
||||
grant execute on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) to authenticated;
|
||||
grant execute on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) to authenticated;
|
||||
grant execute on function public.remove_avatar() to authenticated;
|
||||
|
||||
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
-- Worker RPCs (service_role only; EXECUTE is the guard, as for
|
||||
@@ -493,7 +505,7 @@ begin
|
||||
if v_row.status <> 'uploaded' or lock_token is null or v_row.lock_token is distinct from lock_token then
|
||||
raise exception using message = 'invalid_state', errcode = 'P0001';
|
||||
end if;
|
||||
if byte_size is null or byte_size < 1 or byte_size > 524288 or sha256 !~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' then
|
||||
if byte_size is null or byte_size < 1 or byte_size > 524288 or sha256 is null or sha256 !~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' then
|
||||
raise exception using message = 'invalid_output', errcode = 'P0001';
|
||||
end if;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
-- browser and worker RPCs, the purge queue. Every allowed path has its denial
|
||||
-- twin; the eight scenarios of the Step 8 brief are named in the descriptions.
|
||||
begin;
|
||||
select plan(125);
|
||||
select plan(130);
|
||||
|
||||
insert into auth.users (id, email) values
|
||||
('40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice-files@test.local'),
|
||||
@@ -475,7 +475,8 @@ select is(
|
||||
(select count(*) from private.object_purge_queue where object_name like 'profiles/40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b/%' or object_name like 'quarantine/40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b/%'),
|
||||
2::bigint, 'the cascade enqueues both keys of the deleted row'
|
||||
);
|
||||
-- Ceiling: 2048 rejected rows of 5 MiB owned by Alice fill the 10 GiB.
|
||||
-- Ceiling: 2048 rejected rows of 5 MiB do NOT count (purged bytes never ratchet
|
||||
-- the counter); 2048 in-flight rows of 5 MiB fill the 10 GiB.
|
||||
insert into public.assets (owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, quarantine_key, status, declared_mime, declared_size, rejection_reason, created_at)
|
||||
select '40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'profile_avatar', 'avatars',
|
||||
'profiles/40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a/' || g || '/avatar.webp',
|
||||
@@ -484,8 +485,30 @@ select '40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'profile_avatar', 'avatars',
|
||||
from (select gen_random_uuid() as g from generate_series(1, 2048)) s;
|
||||
set local role authenticated;
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c","role":"authenticated"}', true);
|
||||
select throws_ok($$ select public.begin_avatar_upload('image/jpeg', 1000) $$, 'P0001', 'storage_full', 'the global ceiling refuses a new upload');
|
||||
select lives_ok($$ select public.begin_avatar_upload('image/jpeg', 1000) $$, 'rejected rows do not count toward the ceiling');
|
||||
reset role;
|
||||
insert into public.assets (owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, quarantine_key, status, declared_mime, declared_size, created_at)
|
||||
select '40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c', 'profile_avatar', 'avatars',
|
||||
'profiles/40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c/' || g || '/avatar.webp',
|
||||
'quarantine/40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c/' || g || '/upload',
|
||||
'uploaded', 'image/jpeg', 5242880, now() - interval '2 hours'
|
||||
from (select gen_random_uuid() as g from generate_series(1, 2048)) s;
|
||||
set local role authenticated;
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c","role":"authenticated"}', true);
|
||||
select throws_ok($$ select public.begin_avatar_upload('image/jpeg', 1000) $$, 'P0001', 'storage_full', 'in-flight bytes fill the global ceiling');
|
||||
reset role;
|
||||
-- Deactivated account: confirm is refused like begin.
|
||||
update public.profiles set active = false where id = '40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c';
|
||||
set local role authenticated;
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"40000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c","role":"authenticated"}', true);
|
||||
select throws_ok($$ select public.confirm_asset_upload(gen_random_uuid()) $$, '42501', null, 'a deactivated account cannot confirm an upload');
|
||||
select throws_ok($$ select public.begin_avatar_upload('image/jpeg', 1000) $$, '42501', null, 'a deactivated account cannot begin an upload');
|
||||
reset role;
|
||||
select ok(not has_function_privilege('service_role', 'public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer)', 'execute'), 'browser RPCs are not granted to service_role');
|
||||
select throws_ok(
|
||||
$$ select public.complete_avatar_job(pg_temp.id('a4'), gen_random_uuid(), 30000, null) $$,
|
||||
'P0001', 'invalid_state', 'a null sha256 never reaches the output guard before the state guard; the guard itself refuses null (unit of the regex)'
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
select * from finish();
|
||||
rollback;
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user