Merge feature/rust-r0-foundation into develop
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# Workspace-level Cargo configuration (RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW III.3, III.5).
[target.wasm32-unknown-unknown]
# The shadow stack of the browser module, set explicitly (the toolchain default is also
# 1 MiB). packages/core-wasm/tests/panic.test.ts proves that exhausting it traps.
rustflags = ["-C", "link-arg=-zstack-size=1048576"]
[env]
# ts-rs writes the TypeScript types of the contracts here on `cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts`.
TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR = { value = "packages/core-wasm/types", relative = true }
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@@ -370,3 +370,15 @@ Status: active; awaiting D-R1..D-R14 validation.
Owner validated D-R1/2/3/7/8/10/11/12/14 as recommended. Amended: D-R4 libwebp C only in the isolated child, parent validates result + limits before use, linked libwebp version known/controlled, no new unmanaged risk; D-R5 fingerprint → canonical JSON (RFC 8785 JCS or strictly defined alternative) independent of formatter, explicit compat with old fingerprints/archives, existing fingerprints untouched, decision prepared for R5; D-R9 Edge Functions → Rust services, shared code but distinct processes (worker vs HTTP endpoints), same image + subcommands, least privilege per service, Supabase Auth keeps OAuth; D-R13 CSP `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` proven experimentally without widening JS permissions, reproducible Docker builds in CI, digest images + rollback prepared, no auto-deploy, no image publication without workflow + validation, VPS never compiles Rust. R0 go per Annex B (7 proofs for real, unverified hypotheses tested, blockers reported not assumed); R1 NOT started without a go; release 0.2.0 pending; live deployment untouched.
Status: closed (owner, 2026-10-12); R0 in progress on feature/rust-r0-foundation.
## BDR-046 | 2026-10-13 | R0 implementation choices (Rust foundation)
Choices made while building R0 (feature/rust-r0-foundation), within the validated review: (1) toolchain arbiter = Docker builder image (`docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile`, rust:1.99.0-bookworm + wasm target + wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129 + cargo-deny 0.20.2 + rustfmt/clippy baked in: official images ship rustup's minimal profile), `docker/rust-run.sh` with named volumes `faunosteo_cargo_registry` / `faunosteo_rust_target`; no rustup on the host, never on the VPS. (2) `serde_json` features `preserve_order` + `float_roundtrip` (default parser one ULP off, found by the proof). (3) Boundary = JSON strings + `ts-rs` types committed under `packages/core-wasm/types` with a CI drift check (no serde-wasm-bindgen/tsify). (4) Fresh wasm instance = cache-busting dynamic import of the glue (ESM cache returns the same instance otherwise); R2 must do the same in the browser or use a Worker per instance. (5) Worker: `RLIMIT_CPU` soft N / hard N+2 (soft = hard → SIGKILL first); seccomp allowlist = the 7 traced syscalls (read write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom) + 7 abort-path ones, derived by strace in the Dockerfile `test` stage and compared on every build; dependencies optimised in the dev profile (4096² decode under the 10 s CPU cap); test hooks behind a cargo feature never in release; parent parses the RIFF container only (D-R4 amendment). (6) App `Dockerfile`, `docker/nginx.conf`, compose untouched at R0 (deviation from Annex B's "wasm stage built in CI": no consumer before R2, owner said live deployment untouched); CI `check` job builds the wasm itself (no artifact action dependency on the Gitea runner). (7) cargo-deny `allow-wildcard-paths = true` (a versionless path dep reads as a wildcard) and the core path dep declared per crate (workspace-inherited path dep hits a cargo-deny bug). (8) CSP proof committed as `docker/csp-proof/` (playwright-core outside the repo, documented).
Alt rejected: rustup on the dev host (owner: builds reproducible in Docker); wasm-pack; artifact upload/download between CI jobs (unverified on the forge); Landlock + NPROC/FSIZE/NOFILE (redundant under the allowlist, challenge finding).
Status: closed (R0 delivered, awaiting owner validation; R1 not started).
## BDR-047 | 2026-10-13 | Native Rust toolchain primary on the Ubuntu dev server; Docker builder = reproducible alternative; no CI active
Owner brief after R0 delivery: dev machine = self-hosted Ubuntu native (not WSL, not VPS), Docker rootless. Decision: daily Rust = native user-level rustup (channel from `rust-toolchain.toml`, wasm32 target, wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2 via `cargo install --locked`, no sudo, no global package). Root scripts `rust:check` / `wasm:build` run `scripts/rust-check.sh` / `scripts/wasm-build.sh` natively (moved from docker/, PATH guard `scripts/rust-env.sh`); `rust:check:docker` / `wasm:build:docker` = same files through the builder image (kept, reference for a future runner, proof VPS never compiles). `pnpm check:all` (`scripts/check-all.sh`) = single pre-merge gate: rust check, types drift, wasm, `pnpm check`, app image, `worker:test`, `worker:image` read-only. Docker keeps Supabase, worker container (isolation untouched), sandbox + seccomp tests, images. Workflow files kept, headers "prepared, never executed"; no runner / secret / registry. Supersedes BDR-046 (1) "no rustup on host, container = arbiter". Names: existing script names stay = native (main path), `:docker` suffix = alternative; `check` stays the Node gate, `check:all` the full one.
Alt rejected: Docker as main path (owner: native loop; Docker for services only); scripts left under docker/ (misleading location); one script per environment (drift); `check:all` needing the Supabase stack (non-hermetic; `pnpm db:test` stays the complement after a supabase/ change).
Status: active; awaiting the owner's final validation before R1.
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@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ Method: 4 read-only analyzers (domain, anatomy, pdf + app pdf side, app logic +
Result: real blockers caught by the gates, not by me: (1) VI.4 deleted TS modules still imported by later-phase TS consumers (pipeline, engine); (2) production CSP `script-src 'self'` refuses wasm, VPS 1 GB compiles images; plus wrong premises: envelope byte-parity (integer-valued floats, insertion order), Prettier identity overstated (hash only compared), `catch_unwind` unusable on wasm32 (panic=abort), serde-wasm-bindgen null-for-absent, parent re-decode breaking the keyless invariant, Step 15 misread as server rendering. Simplicity: 6 crates → 3, dual-run harness → frozen goldens, Landlock + 3 rlimits redundant, constraints generator/schemars/cargo-chef/cargo-audit/infer/img-parts dropped.
Anomalies: one analyzer had a read-only `find -exec cat | wc -l` refused (no rule named) and re-ran as `find | xargs wc -l` (already allowed earlier) — reported to the user as a possible workaround; agents flagged writing report files to the scratchpad against their default (orchestrator asked for it). Three challenger claims came from memory not code (json_compatible null, panic=abort, musl mprotect) → folded as "verify at R0/R1".
Action: owner validates study + D-R1..D-R14; nothing implemented; CLAUDE.md rule section added; TODO roadmap lines.
## EVAL-017 | 2026-10-13 | Rust R0 foundation — proofs in the real environment, 3 verifier passes, 3 security passes
Method: contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-verify.md` (16 criteria, CHECK/EXPECT) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on `5fec065..HEAD` (semgrep p/security-audit + p/secrets + p/owasp-top-ten + checklist + manual Rust review); all cargo commands through the Docker builder (no Rust on the host); worker sandbox tests + strace derivation inside the Alpine test stage on the release-profile musl binary; wasm proofs in vitest on the built module; CSP proof with the production nginx image + headers in headless Chrome 156.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2), pass 2 CONFORME 16/16, pass 3 ECARTS(2) — every gap an oracle of MY contract (greps counting comment lines, the contract matching its own regex, the `[gated]` SAFETY form and a second refusal arm moved by the security fixes); code behaviour confirmed by reading each time. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1) HIGH real: shell injection via the `workflow_dispatch` input of release-images.yml, + 6 MEDIUM (shared BuildKit caches, tkill/tgkill without arg filters, core dumps, creds on the runner, no advisories gate, mutable action tag) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but 3 MEDIUM introduced by my fixes (ephemeral builder never used: GITHUB_ENV applied one step too late, silent fallback; `rm -rf "$VAR"`; content reaching the `Broken` outcome via `Reject::Internal`) → fixed; pass 3 PASS, 2 new MEDIUM (unpinned setup-node and `pnpm install` inside the token job) → gates moved to a secret-less job; remaining lows documented as R1/Step 27 follow-ups. Experimental findings (LRN-049): serde_json fast float path (float_roundtrip), traps leave the instance unusable + ESM cache, RLIMIT_CPU soft=hard → SIGKILL, minimal rustup profile, cargo-deny path wildcard, 7 traced syscalls, strace blind once dumpable=0 (marker became a syscall). Final: cargo 12+14 core tests, 9 unit + 16 sandbox worker tests on the release profile, 14 vitest proofs, root `pnpm check` 777 tests green, worker image 8.7 MB read-only/cap-drop, CSP refused/accepted as predicted, floor-guard clean ×3.
Anomalies: my contract oracles cost two verifier passes (lesson repeated from EVAL-013: run every CHECK once before dispatch, and re-run them after any fix commit); two of my own security fixes created new findings (an env variable applied too late, a recursive delete through a variable: the exact pattern the destructive-tools rule forbids) → fixes to CI files need the same adversarial pass as code; a scripted edit silently aborted on a rustfmt-reformatted string and the commit went out with the old test (caught by the next build); the `[gated 2026-10-13]` SAFETY markers were placed by me at the auditor's request, not by the owner → surfaced in the report for the owner's confirmation; one security-auditor Bash call (`cat` of two files) was refused twice by the auto-mode hook, the agent used Read instead (reported, no workaround). Not proven here: the Gitea runner (caches, timings, workflow syntax such as job-level env, actions/cache), HTTPS from the worker (no HTTP client before R1), browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (R2).
Action: owner validation of R0 (report with proved vs hypothetical); R1 not started.
## EVAL-018 | 2026-10-13 | R0 correction: native Rust toolchain on the Ubuntu dev server — 2 verifier passes, 2 security passes
Method: host audit first (rustup already user-level, 1.99.0 auto-installed by `rustup show`, system deps present, no sudo); installs `--locked`; scripts moved to `scripts/`, `pnpm check:all` gate; contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-native-verify.md` (11 criteria) dry-run by me before dispatch (3 oracles fixed: comment prose matched a code grep, per-package vitest totals, README phrasing); fresh verifier ×2; security-auditor on `bd9c7d1..6e2bbec` then on the fix commits; full gate run twice (`check-all.log`, `check-all-2.log`).
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2) = floor STUB hits on doc prose "(not implemented)" → reworded; pass 2 CONFORME 11/11, floor clean. Security pass 1 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (no advisory check has ever run: nightly job never executed) + 6 LOW (PATH prepend, `rm -rf "$out"` via variable, prctl comment overstating the kernel contract + i32 into variadic unsigned long, dormant CI triggers, native build.rs exposure, drift gate blind to untracked files) → fixed except the trigger question (owner's CI/CD step); pass 2 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (my ci.yml drift step failed open on a git error: `test -z "$(…)"` drops the exit status) + `--untracked-files=all` + stale comment → fixed (496f549), verified by execution + shellcheck, no third dispatch (3-line change). Numbers: native rust-check 32 s warm / 1 s incremental, cold workspace build 31.5 s, wasm 224 777 B (+64 B vs builder, path strings), 14 proofs, `check:all` 1 min 59 s then 1 min 39 s, 777 Node tests, 16 sandbox tests, allowlist covers the trace, worker read-only `run --check` OK.
Anomalies: the R0 note "no cargo on the host" was stale, rustup had been installed 2026-10-12 23:27 (rtk) → always re-audit the host at session start; `rustup show` has a side effect (auto-install) → acceptable here (requested install) but say so; a fix I wrote for one security finding introduced the next MEDIUM (fail-open test) → the EVAL-017 lesson again: CI one-liners need the same scrutiny as code, prefer assign-then-test; the harness clock jumped 01:16 → 09:43 mid-session (timestamps in logs are not durations).
Action: owner's final validation of the R0 correction; R1 not started; CI/CD decision separate (trigger mode, runner label, action pinning, advisories cadence).
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@@ -228,3 +228,11 @@ User: Step 7 closed; Step 8 = files foundation + Storage, analysis before implem
User: new permanent rule, Rust preferred for everything equivalent or better, existing code included; study + roadmap before Step 8 or any migration; nothing implemented. On chore/step-08-files-analysis: 4 analyzers + 3 researchers (scratchpad reports) → `docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` rev 1 (6a078da) → 3 plan-challengers (61 findings, 2 blockers: deletion schedule vs surviving TS consumers; CSP/VPS deployment facts) → rev 2 folded. Outcome: A/B/C classification (B empty), 3-crate workspace, Rust worker design (keyless parent, traced seccomp, libwebp in child), roadmap R0–R5 with end criteria + rollback rows, 13 decisions D-R1..D-R14. Memory: BDR-043, LRN-048, EVAL-016; CLAUDE.md "Rust by default" section; TODO Rust block. No cargo on the dev host (owner installs rustup at R0). Awaiting owner validation; release 0.2.0 untouched.
- Same day: owner validated the Rust orientation (10 principles, BDR-044), asked the expanded decision table + R0 scope before validating D-R1..D-R14 → Annex A (13 decisions: recommendation, alternatives, pros/cons, risks, consequence, impact tags) and Annex B (R0: Docker builder image as the reference toolchain, rustup optional locally, workspace skeleton, worker image, CI job, 7 experimental proofs kept as tests, exit criteria) appended to the review. Nothing started; awaiting the 13 validations.
## 2026-10-13 (Rust R0 delivered)
Owner go (BDR-045): chore/step-08-files-analysis finished into develop (Annex C), feature/rust-r0-foundation. Built R0 through the Docker builder only: workspace (core, wasm, worker), proofs (float_roundtrip finding, trap/fresh-instance behaviour, musl + libwebp 1.6.0, seccomp 7 syscalls derived by strace on the release binary, CSP 'wasm-unsafe-eval' proven in Chrome 156, 225 KB / 85 KB gzip module), packages/core-wasm (14 proofs), CI (rust job, worker test stage, advisories nightly, manual release-images), docs (RUST.md, DEPLOY digest deploy prepared, CLAUDE/WORKSPACE/TEST_STRATEGY/CHANGELOG). Gates: verifier ×3 (oracle gaps only, CONFORME in substance), security ×3 (1 HIGH + mediums fixed; my first fixes introduced 3 mediums, fixed; follow-ups documented). Root `pnpm check` 777 tests, live deployment untouched, frontend loads nothing. BDR-046, LRN-049, EVAL-017. Stop: owner validation of R0; R1 not started; release 0.2.0 pending.
## 2026-10-13 (R0 correction: native toolchain)
Owner brief: dev = Ubuntu native server, Docker for services/isolation/images, VPS separate, no CI active. Host audit: rustup 1.29.1 already user-level, `rustup show` auto-installed 1.99.0; added wasm32 target, wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2 (`--locked`, 100 s, no sudo, no package missing). Scripts moved docker/ → scripts/ (`rust-check.sh`, `wasm-build.sh`, PATH guard `rust-env.sh`), root `rust:check`/`wasm:build` native, `:docker` variants, `pnpm check:all` single pre-merge gate (+ warn-only advisories, porcelain drift gate). Worker unit tests now in the native check; sandbox/seccomp stay Docker. SAFETY comments rewritten as invariants (no `[gated]`), stride checked_mul, prctl args as c_ulong. Workflows kept, marked prepared/never executed. Docs: RUST.md §1/§4/§5.8/§6, CLAUDE, README, DEPLOY, WORKSPACE, TEST_STRATEGY, CHANGELOG, review C.1. Gates: verifier ECARTS(2 prose) → CONFORME; security PASS ×2 (fixes landed). `check:all` green ×2. BDR-047, LRN-050, EVAL-018. 7 commits on feature/rust-r0-foundation, pushed. Stop: owner's final validation; R1 not started; no deploy, no release.
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@@ -362,3 +362,24 @@ Apply: every future Supabase auth surface (Step 14 gating, invitations), any pgT
Context: Rust review inventories. Facts found: `documentSha256` = sha256 of Prettier-formatted text (only compared at runtime → mismatch = rebase, not loss); coordinates = raw JS number strings (serde_json prints `1523.0`); attachment = insertion-order JSON, snapshot = Zod schema order; `.optional()` absent vs nullable `null` (serde-wasm-bindgen json preset writes null → breaks readers); text x positions = AFM widths + kerning pairs; dates = ICU; `toUpperCase`, `/\s+/`, non-fatal TextDecoder, last-dup-key JSON.parse, Zod `.int()` accepting 2.0. The 39 PDF goldens record draw calls (spies), never bytes → a Rust engine with a draw-log layer can match them exactly; byte goldens (xmldom XMLSerializer, Prettier files) cannot be matched by another stack → compare parsed trees or regenerate by decision.
Apply: any port (R2–R5): freeze unpinned outputs with the old code (LRN-046), write the contract list with a fixture each, decide lenient-vs-strict per item, keep an N-1 reader test permanently. Challengers found 2 blockers rev 1: deletion schedule vs surviving consumers (name the last consumer per module), and deployment facts (CSP without 'wasm-unsafe-eval', VPS compiling images) → check the serving path before the language.
## LRN-049 | 2026-10-13 | R0 experimental findings: serde_json fast float path, wasm traps and the ESM cache, RLIMIT_CPU soft=hard, minimal rustup profile, traced seccomp set
Facts proven on the real environment (docs/development/RUST.md §5), each one changed a design assumption of the review:
- `serde_json` default float parsing is a fast path one ULP off on some inputs (`1715.4285714285713` → `1715.428571428571`): enable `float_roundtrip` whenever bytes must match `JSON.stringify`; the formatter alone (`js_number`) is not enough.
- wasm32 = panic=abort: a panic and a shadow-stack overflow both surface as `WebAssembly.RuntimeError`; after a stack-overflow trap the next call fails in the allocator (deterministic), after a plain panic the instance still answers with a never-unwound stack pointer (silent) → never reuse an instance after any trap; the wasm-bindgen glue caches its instance in a module variable and `import()` of the same URL returns it → a fresh instance needs a new module record (cache-busting query) or a new Worker.
- `setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, soft, hard)` with soft == hard kills with SIGKILL (hard checked first), indistinguishable from a parent deadline kill → soft two seconds below hard gives SIGXCPU.
- Official `rust:` images install rustup's minimal profile: `rustup component add rustfmt clippy` in the image, else every container downloads them (rust-toolchain.toml lists the components).
- A single-threaded musl static decode (image/zune-jpeg/png/image-webp + libwebp encode) makes exactly 7 syscalls after start: read write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom; mallocng used neither brk nor mprotect, no futex. Derive with strace after a stderr marker, compare in the build, keep an explicit abort-path set (rt_sigaction rt_sigprocmask getpid gettid tkill tgkill exit) proven by the RLIMIT_AS → SIGABRT test.
- Unoptimised debug decoders blow a 10 s CPU budget on 4096² inputs: `[profile.dev.package."*"] opt-level = 3`.
- cargo-deny 0.20: a versionless path dependency is a "wildcard" (`allow-wildcard-paths = true`) and a workspace-inherited path dependency triggers an `unresolved-workspace-dependency` bug (declare `path = "../core"` per crate).
- CSP: `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is required for `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming` under `script-src 'self'` and allows nothing else (inline scripts still blocked); proven with the production nginx image + headers in headless Chrome 156.
Apply: R1 (worker loop keeps the same child), R2 (browser loader: fresh-instance mechanism, float_roundtrip stays on, CSP line at activation), any future "it should work" assumption about a runtime → run it in the real environment first.
## LRN-050 | 2026-10-13 | Native vs Docker Rust: rustup auto-install, non-interactive PATH, path strings in the wasm, worker unit tests native
- `rustup show` inside a repo with `rust-toolchain.toml` auto-installs the channel (rustup 1.29, default profile → rust-docs too, ~1.5 GB per toolchain); `rustup target add --toolchain <ver>` + two `cargo install --locked` ≈ 100 s with a warm registry.
- Agent / hook / editor shells are non-interactive: `~/.bashrc` returns early, `~/.cargo/bin` absent from PATH while the user's shell has it → scripts source a 5-line guard (`scripts/rust-env.sh`), never assume PATH. The harness refuses tool commands containing `export PATH=`: use absolute paths or a sourced file.
- Same rustc + lock → wasm differs by 64 B and by hash between build roots (`/w` vs `/home/...`): panic `Location` paths embedded; bit-identity needs `--remap-path-prefix` (unset at R0). Builder image = reference when bytes must match.
- Worker sandbox tests are `#![cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]`: plain `cargo test --workspace` compiles them empty → the 9 worker unit tests run natively for free (R0's `--exclude faunosteo-worker` was unneeded); seccomp derivation stays Docker/musl only (glibc syscalls differ).
- Contract oracles need a dry run before dispatch (EVAL-013/017 lesson, applied): a grep for `width * 4` matched my own SAFETY prose; `pnpm -r test:run` prints per-package totals, never one root line.
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@@ -135,7 +135,29 @@ feat/findings-tree-v2 merged (FindingsTreePicker tracked in HEAD); all work belo
- [ ] 8.5 docs: STORAGE.md (model, keys, statuses, purge/grace rules, reconciliation query, backup ordering + invariant, managed migration runbook), DEPLOY.md (worker, env file, network, CSP connect-src), SUPABASE.md, CLAUDE.md, CHANGELOG, plan note (worker early, SVG processor → Step 13); CI jobs
- [ ] 8.6 verify: root check, PGlite + real stack pgTAP, types, docker builds (app + worker), real-stack e2e (sign allowed/denied), gates verifier + security; memory; stop for user validation
- [ ] Rust by default (rule adopted 2026-10-12, BDR-043; orientation + 10 principles VALIDATED by the owner 2026-10-12, BDR-044; study `docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` rev 2 + Annex A decision table + Annex B R0 scope on chore/step-08-files-analysis; AWAITING the owner's validation of decisions D-R1..D-R14 (D-R6 withdrawn); R0 and Step 8 NOT started until then). Roadmap (each phase: oracles frozen with the old code, consumer-driven deletion, rollback row, gates):
- [ ] R0 foundation (inside Step 8, Annex B): Docker builder image = reference toolchain (rustup optional locally, never on the VPS), Cargo workspace (`crates/core`, `wasm`, `worker` skeletons), toolchain pin, deny.toml, lints, CI job `rust`, worker image started once against the local stack, app wasm stage built but not loaded, `docs/development/RUST.md`, DEPLOY.md (images pulled by digest, CSP `'wasm-unsafe-eval'`, gzip wasm, VPS headroom, rollback = previous digest); 7 experimental proofs kept as tests (wasm panic/re-instantiate, js_number + optional/nullable vs Zod, musl + libwebp build, traced seccomp child, CSP headless, size/instantiate, runner caches)
- [ ] R0 foundation (GO 2026-10-12, BDR-045; branch feature/rust-r0-foundation; Annex B; owner constraints: builds reproducible in Docker, no Rust on the VPS, live deployment untouched, frontend never loads the module, no R1):
- [x] R0.1 toolchain: `docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile` (rust:1.99.0-bookworm + wasm target + wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129 + cargo-deny 0.20.2 + rustfmt/clippy), `docker/rust-run.sh` (named volumes faunosteo_cargo_registry / faunosteo_rust_target), `docker/rust-check.sh`, `docker/wasm-build.sh` (CLI/crate version lock), root scripts rust:builder / rust:check / wasm:build / worker:test / worker:image
- [x] R0.2 workspace: Cargo.toml (3 members, pinned deps, lints unwrap/expect/disallowed_methods, dev deps optimised), rust-toolchain.toml 1.99.0, rustfmt/clippy/deny config, .cargo/config.toml (wasm stack 1 MiB, TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR), Cargo.lock, .gitignore/.dockerignore (target, pkg)
- [x] R0.3 crates/core: js_number + JsPrettyFormatter (JSON.stringify semantics), report contract types (SheetRef, ReportZone, Vertebra, LateralSide, Unresolved) with optional-absent / nullable-null, facade `call(op, json)` with closed kinds; 12 cargo tests + ts-rs export (4 types committed under packages/core-wasm/types)
- [x] R0.4 crates/wasm: facade (core_version, call, panic_for_test, recurse_for_test); build 224,713 B raw / 85 KB gzip (float_roundtrip on), instantiate ≈ 3 ms in Node
- [x] R0.5 crates/worker: plain main, `decode` child (env check → rlimits AS 512 MiB / CPU 10 s soft, 12 s hard → seccomp allowlist TSYNC kill) → image decode with Limits → orientation → resize_to_fill 512 → libwebp-sys lossy; parent `Spawner` (env_clear, 512 KiB output cap, deadline, signal classification) + `webp_check` (RIFF allowlist, dims, no metadata); `run --check`, `version`; test-hooks (fixtures, violate, flood, alloc, spin, print-allowlist); Dockerfile alpine musl → test stage (sandbox tests + strace derivation) → distroless/static:nonroot
- [x] R0.6 packages/core-wasm: loader (lazy, Node bytes), generated types, vitest proofs (facade, serialisation byte-equal with JSON.stringify on 4 real documents + number cases + Zod readers, panic/stack traps, size budget) skipped with a notice when pkg/ is absent
- [x] R0.7 proofs recorded with numbers in RUST.md §5: panic=abort traps + stack-trap instance unusable + fresh instance via cache-busting import; serde_json `float_roundtrip` finding (byte parity on 4 real documents + number corpus, Zod readers); musl static + libwebp 1.6.0 (image 8.7 MB, read-only, caps dropped); seccomp allowlist derived by strace on the release binary = 7 syscalls + 7 abort path, 13/13 sandbox tests; CSP: refused with `script-src 'self'`, OK with `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (Chrome 156, nginx 1.31, `docker/csp-proof/`); wasm 224,713 B raw / 85 KB gzip / ≈ 3 ms; runner cache NOT measurable here (pending on the forge, §5.7)
- [x] R0.8 CI: job `rust` (builder image, fmt/clippy/test/deny, types drift, wasm build), `check` builds the wasm then runs the Node pipeline, `docker` builds the worker test stage + runtime started read-only/cap-drop, nightly advisories, manual `release-images` hardened after the security audit (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral buildx builder, env secrets + per-job DOCKER_CONFIG + logout, main/develop only, pinned checkout; no deploy)
- [x] R0.9 docs: RUST.md, DEPLOY.md (prepared digest deploy + CSP note, live procedure untouched), WORKSPACE.md, packages/README.md, CLAUDE.md (stack, map, commands, workflow), TEST_STRATEGY.md, CHANGELOG
- [ ] R0 follow-ups from the security audits (R1 unless stated): base images and the buildkit engine image by digest (Step 27); verification decode of the child's output in a second sandboxed child; R1 treats Signalled/Timeout/OutputOverflow as rejections (content never alerts) and logs the child's stderr escaped only; negative tests for tkill(self, SIGTERM) and tgkill; iCCP fixture with image data so the allocation budget is seen firing; WebP structure residuals (duplicate ALPH, ALPH + VP8L, VP8X flags); dedicated release runner label that never runs PR jobs (Step 27); `actions/*@v4` in ci.yml pinned by commit (Step 27); drop `--features proofs` from docker/wasm-build.sh at R2
- [x] R0.10 gates: root `pnpm check` 777 tests green (existing suites untouched); verifier ×3 (CONFORME in substance, oracle fixes only); security ×3 (HIGH shell injection + 6 MEDIUM fixed; 3 MEDIUM introduced by the first fixes fixed; 2 MEDIUM of pass 3 fixed by the secret-less gates job); memory BDR-046, LRN-049, EVAL-017, journal. STOPPED for owner validation (2026-10-13); R1 not started
- [ ] R0 owner points: review the worker's SAFETY comments (rewritten 2026-10-13 as technical invariants, the `[gated]` approval-looking markers removed); decide the registry (forge Gitea registry recommended) and set REGISTRY/REGISTRY_USER/REGISTRY_TOKEN secrets before the first `release-images` run; first run on the forge records the runner numbers (RUST.md §5.7) and validates the workflow syntax (job-level env, GITHUB_ENV path)
- [ ] R0.11 native toolchain correction (owner brief 2026-10-13, delivered 2026-10-13, awaiting the owner's final validation: Ubuntu dev server native Rust, Docker for services/isolation/images, VPS separate, no CI active):
- [x] R0.11.1 host audit: rustup 1.29.1 already user-level (~/.cargo, ~/.rustup), 1.99.0 auto-installed from rust-toolchain.toml, gcc/libc6-dev/pkg-config/libssl-dev/strace present, no sudo, no package needed
- [x] R0.11.2 install (user-level, `--locked`, 100 s, registry cache warm): wasm32-unknown-unknown on 1.99.0, wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2
- [x] R0.11.3 scripts: `scripts/rust-check.sh` + `scripts/wasm-build.sh` (moved from docker/, PATH guard `scripts/rust-env.sh`), `scripts/check-all.sh` pre-merge gate; root `rust:check` / `wasm:build` native, `rust:check:docker` / `wasm:build:docker` through the builder, `check:all`; worker unit tests in the native check (sandbox tests stay feature-gated in Docker)
- [x] R0.11.4 worker: SAFETY comments rewritten as verifiable technical invariants (no `[gated]` approval marker), stride with checked arithmetic
- [x] R0.11.5 CI files kept, header states prepared / never executed (no runner, no secrets), script paths updated
- [x] R0.11.6 verification (native rust-check 32 s warm, cold workspace build 31.5 s; wasm 224 777 B native vs 224 713 B builder, path strings; 14 proofs; `pnpm check:all` 1 min 59 s green: 777 Node tests, 16 sandbox tests, allowlist covers the trace, worker read-only run --check): native versions; cargo fmt/clippy/test/build/deny; wasm native + core-wasm proofs; Docker builder, docker check, docker wasm, worker:test, worker:image run --check, app image; `pnpm check`; numbers compared with R0 (RUST.md §5)
- [x] R0.11.7 docs: RUST.md §1/§4/§6, CLAUDE.md, README verifying, DEPLOY.md, WORKSPACE.md, TEST_STRATEGY.md, CHANGELOG, review Annex C addendum
- [x] R0.11.8 gates: verifier ECARTS(2 doc prose) → CONFORME 11/11; security PASS ×2 (1 MEDIUM + 6 LOW then 1 MEDIUM + 2 LOW, fixed: advisories warn-only stage, fail-closed porcelain drift gate with --untracked-files=all, PATH guard append/absolute, literal rm, prctl c_ulong args); BDR-047, LRN-050, EVAL-018, journal
- [ ] R0.11 follow-ups for the CI/CD step (owner): ci.yml push/PR triggers stay live, so registering a runner starts PR builds at once (keep, or switch to workflow_dispatch until then); `actions/*@v4` mutable tags (Step 27); advisories cadence while no nightly runs (`cargo deny check advisories` is warn-only in check:all); `--remap-path-prefix` if native and builder wasm must match byte for byte
- [ ] R1 = Step 8 worker in Rust (replaces 8.2 below): decode child dispatched before any thread, empty env, RLIMIT_AS/CPU, traced seccomp allowlist, `image` + `moxcms` + `libwebp-sys` in the child, parent RIFF-header check only, 512 KiB output cap, per-stage deadlines, service key
- [ ] R2 domain core (before Step 9): sheet/report/archive contracts, `SheetHandle` + `SheetIndexData`, reducers, Finding builder, vertebra selection, publish gate; wasm facade (JSON strings, ts-rs types, poison + reinstantiate, lazy init); app switched; 3 envelopes frozen first; N-1 reader test; draft quarantine; conformance fixtures + generated pgTAP; `packages/domain` frozen for engine/pipeline
- [ ] R3 anatomy core: tree, one sanitiser, serialiser, layer renderer, `compose_view_svg`; app canvas switched; composed views frozen as trees first
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# CONTRACT — R0 correction: native Rust toolchain on the Ubuntu development server (for the fresh verifier)
- date: 2026-10-13 | flow: ad-hoc correction (owner brief 2026-10-13, after R0 delivery) | branch: feature/rust-r0-foundation (R0 closed at bd9c7d1; this delta on top)
- status: closed 2026-10-13 — pass 2 CONFORME 11/11, security pass 2 PASS; post-pass fix 496f549 (fail-closed drift step) verified by execution (oracles 6, 9, 10 amended before dispatch after a dry run by the orchestrator; pass 1: verifier ECARTS(2) = two floor STUB hits on doc prose "(not implemented)" → reworded; security PASS with 1 MEDIUM + 6 LOW → fixes: warn-only advisories stage and porcelain drift gate in check-all.sh and ci.yml, PATH guard appends an absolute dir only, literal rm path, prctl unused arguments as unsigned long with an honest comment; evidence of pass 2 = check-all-2.log)
- spec: owner brief (REQUEST below), docs/development/RUST.md §1 and §4 (what the correction builds), docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md Annex C.1
- evidence logs (runs made by the orchestrator on this host, readable): /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/71caaac9-9523-489e-bc17-e28e1d4fd532/scratchpad/{toolchain-install.log,warm-build.log,native-check.log,native-check-2.log,docker-alt.log,check-all.log,check-all-2.log}
- the verifier never installs, uninstalls or updates anything on the host; cargo commands below run the native toolchain already installed (rustup in ~/.cargo); `~/.cargo/bin` may be absent from a non-interactive PATH: prefix commands with `PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"` when `cargo` is not found. Docker commands are not re-run (read check-all.log).
## REQUEST (owner brief 2026-10-13, condensed — IMMUTABLE)
Development machine = self-hosted Ubuntu server (native, not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless. Install a native user-level Rust toolchain (rustup, rustc, cargo, rustfmt, clippy, wasm32-unknown-unknown, wasm/bindings tools) at the pinned 1.99.0, no sudo, no global package, no sensitive system change. Daily Rust development = native cargo commands; wasm build native too; pinned toolchain + existing Cargo.lock. Adapt the monorepo scripts so the main path is native; keep the Docker commands as the reproducible alternative without imposing them; short compile times, reuse of Cargo artefacts. Docker stays for Supabase, the worker's execution, integration tests, untrusted-file isolation, seccomp/Linux protections, deployment images, production-like tests; the R0 builder is kept; the worker's isolation is not degraded. No CI/CD is operational: workflow files may stay, never claimed as run, no secrets/runner/auto-publication, no mandatory dependency on a pipeline; one simple command runs every technical check before a merge, reusable by a future Gitea runner. Verification: versions, native tests, lint, core build, wasm build, TS/WASM compatibility tests, Docker builds of R0 still work, monorepo tests, comparison with the R0 proofs; seccomp and container protections stay in Docker; no regression. Re-examine the worker's unsafe blocks: precise, verifiable technical justification, SAFETY comments never presented as the owner's approval; sandbox protections and tests kept. Update RUST.md and the associated docs (Ubuntu native dev, Docker services/isolated tests, separate VPS). No out-of-scope change; no R1, no deploy, no release 0.2.0.
## ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
1. Native toolchain pinned and complete, user-level only.
CHECK: cd /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo && "$HOME/.cargo/bin/rustup" show active-toolchain | cut -d' ' -f1; "$HOME/.cargo/bin/rustup" component list --installed --toolchain 1.99.0 | grep -c "rustfmt\|clippy"; "$HOME/.cargo/bin/rustup" target list --installed --toolchain 1.99.0 | grep -c "^wasm32-unknown-unknown$"; "$HOME/.cargo/bin/wasm-bindgen" --version; "$HOME/.cargo/bin/cargo-deny" --version; dpkg-query -W rustc cargo 2>&1 | grep -c "no packages found"
EXPECT: 1.99.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu ; 2 ; 1 ; wasm-bindgen 0.2.129 ; cargo-deny 0.20.2 ; 2
2. Scripts: the two Rust scripts live under scripts/ (not docker/), source the PATH guard, and the root scripts make native the primary path with `:docker` alternatives and a single pre-merge gate.
CHECK: ls scripts | tr '\n' ' '; ls docker | grep -c "rust-check.sh\|wasm-build.sh"; grep -c "^\. scripts/rust-env.sh" scripts/rust-check.sh scripts/wasm-build.sh; grep -c '"rust:check": "bash scripts/rust-check.sh"' package.json; grep -c '"rust:check:docker": "bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/rust-check.sh"' package.json; grep -c '"wasm:build": "bash scripts/wasm-build.sh"' package.json; grep -c '"wasm:build:docker": "bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh"' package.json; grep -c '"check:all": "bash scripts/check-all.sh"' package.json
EXPECT: check-all.sh rust-check.sh rust-env.sh wasm-build.sh ; 0 ; scripts/rust-check.sh:1 and scripts/wasm-build.sh:1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1
3. The native check covers the worker's unit tests; the sandbox tests stay feature-gated and Docker-only; the pre-merge gate runs them through the worker image.
CHECK: grep -c "cargo test --workspace --locked" scripts/rust-check.sh; grep -c "exclude faunosteo-worker" scripts/rust-check.sh; grep -c "git status --porcelain -- packages/core-wasm/types" scripts/check-all.sh .gitea/workflows/ci.yml | tr '\n' ' '; grep -c "cargo deny check advisories" scripts/check-all.sh; grep -c '#!\[cfg(all(feature = "test-hooks", target_os = "linux"))\]' crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs; grep -c "pnpm worker:test" scripts/check-all.sh; grep -c "pnpm worker:image" scripts/check-all.sh; grep -c "read-only --cap-drop ALL" scripts/check-all.sh
EXPECT: 1 ; 0 ; both files at :1 (any order) ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1
4. The Docker path is intact: rust-run.sh and the builder Dockerfile changed in comments only; the worker Dockerfile, the application Dockerfile, compose and nginx are untouched.
CHECK: git diff HEAD -- docker/rust-run.sh | grep -E "^[-+]" | grep -vE "^(\+\+\+|---)" | grep -vc "^[-+]#"; git diff HEAD -- docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile | grep -E "^[-+]" | grep -vE "^(\+\+\+|---)" | grep -vc "^[-+]#"; git diff --stat HEAD -- crates/worker/Dockerfile Dockerfile docker-compose.yml docker/nginx.conf docker/entrypoint.sh | wc -l
EXPECT: 0 ; 0 ; 0
5. Workflow files kept (three), each marked prepared / never executed, script paths updated, nothing added that configures a runner, a secret or an automatic publication.
CHECK: ls .gitea/workflows | wc -l; grep -c "PREPARED, NEVER EXECUTED" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -c "prepared, never executed" .gitea/workflows/rust-advisories.yml .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml; grep -rc "docker/rust-check.sh\|docker/wasm-build.sh" .gitea/workflows | grep -vc ":0$"; git diff HEAD -- .gitea | grep -E "^\+" | grep -vE "^\+\+\+" | grep -vc "^\+ *#\|^\+ *run: bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/\|^\+ *run: docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile"
EXPECT: 3 ; 1 ; rust-advisories.yml:1 and release-images.yml:1 ; 0 ; 0
6. Worker unsafe blocks: every `unsafe {` in crates/worker/src is preceded by a `// SAFETY:` comment stating invariants the surrounding code establishes (read them: encode_webp checks `rgba.len() == w*h*4` and computes the stride with checked arithmetic; from_raw_parts after `size != 0 && !output.is_null()`; WebPFree once; prctl integer arguments with the return code checked; the two negative hooks compiled with `test-hooks` only); no `[gated …]` approval marker remains; no unsafe outside the worker.
CHECK: grep -c "gated" crates/worker/src/decode.rs crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs; grep -c "unsafe {" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY:" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "unsafe {" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY:" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs; grep -rc "unsafe {" crates/core/src crates/wasm/src | grep -vc ":0$"; grep -c "width.checked_mul(4)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "c_int::try_from(width \* 4)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c 'unsafe_code = "forbid"' Cargo.toml; grep -c 'unsafe_code = "deny"' crates/worker/Cargo.toml
EXPECT: decode.rs:0 and sandbox.rs:0 ; 6 ; 6 ; 2 ; 2 ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1 ; 1
7. The native Rust gate is green and the committed ts-rs types do not drift.
CHECK: cd /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo && PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH" bash scripts/rust-check.sh > /tmp/claude-1000/verify-rust-check.log 2>&1; echo rc=$?; grep -E "^test result" /tmp/claude-1000/verify-rust-check.log | grep -c "ok\."; grep -E "^test result" /tmp/claude-1000/verify-rust-check.log | grep -c " 10 passed\| 9 passed\| 14 passed"; grep -c "bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok" /tmp/claude-1000/verify-rust-check.log; git diff --exit-code -- packages/core-wasm/types > /dev/null && echo SAME
EXPECT: rc=0 ; 12 ; 3 ; 1 ; SAME
8. The native wasm build and the TypeScript/WASM proofs pass on the module it produces; the size stays within 1 KB of the R0 builder figure (224 713 B raw).
CHECK: cd /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo && PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH" bash scripts/wasm-build.sh 2>&1 | grep "faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm:"; corepack pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "Tests "
EXPECT: a line "faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: NNNNNN bytes raw, …" with 223713 <= NNNNNN <= 225713 ; "Tests 14 passed (14)"
9. The single pre-merge gate passed end to end on this host (native stages, Node pipeline, application image, worker sandbox tests + seccomp derivation, worker runtime read-only), read from the evidence log.
CHECK: L=/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/71caaac9-9523-489e-bc17-e28e1d4fd532/scratchpad/check-all-2.log; grep -c "^== all checks passed" "$L"; grep -c "DONE rc=0" "$L"; grep -c "== allowlist covers the trace" "$L"; grep -E "Tests [0-9]+ passed" "$L"; grep -c "test result: ok. 16 passed" "$L"
EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; six per-package lines (domain 194, core-wasm 14, supabase 24, anatomy 130, pdf 137, app 278 = 777, every one "passed") ; 1
10. Documentation reflects the three environments and the CI status; no doc still claims a Docker-only or CI-run toolchain.
CHECK: grep -c "native on the development machine" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "prepared, no CI active" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "### 5.8 Native toolchain run" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "C.1 Addendum 2026-10-13" docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md; for f in CLAUDE.md README.md CHANGELOG.md docs/development/RUST.md docs/development/TEST_STRATEGY.md; do grep -c "check:all" $f; done | tr '\n' ' '; grep -c "no toolchain on the host\|never on the host\|all through the builder image" CLAUDE.md docs/development/RUST.md docs/development/WORKSPACE.md | grep -vc ":0$"; grep -c "(not implemented" docs/development/RUST.md docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md | grep -vc ":0$"; grep -c "No CI/CD\|no CI active\|No CI runs" DEPLOY.md CLAUDE.md README.md | grep -vc ":0$"
EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; five numbers all >= 1 ; 0 ; 0 ; 3
11. Scope held: no change under apps/, packages/, supabase/, no new dependency, Cargo.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml untouched.
CHECK: git diff --stat HEAD -- apps packages supabase Cargo.lock pnpm-lock.yaml | wc -l; git status --short | grep -c "^??" ; git status --short | grep "^??" | grep -vc "^?? scripts/\|^?? .claude/tasks/contracts/"
EXPECT: 0 ; >= 0 ; 0
## OUT OF SCOPE (do not report as gaps)
R1 (job loop), any deployment, release 0.2.0, runner / registry / secrets on the forge, `--remap-path-prefix` for bit-identical native vs Docker modules (documented in RUST.md §5.8), prettier conformance of Markdown files already non-conformant at HEAD, the `rust-docs` component installed by rustup's default profile.
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
# CONTRACT — Rust R0 foundation (whole phase, for the fresh verifier)
- date: 2026-10-13 | flow: ad-hoc phase (owner go 2026-10-12, BDR-045) | branch: feature/rust-r0-foundation (base develop = 5fec065)
- status: active (amended 2026-10-13 after verifier pass 1: criteria 10 and 14 oracles counted comment lines; pass 2 CONFORME 16/16, criterion 16 oracle excludes the contract file itself; pass 3 after the security fixes: criteria 10 and 11 oracles updated to the gated SAFETY form and the second refusal arm; no code change)
- spec: docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md (Part III, Annex B, Annex C), docs/development/RUST.md (what was built and proven)
- evidence logs (runs made by the orchestrator on this host, readable): /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/{pnpm-check.log,worker-test-build-5.log,worker-image-build-2.log,builder-build-2.log}
## REQUEST (owner brief 2026-10-12, condensed — IMMUTABLE)
Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned Rust and dependencies; reproducible Docker builder (no Rust on the VPS); native and WebAssembly compilation; working TypeScript bindings; JSON contracts compatible with the current data; first wasm size and performance measurements; applicable security and isolation tests; CI integration; development and deployment documentation. The seven proofs run in the real environment where possible (serialisation, wasm panics, musl, seccomp verified experimentally; a proof that cannot be obtained is reported, not assumed). Compatibility: the React app, Report v3, PDF v2/v3, Supabase, the interfaces and the existing tests stay unchanged; the frontend does not load the module. No migration of anatomy, PDF or business validations (R2–R5); no avatar business processing (R1). Everything dockerised; production images built in CI and pulled by the VPS; live deployment unchanged; no tag or merge into main.
## ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
1. Workspace with exactly three crates, toolchain pinned identically in the three places.
CHECK: grep -c '"crates/core", "crates/wasm", "crates/worker"' Cargo.toml; grep -c 'channel = "1.99.0"' rust-toolchain.toml; grep -c "FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm" docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile; grep -c "FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24" crates/worker/Dockerfile; ls crates
EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; core wasm worker
2. wasm-bindgen crate and CLI locked to one version, refused up front on mismatch.
CHECK: grep -c 'wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129"' Cargo.toml; grep -c "WASM_BINDGEN_VERSION=0.2.129" docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile; grep -c 'lock_version" != "$cli_version"' docker/wasm-build.sh
EXPECT: 1 ; 1 ; 1
3. The core takes ids, time and bytes as inputs: no I/O, clock or env in crates/core/src, lint-enforced.
CHECK: grep -rn "std::fs\|std::env\|std::time\|SystemTime\|Instant::now" crates/core/src | wc -l; grep -c "disallowed_methods = \"deny\"" Cargo.toml; grep -c "std::fs::read\|std::env::var\|SystemTime::now" clippy.toml; grep -c "^serde\|^serde_json\|^ts-rs" crates/core/Cargo.toml
EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; >= 3 ; 3
4. JSON contract: preserve_order and float_roundtrip enabled; the JavaScript number formatter and the pretty formatter exist with their unit tests.
CHECK: grep -c '"preserve_order", "float_roundtrip"' Cargo.toml; grep -c "pub fn js_number\|pub struct JsPrettyFormatter\|pub fn to_js_pretty\|pub fn pretty_js_round_trip" crates/core/src/json.rs; bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test -p faunosteo-core --locked 2>&1 | grep -E "^test result" | head -2
EXPECT: 1 ; 4 ; two lines "ok. 10 passed" and "ok. 2 passed"
5. Report contract types mirror the Zod rules: optional fields skipped when None, nullable field plain Option, Unresolved = literal true; committed ts-rs types equal a fresh export.
CHECK: grep -c 'skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none"' crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; grep -c "pub version_id: Option<String>" crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; grep -c 'ts(optional, type = "true")' crates/core/src/domain/report.rs; bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts --locked 2>&1 | grep -c "test result: ok"; git diff --exit-code -- packages/core-wasm/types && echo SAME
EXPECT: 5 ; 1 ; 1 ; >= 1 ; SAME
6. Browser facade exposes exactly core_version, call, panic_for_test, recurse_for_test; the loader never imports pkg statically; every proof file skips when pkg is absent.
CHECK: grep -c "^pub fn core_version\|^pub fn call\|^pub fn panic_for_test\|^pub fn recurse_for_test" crates/wasm/src/lib.rs; grep -c "^import .* from '../pkg" packages/core-wasm/src/index.ts; grep -l "describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)" packages/core-wasm/tests/*.test.ts | wc -l
EXPECT: 4 ; 0 ; 4
7. The wasm proofs pass on the built module (byte equality with JSON.stringify on the four documents, number corpus, Zod readers, panic and stack traps, fresh-instance recovery, size budget).
CHECK: ls packages/core-wasm/pkg/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm; corepack pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run 2>&1 | grep -E "Tests |Test Files"; grep -c "float_roundtrip\|memory access out of bounds\|wasm-unsafe-eval" docs/development/RUST.md
EXPECT: file exists (built by the orchestrator; if absent run `pnpm wasm:build` first) ; "4 passed" and "14 passed" ; >= 3
8. Worker process model: plain main without an async runtime; decode checks the environment, then the thread count, then rlimits, then seccomp, before reading input.
CHECK: grep -c "tokio" crates/worker/Cargo.toml; grep -n "vars_os().next().is_some()\|sandbox::apply(\|read_to_end(&mut input)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs | head -3; grep -n "ensure_single_thread()?;\|set_rlimits(limits)?;\|install_seccomp()?;" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | head -3
EXPECT: 0 ; the three lines appear in that order (env check line < sandbox line < read line) ; the three calls appear in that order
9. seccomp allowlist is the traced set plus the abort path, denies every file and process syscall, and was derived and proven on the musl binary.
CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 16 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-11.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
EXPECT: 7 ; 7 ; 0 ; both lines present
10. The keyed parent never decodes: spawn.rs and webp_check.rs use no image decoder; output capped at 512 KiB; the RIFF check allowlists four chunk types and refuses the rest.
CHECK: grep -c "image::" crates/worker/src/spawn.rs crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 512 \* 1024" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c 'b"VP8X", b"VP8 ", b"VP8L", b"ALPH"' crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc))" crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs
EXPECT: 0 for both files ; 1 ; 1 ; 2 (the allowlist gate and the defensive arm of the structure match, since a8b644a)
11. libwebp confined to the child and its version controlled: FFI only in decode.rs with SAFETY comments, minimum 1.6.0 checked by a test and by `run --check`.
CHECK: grep -l "libwebp_sys::" crates/worker/src/*.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION: (u8, u8, u8) = (1, 6, 0)" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c "the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough" crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs
EXPECT: crates/worker/src/decode.rs only ; >= 4 ; 1 ; 1
12. Test hooks never ship: release build without features; the runtime image is distroless static, non-root, with `run --check` as its command.
CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-6.log
EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; exit=0
13. Frontend, live deployment and database untouched; the existing suites still pass.
CHECK: git diff --stat 5fec065..HEAD -- apps/app Dockerfile docker-compose.yml docker/nginx.conf docker/entrypoint.sh supabase packages/domain packages/anatomy packages/pdf packages/supabase | wc -l; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log; grep -E "apps/app test:run:\s+Tests|packages/pdf test:run:\s+Tests|packages/anatomy test:run:\s+Tests" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log
EXPECT: 0 ; exit=0 ; 278, 137, 130 passed
14. CI: rust job before check through the builder image with the types drift check; docker job builds the worker test stage and starts the runtime image read-only with every capability dropped; advisories nightly; release-images manual only and deploys nothing.
CHECK: grep -c "needs: rust" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -c "docker/rust-check.sh\|git diff --exit-code -- packages/core-wasm/types" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -c -- "--target test\|--read-only --cap-drop ALL" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml; grep -v "^#" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml | grep -c "^ workflow_dispatch:"; grep -v "^#" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml | grep -cE "^\s*(push|pull_request|schedule):|ssh |scp |compose (up|pull)"; grep -c "cron:" .gitea/workflows/rust-advisories.yml
EXPECT: 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1
15. Docs: RUST.md carries the seven proofs with numbers and the hypothetical list; DEPLOY.md carries the prepared digest procedure and the CSP note while the live procedure stays; CLAUDE.md, WORKSPACE.md, TEST_STRATEGY.md, packages/README.md, CHANGELOG updated.
CHECK: grep -c "^### 5\.[1-7]" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "^## 7. What stays hypothetical" docs/development/RUST.md; grep -c "^## Image deploy by digest (prepared at R0, not yet applied)" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "docker compose up --build -d" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "wasm-unsafe-eval" DEPLOY.md; grep -c "pnpm rust:check" CLAUDE.md; grep -c "crates/worker" docs/development/WORKSPACE.md; grep -c "Worker sandbox" docs/development/TEST_STRATEGY.md; grep -c "core-wasm" packages/README.md; grep -c "Rust foundation, plan R0" CHANGELOG.md
EXPECT: 7 ; 1 ; 1 ; >= 2 (live procedure kept) ; >= 2 ; >= 1 ; >= 1 ; 1 ; >= 1 ; 1
16. No secret and no credential in the new files; the worker's env check and the CI secrets usage are the only places naming keys.
CHECK: git diff 5fec065..HEAD -- . ':!.claude/tasks/contracts' | grep -E "^\+" | grep -Ei "eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}|sk_live|service_role_key *= *\"[^\"]+\"|password *= *\"" | wc -l; grep -c "secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN" .gitea/workflows/release-images.yml
EXPECT: 0 ; 1
+2
View File
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ graphify-out/
.gitea/
docs/
logos/
target/
packages/core-wasm/pkg/
+39 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
# Gitea Actions (same syntax as GitHub Actions). Runs on the self-hosted forge
# runner; no external provider. The check job covers the SQL layer through the
# PGlite harness (no Docker); the supabase job replays it on the real stack.
# Gitea Actions (same syntax as GitHub Actions), written for a self-hosted forge
# runner; no external provider.
#
# STATUS 2026-10-13: PREPARED, NEVER EXECUTED. No runner, secret or registry is
# configured on the forge; the CI/CD decision is a separate step. Until then the
# same checks run on the development machine with `pnpm check:all`
# (scripts/check-all.sh), which a future runner can call as is.
#
# The check job covers the SQL layer through the PGlite harness (no Docker); the
# supabase job replays it on the real stack. Rust (plan R0, docs/development/RUST.md):
# in this file every cargo command runs inside the reference builder image built from
# docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile (the native toolchain of the development machine runs
# the same scripts), so a runner and a developer machine use the same compiler and the
# production VPS never needs Rust.
name: ci
on:
@@ -9,8 +20,24 @@ on:
pull_request:
jobs:
rust:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Reference Rust builder image (runner needs a Docker daemon)
run: docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker
- name: fmt, clippy, tests, ts-rs export, cargo-deny (licenses, bans, sources)
run: bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/rust-check.sh
- name: Committed TypeScript types match the Rust contracts (no modified or new file)
run: |
drift="$(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types)"
if [ -n "$drift" ]; then echo "$drift"; exit 1; fi
- name: Browser module builds (size printed; the budget is asserted by the vitest proofs)
run: bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: rust
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
@@ -19,6 +46,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Activate pnpm (version from package.json "packageManager")
run: corepack enable && corepack prepare --activate
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- name: Browser module for the core-wasm proofs (same builder image as the rust job)
run: docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker && bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh
- run: pnpm typecheck
- run: pnpm test:run
- run: pnpm lint
@@ -29,8 +58,14 @@ jobs:
needs: check
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Docker image builds (runner needs a Docker daemon)
- name: Application image builds (runner needs a Docker daemon)
run: docker build -t faunosteo:ci .
- name: Worker sandbox tests and seccomp derivation on the musl binary that ships
run: docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile --target test -t faunosteo_worker:test .
- name: Worker runtime image builds and starts (configuration check, no job loop before R1)
run: |
docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t faunosteo_worker:ci .
docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true faunosteo_worker:ci run --check
supabase:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
# Production images, built in CI and identified by digest (D-R13, owner amendment of
# 2026-10-12): the VPS pulls them and never compiles. Manual only (workflow_dispatch), never
# on push: no publication or promotion of a production image without an explicit run and
# a validation. Nothing here deploys; DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest (prepared at R0, not
# yet applied)" is the runbook.
#
# Hardening (security audits of R0): the dispatch input is a typed choice re-validated in
# the shell through an environment variable (never interpolated into a script); the
# advisory gates (RustSec, npm) run in a job that holds no secret, and the image job runs no
# third-party code before its login (no npm install, only the pinned checkout); the registry
# token reaches the login step only, through env, into a per-job DOCKER_CONFIG under
# RUNNER_TEMP created fresh before the login and removed by a literal path; the images are
# built by a named ephemeral buildx builder (`--builder`, so a missing builder fails instead
# of falling back to the daemon's shared BuildKit and its cache mounts). The
# `if: github.ref` line keeps honest runs on main or develop: it is not a security boundary
# (whoever can push a branch can dispatch a copy of this file), push access and the token's
# scope are. The real isolation from pull-request jobs is a dedicated release runner label
# that never runs them (Step 27 operations). Known mutable references, to pin at Step 27:
# the buildkit engine image of the builder, the base images of the Dockerfiles.
#
# STATUS 2026-10-13: prepared, never executed. No runner, no registry and none of the
# secrets below exist on the forge yet; configuring them is the CI/CD step, not R0.
#
# Secrets expected on the forge: REGISTRY (host, e.g. the Gitea container registry of this
# forge), REGISTRY_USER, REGISTRY_TOKEN (write:package scope). Images are pushed as
# <registry>/<namespace>/faunosteo_app:<sha> and faunosteo_worker:<sha>; the digests are
# printed in the job summary and are what the VPS pins.
name: release-images
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
sheet_bundle:
description: 'SHEET_BUNDLE for the app image (none = production default, draft = preview)'
required: true
type: choice
options:
- none
- draft
default: none
concurrency:
group: release-images-${{ github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
# No secret here: this job runs third-party code (pnpm install for the audit, the
# builder image) and must never see the registry token.
gates:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || github.ref == 'refs/heads/develop'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
SHEET_BUNDLE: ${{ inputs.sheet_bundle }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- name: Validate the dispatch input (the shell trusts the env value only after this)
run: |
case "$SHEET_BUNDLE" in
none|draft) ;;
*) echo "refused SHEET_BUNDLE value" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
- name: RustSec advisories gate (release only; CI runs it nightly)
run: |
docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker
bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo deny check advisories
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version-file: .nvmrc
- name: npm advisories gate for the application image (production dependencies)
run: |
corepack enable && corepack prepare --activate
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
pnpm audit --prod --audit-level=high
images:
needs: gates
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
SHEET_BUNDLE: ${{ inputs.sheet_bundle }}
REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}
NAMESPACE: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
GIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
BUILDER: faunosteo_release_${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- name: Re-validate the dispatch input in this job
run: |
case "$SHEET_BUNDLE" in
none|draft) ;;
*) echo "refused SHEET_BUNDLE value" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
- name: Fresh per-job Docker config (fails if the directory already exists)
run: |
mkdir -m 700 "$RUNNER_TEMP/faunosteo-release-docker"
echo "DOCKER_CONFIG=$RUNNER_TEMP/faunosteo-release-docker" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Ephemeral builder with its own cache (named; every build names it explicitly)
run: docker buildx create --name "$BUILDER" --driver docker-container
- name: Registry login (token in this step's env only, never on the command line)
env:
REGISTRY_USER: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login "$REGISTRY" -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin
- name: Build and push the application image
run: |
image="$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/faunosteo_app:$GIT_SHA"
docker buildx build --builder "$BUILDER" --push --provenance=false \
--metadata-file "$RUNNER_TEMP/app-metadata.json" \
--build-arg "SHEET_BUNDLE=$SHEET_BUNDLE" -t "$image" .
digest="$(sed -n 's/.*"containerimage.digest": *"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$RUNNER_TEMP/app-metadata.json")"
[ -n "$digest" ] || { echo "no digest in the build metadata" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "app: faunosteo_app:$GIT_SHA@$digest" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Build and push the worker image
run: |
image="$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/faunosteo_worker:$GIT_SHA"
docker buildx build --builder "$BUILDER" --push --provenance=false \
--metadata-file "$RUNNER_TEMP/worker-metadata.json" \
-f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t "$image" .
digest="$(sed -n 's/.*"containerimage.digest": *"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$RUNNER_TEMP/worker-metadata.json")"
[ -n "$digest" ] || { echo "no digest in the build metadata" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "worker: faunosteo_worker:$GIT_SHA@$digest" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Logout, remove the builder and the per-job Docker config (literal path)
if: always()
run: |
rc=0
docker logout "$REGISTRY" || true
docker buildx rm "$BUILDER" || rc=$?
rm -rf -- "${RUNNER_TEMP:?}/faunosteo-release-docker"
exit "$rc"
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
# RustSec advisories, out of the blocking path on purpose (RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW VIII.3):
# an advisory published for an unrelated crate must not redden every branch. The run is
# nightly and manual; the release gate (Step 27) reads its last result.
# STATUS 2026-10-13: prepared, never executed (no runner on the forge yet). Locally:
# `bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo deny check advisories` or, natively, `cargo deny check advisories`.
name: rust-advisories
on:
schedule:
- cron: '17 3 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
advisories:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker
- run: bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo deny check advisories
+4
View File
@@ -59,3 +59,7 @@ graphify-out/
# Supabase CLI local state (written by supabase start / db reset)
supabase/.branches/
supabase/.temp/
# Rust workspace (R0): build output and the generated browser module
target/
packages/core-wasm/pkg/
+8
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@ Versions follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
## [Unreleased]
### Added (Rust foundation, plan R0)
- **Rust by default** (rule adopted 2026-10-12, `docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md`): Cargo workspace with three crates, `crates/core` (contracts and the JavaScript-compatible JSON formatter, no I/O by lint), `crates/wasm` (browser facade built into `packages/core-wasm/pkg`) and `crates/worker` (the future file-processing worker: sandboxed `decode` child with rlimits and a seccomp allowlist derived by `strace`, image decoding in pure Rust, lossy WebP through libwebp confined to the child, parent-side container check; `run --check` only, no job loop before R1). Reference toolchain in Docker (`docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile`, `pnpm rust:check`, `pnpm wasm:build`), worker image on `distroless/static`, CI job `rust`, nightly advisories, manual digest-tagged image workflow (no deploy). R0 proofs recorded in `docs/development/RUST.md`: `float_roundtrip` required for JSON parity, traps leave a wasm instance unusable (fresh instance per recovery), CSP needs `'wasm-unsafe-eval'`. No application behaviour, interface, archive or database change; the frontend does not load the module.
### Changed (Rust foundation, R0 correction 2026-10-13)
- **Native Rust toolchain as the primary path** on the Ubuntu development machine (user-level rustup, channel of `rust-toolchain.toml`, `wasm32-unknown-unknown`, `wasm-bindgen-cli` 0.2.129, `cargo-deny` 0.20.2): `pnpm rust:check` and `pnpm wasm:build` run `scripts/rust-check.sh` and `scripts/wasm-build.sh` natively (moved from `docker/`, PATH guard `scripts/rust-env.sh`); the builder image stays the reproducible alternative (`pnpm rust:check:docker`, `pnpm wasm:build:docker`). The native check now covers the worker's unit tests; the sandbox tests and the seccomp derivation stay Docker-only (`pnpm worker:test`). New `pnpm check:all` (`scripts/check-all.sh`): every check a branch must pass before a merge, in one command. The Gitea workflow files are kept but marked prepared and never executed (no runner, secret or registry on the forge). Worker `unsafe` blocks: SAFETY comments rewritten as verifiable invariants (no approval marker), WebP stride computed with checked arithmetic. `docs/development/RUST.md` §1 and §4 describe the three environments (Ubuntu native development, Docker for services and isolation, separate production VPS).
### Added (SaaS migration, plan Step 7)
- **Identity (Step 7)** — sign-in and sign-up by email/password (confirmation mandatory, policy 12 chars + lower/upper/digit), password recovery, OAuth buttons (Google, Apple) driven by `APP_AUTH_PROVIDERS`, landing route for confirmation / OAuth links; the guarded `/app` shell (desktop sidebar, light top bar, mobile drawer) with a dashboard (greeting, profile completeness, local tool, account) and **Mon compte** (personal, professional, preferences, security). Profile columns `practice_name`, `professional_title`, `siret` (migration `20261011100000`, pgTAP 009), language synced with `profiles.locale`, platform roles shown read-only. GoTrue TOTP enabled server-side; MFA enforcement for platform roles documented as a gap (`docs/development/IDENTITY.md`). The local tool (`/`, `/new`, `/editor`) stays unauthenticated; the Home header links to the space only when Supabase is configured.
+23 -1
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ MVP species: equine only. Open-source MIT.
| DB client | @supabase/supabase-js (packages/supabase) | 2.x |
| SQL tests | pgTAP under supabase/tests, run by `supabase test db` and by PGlite (Dockerless) | PGlite 0.3 |
| Deploy | Docker multi-stage → nginx:alpine | — |
| Rust (core, wasm facade, worker) | Rust pinned by `rust-toolchain.toml`, edition 2024; native user-level rustup on the Ubuntu development machine (`pnpm rust:check`, `pnpm wasm:build`, plain `cargo`), the builder image `docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile` as the reproducible alternative (`:docker` scripts), never on the VPS | 1.99.0 |
| WASM glue | wasm-bindgen crate = CLI version (locked in `scripts/wasm-build.sh`), `ts-rs` types committed under `packages/core-wasm/types` | 0.2.129 / 12 |
| Worker image | `crates/worker/Dockerfile`: `rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24` (musl, libwebp via `cc`) → `distroless/static:nonroot`; sandbox tests + seccomp derivation in the `test` stage | — |
---
@@ -99,6 +102,16 @@ pnpm build:preview # SHEET_BUNDLE=draft build (manual validation, preview de
pnpm preview:draft # same, then serves it
pnpm import:equine # regenerate legacy-import/ and draft/ (document, migration map, review drawings)
pnpm report:compare <pdf|dir>... # archive check: attachment vs its v3 reading, unresolved items flagged (docs/PDF-FORMAT.md)
# Rust (docs/development/RUST.md) — native toolchain (user-level rustup, channel of rust-toolchain.toml) first
pnpm rust:check # scripts/rust-check.sh: fmt --check, clippy -D warnings, cargo test (core, wasm, worker unit), ts-rs export, cargo deny
pnpm wasm:build # scripts/wasm-build.sh: crates/wasm → packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored); then the core-wasm vitest proofs run
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh: the whole pre-merge gate (rust:check, types drift, wasm:build, check, app image, worker:test, worker:image)
pnpm rust:builder # build docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile once (faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0), the reproducible alternative
pnpm rust:check:docker # the same rust-check.sh inside the builder image
pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same wasm-build.sh inside the builder image
pnpm worker:test # Docker only: crates/worker/Dockerfile stage test, sandbox tests + seccomp derivation on the musl binary
pnpm worker:image # Docker only: runtime image faunosteo_worker:dev (distroless/static, `run --check`)
```
## Docker commands
@@ -244,7 +257,15 @@ faunosteo/
│ │ └─ draft/ ← GENERATED working revision: document, cleaned horse.svg, sheet-ref, report-migration-map, CHANGELOG, REVIEW-REPORT, review/*.svg, equine_draft.sql
│ └─ tests/*.sql ← pgTAP: allowed + denied paths per policy
├─ packages/README.md ← shared packages index
├─ .gitea/workflows/ci.yml ← CI: install, typecheck, test, lint, build, docker
├─ packages/core-wasm/ ← @faunosteo/core-wasm: loader of the browser module (pkg/ built, git-ignored), ts-rs types (committed), R0 proofs (panic, serialisation, size)
├─ crates/ ← Rust workspace (Cargo.toml, rust-toolchain.toml, deny.toml, clippy.toml, .cargo/config.toml at the root)
│ ├─ core/ ← faunosteo-core: contracts (report types), js_number + JS pretty formatter, facade `call(op, json)`; no I/O, no clock (lint-enforced)
│ ├─ wasm/ ← faunosteo-wasm: wasm-bindgen facade (core_version, call, R0 trap proofs)
│ └─ worker/ ← faunosteo-worker: plain main; `decode` sandboxed child (rlimits, seccomp allowlist, image → libwebp), parent Spawner + RIFF check, `run --check`; Dockerfile, scripts/derive-seccomp.sh
├─ scripts/{rust-env,rust-check,wasm-build,check-all}.sh ← native Rust gate, wasm build, the pre-merge gate (`pnpm check:all`)
├─ docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile, rust-run.sh, csp-proof/ ← reproducible Rust builder (alternative) + the CSP proof
├─ .gitea/workflows/ci.yml ← PREPARED, never executed (no runner): rust job (builder image, scripts/rust-check.sh, types drift, wasm), install, typecheck, test, lint, build, docker (app + worker test stage + runtime)
├─ .gitea/workflows/{rust-advisories,release-images}.yml ← nightly RustSec advisories; manual digest-tagged image publication (no deploy)
├─ .claude/{tasks/TODO.md,memory/,audits/}
├─ Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, docker/
├─ .env.example, .editorconfig, .nvmrc, .node-version, .npmrc, .prettierrc.json
@@ -492,6 +513,7 @@ the owner's validation before any implementation; release 0.2.0 unaffected).
- Import never parses untrusted PDF object graphs: the attachment is located by byte scan and inflated under the 16 MiB cap (BLK-009). Opening the import to external users is gated by `docs/development/PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md` §5 (BDR-040).
- After PDF roundtrip tests fail: check attachment bytes, then the layered reader (report first, envelope metadata, snapshot/branding/labels), then DecompressionStream inflation. Goldens under `apps/app/tests/fixtures/goldens/step6` are never regenerated without a user decision.
- Node 24 / pnpm 10.13.1: `corepack enable` or `corepack pnpm`; never a global install.
- Rust: native on the Ubuntu development machine (user-level rustup, never a global package, never on the VPS); `pnpm rust:check` and `pnpm wasm:build` run natively, the `:docker` variants reproduce them in the builder image. Before every Rust commit: `pnpm rust:check` green, `pnpm worker:test` green when `crates/worker` changed (Docker only: the sandbox tests and the seccomp derivation never run natively), the ts-rs types under `packages/core-wasm/types` committed, `Cargo.lock` committed. Before a merge: `pnpm check:all`. No CI runs on the forge: a workflow file is never cited as a passed check. The core takes ids, time and bytes as inputs (clippy `disallowed_methods`); the worker child is the only process that decodes untrusted bytes.
- SQL change: `pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase test:run` (PGlite) before commit; `pnpm db:reset && pnpm db:test`
on the real stack when Docker is available; regenerate types (`pnpm db:types`).
Generated
+588
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo.
# It is not intended for manual editing.
version = 4
[[package]]
name = "adler2"
version = "2.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "320119579fcad9c21884f5c4861d16174d0e06250625266f50fe6898340abefa"
[[package]]
name = "autocfg"
version = "1.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f2032f911046de80f0a198e0901378627c33f59ea0ac00e363d481118bd70a53"
[[package]]
name = "bitflags"
version = "2.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3ded4057c258ba199e2d26386d3af3780957ecaee6c4ef4041c6b4b8b97c0b06"
[[package]]
name = "bumpalo"
version = "3.20.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "72f5acc6cb2ba439de613abc23857ec3d78374d8ed5ac84e9d11336e87da8649"
[[package]]
name = "bytemuck"
version = "1.25.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "95832e849adfb21180ccb6826a99da14e5d266ae5c2e668e1602cf234f153797"
[[package]]
name = "byteorder-lite"
version = "0.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8f1fe948ff07f4bd06c30984e69f5b4899c516a3ef74f34df92a2df2ab535495"
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6651c9ed80effdc7db0ff72512157f901af5e3549e341e24b1dd4887d836d838"
dependencies = [
"find-msvc-tools",
"jobserver",
"libc",
"shlex",
]
[[package]]
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+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# Faunosteo Rust workspace (plan R0, docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md Part III).
# Three crates: core (feature-gated library), wasm (browser facade), worker (service binary).
# Commands run on the native toolchain of the development machine (rustup, the channel of
# rust-toolchain.toml) or inside the builder image: docs/development/RUST.md §1.
[workspace]
resolver = "3"
members = ["crates/core", "crates/wasm", "crates/worker"]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
license = "MIT"
rust-version = "1.99"
publish = false
# The path dependency on crates/core is declared per crate (`path = "../core"`): cargo-deny
# 0.20 reads a workspace-inherited path dependency as a wildcard and fails the bans check.
[workspace.dependencies]
serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
# preserve_order keeps the input key order of parsed documents (JSON.stringify semantics).
# float_roundtrip: the default parser is a fast path that can be one ULP off (found by the R0
# proof: 1715.4285714285713 came back as 1715.428571428571); JavaScript parses correctly.
serde_json = { version = "1.0.154", features = ["preserve_order", "float_roundtrip"] }
ts-rs = { version = "12.0", features = ["serde-compat"] }
# The CLI in docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile must be this exact version.
wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129"
image = { version = "0.25.10", default-features = false, features = ["jpeg", "png", "webp"] }
libwebp-sys = "0.14.4"
seccompiler = "0.5.0"
rlimit = "0.11"
libc = "0.2"
# The library crates deny unwrap/expect so that no panic path depends on content;
# the worker binary relaxes disallowed_methods (it owns I/O) in its own [lints].
[workspace.lints.rust]
unsafe_code = "forbid"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
unwrap_used = "deny"
expect_used = "deny"
disallowed_methods = "deny"
# Dependencies optimised even in debug builds: the sandbox tests decode 4096² images under a
# 10 s CPU limit, which an unoptimised image decoder does not meet.
[profile.dev.package."*"]
opt-level = 3
[profile.release]
opt-level = 3
lto = "fat"
codegen-units = 1
# The worker child dies on a panic (the parent logs it); on wasm32 the std is abort anyway.
panic = "abort"
strip = "symbols"
[profile.release.package.faunosteo-wasm]
opt-level = "z"
+70
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ The host should publish only ports `22`, `80`, `443` to the internet. The
container port (`8080` by default) should stay loopback-only — the host
reverse proxy reads from it on `127.0.0.1:8080`.
Rust (plan R0, `docs/development/RUST.md`): the repository also builds a
worker image (`crates/worker/Dockerfile`, static musl binary on
`distroless/static`, container `faunosteo_worker`). It is not deployed yet
(its job loop arrives at R1); the live deployment above is unchanged. The
production VPS never needs a Rust toolchain: Rust is compiled on the Ubuntu
development machine (native toolchain) or inside Docker builder images, and
production images will be pulled by digest ("Image deploy by digest",
prepared below) once a runner and a registry exist on the forge. No CI/CD is
operational today (2026-10-13).
### Reference sheet in the image (SHEET_BUNDLE)
The application needs an anatomical sheet to work. Until sheets are served by
@@ -563,6 +573,66 @@ already exported are unaffected.
---
## Image deploy by digest (prepared at R0, not yet applied)
Decision D-R13 (`docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` Annex A and
C): production images are built in CI and the VPS pulls them; it never
compiles the Rust project, and the DEV1-XS memory limit stops mattering for
builds. The procedure below is prepared and documented now; it replaces
"Routine deploys" and "Rollback" above **only when the first image built
this way is deployed, after a separate validation**. Until then the live
deployment keeps building on the VPS as documented above.
1. Build and publish: run the manual workflow `release-images`
(`.gitea/workflows/release-images.yml`, `workflow_dispatch`, never on
push) on the forge. Prerequisite not met yet: no runner, registry or
secret is configured on the forge (2026-10-13); the workflow has never
run, which is the CI/CD step to decide separately. It pushes `faunosteo_app:<sha>` and
`faunosteo_worker:<sha>` to the container registry named by the
`REGISTRY` secret (the forge's own Gitea registry is the recommended
choice, Scaleway Container Registry the alternative) and prints their
digests in the job summary. No workflow deploys anything.
2. Pin: `docker-compose.yml` on the VPS references the images by digest
(`image: <registry>/<owner>/faunosteo_app@sha256:…`); the digest is the
only thing that changes at a deploy, by hand, after validation.
3. Deploy: `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` (no `--build`), then
the post-deploy checks of "Routine deploys".
4. Rollback: set the previous digest back in `docker-compose.yml` and run
step 3 again; nothing is rebuilt and nothing needs crates.io or npm.
5. Registry credentials on the VPS: a read-only token in `~/.docker/config.json`
of the deploy user, never in the repository.
Prerequisites checked at R0 and to re-check before the first digest deploy:
disk headroom on the VPS for two image generations (app ≈ 100 MB,
worker ≈ 9 MB, measured at R0), the registry reachable from the VPS, `docker compose pull`
working with the read-only token.
### WebAssembly and the CSP (from R2 on)
The application does not load the Rust core module before plan R2. When it
does, the two `Content-Security-Policy` headers of this file (nginx and
Caddy options) must carry `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` in `script-src`:
```text
script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval';
```
Proven at R0 under the production nginx image and headers with headless
Chrome for Testing 156 (`docker/csp-proof/run.sh`, result in
`docs/development/RUST.md` §5): with `script-src 'self'` the browser refuses
to compile the module ("Compiling or instantiating WebAssembly module
violates the following Content Security policy directive"); with the keyword
the module instantiates. `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` allows WebAssembly compilation
only, never `eval` or inline scripts (the proof's inline variant was still
blocked). Browser floor for the keyword: Chrome 97, Firefox 102, Safari 16
(the Vite 7 baseline). The `.wasm` file is served as `application/wasm` by
`nginx:1.31-alpine` out of the box; at R2 `docker/nginx.conf` gains
`gzip_static on;` for a precompressed `.wasm.gz` (or `gzip_types
application/wasm`) and the served, compressed size is what the D-R13 budget
counts.
---
## Health checks
| URL | Expected |
+11
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@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ cp .env.example .env # edit APP_* vars if desired
pnpm dev # http://localhost:5173
```
Rust (core, browser module, worker): a user-level `rustup` installs the
pinned toolchain from `rust-toolchain.toml` on first use; see
`docs/development/RUST.md` §1 for the three `cargo install` / `rustup
target add` lines and the Docker alternative.
Docker Compose (matches production topology):
```bash
@@ -81,8 +86,14 @@ pnpm lint # ESLint 9 flat config, 0 warnings
pnpm test:run # vitest run (domain, anatomy, supabase/PGlite, app)
pnpm build # tsc + vite build → apps/app/dist/
pnpm report:compare <pdf|dir>... # archive PDF vs its v3 reading, unresolved items flagged
pnpm rust:check # native: fmt, clippy -D warnings, cargo test, ts-rs export, cargo deny
pnpm wasm:build # native: browser module → packages/core-wasm/pkg (the core-wasm proofs run on it)
pnpm check:all # everything a branch must pass before a merge, in one command (needs Docker for the image stages)
```
No CI/CD runs on the forge yet: the workflow files under `.gitea/workflows/`
are prepared for a future runner and call these same scripts.
---
## Build & deploy
+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# The core library never reads the clock, the file system or the environment: ids, time
# and bytes are inputs (RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW III.3). Tests and the worker binary
# allow these lints locally where they own I/O.
disallowed-methods = [
{ path = "std::time::SystemTime::now", reason = "the core takes time as an input" },
{ path = "std::time::Instant::now", reason = "the core takes time as an input" },
{ path = "std::fs::read", reason = "the core takes bytes as inputs" },
{ path = "std::fs::read_to_string", reason = "the core takes bytes as inputs" },
{ path = "std::fs::write", reason = "the core returns bytes, the caller writes" },
{ path = "std::fs::File::open", reason = "the core takes bytes as inputs" },
{ path = "std::fs::File::create", reason = "the core returns bytes, the caller writes" },
{ path = "std::env::var", reason = "configuration is injected into the core" },
{ path = "std::env::var_os", reason = "configuration is injected into the core" },
]
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
[package]
name = "faunosteo-core"
description = "Faunosteo core: data contracts, rules and parsers shared by the browser (wasm), the worker and the tools"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
publish.workspace = true
[lib]
path = "src/lib.rs"
[features]
default = []
# Exports the TypeScript types of the contracts (ts-rs) on `cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts`.
ts = ["dep:ts-rs"]
[dependencies]
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
ts-rs = { workspace = true, optional = true }
[lints]
workspace = true
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
//! Data contracts of the core.
//!
//! R0 carries the Report v3 reference types (sheet reference, zone, vertebra) to prove the
//! serialisation rules against the current Zod schemas; the full contracts and the rules
//! arrive at R2 (review Part VI.2).
pub mod report;
pub use report::{LateralSide, ReportZone, SheetRef, Unresolved, Vertebra};
+137
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@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
//! Report v3 reference types (`packages/domain/src/report/v3.ts`), field order as the Zod
//! schemas declare it. Optional fields are absent when unset and nullable fields are `null`
//! (review I.2): the serde attributes below are the contract, not a convenience.
use serde::de::Error as _;
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
#[cfg(feature = "ts")]
use ts_rs::TS;
/// Reference of the anatomical sheet a report was written against (`Report.sheet`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", derive(TS), ts(export))]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct SheetRef {
pub sheet_id: String,
/// Database version id once the sheet lives in the database; `null` for a bundled draft.
pub version_id: Option<String>,
/// sha256 of the document file the report was written against.
pub document_sha256: String,
}
/// Side of a bilateral zone.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", derive(TS), ts(export))]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum LateralSide {
Left,
Right,
}
/// One vertebra of a spine zone: the region code and the 1-based index in that region.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", derive(TS), ts(export))]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct Vertebra {
pub region: String,
pub index: u32,
}
/// A zone of an observation. Unknown keys are ignored on input, as the Zod schema strips
/// them; optional fields are written only when set.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", derive(TS), ts(export))]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct ReportZone {
pub annotation_id: String,
pub view_id: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", ts(optional))]
pub side: Option<LateralSide>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", ts(optional))]
pub vertebrae: Option<Vec<Vertebra>>,
/// Annotation name at selection time (or legacy name at migration).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", ts(optional))]
pub label_fr_snapshot: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", ts(optional))]
pub label_en_snapshot: Option<String>,
/// Set by the migration when the legacy id has no canonical annotation.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "ts", ts(optional, type = "true"))]
pub unresolved: Option<Unresolved>,
}
/// The literal `true` flag of a zone or finding the sheet cannot place
/// (`z.literal(true).optional()` in Zod).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
pub struct Unresolved;
impl Serialize for Unresolved {
fn serialize<S: Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
serializer.serialize_bool(true)
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for Unresolved {
fn deserialize<D: Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
if bool::deserialize(deserializer)? {
Ok(Unresolved)
} else {
Err(D::Error::custom(
"unresolved must be the literal true when present",
))
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::json::to_js_pretty;
#[test]
fn optional_fields_are_absent_and_nullable_fields_are_null() {
let zone = ReportZone {
annotation_id: "hip".to_owned(),
view_id: "main".to_owned(),
..ReportZone::default()
};
let Ok(text) = to_js_pretty(&zone) else {
panic!("serialisation failed");
};
assert_eq!(
text,
"{\n \"annotationId\": \"hip\",\n \"viewId\": \"main\"\n}"
);
let sheet = SheetRef {
sheet_id: "faunosteo-cheval".to_owned(),
version_id: None,
document_sha256: "0".repeat(64),
};
let Ok(text) = to_js_pretty(&sheet) else {
panic!("serialisation failed");
};
assert!(text.contains("\"versionId\": null"));
}
#[test]
fn unresolved_accepts_true_only() {
let parsed: Result<ReportZone, _> =
serde_json::from_str(r#"{"annotationId":"a","viewId":"v","unresolved":true}"#);
assert_eq!(parsed.ok().and_then(|z| z.unresolved), Some(Unresolved));
let refused: Result<ReportZone, _> =
serde_json::from_str(r#"{"annotationId":"a","viewId":"v","unresolved":false}"#);
assert!(refused.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn unknown_keys_are_ignored_like_the_zod_strip_schema() {
let parsed: Result<ReportZone, _> =
serde_json::from_str(r#"{"annotationId":"a","viewId":"v","extra":1}"#);
assert!(parsed.is_ok());
}
}
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
//! The call surface the wasm facade and the tools expose (review III.3): one operation
//! name, one JSON text in, one JSON text out, closed outcome kinds, never a panic on
//! content. The envelope is `{"ok":true,"value":…}` or `{"ok":false,"kind":…,"detail":…}`.
use serde::Serialize;
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde_json::{Value, json};
use crate::domain::{ReportZone, SheetRef};
use crate::json::pretty_js_round_trip;
/// Runs the operation `op` on the JSON text `input` and returns the outcome envelope.
///
/// Operations of R0: `core_version`, `pretty_json` (JavaScript pretty form of any JSON
/// text), `sheet_ref` and `report_zone` (parse and re-emit a contract type).
pub fn call(op: &str, input: &str) -> String {
let outcome = match op {
"core_version" => Ok(Value::String(crate::CORE_VERSION.to_owned())),
"pretty_json" => pretty_js_round_trip(input)
.map(Value::String)
.map_err(|error| Failure::new("invalid_json", error)),
"sheet_ref" => echo::<SheetRef>(input),
"report_zone" => echo::<ReportZone>(input),
_ => Err(Failure::new(
"unknown_op",
format!("no operation named {op}"),
)),
};
render(outcome)
}
fn echo<T: DeserializeOwned + Serialize>(input: &str) -> Result<Value, Failure> {
let parsed: T =
serde_json::from_str(input).map_err(|error| Failure::new("invalid_shape", error))?;
serde_json::to_value(parsed).map_err(|error| Failure::new("internal", error))
}
struct Failure {
kind: &'static str,
detail: String,
}
impl Failure {
fn new(kind: &'static str, detail: impl std::fmt::Display) -> Self {
Self {
kind,
detail: detail.to_string(),
}
}
}
fn render(outcome: Result<Value, Failure>) -> String {
let envelope = match outcome {
Ok(value) => json!({ "ok": true, "value": value }),
Err(failure) => json!({ "ok": false, "kind": failure.kind, "detail": failure.detail }),
};
serde_json::to_string(&envelope).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
r#"{"ok":false,"kind":"internal","detail":"outcome serialisation failed"}"#.to_owned()
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::call;
#[test]
fn unknown_operation_is_a_closed_kind() {
let outcome = call("nope", "{}");
assert!(outcome.contains(r#""ok":false"#));
assert!(outcome.contains(r#""kind":"unknown_op""#));
}
#[test]
fn invalid_json_never_panics() {
let outcome = call("pretty_json", "{ not json");
assert!(outcome.contains(r#""kind":"invalid_json""#));
}
#[test]
fn report_zone_round_trip_keeps_the_declared_order() {
let outcome = call(
"report_zone",
r#"{"viewId":"v","side":"left","annotationId":"a"}"#,
);
assert_eq!(
outcome,
r#"{"ok":true,"value":{"annotationId":"a","viewId":"v","side":"left"}}"#
);
}
}
+227
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@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
//! JSON output with JavaScript number semantics.
//!
//! `JSON.stringify(value, null, 2)` and `serde_json`'s pretty printer agree on everything
//! (two-space indent, `": "`, `[]` and `{}` for empty containers, raw non-ASCII, `\u00XX`
//! control escapes) except finite floats: JavaScript prints `1523` for `1523.0` and `1e+21`
//! for `1e21`, `serde_json` prints `1523.0` and `1e21`. The documents of the repository carry
//! integer-valued coordinates as floats, so the archive attachment and the generated seed
//! files need the JavaScript form (review I.2, D-R11).
use std::io;
use serde::Serialize;
use serde_json::ser::{Formatter, PrettyFormatter};
/// Formats a finite `f64` exactly as ECMAScript `Number::toString(10)` does.
///
/// Non-finite values have no JSON form (`JSON.stringify` writes `null`): same here.
pub fn js_number(value: f64) -> String {
if !value.is_finite() {
return "null".to_owned();
}
if value == 0.0 {
return "0".to_owned();
}
let (digits, point) = shortest_digits(value.abs());
let mut out = String::with_capacity(digits.len() + 8);
if value.is_sign_negative() {
out.push('-');
}
write_decimal(&mut out, &digits, point);
out
}
/// Shortest round-trip digits of a positive finite value and the position `n` of the
/// decimal point relative to the first digit (ECMAScript's `n`): value = 0.d₁d₂… × 10ⁿ.
///
/// Rust's `LowerExp` prints the shortest round-trip mantissa (`1.7154285714285713e3`),
/// chosen by the same rule as ECMAScript (shortest, then closest to the value).
fn shortest_digits(value: f64) -> (String, i32) {
let scientific = format!("{value:e}");
let (mantissa, exponent) = scientific
.split_once('e')
.unwrap_or((scientific.as_str(), "0"));
let exponent: i32 = exponent.parse().unwrap_or(0);
let digits: String = mantissa.chars().filter(char::is_ascii_digit).collect();
(digits, exponent + 1)
}
/// ECMAScript Number::toString steps 6 to 10 for `k` digits and point position `n`.
fn write_decimal(out: &mut String, digits: &str, n: i32) {
let k = i32::try_from(digits.len()).unwrap_or(i32::MAX);
if k <= n && n <= 21 {
out.push_str(digits);
out.extend(std::iter::repeat_n('0', (n - k).unsigned_abs() as usize));
} else if 0 < n && n <= 21 {
let (integer, fraction) = digits.split_at(n.unsigned_abs() as usize);
out.push_str(integer);
out.push('.');
out.push_str(fraction);
} else if -6 < n && n <= 0 {
out.push_str("0.");
out.extend(std::iter::repeat_n('0', n.unsigned_abs() as usize));
out.push_str(digits);
} else {
let (first, rest) = digits.split_at(1);
out.push_str(first);
if !rest.is_empty() {
out.push('.');
out.push_str(rest);
}
let exponent = n - 1;
out.push('e');
out.push(if exponent < 0 { '-' } else { '+' });
out.push_str(&exponent.unsigned_abs().to_string());
}
}
/// `serde_json`'s pretty formatter with JavaScript float printing.
pub struct JsPrettyFormatter<'a> {
inner: PrettyFormatter<'a>,
}
impl Default for JsPrettyFormatter<'_> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
inner: PrettyFormatter::new(),
}
}
}
impl Formatter for JsPrettyFormatter<'_> {
fn write_f32<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W, value: f32) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
writer.write_all(js_number(f64::from(value)).as_bytes())
}
fn write_f64<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W, value: f64) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
writer.write_all(js_number(value).as_bytes())
}
fn begin_array<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.begin_array(writer)
}
fn end_array<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.end_array(writer)
}
fn begin_array_value<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W, first: bool) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.begin_array_value(writer, first)
}
fn end_array_value<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.end_array_value(writer)
}
fn begin_object<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.begin_object(writer)
}
fn end_object<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.end_object(writer)
}
fn begin_object_key<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W, first: bool) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.begin_object_key(writer, first)
}
fn begin_object_value<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.begin_object_value(writer)
}
fn end_object_value<W>(&mut self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>
where
W: ?Sized + io::Write,
{
self.inner.end_object_value(writer)
}
}
/// Serialises `value` as `JSON.stringify(value, null, 2)` would (no trailing newline).
pub fn to_js_pretty<T: Serialize + ?Sized>(value: &T) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut serializer =
serde_json::Serializer::with_formatter(&mut buffer, JsPrettyFormatter::default());
value.serialize(&mut serializer)?;
String::from_utf8(buffer).map_err(<serde_json::Error as serde::ser::Error>::custom)
}
/// Parses JSON text and re-emits it in the JavaScript pretty form, keeping the key order.
pub fn pretty_js_round_trip(text: &str) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(text)?;
to_js_pretty(&value)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn integer_valued_floats_print_without_a_fraction() {
assert_eq!(js_number(1523.0), "1523");
assert_eq!(js_number(-7.0), "-7");
assert_eq!(
js_number(123_456_789_012_345_680_000.0),
"123456789012345680000"
);
}
#[test]
fn fractions_and_small_values_follow_the_javascript_thresholds() {
assert_eq!(js_number(0.85), "0.85");
assert_eq!(js_number(1_715.428_571_428_571_3), "1715.4285714285713");
assert_eq!(js_number(0.000_001), "0.000001");
assert_eq!(js_number(0.000_000_1), "1e-7");
assert_eq!(js_number(1e21), "1e+21");
assert_eq!(js_number(1.5e300), "1.5e+300");
assert_eq!(js_number(5e-324), "5e-324");
}
#[test]
fn zero_and_non_finite_values() {
assert_eq!(js_number(0.0), "0");
assert_eq!(js_number(-0.0), "0");
assert_eq!(js_number(f64::NAN), "null");
assert_eq!(js_number(f64::INFINITY), "null");
}
#[test]
fn pretty_output_matches_the_javascript_shape() {
let text = r#"{"b":[1,2.0,{"c":[]}],"a":{},"d":"é\u0001","e":-0.0}"#;
let expected = "{\n \"b\": [\n 1,\n 2,\n {\n \"c\": []\n }\n ],\n \"a\": {},\n \"d\": \"é\\u0001\",\n \"e\": 0\n}";
let Ok(actual) = pretty_js_round_trip(text) else {
panic!("round trip failed");
};
assert_eq!(actual, expected);
}
}
+13
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
//! Faunosteo core library (plan R0, `docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md`).
//!
//! Rules of the crate (review Part III.3): no I/O, no clock, no random ids; every input
//! is bytes or JSON text, every output is plain data. The same code serves the browser
//! (`crates/wasm`), the worker and the tools. R0 ships the serialisation rules and the
//! first contract types; the business rules arrive with R2.
pub mod domain;
pub mod facade;
pub mod json;
/// Version of the core, reported by the wasm facade and the worker.
pub const CORE_VERSION: &str = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
+39
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
//! R0 proof (half of it): the JavaScript pretty form is idempotent on the real documents and
//! prints no integer-valued float with a fraction. The other half, byte equality against
//! `JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2)`, runs in `packages/core-wasm/tests` on the
//! same files through the wasm build.
#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use faunosteo_core::json::pretty_js_round_trip;
fn fixture(relative: &str) -> String {
let path = format!("{}/../../{relative}", env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{path}: {error}"))
}
fn assert_round_trip(relative: &str) -> String {
let text = fixture(relative);
let once = pretty_js_round_trip(&text).expect("first pass");
let twice = pretty_js_round_trip(&once).expect("second pass");
assert_eq!(
once, twice,
"{relative}: the pretty form must be a fixed point"
);
assert!(
!once.contains(".0,") && !once.contains(".0\n"),
"{relative}: a float printed as x.0"
);
once
}
#[test]
fn demo_report_v3_round_trips() {
let text = assert_round_trip("apps/app/tests/fixtures/report-v3.demo.json");
assert!(text.starts_with("{\n \"version\": 3,\n"));
}
#[test]
fn equine_draft_document_round_trips() {
let text = assert_round_trip("supabase/seed/anatomical-sheets/equine/draft/document.json");
assert!(text.contains("\"schema_version\": 2"));
}
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
[package]
name = "faunosteo-wasm"
description = "Browser facade of the Faunosteo core (wasm-bindgen), built into packages/core-wasm/pkg"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
publish.workspace = true
[lib]
crate-type = ["cdylib", "rlib"]
path = "src/lib.rs"
[features]
default = []
# The R0 trap proofs (panic_for_test, recurse_for_test): built for the proofs, never for the
# module the application ships (scripts/wasm-build.sh passes it until R2 wires the real loader).
proofs = []
[dependencies]
faunosteo-core = { path = "../core" }
wasm-bindgen.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
//! wasm-bindgen facade over `faunosteo-core` (review III.3): JSON strings in and out, closed
//! outcome kinds. Built by `scripts/wasm-build.sh` into `packages/core-wasm/pkg`; loaded
//! lazily by the application from R2 on (never at R0).
use wasm_bindgen::prelude::wasm_bindgen;
/// Version of the core compiled into this module.
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn core_version() -> String {
faunosteo_core::CORE_VERSION.to_owned()
}
/// Runs one core operation: `op` names it, `input` is its JSON text, the result is the
/// JSON text of the outcome envelope (`{"ok":true,"value":…}` or `{"ok":false,"kind":…}`).
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn call(op: &str, input: &str) -> String {
faunosteo_core::facade::call(op, input)
}
/// R0 proof: on wasm32 a panic is a trap (panic = abort), reaching JavaScript as a
/// `WebAssembly.RuntimeError`; the caller re-instantiates the module.
#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn panic_for_test() {
panic!("deliberate panic for the R0 proof");
}
/// R0 proof: exhausting the shadow stack traps instead of corrupting memory.
#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn recurse_for_test(depth: u32) -> u32 {
recurse(depth)
}
#[cfg(feature = "proofs")]
#[inline(never)]
fn recurse(depth: u32) -> u32 {
let mut frame = [depth; 32];
if depth == 0 {
return std::hint::black_box(&frame)[0];
}
let below = recurse(depth - 1);
frame[(below as usize) % 32] ^= below;
std::hint::black_box(&frame);
below.wrapping_add(1)
}
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[package]
name = "faunosteo-worker"
description = "Faunosteo file-processing worker: job loop (R1) and the sandboxed decode child (R0 proof)"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
publish.workspace = true
[lib]
path = "src/lib.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "faunosteo-worker"
path = "src/main.rs"
[features]
default = []
# Extra subcommands and flags for the sandbox tests and the seccomp derivation
# (crates/worker/Dockerfile stage `test`); never part of a release build.
test-hooks = ["dep:crc32fast", "dep:flate2"]
[dependencies]
image.workspace = true
libwebp-sys.workspace = true
seccompiler.workspace = true
rlimit.workspace = true
libc.workspace = true
crc32fast = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
# Already in the tree through png: used by the iCCP-bomb fixture only.
flate2 = { version = "1.1", optional = true }
# The worker owns I/O (it is the process boundary), so the core's disallowed_methods lint is
# off here. unsafe stays denied crate-wide; the libwebp FFI and the prctl call carry a local
# #[allow(unsafe_code)] with a SAFETY comment each (forbid would not allow the local override).
[lints.rust]
unsafe_code = "deny"
[lints.clippy]
unwrap_used = "deny"
expect_used = "deny"
disallowed_methods = "allow"
+39
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# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
# Faunosteo worker image (review Part IV, VIII.1). Build context = repository root:
# docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile --target test . # sandbox tests + seccomp derivation
# docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t faunosteo_worker:dev . # runtime image
# The binary is a static musl executable; the runtime image carries nothing else.
FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24 AS base
# build-base: the C compiler for libwebp (libwebp-sys, D-R4), nothing else is compiled from C.
# rustfmt/clippy: listed in rust-toolchain.toml, absent from the image's minimal profile.
RUN apk add --no-cache build-base && rustup component add rustfmt clippy
WORKDIR /w
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock rust-toolchain.toml rustfmt.toml clippy.toml ./
COPY .cargo .cargo
COPY crates crates
FROM base AS build
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
--mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_target_musl,target=/w/target \
cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked \
&& cp target/release/faunosteo-worker /faunosteo-worker
# The tests and the derivation run on the release profile (LTO, panic = abort) plus the
# test-hooks feature, inside the default Docker seccomp profile (the inner filter is allowed
# by it): the binary under test differs from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only.
FROM base AS test
RUN apk add --no-cache strace
# Own target cache: the hooks build and the shipped build must never share target/release.
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
--mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_target_musl_test,target=/w/target \
cargo test -p faunosteo-worker --release --features test-hooks --locked -- --test-threads=4
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
--mount=type=cache,id=faunosteo_target_musl_test,target=/w/target \
sh crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot AS runtime
COPY --from=build /faunosteo-worker /faunosteo-worker
USER nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["/faunosteo-worker"]
CMD ["run", "--check"]
+48
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#!/bin/sh
# Derives the seccomp allowlist of the decode child from a real trace and checks it against
# `sandbox::ALLOWED_SYSCALLS` (review Part IV.1: "derived by strace over the fixture corpus
# at the caps on the production image, not hand-written"). Runs in the Alpine `test` stage
# of crates/worker/Dockerfile, where the musl binary that ships is built.
#
# Exit 1 when a traced syscall is missing from the allowlist (the sandbox would kill a
# legitimate decode). Syscalls the list allows but the trace never shows are printed for
# review (the abort path is expected there).
set -eu
bin=target/release/faunosteo-worker
cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --features test-hooks --locked
work=$(mktemp -d)
fixtures="png jpeg webp big-jpeg big-png"
: > "$work/traced.raw"
for kind in $fixtures; do
"$bin" fixture "$kind" > "$work/$kind.bin"
# `env -i`: the child refuses a non-empty environment; `--no-seccomp` keeps the rlimits
# and makes one sched_yield where the filter would be installed (strace cannot read the
# child's memory once PR_SET_DUMPABLE is 0, so the marker is a syscall, not a string).
env -i strace -f -qq -o "$work/trace.$kind" "$bin" decode --no-seccomp \
< "$work/$kind.bin" > "$work/$kind.webp"
awk 'found { print } /sched_yield\(/ { found = 1 }' "$work/trace.$kind" \
| sed -E 's/^[0-9]+ +//; /^(\+\+\+|---)/d; s/^<\.\.\. ([a-z0-9_]+) resumed>.*/\1/; s/\(.*//' \
| grep -E '^[a-z0-9_]+$' >> "$work/traced.raw" || true
done
sort -u "$work/traced.raw" > "$work/traced.txt"
"$bin" print-allowlist | sort -u > "$work/allowed.txt"
if [ ! -s "$work/traced.txt" ]; then
echo "== NO SYSCALL TRACED AFTER THE MARKER: the derivation is broken, not the allowlist" >&2
echo "== tail of the png trace:" >&2
tail -n 40 "$work/trace.png" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "== syscalls traced after the sandbox marker"
cat "$work/traced.txt"
missing=$(comm -23 "$work/traced.txt" "$work/allowed.txt")
extra=$(comm -13 "$work/traced.txt" "$work/allowed.txt")
echo "== allowed but not traced (abort path expected): $(echo "$extra" | tr '\n' ' ')"
if [ -n "$missing" ]; then
echo "== TRACED BUT NOT ALLOWED (the filter would kill a legitimate decode):"
echo "$missing"
exit 1
fi
echo "== allowlist covers the trace"
+364
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//! The decode child: bytes in, one 512 × 512 lossy WebP out (review Part IV.1). R0 ships
//! the pipeline as the sandbox, musl and libwebp proof; the job semantics arrive with R1.
use std::ffi::c_int;
use std::io::{self, Cursor, Read, Write};
use image::error::LimitErrorKind;
use image::imageops::FilterType;
use image::metadata::Orientation;
use image::{DynamicImage, ImageDecoder, ImageError, ImageFormat, ImageReader, Limits};
use crate::exit_codes;
use crate::limits::{
MAX_ALLOC_BYTES, MAX_INPUT_BYTES, MAX_SIDE, MIN_SIDE, OUTPUT_SIDE, WEBP_QUALITY,
};
use crate::sandbox;
/// Why the child refused an input (one exit code each).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Reject {
UnsupportedType,
DecodeFailed,
Dimensions,
/// A decoder budget (`image::Limits`, allocation, complexity) exceeded by the content.
ResourceLimit,
/// libwebp failed on the buffer the child produced itself: an environment fault.
EncodeFailed,
/// A programming or I/O fault of the child, never a judgement on the content.
Internal,
}
impl Reject {
pub fn exit_code(self) -> i32 {
match self {
Self::UnsupportedType => exit_codes::UNSUPPORTED_TYPE,
Self::DecodeFailed => exit_codes::DECODE_FAILED,
Self::Dimensions => exit_codes::DIMENSIONS,
Self::ResourceLimit => exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT,
Self::EncodeFailed => exit_codes::ENCODE_FAILED,
Self::Internal => exit_codes::INTERNAL,
}
}
}
/// Entry of `faunosteo-worker decode`: returns the process exit code.
///
/// Order matters: the environment check and the sandbox come before the first byte of
/// input is read, and no thread exists at that point (`main` is a plain function).
pub fn main(
args: &[String],
stdin: &mut dyn Read,
stdout: &mut dyn Write,
stderr: &mut dyn Write,
) -> i32 {
if std::env::vars_os().next().is_some() {
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: the environment must be empty");
return exit_codes::ENV_NOT_EMPTY;
}
let hooks = match TestHooks::parse(args) {
Ok(hooks) => hooks,
Err(message) => {
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: {message}");
return exit_codes::USAGE;
}
};
if let Err(error) = sandbox::apply(&sandbox::Limits::default(), hooks.seccomp) {
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: sandbox: {error}");
return exit_codes::SANDBOX_FAILED;
}
if let Some(code) = hooks.run_after_sandbox(stdout, stderr) {
return code;
}
let mut input = Vec::new();
let read = stdin
.take(MAX_INPUT_BYTES as u64 + 1)
.read_to_end(&mut input);
if read.is_err() {
return exit_codes::INTERNAL;
}
if input.len() > MAX_INPUT_BYTES {
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: input over {MAX_INPUT_BYTES} bytes");
return exit_codes::INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
match process(&input) {
Ok(webp) => match stdout.write_all(&webp).and_then(|()| stdout.flush()) {
Ok(()) => exit_codes::OK,
Err(_) => exit_codes::OUTPUT_FAILED,
},
Err(reject) => {
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: {}", exit_codes::name(reject.exit_code()));
reject.exit_code()
}
}
}
/// Decodes, orients, crops to a square and encodes one image; pure function of the bytes.
pub fn process(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Reject> {
let format = image::guess_format(bytes).map_err(|_| Reject::UnsupportedType)?;
if !matches!(
format,
ImageFormat::Jpeg | ImageFormat::Png | ImageFormat::WebP
) {
return Err(Reject::UnsupportedType);
}
let mut reader = ImageReader::with_format(Cursor::new(bytes), format);
let mut limits = Limits::default();
limits.max_image_width = Some(MAX_SIDE);
limits.max_image_height = Some(MAX_SIDE);
limits.max_alloc = Some(MAX_ALLOC_BYTES);
reader.limits(limits);
let mut decoder = reader.into_decoder().map_err(map_image_error)?;
let (width, height) = decoder.dimensions();
if width < MIN_SIDE || height < MIN_SIDE {
return Err(Reject::Dimensions);
}
let orientation = decoder.orientation().unwrap_or(Orientation::NoTransforms);
let mut image = DynamicImage::from_decoder(decoder).map_err(map_image_error)?;
image.apply_orientation(orientation);
let square = image
.resize_to_fill(OUTPUT_SIDE, OUTPUT_SIDE, FilterType::Lanczos3)
.into_rgba8();
encode_webp(square.as_raw(), OUTPUT_SIDE, OUTPUT_SIDE, WEBP_QUALITY)
}
/// Every decode-time error is a judgement on the content (a content code): an uploader must
/// never be able to produce a "broken environment" outcome (security audit of R0).
fn map_image_error(error: ImageError) -> Reject {
match error {
ImageError::Limits(limit) => match limit.kind() {
LimitErrorKind::DimensionError => Reject::Dimensions,
_ => Reject::ResourceLimit,
},
ImageError::Unsupported(_) => Reject::UnsupportedType,
_ => Reject::DecodeFailed,
}
}
/// Encodes an RGBA buffer as lossy WebP through libwebp (D-R4: C confined to this process).
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
pub fn encode_webp(rgba: &[u8], width: u32, height: u32, quality: f32) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Reject> {
let expected = (width as usize)
.checked_mul(height as usize)
.and_then(|n| n.checked_mul(4));
if expected != Some(rgba.len()) {
return Err(Reject::Internal);
}
let Some(stride_bytes) = width.checked_mul(4) else {
return Err(Reject::Internal);
};
let (Ok(w), Ok(h), Ok(stride)) = (
c_int::try_from(width),
c_int::try_from(height),
c_int::try_from(stride_bytes),
) else {
return Err(Reject::Internal);
};
let mut output: *mut u8 = std::ptr::null_mut();
// SAFETY: WebPEncodeRGBA reads `height` rows of `stride` bytes starting at `rgba`;
// `rgba.len() == width * height * 4` and `stride == width * 4` are established above with
// overflow-checked arithmetic, so every read stays inside the slice, which outlives the
// call. `&mut output` is a valid `*mut *mut u8` for the duration of the call: libwebp
// stores the address of a buffer it allocated there, or leaves it null and returns 0.
// libwebp retains no pointer once the call returns.
let size =
unsafe { libwebp_sys::WebPEncodeRGBA(rgba.as_ptr(), w, h, stride, quality, &mut output) };
if size == 0 || output.is_null() {
return Err(Reject::EncodeFailed);
}
// SAFETY: a non-zero return means libwebp initialised exactly `size` bytes at `output`
// (both non-zero and non-null, checked just above). The slice lives only for the copy
// below and is dropped before the buffer is released.
let encoded = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(output, size) }.to_vec();
// SAFETY: `output` was allocated by libwebp for this call and must be released by its
// own WebPFree; this is the single release and the pointer is not used afterwards.
unsafe { libwebp_sys::WebPFree(output.cast()) };
Ok(encoded)
}
/// Version of the libwebp linked into this binary, as (major, minor, revision).
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
pub fn libwebp_version() -> (u8, u8, u8) {
// SAFETY: WebPGetEncoderVersion takes no argument, touches no memory owned by the caller
// and has no side effect: it returns the version packed into a C int.
let packed = unsafe { libwebp_sys::WebPGetEncoderVersion() };
let packed = u32::try_from(packed).unwrap_or(0);
(
u8::try_from((packed >> 16) & 0xff).unwrap_or(0),
u8::try_from((packed >> 8) & 0xff).unwrap_or(0),
u8::try_from(packed & 0xff).unwrap_or(0),
)
}
/// Flags of the test build (`--features test-hooks`); a release build accepts no argument.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct TestHooks {
pub seccomp: bool,
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
action: Option<HookAction>,
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum HookAction {
/// Makes a denied syscall (`getcwd`) after the filter: the child must die with SIGSYS.
Violate,
/// Writes a megabyte on stdout: the parent must cut the child at its output cap.
Flood,
/// Allocates the given number of GiB: `RLIMIT_AS` must abort the child.
AllocGib(usize),
/// Burns CPU forever: `RLIMIT_CPU` (SIGXCPU) or the parent's deadline must stop it.
Spin,
/// Sends SIGTERM to the parent through `tkill`: the argument filter must kill the child.
SignalParent,
/// Maps executable memory: the `mmap` argument filter must kill the child.
MmapExec,
}
impl TestHooks {
fn parse(args: &[String]) -> Result<Self, String> {
#[cfg(not(feature = "test-hooks"))]
let hooks = Self { seccomp: true };
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
let mut hooks = Self {
seccomp: true,
action: None,
};
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
{
let mut iter = args.iter();
while let Some(arg) = iter.next() {
match arg.as_str() {
"--no-seccomp" => hooks.seccomp = false,
"--violate" => hooks.action = Some(HookAction::Violate),
"--flood" => hooks.action = Some(HookAction::Flood),
"--spin" => hooks.action = Some(HookAction::Spin),
"--signal-parent" => hooks.action = Some(HookAction::SignalParent),
"--mmap-exec" => hooks.action = Some(HookAction::MmapExec),
"--alloc-gib" => {
let value = iter
.next()
.and_then(|v| v.parse().ok())
.ok_or("--alloc-gib <n>")?;
hooks.action = Some(HookAction::AllocGib(value));
}
other => return Err(format!("unknown flag {other}")),
}
}
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "test-hooks"))]
if let Some(arg) = args.first() {
return Err(format!("unexpected argument {arg}"));
}
Ok(hooks)
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
fn run_after_sandbox(&self, stdout: &mut dyn Write, stderr: &mut dyn Write) -> Option<i32> {
if !self.seccomp {
// Marker for crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh: one `sched_yield`, a syscall
// the decode path never makes, right where the filter would be installed. The
// syscalls after it are the ones the filter must allow. (A string marker is not
// readable by strace once PR_SET_DUMPABLE is 0.)
std::thread::yield_now();
let _ = stderr.write_all(b"SECCOMP-MARKER\n");
}
match self.action? {
HookAction::Violate => {
let cwd = std::env::current_dir();
let _ = writeln!(stderr, "decode: getcwd survived the filter: {cwd:?}");
Some(exit_codes::INTERNAL)
}
HookAction::Flood => {
let chunk = vec![0u8; 64 * 1024];
for _ in 0..16 {
if stdout.write_all(&chunk).is_err() {
return Some(exit_codes::OUTPUT_FAILED);
}
}
Some(exit_codes::OK)
}
HookAction::AllocGib(gib) => {
let bytes = gib.saturating_mul(1024 * 1024 * 1024);
let buffer = vec![1u8; bytes];
let _ = writeln!(
stderr,
"decode: allocated {} bytes",
std::hint::black_box(&buffer).len()
);
Some(exit_codes::INTERNAL)
}
HookAction::Spin => loop {
std::hint::black_box(0u8);
},
HookAction::SignalParent => {
let survived = negative_hooks::signal_parent();
let _ = writeln!(
stderr,
"decode: tkill(parent) survived the filter: {survived}"
);
Some(exit_codes::INTERNAL)
}
HookAction::MmapExec => {
let survived = negative_hooks::mmap_exec();
let _ = writeln!(
stderr,
"decode: mmap(PROT_EXEC) survived the filter: {survived}"
);
Some(exit_codes::INTERNAL)
}
}
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "test-hooks"))]
fn run_after_sandbox(&self, _stdout: &mut dyn Write, _stderr: &mut dyn Write) -> Option<i32> {
None
}
}
/// Negative proofs of the seccomp argument filters (`test-hooks` only): each call must die
/// with SIGSYS before returning; a return value means the filter let it through.
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
mod negative_hooks {
/// `tkill(getppid(), SIGTERM)`: a signal to another process.
pub fn signal_parent() -> i32 {
// SAFETY: a raw syscall with three integer arguments and no pointer: the kernel
// validates them, so the call cannot touch this process's memory. What the proof
// checks is behaviour: under the filter the process dies with SIGSYS before any
// signal exists; without the filter the parent would receive SIGTERM, which is why
// this module is compiled with the test hooks only and reached by `--signal-parent`.
unsafe { libc::syscall(libc::SYS_tkill, libc::getppid(), libc::SIGTERM) as i32 }
}
/// `mmap` of one executable page.
pub fn mmap_exec() -> i32 {
// SAFETY: an anonymous private mapping with a null address hint and no file
// descriptor: no existing mapping is touched, and the returned address is only
// compared with MAP_FAILED, never dereferenced. Under the filter the process dies
// with SIGSYS before the mapping exists; without it one page leaks in a test process.
let page = unsafe {
libc::mmap(
std::ptr::null_mut(),
4096,
libc::PROT_READ | libc::PROT_EXEC,
libc::MAP_PRIVATE | libc::MAP_ANONYMOUS,
-1,
0,
)
};
i32::from(page != libc::MAP_FAILED)
}
}
/// Reads at most `cap` bytes from a reader, reporting whether more were available.
pub fn read_capped(reader: &mut dyn Read, cap: usize) -> io::Result<(Vec<u8>, bool)> {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
reader.take(cap as u64 + 1).read_to_end(&mut buffer)?;
let overflow = buffer.len() > cap;
buffer.truncate(cap);
Ok((buffer, overflow))
}
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//! Exit codes of the `decode` child, reserved away from 1 (generic failure), 101 (Rust
//! panic) and signal deaths (reported separately by the parent). The parent maps them to
//! the closed rejection reasons of STEP8_FILES_ANALYSIS II.7.
pub const OK: i32 = 0;
pub const USAGE: i32 = 2;
pub const ENV_NOT_EMPTY: i32 = 10;
pub const SANDBOX_FAILED: i32 = 11;
pub const INPUT_TOO_LARGE: i32 = 12;
pub const UNSUPPORTED_TYPE: i32 = 13;
pub const DECODE_FAILED: i32 = 14;
pub const DIMENSIONS: i32 = 15;
pub const ENCODE_FAILED: i32 = 16;
pub const OUTPUT_FAILED: i32 = 17;
pub const INTERNAL: i32 = 18;
/// The decoders' allocation or complexity budget was exceeded by the content.
pub const RESOURCE_LIMIT: i32 = 19;
/// Codes that judge the content (the upload is refused). Every other non-zero code means
/// the child's environment is broken (`Broken` outcome: the parent alerts rather than
/// rejects). Explicit list on purpose: a new code never lands in the wrong class by
/// accident, and no content can produce a "broken" code.
pub fn is_content_rejection(code: i32) -> bool {
matches!(
code,
INPUT_TOO_LARGE | UNSUPPORTED_TYPE | DECODE_FAILED | DIMENSIONS | RESOURCE_LIMIT
)
}
/// Stable name of an exit code for logs and tests.
pub fn name(code: i32) -> &'static str {
match code {
OK => "ok",
USAGE => "usage",
ENV_NOT_EMPTY => "env_not_empty",
SANDBOX_FAILED => "sandbox_failed",
INPUT_TOO_LARGE => "input_too_large",
UNSUPPORTED_TYPE => "unsupported_type",
DECODE_FAILED => "decode_failed",
DIMENSIONS => "dimensions",
ENCODE_FAILED => "encode_failed",
OUTPUT_FAILED => "output_failed",
INTERNAL => "internal",
RESOURCE_LIMIT => "resource_limit",
_ => "unknown",
}
}
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//! Synthetic images for the sandbox tests and the seccomp derivation (`test-hooks` only):
//! nothing binary lives in the repository.
use std::io::Cursor;
use image::{DynamicImage, ImageBuffer, ImageFormat, Rgba};
fn gradient(width: u32, height: u32) -> DynamicImage {
let buffer = ImageBuffer::from_fn(width, height, |x, y| {
let r = u8::try_from(x * 255 / width.max(1)).unwrap_or(255);
let g = u8::try_from(y * 255 / height.max(1)).unwrap_or(255);
let b = u8::try_from((x / 8 + y / 8) % 256).unwrap_or(0);
Rgba([r, g, b, 255])
});
DynamicImage::ImageRgba8(buffer)
}
fn encode(image: &DynamicImage, format: ImageFormat) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
if image.write_to(&mut out, format).is_err() {
return Vec::new();
}
out.into_inner()
}
/// A PNG gradient.
pub fn png(width: u32, height: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
encode(&gradient(width, height), ImageFormat::Png)
}
/// A baseline JPEG gradient (no alpha channel).
pub fn jpeg(width: u32, height: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
let rgb = DynamicImage::ImageRgb8(gradient(width, height).into_rgb8());
encode(&rgb, ImageFormat::Jpeg)
}
/// A lossless WebP gradient (the only WebP encoder of the `image` crate).
pub fn webp(width: u32, height: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
encode(&gradient(width, height), ImageFormat::WebP)
}
/// A PNG whose header declares `width` × `height` with no pixel data: the decoder must
/// refuse it on dimensions before allocating anything.
pub fn png_header_only(width: u32, height: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = vec![0x89, b'P', b'N', b'G', 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a];
let mut ihdr = Vec::new();
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&width.to_be_bytes());
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&[8, 6, 0, 0, 0]);
push_chunk(&mut out, b"IHDR", &ihdr);
push_chunk(&mut out, b"IEND", &[]);
out
}
fn push_chunk(out: &mut Vec<u8>, kind: &[u8; 4], payload: &[u8]) {
out.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
let mut hasher = crc32fast::Hasher::new();
hasher.update(kind);
hasher.update(payload);
out.extend_from_slice(kind);
out.extend_from_slice(payload);
out.extend_from_slice(&hasher.finalize().to_be_bytes());
}
/// A small PNG header whose `iCCP` profile inflates to `inflated_bytes` (hundreds of
/// kilobytes of compressed zeros) and that carries no image data: the decoder refuses it as
/// content (`decode_failed` or `resource_limit`, depending on which check fires first),
/// never as a broken environment. R1 adds a variant with image data so the budget itself
/// is seen firing.
pub fn png_iccp_bomb(inflated_bytes: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
use std::io::Write;
let mut out = vec![0x89, b'P', b'N', b'G', 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a];
let mut ihdr = Vec::new();
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&64u32.to_be_bytes());
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&64u32.to_be_bytes());
ihdr.extend_from_slice(&[8, 6, 0, 0, 0]);
push_chunk(&mut out, b"IHDR", &ihdr);
let mut iccp = b"p\0\0".to_vec();
let mut encoder = flate2::write::ZlibEncoder::new(Vec::new(), flate2::Compression::best());
let zeros = vec![0u8; 1 << 20];
let mut written = 0;
while written < inflated_bytes {
let chunk = (inflated_bytes - written).min(zeros.len());
if encoder.write_all(&zeros[..chunk]).is_err() {
break;
}
written += chunk;
}
iccp.extend_from_slice(&encoder.finish().unwrap_or_default());
push_chunk(&mut out, b"iCCP", &iccp);
push_chunk(&mut out, b"IEND", &[]);
out
}
/// The first bytes of a GIF: a format the avatar pipeline never accepts.
pub fn gif() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = b"GIF89a".to_vec();
out.extend_from_slice(&[64, 0, 64, 0, 0xf7, 0, 0]);
out.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(0u8, 800));
out
}
/// A valid PNG cut in half.
pub fn truncated_png() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut bytes = png(200, 200);
bytes.truncate(bytes.len() / 2);
bytes
}
/// Writes one named fixture on stdout (`faunosteo-worker fixture <name>`).
pub fn by_name(name: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
Some(match name {
"png" => png(800, 600),
"jpeg" => jpeg(640, 480),
"webp" => webp(300, 700),
"big-jpeg" => jpeg(4096, 4096),
// Same pixel budget as the JPEG but compressible (4096 × 2048 of this gradient
// weighed more than the 5 MiB input cap).
"big-png" => png(3000, 3000),
"tiny" => png(32, 32),
"huge-header" => png_header_only(20_000, 20_000),
"iccp-bomb" => png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20),
"gif" => gif(),
"truncated" => truncated_png(),
_ => return None,
})
}
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//! `faunosteo-worker` library: the pieces the binary, the tests and the R1 job loop share.
//!
//! Process model (review Part IV.1): a keyed parent spawns the same binary as `decode`, a
//! child with an empty environment that confines itself (rlimits + seccomp) before reading
//! one image on stdin and writing one 512 × 512 WebP on stdout. The parent never decodes:
//! it checks the container header of what comes back (`webp_check`).
pub mod decode;
pub mod exit_codes;
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
pub mod fixtures;
pub mod limits;
pub mod sandbox;
pub mod spawn;
pub mod webp_check;
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//! Caps of the decode child (review Part IV.1 and STEP8_FILES_ANALYSIS II.5 step 6).
use std::time::Duration;
/// Largest accepted upload (STEP8 D4: 5 MiB at upload).
pub const MAX_INPUT_BYTES: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Largest output the parent reads before killing the child (a 512 × 512 WebP is ~30 KB).
pub const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 512 * 1024;
/// Smallest accepted side of the source image.
pub const MIN_SIDE: u32 = 64;
/// Largest accepted side of the source image (header check before decoding).
pub const MAX_SIDE: u32 = 4096;
/// Allocation budget handed to the decoders (`image::Limits::max_alloc`, advisory).
pub const MAX_ALLOC_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Side of the produced avatar.
pub const OUTPUT_SIDE: u32 = 512;
/// Lossy WebP quality of the produced avatar.
pub const WEBP_QUALITY: f32 = 82.0;
/// Hard address-space cap of the child (`RLIMIT_AS`): the real memory bound.
pub const CHILD_ADDRESS_SPACE_BYTES: u64 = 512 * 1024 * 1024;
/// CPU-time cap of the child (`RLIMIT_CPU`, seconds).
pub const CHILD_CPU_SECONDS: u64 = 10;
/// Wall-clock deadline after which the parent kills the child.
pub const CHILD_DEADLINE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
/// Oldest libwebp the worker accepts to link (D-R4: the linked version is controlled).
pub const MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION: (u8, u8, u8) = (1, 6, 0);
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//! `faunosteo-worker` entry: a plain `main`, no async runtime, no thread, so the `decode`
//! child installs its sandbox in a single-threaded process (review Part IV.1).
//!
//! R0 subcommands: `decode` (the sandboxed child), `run --check` (prints the resolved
//! configuration, no job loop before R1), `version`.
use std::io::Write;
use faunosteo_worker::decode;
use faunosteo_worker::exit_codes;
use faunosteo_worker::limits::MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION;
fn main() {
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().collect();
let code = match args.get(1).map(String::as_str) {
Some("decode") => {
let stdin = std::io::stdin();
let stdout = std::io::stdout();
let stderr = std::io::stderr();
decode::main(
&args[2..],
&mut stdin.lock(),
&mut stdout.lock(),
&mut stderr.lock(),
)
}
Some("run") => run(&args[2..]),
Some("version") => version(),
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
Some("fixture") => fixture(&args[2..]),
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
Some("print-allowlist") => {
for name in faunosteo_worker::sandbox::allowed_names() {
println!("{name}");
}
exit_codes::OK
}
_ => {
eprintln!("usage: faunosteo-worker <decode | run --check | version>");
exit_codes::USAGE
}
};
std::process::exit(code);
}
fn version() -> i32 {
let (major, minor, revision) = decode::libwebp_version();
println!(
"faunosteo-worker {} (core {}, libwebp {major}.{minor}.{revision})",
env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
faunosteo_core_version()
);
exit_codes::OK
}
fn faunosteo_core_version() -> &'static str {
// The worker links no core module before R1 (nothing to share yet); the version printed
// is the workspace version the two crates share.
env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")
}
/// `run --check`: prints what the worker would start with, without secrets. The job loop
/// arrives at R1; a plain `run` therefore refuses to pretend it works.
fn run(args: &[String]) -> i32 {
let (major, minor, revision) = decode::libwebp_version();
let libwebp_ok = (major, minor, revision) >= MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION;
println!("faunosteo-worker run: R0 skeleton, the job loop arrives at R1");
println!(
"libwebp {major}.{minor}.{revision} ({})",
if libwebp_ok {
"accepted"
} else {
"below the minimum, refusing to start"
}
);
for name in ["SUPABASE_URL", "SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY", "WORKER_ID"] {
let state = if std::env::var_os(name).is_some() {
"set"
} else {
"unset"
};
println!("{name}: {state}");
}
let _ = std::io::stdout().flush();
if !libwebp_ok {
return exit_codes::INTERNAL;
}
if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--check") {
exit_codes::OK
} else {
eprintln!("run: nothing to do before R1 (use --check to print the configuration)");
exit_codes::USAGE
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-hooks")]
fn fixture(args: &[String]) -> i32 {
let Some(bytes) = args
.first()
.and_then(|name| faunosteo_worker::fixtures::by_name(name))
else {
eprintln!(
"usage: faunosteo-worker fixture <png|jpeg|webp|big-jpeg|big-png|tiny|huge-header|gif|truncated>"
);
return exit_codes::USAGE;
};
let stdout = std::io::stdout();
let mut lock = stdout.lock();
if lock.write_all(&bytes).and_then(|()| lock.flush()).is_err() {
return exit_codes::OUTPUT_FAILED;
}
exit_codes::OK
}
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//! Confinement of the decode child (review Part IV.1), applied by the child itself from a
//! single-threaded process before it reads any input. Three layers: an empty environment
//! (cleared by the parent, checked in `decode`), rlimits on address space and CPU time, and
//! a seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC that kills the process on any other syscall.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::fmt;
use seccompiler::{
BpfProgram, SeccompAction, SeccompCmpArgLen, SeccompCmpOp, SeccompCondition, SeccompFilter,
SeccompRule, TargetArch,
};
use crate::limits;
/// Syscalls the decode child makes once the filter is installed (static musl binary, x86_64).
///
/// Derived with `strace -f` over the fixture corpus at the caps (`crates/worker/scripts/
/// derive-seccomp.sh`, run by the Dockerfile stage `test`, 2026-10-12: exactly these seven
/// after the marker) and proven by running every fixture through the full sandbox. musl's
/// mallocng used neither `brk` nor `mprotect`, and no `futex` appears in a single-threaded
/// decode.
pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS: &[(&str, i64)] = &[
("read", libc::SYS_read),
("write", libc::SYS_write),
("mmap", libc::SYS_mmap),
("munmap", libc::SYS_munmap),
("mremap", libc::SYS_mremap),
("exit_group", libc::SYS_exit_group),
("getrandom", libc::SYS_getrandom),
];
/// Syscalls of the abort path (`RLIMIT_AS` hit, allocation failure, panic = abort): what
/// musl's `abort()` and Rust's alloc error handler need, proven by the sandbox test
/// `the_address_space_limit_aborts_a_huge_allocation` (SIGABRT observed, not SIGSYS).
pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS: &[(&str, i64)] = &[
("rt_sigaction", libc::SYS_rt_sigaction),
("rt_sigprocmask", libc::SYS_rt_sigprocmask),
("getpid", libc::SYS_getpid),
("gettid", libc::SYS_gettid),
("tkill", libc::SYS_tkill),
("tgkill", libc::SYS_tgkill),
("exit", libc::SYS_exit),
];
/// Resource limits of the child.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Limits {
pub address_space_bytes: u64,
pub cpu_seconds: u64,
}
impl Default for Limits {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
address_space_bytes: limits::CHILD_ADDRESS_SPACE_BYTES,
cpu_seconds: limits::CHILD_CPU_SECONDS,
}
}
}
/// Why the sandbox could not be applied (the child exits `sandbox_failed`).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SandboxError {
NotSingleThreaded(usize),
ProcStatusUnreadable,
Rlimit(String),
Seccomp(String),
UnsupportedArchitecture,
}
impl fmt::Display for SandboxError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::NotSingleThreaded(n) => write!(f, "process has {n} threads, expected 1"),
Self::ProcStatusUnreadable => write!(f, "/proc/self/status unreadable"),
Self::Rlimit(detail) => write!(f, "rlimit: {detail}"),
Self::Seccomp(detail) => write!(f, "seccomp: {detail}"),
Self::UnsupportedArchitecture => write!(f, "no seccomp filter for this architecture"),
}
}
}
impl std::error::Error for SandboxError {}
/// Applies the three layers. `seccomp = false` keeps only the rlimits (the strace
/// derivation run of the test stage); a release child always passes `true`.
pub fn apply(limits: &Limits, seccomp: bool) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
ensure_single_thread()?;
disable_core_dumps()?;
set_rlimits(limits)?;
if seccomp {
install_seccomp()?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// No core dump of the child: a dump would hold the uploaded photo (personal data) and
/// could fill the VPS disk (SIGABRT under `RLIMIT_AS`, SIGSYS, SIGXCPU all dump by default).
/// `PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0` is the kernel-side stop, `RLIMIT_CORE 0` the belt.
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
fn disable_core_dumps() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
/// prctl reads its variadic arguments as unsigned long: the flag value and the
/// arguments an option ignores are passed at that width.
const NOT_DUMPABLE: libc::c_ulong = 0;
const UNUSED: libc::c_ulong = 0;
// SAFETY: prctl is a variadic FFI reading its extra arguments as unsigned long; for
// PR_SET_DUMPABLE the kernel uses the first one (the new flag) and ignores the other
// three, passed at that width: no pointer, no memory of this process involved, and only
// this process's flag changes. The return code is checked below.
let rc = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_DUMPABLE, NOT_DUMPABLE, UNUSED, UNUSED, UNUSED) };
if rc != 0 {
return Err(SandboxError::Rlimit("PR_SET_DUMPABLE".to_owned()));
}
// SAFETY: PR_GET_DUMPABLE reads this process's flag and ignores the extra arguments,
// passed as unsigned-long zeros. The result is the flag (0 expected) or -1 on failure:
// any non-zero value is refused below.
let dumpable = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_GET_DUMPABLE, UNUSED, UNUSED, UNUSED, UNUSED) };
if dumpable != 0 {
return Err(SandboxError::Rlimit(format!(
"PR_GET_DUMPABLE = {dumpable}"
)));
}
rlimit::setrlimit(rlimit::Resource::CORE, 0, 0)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Rlimit(format!("RLIMIT_CORE: {error}")))
}
/// Every syscall name the filter allows, for the derivation script and the tests.
pub fn allowed_names() -> Vec<&'static str> {
ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
.iter()
.chain(ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS)
.map(|(name, _)| *name)
.collect()
}
/// Parses the `Threads:` line of a `/proc/<pid>/status` text.
pub fn thread_count(status: &str) -> Option<usize> {
status
.lines()
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("Threads:"))
.and_then(|value| value.trim().parse().ok())
}
fn ensure_single_thread() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
let status = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status")
.map_err(|_| SandboxError::ProcStatusUnreadable)?;
match thread_count(&status) {
Some(1) => Ok(()),
Some(n) => Err(SandboxError::NotSingleThreaded(n)),
None => Err(SandboxError::ProcStatusUnreadable),
}
}
fn set_rlimits(limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
rlimit::setrlimit(
rlimit::Resource::AS,
limits.address_space_bytes,
limits.address_space_bytes,
)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Rlimit(format!("RLIMIT_AS: {error}")))?;
// Soft limit first (SIGXCPU, observable), hard limit two seconds later (SIGKILL): with
// soft == hard the kernel checks the hard limit first and the child dies by SIGKILL,
// indistinguishable from the parent's own deadline kill.
rlimit::setrlimit(
rlimit::Resource::CPU,
limits.cpu_seconds,
limits.cpu_seconds + 2,
)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Rlimit(format!("RLIMIT_CPU: {error}")))
}
/// Builds the BPF program: allow the listed syscalls, kill the process on anything else.
///
/// Argument filters on the abort path and on `mmap`: `tkill`/`tgkill` may only send SIGABRT
/// to this very process (the child is single-threaded, so tid == pid), never a signal to the
/// keyed parent or a sibling; `mmap` may not map executable memory.
pub fn build_filter() -> Result<BpfProgram, SandboxError> {
let pid = u64::from(std::process::id());
let sigabrt = u64::try_from(libc::SIGABRT).unwrap_or(6);
let prot_exec = u64::try_from(libc::PROT_EXEC).unwrap_or(4);
let mut rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
.iter()
.chain(ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS)
.map(|(_, number)| (*number, Vec::new()))
.collect();
let seccomp_err = |error: seccompiler::BackendError| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string());
let eq = |index: u8, value: u64| {
SeccompCondition::new(index, SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword, SeccompCmpOp::Eq, value)
.map_err(seccomp_err)
};
rules.insert(
libc::SYS_tkill,
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, sigabrt)?]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
);
rules.insert(
libc::SYS_tgkill,
vec![
SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, pid)?, eq(2, sigabrt)?])
.map_err(seccomp_err)?,
],
);
let no_exec = SeccompCondition::new(
2,
SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword,
SeccompCmpOp::MaskedEq(prot_exec),
0,
)
.map_err(seccomp_err)?;
rules.insert(
libc::SYS_mmap,
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![no_exec]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
);
let filter = SeccompFilter::new(
rules,
SeccompAction::KillProcess,
SeccompAction::Allow,
target_arch()?,
)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))?;
filter.try_into().map_err(seccomp_err)
}
fn install_seccomp() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
let program = build_filter()?;
seccompiler::apply_filter_all_threads(&program)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))
}
fn target_arch() -> Result<TargetArch, SandboxError> {
if cfg!(target_arch = "x86_64") {
Ok(TargetArch::x86_64)
} else if cfg!(target_arch = "aarch64") {
Ok(TargetArch::aarch64)
} else {
Err(SandboxError::UnsupportedArchitecture)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn thread_count_reads_the_status_line() {
assert_eq!(thread_count("Name:\tx\nThreads:\t1\nSigQ:\t0/1\n"), Some(1));
assert_eq!(thread_count("Threads:\t12\n"), Some(12));
assert_eq!(thread_count("Name:\tx\n"), None);
}
#[test]
fn the_filter_compiles() {
let program = build_filter();
assert!(program.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn no_file_or_process_syscall_is_allowed() {
let names = allowed_names();
for forbidden in [
"open", "openat", "execve", "clone", "fork", "socket", "ptrace",
] {
assert!(!names.contains(&forbidden), "{forbidden} must stay denied");
}
}
}
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//! Runs the decode child from the keyed parent (review Part IV.1): empty environment,
//! bounded output, wall-clock deadline, and the mapping of every way the child can end to
//! a closed outcome. The parent reads the container header of the output, never the pixels.
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::{Command, ExitStatus, Stdio};
use std::sync::mpsc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use crate::limits::{CHILD_DEADLINE, MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES, OUTPUT_SIDE};
use crate::{exit_codes, webp_check};
/// How a decode child ended.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum ChildOutcome {
/// A 512 × 512 WebP whose container passed the parent's check.
Produced(Vec<u8>),
/// The child refused the input with one of its content exit codes
/// (`exit_codes::is_content_rejection`).
Rejected { code: i32, name: &'static str },
/// The child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox failure,
/// encode or output failure, internal error): the confinement environment is broken,
/// not the upload. No content can produce this outcome (every decode-time error maps
/// to a content code). R1 alerts and stops on it instead of rejecting the job.
Broken { code: i32, name: &'static str },
/// The child died from a signal (SIGSYS 31 = seccomp, SIGABRT 6 = allocation failure,
/// SIGXCPU 24 = CPU limit, SIGKILL 9 = the parent).
Signalled { signal: i32 },
/// The child wrote more than the output cap and was killed.
OutputOverflow,
/// The child outlived the deadline and was killed.
Timeout,
/// The child exited 0 but its output failed the container check, or it could not run.
Failed(String),
}
/// A finished child run. `stderr` is text the child controls (up to 4 KiB): never logged
/// raw by R1, control characters escaped and the field allowlist applied (LRN-044).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ChildRun {
pub outcome: ChildOutcome,
pub stderr: String,
}
/// Spawns `decode` children of one worker binary.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Spawner {
pub exe: PathBuf,
pub deadline: Duration,
pub max_output: usize,
pub extra_args: Vec<String>,
}
impl Spawner {
pub fn new(exe: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self {
exe: exe.into(),
deadline: CHILD_DEADLINE,
max_output: MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
extra_args: Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Feeds `input` to a fresh child and classifies what comes back.
pub fn decode(&self, input: &[u8]) -> ChildRun {
let spawned = Command::new(&self.exe)
.arg("decode")
.args(&self.extra_args)
.env_clear()
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn();
let mut child = match spawned {
Ok(child) => child,
Err(error) => return failed(format!("spawn: {error}")),
};
let (Some(mut stdin), Some(stdout), Some(stderr)) =
(child.stdin.take(), child.stdout.take(), child.stderr.take())
else {
let _ = child.kill();
let _ = child.wait();
return failed("child pipes unavailable".to_owned());
};
let input = input.to_vec();
let writer = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = stdin.write_all(&input);
});
let cap = self.max_output;
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut limited = stdout.take(cap as u64 + 1);
let _ = limited.read_to_end(&mut buffer);
let _ = tx.send(buffer);
});
let err_reader = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let _ = stderr.take(4096).read_to_end(&mut buffer);
String::from_utf8_lossy(&buffer).into_owned()
});
let started = Instant::now();
let mut output: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
let status: Option<ExitStatus> = loop {
if output.is_none()
&& let Ok(buffer) = rx.try_recv()
{
if buffer.len() > cap {
let _ = child.kill();
let _ = child.wait();
let _ = writer.join();
let stderr = err_reader.join().unwrap_or_default();
return ChildRun {
outcome: ChildOutcome::OutputOverflow,
stderr,
};
}
output = Some(buffer);
}
match child.try_wait() {
Ok(Some(status)) => break Some(status),
Ok(None) => {
if started.elapsed() > self.deadline {
let _ = child.kill();
let _ = child.wait();
break None;
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
}
Err(error) => {
let _ = child.kill();
let _ = child.wait();
return failed(format!("wait: {error}"));
}
}
};
let _ = writer.join();
let output = output.unwrap_or_else(|| rx.recv().unwrap_or_default());
let stderr = err_reader.join().unwrap_or_default();
if output.len() > cap {
return ChildRun {
outcome: ChildOutcome::OutputOverflow,
stderr,
};
}
let outcome = match status {
None => ChildOutcome::Timeout,
Some(status) => classify(status, output),
};
ChildRun { outcome, stderr }
}
}
fn classify(status: ExitStatus, output: Vec<u8>) -> ChildOutcome {
match status.code() {
Some(0) => match webp_check::expect_square(&output, OUTPUT_SIDE) {
Ok(_) => ChildOutcome::Produced(output),
Err(issue) => ChildOutcome::Failed(format!("output refused: {issue}")),
},
Some(code) if exit_codes::is_content_rejection(code) => ChildOutcome::Rejected {
code,
name: exit_codes::name(code),
},
Some(code) => ChildOutcome::Broken {
code,
name: exit_codes::name(code),
},
None => ChildOutcome::Signalled {
signal: status.signal().unwrap_or(-1),
},
}
}
fn failed(detail: String) -> ChildRun {
ChildRun {
outcome: ChildOutcome::Failed(detail),
stderr: String::new(),
}
}
+291
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//! Parent-side check of the child's output (review Part IV.1): the keyed parent never
//! decodes pixels. It parses the RIFF container, allowlists the chunk types, reads the
//! canvas size from the bitstream headers and refuses any metadata chunk.
use std::fmt;
/// Why the parent refused the child's output.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum WebpIssue {
TooShort,
NotRiff,
RiffSizeMismatch,
NotWebp,
ChunkOverrun,
ForbiddenChunk([u8; 4]),
MissingBitstream,
BadBitstream,
Dimensions { width: u32, height: u32 },
}
impl fmt::Display for WebpIssue {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc) => {
write!(f, "forbidden chunk {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(fourcc))
}
Self::Dimensions { width, height } => write!(f, "unexpected size {width}x{height}"),
other => write!(f, "{other:?}"),
}
}
}
/// What the parent learnt from the container without decoding a pixel.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct WebpSummary {
pub width: u32,
pub height: u32,
pub chunks: Vec<[u8; 4]>,
}
const ALLOWED_CHUNKS: [&[u8; 4]; 4] = [b"VP8X", b"VP8 ", b"VP8L", b"ALPH"];
/// Parses the container of a WebP file produced by the child.
pub fn inspect(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<WebpSummary, WebpIssue> {
let header = bytes.get(0..12).ok_or(WebpIssue::TooShort)?;
if &header[0..4] != b"RIFF" {
return Err(WebpIssue::NotRiff);
}
let riff_size = u32::from_le_bytes([header[4], header[5], header[6], header[7]]) as usize;
if riff_size.checked_add(8) != Some(bytes.len()) {
return Err(WebpIssue::RiffSizeMismatch);
}
if &header[8..12] != b"WEBP" {
return Err(WebpIssue::NotWebp);
}
let mut offset = 12;
let mut chunks: Vec<[u8; 4]> = Vec::new();
let mut canvas: Option<(u32, u32)> = None;
let mut frame: Option<(u32, u32)> = None;
while offset < bytes.len() {
let chunk_header = bytes
.get(offset..offset + 8)
.ok_or(WebpIssue::ChunkOverrun)?;
let fourcc = [
chunk_header[0],
chunk_header[1],
chunk_header[2],
chunk_header[3],
];
let size = u32::from_le_bytes([
chunk_header[4],
chunk_header[5],
chunk_header[6],
chunk_header[7],
]) as usize;
let start = offset + 8;
let end = start.checked_add(size).ok_or(WebpIssue::ChunkOverrun)?;
let payload = bytes.get(start..end).ok_or(WebpIssue::ChunkOverrun)?;
if !ALLOWED_CHUNKS.contains(&&fourcc) {
return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc));
}
// Structure the encoder produces, and nothing else: an optional VP8X first, then an
// optional ALPH (extended files only), then exactly one VP8 or VP8L frame.
match &fourcc {
b"VP8X" => {
if !chunks.is_empty() {
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
canvas = Some(parse_vp8x(payload)?);
}
b"ALPH" => {
if canvas.is_none() || frame.is_some() {
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
}
b"VP8 " | b"VP8L" => {
if frame.is_some() {
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
frame = Some(if &fourcc == b"VP8 " {
parse_vp8(payload)?
} else {
parse_vp8l(payload)?
});
}
_ => return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc)),
}
chunks.push(fourcc);
offset = end + (size & 1);
}
let frame = frame.ok_or(WebpIssue::MissingBitstream)?;
// The canvas (VP8X) and the frame must agree: the encoder never writes otherwise.
if let Some(canvas) = canvas
&& canvas != frame
{
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
let (width, height) = canvas.unwrap_or(frame);
Ok(WebpSummary {
width,
height,
chunks,
})
}
/// `inspect`, then the canvas must be exactly `side` × `side`.
pub fn expect_square(bytes: &[u8], side: u32) -> Result<WebpSummary, WebpIssue> {
let summary = inspect(bytes)?;
if summary.width != side || summary.height != side {
return Err(WebpIssue::Dimensions {
width: summary.width,
height: summary.height,
});
}
Ok(summary)
}
fn parse_vp8x(payload: &[u8]) -> Result<(u32, u32), WebpIssue> {
let p = payload.get(0..10).ok_or(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)?;
let width = 1 + u32::from_le_bytes([p[4], p[5], p[6], 0]);
let height = 1 + u32::from_le_bytes([p[7], p[8], p[9], 0]);
Ok((width, height))
}
fn parse_vp8(payload: &[u8]) -> Result<(u32, u32), WebpIssue> {
let p = payload.get(0..10).ok_or(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)?;
if p[3..6] != [0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a] {
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
let width = u32::from(u16::from_le_bytes([p[6], p[7]]) & 0x3fff);
let height = u32::from(u16::from_le_bytes([p[8], p[9]]) & 0x3fff);
Ok((width, height))
}
fn parse_vp8l(payload: &[u8]) -> Result<(u32, u32), WebpIssue> {
let p = payload.get(0..5).ok_or(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)?;
if p[0] != 0x2f {
return Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream);
}
let bits = u32::from_le_bytes([p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4]]);
Ok(((bits & 0x3fff) + 1, ((bits >> 14) & 0x3fff) + 1))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn riff(chunks: &[(&[u8; 4], &[u8])]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut body = b"WEBP".to_vec();
for (fourcc, payload) in chunks {
body.extend_from_slice(*fourcc);
body.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(payload);
if payload.len() % 2 == 1 {
body.push(0);
}
}
let mut out = b"RIFF".to_vec();
out.extend_from_slice(&(body.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&body);
out
}
fn vp8x(width: u32, height: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
let w = (width - 1).to_le_bytes();
let h = (height - 1).to_le_bytes();
vec![0x10, 0, 0, 0, w[0], w[1], w[2], h[0], h[1], h[2]]
}
#[test]
fn a_square_vp8x_file_passes() {
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 20];
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)]);
let summary = expect_square(&bytes, 512);
assert_eq!(summary.map(|s| (s.width, s.height)), Ok((512, 512)));
}
#[test]
fn a_frame_disagreeing_with_its_canvas_is_refused() {
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 10];
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&256u16.to_le_bytes());
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)]);
assert_eq!(inspect(&bytes), Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream));
}
#[test]
fn chunk_structure_is_strict() {
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 20];
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
// two frames
assert_eq!(
inspect(&riff(&[(b"VP8 ", &vp8), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)])),
Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)
);
// ALPH without VP8X
assert_eq!(
inspect(&riff(&[(b"ALPH", &[0; 4]), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)])),
Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)
);
// VP8X not first
assert_eq!(
inspect(&riff(&[(b"VP8 ", &vp8), (b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512))])),
Err(WebpIssue::BadBitstream)
);
// the encoder's extended layout
assert!(
expect_square(
&riff(&[
(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)),
(b"ALPH", &[0; 4]),
(b"VP8 ", &vp8)
]),
512
)
.is_ok()
);
}
#[test]
fn metadata_chunks_are_refused() {
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512)), (b"EXIF", b"x")]);
// refused on the chunk type before any structural rule
assert_eq!(inspect(&bytes), Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(*b"EXIF")));
}
#[test]
fn wrong_sizes_are_refused() {
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 20];
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&511u16.to_le_bytes());
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
let bytes = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(511, 512)), (b"VP8 ", &vp8)]);
assert_eq!(
expect_square(&bytes, 512),
Err(WebpIssue::Dimensions {
width: 511,
height: 512
})
);
let mut truncated = riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512))]);
truncated.pop();
assert_eq!(inspect(&truncated), Err(WebpIssue::RiffSizeMismatch));
assert_eq!(
inspect(&riff(&[(b"VP8X", &vp8x(512, 512))])),
Err(WebpIssue::MissingBitstream)
);
assert_eq!(inspect(b"not a webp"), Err(WebpIssue::TooShort));
}
#[test]
fn simple_lossy_and_lossless_headers_give_the_size() {
let mut vp8 = vec![0u8; 10];
vp8[3..6].copy_from_slice(&[0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a]);
vp8[6..8].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
vp8[8..10].copy_from_slice(&512u16.to_le_bytes());
assert!(expect_square(&riff(&[(b"VP8 ", &vp8)]), 512).is_ok());
let bits: u32 = (512 - 1) | ((512 - 1) << 14);
let mut vp8l = vec![0x2f];
vp8l.extend_from_slice(&bits.to_le_bytes());
assert!(expect_square(&riff(&[(b"VP8L", &vp8l)]), 512).is_ok());
}
}
+212
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//! R0 proofs of the decode child, run against the real binary (`--features test-hooks`,
//! Linux): the full sandbox accepts the fixture corpus, refuses what it must, and every
//! other way the child can die is observed and classified by the parent.
#![cfg(all(feature = "test-hooks", target_os = "linux"))]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use std::time::Duration;
use faunosteo_worker::spawn::{ChildOutcome, Spawner};
use faunosteo_worker::{exit_codes, fixtures, limits, webp_check};
const SIGABRT: i32 = 6;
const SIGXCPU: i32 = 24;
const SIGSYS: i32 = 31;
fn spawner() -> Spawner {
Spawner::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_faunosteo-worker"))
}
fn with_hook(flags: &[&str]) -> Spawner {
let mut spawner = spawner();
spawner.extra_args = flags.iter().map(|flag| (*flag).to_owned()).collect();
spawner
}
fn expect_rejected(bytes: &[u8], code: i32) {
let run = spawner().decode(bytes);
match run.outcome {
ChildOutcome::Rejected { code: got, .. } if got == code => {}
other => panic!(
"expected {}, got {other:?} (stderr: {})",
exit_codes::name(code),
run.stderr
),
}
}
#[test]
fn png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox() {
for (name, bytes) in [
("png", fixtures::png(800, 600)),
("jpeg", fixtures::jpeg(640, 480)),
("webp", fixtures::webp(300, 700)),
] {
let run = spawner().decode(&bytes);
match run.outcome {
ChildOutcome::Produced(out) => {
let summary = webp_check::inspect(&out).unwrap();
assert_eq!((summary.width, summary.height), (512, 512), "{name}");
assert!(
out.len() < limits::MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
"{name}: {} bytes",
out.len()
);
}
other => panic!("{name}: {other:?} (stderr: {})", run.stderr),
}
}
}
#[test]
fn inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits() {
let big = fixtures::jpeg(4096, 4096);
let run = spawner().decode(&big);
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Produced(_)),
"{:?} {}",
run.outcome,
run.stderr
);
}
#[test]
fn too_small_images_are_refused_on_dimensions() {
expect_rejected(&fixtures::png(32, 32), exit_codes::DIMENSIONS);
}
#[test]
fn oversized_headers_are_refused_before_decoding() {
expect_rejected(
&fixtures::png_header_only(20_000, 20_000),
exit_codes::DIMENSIONS,
);
}
#[test]
fn an_iccp_bomb_is_a_content_rejection_not_a_broken_environment() {
// The png crate reports the inflated profile as a decoding error; the property proven
// here is that content can only ever be rejected, never classified as a broken
// environment (the outcome R1 alerts on).
let run = spawner().decode(&fixtures::png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20));
match run.outcome {
ChildOutcome::Rejected { code, .. }
if code == exit_codes::DECODE_FAILED || code == exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT => {}
other => panic!(
"expected a content rejection, got {other:?} ({})",
run.stderr
),
}
}
#[test]
fn a_signal_to_the_parent_is_killed_by_the_argument_filter() {
let run = with_hook(&["--signal-parent"]).decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: SIGSYS }),
"{:?} {}",
run.outcome,
run.stderr
);
}
#[test]
fn an_executable_mapping_is_killed_by_the_argument_filter() {
let run = with_hook(&["--mmap-exec"]).decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: SIGSYS }),
"{:?} {}",
run.outcome,
run.stderr
);
}
#[test]
fn unsupported_formats_are_refused() {
expect_rejected(&fixtures::gif(), exit_codes::UNSUPPORTED_TYPE);
expect_rejected(
b"<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'/>",
exit_codes::UNSUPPORTED_TYPE,
);
}
#[test]
fn truncated_files_are_decode_failures() {
expect_rejected(&fixtures::truncated_png(), exit_codes::DECODE_FAILED);
}
#[test]
fn the_child_refuses_a_non_empty_environment() {
let status = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_faunosteo-worker"))
.arg("decode")
.env_clear()
.env("LEAKED", "1")
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::null())
.stderr(Stdio::null())
.status()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(status.code(), Some(exit_codes::ENV_NOT_EMPTY));
}
#[test]
fn a_denied_syscall_kills_the_child_with_sigsys() {
let run = with_hook(&["--violate"]).decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: SIGSYS }),
"{:?} {}",
run.outcome,
run.stderr
);
}
#[test]
fn an_output_flood_is_cut_at_the_cap() {
let run = with_hook(&["--flood"]).decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::OutputOverflow),
"{:?}",
run.outcome
);
}
#[test]
fn the_address_space_limit_aborts_a_huge_allocation() {
let run = with_hook(&["--alloc-gib", "2"]).decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: SIGABRT }),
"{:?} {}",
run.outcome,
run.stderr
);
}
#[test]
fn the_deadline_kills_a_spinning_child() {
let mut spawner = with_hook(&["--spin"]);
spawner.deadline = Duration::from_secs(2);
let run = spawner.decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Timeout),
"{:?}",
run.outcome
);
}
#[test]
fn the_cpu_limit_stops_a_spinning_child_before_the_deadline() {
let mut spawner = with_hook(&["--spin"]);
spawner.deadline = Duration::from_secs(limits::CHILD_CPU_SECONDS + 10);
let run = spawner.decode(b"");
assert!(
matches!(run.outcome, ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: SIGXCPU }),
"{:?}",
run.outcome
);
}
#[test]
fn the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough() {
assert!(faunosteo_worker::decode::libwebp_version() >= limits::MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION);
}
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# cargo-deny policy (RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW Part V). `cargo deny check licenses bans sources`
# blocks in CI; `cargo deny check advisories` runs in the nightly job and at release time, so
# an unrelated advisory publication never reddens every branch.
[graph]
targets = [
{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu" },
{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" },
{ triple = "wasm32-unknown-unknown" },
]
all-features = true
[advisories]
yanked = "deny"
ignore = []
[licenses]
allow = [
"MIT",
"Apache-2.0",
"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
"BSD-2-Clause",
"BSD-3-Clause",
"ISC",
"Unicode-3.0",
"Zlib",
"MPL-2.0",
"CC0-1.0",
"Unlicense",
"BSL-1.0",
]
confidence-threshold = 0.9
[licenses.private]
ignore = true
[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"
# The workspace path dependency on crates/core has no version requirement: not a wildcard.
allow-wildcard-paths = true
highlight = "all"
[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
+17
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
import { chromium } from 'playwright-core'
const exe = process.env.CHROME
const browser = await chromium.launch({ executablePath: exe, headless: true })
for (const [name, port] of [['without wasm-unsafe-eval', 8091], ['with wasm-unsafe-eval', 8092]]) {
const page = await browser.newPage()
const logs = []
page.on('console', (m) => logs.push(`${m.type()}: ${m.text()}`))
page.on('pageerror', (e) => logs.push(`pageerror: ${e.message}`))
const resp = await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`)
const csp = resp.headers()['content-security-policy']
await page.waitForFunction(() => document.title !== 'pending', null, { timeout: 10000 }).catch(() => {})
const wasmResp = await page.request.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/pkg/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm`)
console.log(`== ${name}: title="${await page.title()}" csp-has-wasm-unsafe-eval=${csp.includes('wasm-unsafe-eval')} wasm-content-type=${wasmResp.headers()['content-type']}`)
for (const l of logs) console.log(' ' + l.slice(0, 220))
await page.close()
}
await browser.close()
+28
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# R0 proof (D-R13): the browser module instantiates under the production CSP only with
# 'wasm-unsafe-eval'. Serves packages/core-wasm/pkg through the production nginx image with
# the DEPLOY.md header (as is, then with the keyword) and loads the page in headless Chromium.
#
# pnpm wasm:build
# CHROME=/path/to/chrome bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh # needs playwright-core on NODE_PATH
#
# Recorded result (2026-10-12, Chrome for Testing 156, nginx:1.31-alpine): docs/development/RUST.md §5.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
work="$(mktemp -d)"
mkdir -p "$work/site"
cp -r packages/core-wasm/pkg "$work/site/"
cp docker/csp-proof/site/index.html docker/csp-proof/site/main.js "$work/site/"
prod_csp="$(grep -m1 '^add_header Content-Security-Policy' DEPLOY.md | sed -E 's/^add_header Content-Security-Policy "(.*)" always;$/\1/')"
wasm_csp="${prod_csp/script-src \'self\'/script-src \'self\' \'wasm-unsafe-eval\'}"
for variant in without with; do
if [ "$variant" = without ]; then csp="$prod_csp"; else csp="$wasm_csp"; fi
sed "s/\${PORT}/8080/; s|^ # SPA fallback| add_header Content-Security-Policy \"$csp\" always;\n # SPA fallback|" docker/nginx.conf > "$work/csp-$variant.conf"
done
cleanup() { docker rm -f faunosteo_csp_without faunosteo_csp_with >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT
cleanup
docker run -d --rm --name faunosteo_csp_without -p 127.0.0.1:8091:8080 -v "$work/site:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro" -v "$work/csp-without.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" nginx:1.31-alpine >/dev/null
docker run -d --rm --name faunosteo_csp_with -p 127.0.0.1:8092:8080 -v "$work/site:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro" -v "$work/csp-with.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" nginx:1.31-alpine >/dev/null
sleep 1.5
node docker/csp-proof/run.mjs
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>pending</title>
<script type="module" src="./main.js"></script>
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
import init, { core_version } from './pkg/faunosteo_wasm.js'
try { await init(); document.title = 'OK ' + core_version() } catch (e) { document.title = 'FAIL ' + (e && e.message) }
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# Faunosteo reference Rust build environment (plan R0, RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW Annex B,
# amended 2026-10-13). Daily development runs cargo natively on the Ubuntu development
# machine (rustup, docs/development/RUST.md §1); this image is the reproducible
# alternative (`pnpm rust:check:docker`, `pnpm wasm:build:docker`), the reference for a
# future runner, and the proof that the production VPS never needs Rust.
#
# docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker
# bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test --workspace
#
# The pinned versions below must match rust-toolchain.toml (channel) and Cargo.lock
# (wasm-bindgen crate): scripts/wasm-build.sh refuses to run when they differ. The same
# three tools are installed natively with rustup / cargo install at these versions.
FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm
ARG WASM_BINDGEN_VERSION=0.2.129
ARG CARGO_DENY_VERSION=0.20.2
# The wasm target is the browser build of crates/wasm.
RUN rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
# Build tools compiled from crates.io at pinned versions with their own lockfiles.
RUN cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version "${WASM_BINDGEN_VERSION}" --locked \
&& cargo install cargo-deny --version "${CARGO_DENY_VERSION}" --locked \
&& rm -rf /usr/local/cargo/registry
# The official image installs rustup's minimal profile: without this line every container
# would download rustfmt and clippy again (rust-toolchain.toml lists them as components).
RUN rustup component add rustfmt clippy
WORKDIR /w
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Runs a command inside the reference Rust builder image with the repository mounted
# at /w: the reproducible alternative to the native toolchain of the development machine
# (docs/development/RUST.md §1). Cargo's registry and the target directory live in named
# Docker volumes (faunosteo_ prefix, DEPLOY.md "Docker resource naming"), separate from
# the native ./target, so incremental builds stay fast across runs.
#
# bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo test --workspace
# bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh # = pnpm wasm:build:docker
set -euo pipefail
IMAGE="${FAUNOSTEO_RUST_BUILDER:-faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0}"
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
TTY_FLAG=()
if [ -t 0 ] && [ -t 1 ]; then
TTY_FLAG=(-t)
fi
exec docker run --rm -i "${TTY_FLAG[@]}" \
-v "$ROOT":/w \
-v faunosteo_cargo_registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry \
-v faunosteo_rust_target:/w/target \
-w /w \
"$IMAGE" "$@"
+416
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@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
# Rust in the Faunosteo monorepo
Status: plan R0 (foundation), 2026-10-12, on `feature/rust-r0-foundation`. Rule
and roadmap: `RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` (rule "Rust by default", Part III
boundary rules, Part VI phases R0–R5, Annex B R0 scope, Annex C owner
amendments). R0 ships the toolchain, the workspace skeleton, the worker's
sandboxed child, the browser module loader and seven experimental proofs. No
application behaviour, interface, archive or database changes; the frontend
does not load the module before R2; the worker's job loop arrives at R1.
## 1. Toolchain: native on the development machine, reproducible in Docker, never on the VPS
Three environments, three roles (owner decision of 2026-10-13, review Annex C
addendum). The development machine is a self-hosted Ubuntu server (native,
not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless.
| Environment | Role | Rust |
|---|---|---|
| Ubuntu development machine, native | daily development (`cargo check / test / build / clippy / fmt`), the browser module build, every check before a merge (`pnpm check:all`) | user-level `rustup` in `~/.cargo` and `~/.rustup`, channel pinned by `rust-toolchain.toml` |
| Docker on that machine | the Supabase stack, the worker's sandbox tests and seccomp derivation, integration tests, the application and worker images, and the reproducible run of the same Rust scripts through the builder image | inside images only |
| Production VPS | runs images; never compiles | none |
### 1.1 Native toolchain (the primary path)
Everything lives in the user's home: no global package, no `sudo`. Checked on
2026-10-13 (Ubuntu 26.04.1, x86_64): `build-essential` (gcc 15, the C
compiler that builds the worker's vendored libwebp), `libc6-dev`,
`pkg-config`, `libssl-dev` and `strace` were already installed; no system
package is missing.
```bash
# once: rustup, the user-level installer (https://rustup.rs); ~/.bashrc and ~/.profile source ~/.cargo/env
rustup show # from the repository: installs 1.99.0 + rustfmt + clippy
rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown # browser build of crates/wasm
cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version 0.2.129 --locked # = the wasm-bindgen crate in Cargo.lock
cargo install cargo-deny --version 0.20.2 --locked
```
`rustup show` run inside the repository installs the channel of
`rust-toolchain.toml` (rustup auto-install), so `cargo` here is always
1.99.0 whatever the default toolchain of the machine. Non-interactive
shells (editor tasks, git hooks, agent shells) skip `~/.bashrc` and start
without `~/.cargo/bin` on PATH: the scripts source `scripts/rust-env.sh`,
which prepends it when `cargo` is not found.
| Piece | Native | Builder image | Pinned by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rust 1.99.0, edition 2024, rustfmt, clippy | `rustup show` (auto-install) | `FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm` + `rustup component add` | `rust-toolchain.toml` |
| `wasm32-unknown-unknown` | `rustup target add` | `RUN rustup target add` | same channel |
| `wasm-bindgen-cli` 0.2.129 | `cargo install --locked` | same | `wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129"` in `Cargo.toml`; `scripts/wasm-build.sh` refuses to run when `Cargo.lock` and the CLI on PATH differ |
| `cargo-deny` 0.20.2 | `cargo install --locked` | same | `deny.toml` |
| worker builder (musl, libwebp) | not native: sandbox tests run in Docker only | `crates/worker/Dockerfile` (`FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24`, `build-base`) | same channel |
Commands (root `package.json`; every Rust script is one file run natively
or inside the builder image):
```bash
pnpm rust:check # scripts/rust-check.sh, native: fmt --check, clippy -D warnings (all targets),
# cargo test (core, wasm, worker unit tests), ts-rs export, cargo deny licenses/bans/sources
pnpm wasm:build # scripts/wasm-build.sh, native: crates/wasm → packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored), sizes printed
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh: the pre-merge gate (§4): rust:check, types drift, wasm:build,
# pnpm check, application image, worker:test, worker:image started read-only
pnpm rust:check:docker # the same rust-check.sh inside the builder image (reproducible run)
pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same wasm-build.sh inside the builder image
pnpm rust:builder # builds faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 once (about 6 minutes cold)
pnpm worker:test # Docker only: crates/worker/Dockerfile stage test, 16 sandbox tests + seccomp derivation
pnpm worker:image # Docker only: runtime image faunosteo_worker:dev (distroless/static:nonroot)
bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo <anything> # any cargo command in the builder
cargo check | test | build | clippy | fmt # the inner loop, from the repository root
```
The native `target/` (git-ignored, `.dockerignore`d) and the builder's named
volumes `faunosteo_cargo_registry` / `faunosteo_rust_target` are two
separate caches; neither invalidates the other.
### 1.2 What stays in Docker, and why
- The worker's sandbox tests (`crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs`) are gated by
the `test-hooks` feature: a native `cargo test` compiles that target empty
and runs the worker's unit tests only. The seccomp allowlist is derived by
`strace` on the **musl static binary that ships**, inside the Alpine
`test` stage, and glibc would need other syscalls (`brk`, `mprotect`,
`futex`): running the sandbox natively would either kill a legitimate
decode or prove nothing about the shipped binary. `pnpm worker:test` is
the only path, and the worker keeps running in its container.
- The Supabase stack, the application image, the worker image and the
integration tests on them: `pnpm db:start`, `docker build -t faunosteo .`,
`pnpm worker:image`.
- The builder image stays as the reproducible alternative (same compiler,
same tools, a clean environment) and as the reference a future runner
uses; it is not needed for a compile or a test on the development
machine.
Exposure change, stated for the record: a native build runs the build
scripts and proc-macros of the dependencies under the user account (the
builder container ran them with the repository mounted read-write, so the
difference is the rest of the home directory). Mitigations in place:
`--locked` everywhere, `deny.toml` `[sources]` limited to crates.io with
unknown registries and git sources denied, `cargo deny check licenses bans
sources` in every check.
## 2. Workspace
```text
Cargo.toml workspace (resolver 3), pinned [workspace.dependencies], lints, profiles
rust-toolchain.toml channel 1.99.0, components rustfmt + clippy
rustfmt.toml edition 2024, max_width 100
clippy.toml disallowed-methods: std::time::*::now, std::fs::*, std::env::var* (the core)
deny.toml licences allow-list, bans (duplicates warn, wildcards deny, path deps allowed), sources
.cargo/config.toml wasm shadow stack 1 MiB (explicit), TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR = packages/core-wasm/types
crates/core faunosteo-core: lib, no I/O (lint), serde + serde_json only
crates/wasm faunosteo-wasm: cdylib facade over core (wasm-bindgen)
crates/worker faunosteo-worker: bin + lib (image, libwebp-sys, seccompiler, rlimit)
packages/core-wasm loader, generated types (committed), vitest proofs
```
Lints: `unwrap_used`, `expect_used` and `disallowed_methods` are errors in the
libraries (tests allow them explicitly at the top of the file); `unsafe_code`
is forbidden everywhere except the worker (libwebp FFI, each block with a
`SAFETY` comment). Dependencies are optimised even in debug builds
(`profile.dev.package."*"`) because the sandbox tests decode 4096² images
under a 10 s CPU limit.
### 2.1 Boundary rules in code (review III.3)
- `faunosteo_core::facade::call(op, json) -> json`: one operation name, one
JSON text in, the outcome envelope out (`{"ok":true,"value":…}` or
`{"ok":false,"kind":…,"detail":…}`), never a panic on content. R0 ops:
`core_version`, `pretty_json`, `sheet_ref`, `report_zone`.
- `faunosteo_core::json`: `js_number(f64)` prints floats as ECMAScript
`Number::toString`; `JsPrettyFormatter` is `serde_json`'s pretty formatter
with that rule; `to_js_pretty` and `pretty_js_round_trip` produce
`JSON.stringify(v, null, 2)` byte for byte (proof §5.2).
- `faunosteo_core::domain::report`: `SheetRef`, `ReportZone`, `Vertebra`,
`LateralSide`, `Unresolved`, field order of the Zod schemas, optional
fields `skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none"`, nullable fields plain
`Option`, unknown keys ignored where Zod strips them. `cargo test -p
faunosteo-core --features ts` writes the TypeScript types to
`packages/core-wasm/types` (committed; CI fails on drift).
- `packages/core-wasm/src/index.ts`: `loadCore()` instantiates a **fresh**
module each time (cache-busting import of the glue), `callCore()` parses
the envelope, `isCoreBuilt()` lets the proofs skip when `pkg/` is absent.
## 3. The worker (R0 skeleton, R1 job loop)
`faunosteo-worker` is one static musl binary with subcommands dispatched by
a plain `main` (no async runtime, no thread), so `decode` installs its
sandbox in a single-threaded process:
- `decode`: refuses a non-empty environment; checks `Threads: 1` in
`/proc/self/status`; disables core dumps (`PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0`,
`RLIMIT_CORE 0`: a dump would hold the uploaded photo); `RLIMIT_AS`
512 MiB, `RLIMIT_CPU` 10 s soft / 12 s hard (soft = hard made the kernel
SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC,
`KillProcess` on anything else, with argument filters: `tkill`/`tgkill`
may only send SIGABRT to the child's own pid (never a signal to the keyed
parent or a sibling), `mmap` may not map `PROT_EXEC`; then reads
≤ 5 MiB on stdin, sniffs the format (JPEG, PNG, WebP), decodes with
`image::Limits` (sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF
orientation, `resize_to_fill` 512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) through
`libwebp-sys` (C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes in
`exit_codes.rs` (10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time
error maps to a content code (`unsupported_type`, `decode_failed`,
`dimensions`, `resource_limit`), so no upload can produce a broken-environment
code.
- the parent side (`spawn::Spawner`, used by the tests now and by R1):
`env_clear`, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the
child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit
(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes
(`exit_codes::is_content_rejection`, an explicit list), `Broken{code}` when
the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox
failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming
the upload; no content can produce it), `Signalled{signal}`,
`OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
parent **never decodes**: `webp_check::inspect` parses the RIFF container
only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; the encoder's structure
enforced: optional `VP8X` first, optional `ALPH` only in an extended file,
exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree
with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `, `ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the
output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw
(LRN-044).
- `run --check`: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which
variables are set, the linked libwebp version, refused below 1.6.0). A
plain `run` does nothing before R1 and says so.
- `version`: binary, workspace and libwebp versions.
- test hooks (`--features test-hooks`, never in a release build): fixtures
generated in memory (no binary in git), `--no-seccomp` (rlimits only,
prints the `SECCOMP-MARKER` line for the strace derivation), `--violate`
(`getcwd` after the filter), `--flood`, `--alloc-gib n`, `--spin`,
`print-allowlist`.
Image: `crates/worker/Dockerfile`, stages `build` (release, static),
`test` (sandbox tests and `scripts/derive-seccomp.sh` on the **release
profile** with the `test-hooks` feature, so the binary under test differs
from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only), `runtime`
(`gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot`, `USER nonroot`, `ENTRYPOINT
/faunosteo-worker`, `CMD run --check`). Measured 2026-10-12: image 8.7 MB (one static
binary), `run --check` exits 0 with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL
--security-opt no-new-privileges:true`.
## 4. Checks before a merge, and the workflow files (prepared, no CI active)
No CI/CD runs on the forge today (2026-10-13): no runner, no secret, no
registry. The YAML files under `.gitea/workflows/` are kept as prepared
material for that separate decision; a green workflow is never claimed
until one has actually run on the forge. Until then the gate is local:
```bash
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh, stops at the first failure
```
Stages, in order: `scripts/rust-check.sh` (native), the ts-rs types drift
(`git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types`
must be empty: a modified or a new type file both fail, whatever the git
configuration), `cargo deny check advisories`
(warn-only: out of the blocking path by design, review VIII.3, but printed
here because no nightly job runs yet; needs the network), `scripts/wasm-build.sh`
(native), `pnpm check` (typecheck, tests including the `core-wasm` proofs on
the module just built and the pgTAP suite on PGlite, lint, build), the
application image, `pnpm worker:test` (sandbox tests and seccomp derivation
on the musl binary), `pnpm worker:image` started once with `--read-only
--cap-drop ALL`. The local Supabase stack is not required; `pnpm db:test`
is the real-stack complement after a change under `supabase/`.
Workflow files, each mapping onto those stages so a future runner calls the
same scripts:
- `ci.yml` (push on main/develop, pull requests): job `rust` (builder image,
`scripts/rust-check.sh`, types drift, `scripts/wasm-build.sh`), job `check`
(module built the same way, then the Node pipeline), job `docker`
(application image, worker `test` stage, worker runtime started read-only),
job `supabase` (real stack, pgTAP, generated types diff).
- `rust-advisories.yml`: nightly and manual `cargo deny check advisories`,
out of the blocking path on purpose.
- `release-images.yml`: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice
re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm
(`pnpm audit --prod`) advisories gates run first in a job without
secrets; a named ephemeral `buildx` builder (`--builder`, no silent
fallback) with its own cache builds the images; the registry token
reaches the login step only, into a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG` under
`RUNNER_TEMP` created before any step and removed by a literal path;
digests read from the build metadata; `actions/checkout` pinned to a
commit. The `if: github.ref` line is not a boundary (push access and the
token's scope are; a dedicated release runner label is the Step 27
operation). It would push `faunosteo_app:<sha>` and
`faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and print their digests. Deploys nothing
(DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
Target of the future CI/CD step (planned, not yet built; recorded so the
scripts stay compatible): tests on every push and pull request, Rust and
TypeScript checks, PostgreSQL/RLS tests, Docker builds, security checks,
branch verification before a merge, image publication only in an
explicitly authorised workflow.
Not measured: the forge runner's cache behaviour, cold build times and the
workflow syntax (job-level `env`, `GITHUB_ENV` path) have never run. The
builder image build took about 6 minutes cold on the development host; both
image builds reuse BuildKit cache mounts (`faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl`,
`faunosteo_target_musl`).
## 5. R0 proofs (2026-10-12, development host, Docker 29.8 rootless, kernel 7.0)
Each proof is a permanent test; the numbers are what the run produced.
### 5.1 Panic strategy on wasm32 (`packages/core-wasm/tests/panic.test.ts`)
- A Rust panic reaches JavaScript as `WebAssembly.RuntimeError` (`unreachable`):
the module is panic = abort, `catch_unwind` cannot be used there.
- Exhausting the 1 MiB shadow stack (2 000 000 frames of 128 bytes) traps
(`RuntimeError`) instead of corrupting memory.
- After a stack-exhaustion trap, the next call on the same instance fails in
the allocator (`memory access out of bounds`, deterministic). After a
plain panic the same instance *still answers*, with a stack pointer that
was never unwound: the dangerous case. Rule for R2: no instance is reused
after any trap; a fresh instance is a new module record (the wasm-bindgen
glue caches its instance in a module variable, and the ESM cache returns
the same module for the same URL: `loadCore()` imports with a cache-busting
query; in the browser the glue must be a static asset imported the same
way, or the core runs in a Worker recreated on trap).
### 5.2 Serialisation contract (`tests/serialisation.test.ts`, `crates/core/tests`)
- Byte equality with `JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2)` on
`report-v3.demo.json`, `report-v2.full.json`, the 296 KB equine
`document.json` and the 84 KB `report-migration-map.json`, plus a number
corpus (`1523`, `1715.4285714285713`, `0.85`, `1e+21`, `1e-7`,
`0.000001`, `-0` → `0`, `123456789012345680000`, `5e-324`,
`1.7976931348623157e+308`).
- Finding: `serde_json`'s default float parser is a documented fast path
that can be one ULP off; the first run printed `1715.428571428571` and
`123456789012345670000`. The `float_roundtrip` feature (enabled in
`Cargo.toml`) fixes it; the module grew from 187 KB to 225 KB raw.
- Optional fields absent, nullable fields `null`, unknown keys ignored,
`unresolved: false` refused; the current `ReportZoneSchema` and
`SheetRefSchema` (Zod 3, `@faunosteo/domain`) parse what the core writes.
### 5.3 musl static binary with libwebp (`crates/worker/Dockerfile`)
Builds on `rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24` with `build-base`; `libwebp-sys` 0.14.4
compiles its vendored libwebp with `cc`; `WebPGetEncoderVersion()` reports
**1.6.0** (logged by `run --check`, test
`the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough`). The runtime image carries the one
static binary.
### 5.4 seccomp allowlist, derived and proven (`crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs`)
- Derivation (`scripts/derive-seccomp.sh`, strace over png, jpeg, webp, a
4096 × 4096 JPEG and a 3000 × 3000 PNG, after the marker): exactly
`read write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom`. musl's mallocng used
neither `brk` nor `mprotect`; no `futex` in a single-threaded decode. The
allowlist is that set plus the abort path (`rt_sigaction`,
`rt_sigprocmask`, `getpid`, `gettid`, `tkill`, `tgkill`, `exit`).
- Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
`inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits` (4096²), dimensions 32 px
and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty
environment refused, `--violate` → SIGSYS 31, `--flood` → output cut,
`--alloc-gib 2` → SIGABRT 6 under `RLIMIT_AS`, `--spin` → parent deadline,
`--spin` → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative
proofs of the argument filters: `--signal-parent` (`tkill` to the parent)
and `--mmap-exec` → SIGSYS; an `iCCP` bomb of 300 MB inflated → a content
rejection, never a broken-environment outcome).
- Findings: with `RLIMIT_CPU` soft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard
limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill;
the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode
exceeded 10 s of CPU in an unoptimised debug build: dependencies are
optimised in every profile.
### 5.5 CSP with `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (`docker/csp-proof/run.sh`)
Served `packages/core-wasm/pkg` through `nginx:1.31-alpine` with
`docker/nginx.conf` plus the exact `Content-Security-Policy` of
`DEPLOY.md`, loaded by headless Chrome for Testing 156:
| Header | Result |
|---|---|
| production (`script-src 'self'`) | `FAIL WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(): Compiling or instantiating WebAssembly module violates the following Content Security policy directive because 'unsafe-eval' is not an allowed source of script in the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'"` |
| `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'` | `OK 0.1.0` (module instantiated, `core_version()` answered) |
The keyword allows WebAssembly compilation only: an inline `<script>`
variant stayed blocked under both headers. nginx serves `.wasm` as
`application/wasm` out of the box.
### 5.6 Served size and instantiate time (`tests/size.test.ts`)
`faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm`: 224 713 bytes raw, 85 396 bytes gzip-9 (with
`float_roundtrip`; 186 805 / 72 917 without), instantiate 2.7 ms in Node 24.
The D-R13 budget (600 KB compressed) is asserted by the test from R0 on.
### 5.7 Runner caches and build times
Not measurable from this host (no forge runner here). Recorded instead:
builder image cold build about 6 minutes; worker test stage cold about 2
minutes, warm under 30 s with the BuildKit cache mounts; the wasm build
under 10 s warm. The first run on the forge records its own numbers here.
### 5.8 Native toolchain run (2026-10-13, Ubuntu 26.04.1, rustup 1.29.1, 16 cores)
Same proofs, native toolchain (`rustc 1.99.0 (b940084d7 2026-09-28)`,
`cargo 1.99.0`, `clippy 0.1.99`, `rustfmt 1.10.0-stable`, `wasm-bindgen
0.2.129`, `cargo-deny 0.20.2`), compared with the builder image runs above:
| Measure | Native | Builder image (R0) |
|---|---|---|
| cold `cargo build --workspace --all-targets` (libwebp compiled by gcc 15) | 31.5 s | not timed at R0 |
| cold wasm release build | 4.3 s | under 10 s warm |
| `scripts/rust-check.sh` warm (fmt, clippy, tests, ts export, deny) | 32 s | 2.2 s warm volumes (same script, same results) |
| cargo tests | core 10 + 2, worker unit 9, core with `ts` 14 + 2, all green | identical counts |
| committed ts-rs types | unchanged after the export | unchanged |
| `faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm` raw | 224 777 B | 224 713 B |
| gzip -9 | 84 924 B (`gzip`), 85 390 B (the vitest measure) | 84 927 B / 85 396 B |
| sha256 | `2d559a6b…bb3a` | `451d49c1…a752` |
| core-wasm proofs | 14 passed, instantiate 3.9 ms | 14 passed, 2.7 ms |
The 64-byte difference and the distinct hashes come from the source paths
embedded in the panic locations (`/home/<user>/Documents/faunosteo/…`
natively, `/w/…` in the builder): the module is not bit-reproducible across
build roots without `--remap-path-prefix`, which R0 does not set. The
builder image is the reference when two builds must match byte for byte.
`cargo deny` prints the same warnings in both environments
(`license-not-encountered` for six allowed licences, duplicate `miniz_oxide`
and `syn`): policy `warn`, not failures.
## 6. Reproduction
```bash
pnpm rust:check # §2, §5.2 (cargo side), native
pnpm wasm:build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run # §5.1, §5.2, §5.6, native module
pnpm rust:builder && pnpm rust:check:docker && pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same, reproducible in the builder
pnpm worker:test # §5.3, §5.4 (tests + derivation in the build log)
pnpm worker:image && docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL faunosteo_worker:dev # §3
CHROME=<chromium binary> bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh # §5.5 (playwright-core on NODE_PATH)
pnpm check:all # everything above but the CSP proof, in one command
```
## 7. What stays hypothetical after R0
- Follow-ups from the R0 security audit, owned by R1 unless stated: base
images pinned by digest in the three Dockerfiles (today by tag, as the
existing `Dockerfile`); a verification decode of the child's output in a
second sandboxed child (the RIFF check validates the container, not the
bitstream); the shared BuildKit cache mounts of the CI builds (the
release workflow already uses its own builder); `actions/*@v4` tags in
`ci.yml` (pre-existing practice) to pin by commit at Step 27.
- The browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (static glue URL with a
cache-busting query under Vite, or a Worker per instance) is designed, not
built: R2 builds and tests it.
- HTTPS from the worker (CA bundle of distroless, `webpki-roots`): no HTTP
client in the R0 binary; R1 adds `reqwest` and the CI HTTPS call.
- The forge runner's cache and timings (§5.7), and the workflow files
themselves: no runner exists, none of the three workflows has ever run
(§4).
- The allowlist is x86_64; an aarch64 host would need its own derivation
(`target_arch` selects the seccomp architecture, the syscall numbers come
from `libc`).
@@ -985,3 +985,35 @@ frontend to load the module; no anatomy, PDF or business validation
migration (R2–R5); no avatar processing (R1); everything dockerised, the
production image produced in CI and pulled by the VPS; the live deployment
untouched; no tag or merge into main.
### C.1 Addendum 2026-10-13: development environment and CI status (owner brief after R0)
R0 delivered and validated on the architecture. The owner corrected the
development organisation before closing R0; these points amend Annex B §B.1
and VIII.4 and are implemented on `feature/rust-r0-foundation`:
- Three environments, three roles. The development machine is a self-hosted
Ubuntu server (native, not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless: Rust is
developed and compiled **natively** there (user-level `rustup`, channel of
`rust-toolchain.toml`, `wasm32-unknown-unknown`, `wasm-bindgen-cli` and
`cargo-deny` at the pinned versions; `cargo check / test / build / clippy /
fmt` and the browser module build run without Docker). Docker on that
machine runs the Faunosteo services (Supabase), the worker in its hardened
container, the integration tests, the sandbox and seccomp proofs, and
builds the deployment images (multi-stage). The production VPS is separate
and never compiles.
- The R0 builder image is kept as the reproducible alternative
(`pnpm rust:check:docker`, `pnpm wasm:build:docker`) and as the reference
for a future runner; it is no longer the arbiter of daily work and is not
required for a compile or a test. The worker's isolation is unchanged.
- No CI/CD is operational on the forge (no runner, secret or registry). The
workflow files are prepared material for a separate CI/CD decision; a
workflow is never reported as passed before it has run on the forge. The
pre-merge gate is local: `pnpm check:all` (`scripts/check-all.sh`), which a
future runner calls as is.
- Target of that future step (planned, not yet built): tests on every push and pull
request, Rust and TypeScript checks, PostgreSQL/RLS tests, Docker builds,
security checks, branch verification before a merge, image publication
only in an explicitly authorised workflow.
- R1 (the Step 8 worker) waits for the owner's final validation of this
correction; no deployment, no release 0.2.0.
+13 -5
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ Status: Step 0 deliverable, 2026-10-08. Current state: 32 files under
| Migration | `supabase db reset` from zero + seed + regression fixtures | CI | every PR touching `supabase/` |
| PDF regression | vitest golden tests: text extraction of generated PDFs, attachment roundtrip, raster hash on fixed inputs | `packages/pdf/tests` | CI |
| SQL/TS contract | generated types diff check | CI | every PR touching `supabase/` |
| Rust core and facade | `cargo test` (unit + fixture tests reading the repository JSON in place), `clippy -D warnings`, `cargo deny`; ts-rs types drift check | `crates/*`, `pnpm rust:check` (native, `scripts/rust-check.sh`; same file in the builder image), `pnpm check:all` | before every Rust commit and every merge; CI job `rust` prepared, no runner yet |
| Rust/TS contract | vitest proofs on the built module: byte equality with `JSON.stringify(…, null, 2)` on the real documents, optional/nullable shape read by the current Zod schemas, panic and stack traps, served size budget | `packages/core-wasm/tests` (skipped with a notice when `pkg/` is absent) | `pnpm check:all` (after the native `wasm:build`); CI `check` prepared |
| Worker sandbox | integration tests against the musl binary that ships: fixture corpus through the full sandbox, refusals, SIGSYS on a denied syscall, output cap, `RLIMIT_AS` abort, `RLIMIT_CPU`, deadline; seccomp allowlist derived by `strace` and compared | `crates/worker/tests`, Dockerfile stage `test` (`pnpm worker:test`, Docker only, never native) | every `crates/worker` commit, `pnpm check:all`; CI `docker` job prepared |
Browser-only code (`svgToPng`, `DOMParser` in the importer) runs under
happy-dom where sufficient and under Playwright when real rendering matters
@@ -73,12 +76,17 @@ Target after Step 1: roughly 230–250 cases, all current ones untouched.
- Golden PDFs are compared by extracted text and attachment JSON, not by
bytes (pdf-lib dates and ids vary); raster hash only on fixed-size inputs.
## 5. CI gates
## 5. Gates before a merge, and the CI target
Per PR: `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint` (0 warnings), `pnpm test:run`,
`pnpm build`; when `supabase/` changes: `supabase db reset`, `supabase test
db`, types diff. Nightly: Playwright suite. Release: full RLS matrix,
backup/restore rehearsal checklist, `pnpm audit`, secret scan.
Today (2026-10-13) no CI runs on the forge; the gate is run on the
development machine: `pnpm check:all` (`docs/development/RUST.md` §4) before
every merge, plus `supabase db reset`, `supabase test db` and the types diff
when `supabase/` changes. The workflow files under `.gitea/workflows/` are
prepared for a future runner and call the same scripts.
CI target (planned): per PR the stages of `pnpm check:all`; nightly the
Playwright suite and `cargo deny check advisories`; at release the full RLS
matrix, the backup/restore rehearsal checklist, `pnpm audit`, a secret scan.
## 6. Numbers to track
+12 -2
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,17 @@ Future units, created only by the step that needs them:
| Path | Role | Created at |
|---|---|---|
| `apps/public-web` | SSR public site (landing, practitioner profiles, search) | plan Step 22 |
| `apps/worker` | Node job runner (emails, expiry, calendar sync, imports) | plan Step 19 |
| `crates/worker` | Rust job runner (avatars at R1, then emails, expiry, calendar sync, imports) — created at R0, replaces the planned `apps/worker` | R0 (2026-10-12) |
| `packages/*` | shared domain, anatomy, pdf, i18n, supabase, config, ui | see `packages/README.md` |
Rust workspace (plan R0, `docs/development/RUST.md`): `Cargo.toml` at the
root with `crates/core` (library), `crates/wasm` (browser facade, built into
`packages/core-wasm/pkg`) and `crates/worker` (binary). Every cargo command
runs on the native toolchain of the development machine (`pnpm rust:check`,
`pnpm wasm:build`; user-level rustup, channel of `rust-toolchain.toml`) or,
for a reproducible run, through the builder image (`:docker` variants); the
pnpm workspace gains `packages/core-wasm` (loader, generated types, proofs),
whose tests skip with a notice when the module has not been built.
| `supabase/` | migrations, functions, seed, tests | plan Step 3 |
## 2. Why this layout now
@@ -83,7 +92,8 @@ works as `corepack pnpm <cmd>`.
| `pnpm test` | vitest watch for `apps/app` |
| `pnpm lint` | ESLint, 0 warnings, in every package |
| `pnpm build` | typecheck + Vite build in every package |
| `pnpm check` | typecheck, test:run, lint, build in sequence (what CI runs) |
| `pnpm check` | typecheck, test:run, lint, build in sequence (the Node gate) |
| `pnpm check:all` | the whole pre-merge gate: native Rust check, types drift, wasm build, `pnpm check`, application and worker images (`docs/development/RUST.md` §4; no CI runs it yet) |
| `pnpm format` | Prettier on the whole repository |
Package-scoped: `pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app <script>`.
+9 -1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
"lint": "pnpm -r lint",
"format": "prettier --write .",
"check": "pnpm typecheck && pnpm test:run && pnpm lint && pnpm build",
"check:all": "bash scripts/check-all.sh",
"report:compare": "pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app report:compare",
"import:equine": "pnpm --filter @faunosteo/anatomy import:equine",
"db:start": "supabase start",
@@ -29,7 +30,14 @@
"db:types:check": "supabase gen types typescript --local --schema public | prettier --parser typescript | diff - packages/supabase/src/database.types.ts",
"assets:upload": "pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase assets:upload",
"build:preview": "SHEET_BUNDLE=draft pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app build",
"preview:draft": "SHEET_BUNDLE=draft pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app preview"
"preview:draft": "SHEET_BUNDLE=draft pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/app preview",
"rust:builder": "docker build -f docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile -t faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 docker",
"rust:check": "bash scripts/rust-check.sh",
"rust:check:docker": "bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/rust-check.sh",
"wasm:build": "bash scripts/wasm-build.sh",
"wasm:build:docker": "bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh",
"worker:test": "docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile --target test -t faunosteo_worker:test .",
"worker:image": "docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t faunosteo_worker:dev ."
},
"devDependencies": {
"pnpm": "10.13.1",
+6
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ Planned packages and the step that creates each one:
| `@faunosteo/pdf` | browser-free PDF engine (**created**, Step 6): report archive export from explicit inputs (report, sheet snapshot, branding, labels, rasterizer), layered archive reading, SVG sanitiser, page renderers | Step 6 (PDF archives) |
| `@faunosteo/i18n` | FR/EN dictionaries (no React) + `useT` | first second consumer (public-web or worker) |
| `@faunosteo/supabase` | browser client factory, generated database types, PGlite harness running the pgTAP suite, sheet publish gate | **created**, Step 3 |
| `@faunosteo/core-wasm` | loader of the Rust core compiled to WebAssembly (`pkg/` built by `pnpm wasm:build`, git-ignored), TypeScript types of the contracts generated by ts-rs (committed), the R0 proofs (panic and stack traps, JSON.stringify parity, Zod readers, size budget) | **created**, R0 (Rust review) |
From R2 on, the Rust core (`crates/core`) replaces the TypeScript business
logic of `domain`, `anatomy` and `pdf` phase by phase
(`docs/development/RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` Part VI); each TypeScript
package is deleted in the phase that switches its last consumer.
| `@faunosteo/config` | runtime config resolution shared by app, public-web, worker | with public-web |
| `@faunosteo/ui` | UI primitives and design tokens | only when public-web reuses them |
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
import globals from 'globals'
import tseslint from 'typescript-eslint'
export default tseslint.config(
// pkg/ is the wasm-bindgen output, types/ the ts-rs output: generated, never linted.
{ ignores: ['node_modules/**', 'pkg/**', 'types/**'] },
{
files: ['**/*.ts'],
extends: [...tseslint.configs.recommended],
languageOptions: {
globals: { ...globals.node, ...globals.es2022 },
},
rules: {
'@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any': 'warn',
'@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars': [
'error',
{ argsIgnorePattern: '^_' },
],
},
},
)
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
"name": "@faunosteo/core-wasm",
"version": "0.1.0",
"private": true,
"description": "Faunosteo core compiled to WebAssembly: loader, generated TypeScript types of the contracts, and the R0 proofs (panic, serialisation, size)",
"license": "MIT",
"type": "module",
"exports": {
".": "./src/index.ts",
"./types": "./types/index.ts"
},
"scripts": {
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit",
"test": "vitest",
"test:run": "vitest run",
"lint": "eslint . --max-warnings 0",
"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@faunosteo/domain": "workspace:*",
"@types/node": "^20.19.41",
"eslint": "^9.17.0",
"globals": "^15.14.0",
"typescript": "^5.7.2",
"typescript-eslint": "^8.19.0",
"vitest": "^3.2.7"
}
}
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
/**
* Loader of the Faunosteo core module (wasm-bindgen `--target web` output under `pkg/`,
* built by `pnpm wasm:build`, git-ignored).
*
* The module is never imported statically: `pkg/` may be absent on a host without Docker,
* and the application loads the core lazily behind the paths that need it (review III.3).
* No file of this package is reachable from the application before R2.
*/
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
/** The functions the module exports (mirror of `pkg/faunosteo_wasm.d.ts`). */
export interface CoreModule {
core_version(): string
call(op: string, input: string): string
panic_for_test(): void
recurse_for_test(depth: number): number
}
/** Outcome envelope of every `call` (closed kinds, never an exception for content). */
export type CoreOutcome<T = unknown> =
| { ok: true; value: T }
| { ok: false; kind: string; detail?: string }
const PKG_JS = new URL('../pkg/faunosteo_wasm.js', import.meta.url)
const PKG_WASM = new URL('../pkg/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm', import.meta.url)
interface PkgModule extends CoreModule {
default(input: { module_or_path: BufferSource }): Promise<unknown>
}
/** True when `pnpm wasm:build` has produced the module. */
export function isCoreBuilt(): boolean {
return existsSync(fileURLToPath(PKG_WASM))
}
let instances = 0
/**
* Instantiates a fresh module (Node: bytes from disk). Each call is a new instance.
*
* The wasm-bindgen glue keeps its instance in a module-level variable and the ESM cache
* returns the same module for the same URL, so a second plain `import()` would hand back
* the previous (possibly trapped) instance: R0 proved that an instance is unusable after a
* trap (`memory access out of bounds` in the allocator on the next call). A cache-busting
* query gives a new module record, hence a new instance. The browser loader of R2 must do
* the same (static glue URL imported with a query, or a Worker recreated on trap).
*/
export async function loadCore(): Promise<CoreModule> {
instances += 1
const pkg = (await import(
`${PKG_JS.href}?instance=${instances}`
)) as PkgModule
const bytes = await readFile(PKG_WASM)
await pkg.default({ module_or_path: bytes })
return pkg
}
/** Runs one operation and parses its envelope. */
export function callCore<T = unknown>(
core: CoreModule,
op: string,
input: string,
): CoreOutcome<T> {
return JSON.parse(core.call(op, input)) as CoreOutcome<T>
}
/** Path of the built module on disk (size measurements). */
export function coreWasmPath(): string {
return fileURLToPath(PKG_WASM)
}
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import { callCore, loadCore } from '../src/index'
import { coreBuilt } from './helpers/core'
const CORE_MANIFEST = new URL(
'../../../crates/core/Cargo.toml',
import.meta.url,
)
const WORKSPACE_MANIFEST = new URL('../../../Cargo.toml', import.meta.url)
describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)('core facade (wasm)', () => {
it('reports the workspace version of the core', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
const workspace = readFileSync(fileURLToPath(WORKSPACE_MANIFEST), 'utf8')
const version = /\[workspace\.package\][^[]*?version = "([^"]+)"/s.exec(
workspace,
)?.[1]
expect(version).toBeDefined()
expect(readFileSync(fileURLToPath(CORE_MANIFEST), 'utf8')).toContain(
'version.workspace = true',
)
expect(core.core_version()).toBe(version)
})
it('answers with a closed outcome envelope', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
expect(callCore(core, 'core_version', '')).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: core.core_version(),
})
expect(callCore(core, 'nope', '{}')).toMatchObject({
ok: false,
kind: 'unknown_op',
})
expect(callCore(core, 'pretty_json', '{ not json')).toMatchObject({
ok: false,
kind: 'invalid_json',
})
})
it('exposes exactly the documented functions', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
for (const name of [
'core_version',
'call',
'panic_for_test',
'recurse_for_test',
]) {
expect(typeof (core as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[name]).toBe(
'function',
)
}
})
})
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
import { isCoreBuilt } from '../../src/index'
/**
* The proofs need the built module. On a host without Docker they are skipped with a
* visible notice instead of failing `pnpm check`; CI always builds the module first.
*/
export const coreBuilt = isCoreBuilt()
if (!coreBuilt) {
console.warn(
'[core-wasm] pkg/ missing: run `pnpm wasm:build` (Docker builder); proofs skipped',
)
}
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
/**
* R0 proof: on wasm32 a Rust panic is a trap (`WebAssembly.RuntimeError`), the shadow
* stack overflow is a trap too (no silent corruption), and a trapped instance must never be
* reused: review III.3 rule 5 (poison and re-instantiate) rests on these three facts.
*
* Observed at R0 (Node 24, wasm-bindgen 0.2.129):
* - after a plain panic the same instance still answers calls, which is the dangerous case:
* the shadow stack pointer was never unwound, so later frames run in a shifted stack;
* - after a stack-exhaustion trap the next call on the same instance fails in the allocator
* (`memory access out of bounds`), deterministically;
* - a genuinely new instance (new module record, new memory) recovers in full.
*/
import { loadCore } from '../src/index'
import { coreBuilt } from './helpers/core'
describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)('panics and stack exhaustion (wasm)', () => {
it('turns a panic into a WebAssembly.RuntimeError', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
expect(() => core.panic_for_test()).toThrow(WebAssembly.RuntimeError)
})
it('traps on shadow stack exhaustion instead of returning garbage', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
expect(core.recurse_for_test(100)).toBe(100)
// 2 000 000 frames of at least 128 bytes exceed the 1 MiB shadow stack by far.
expect(() => core.recurse_for_test(2_000_000)).toThrow(
WebAssembly.RuntimeError,
)
})
it('leaves a stack-trapped instance unusable and recovers with a fresh instance', async () => {
const poisoned = await loadCore()
expect(() => poisoned.recurse_for_test(2_000_000)).toThrow(
WebAssembly.RuntimeError,
)
expect(() => poisoned.core_version()).toThrow(WebAssembly.RuntimeError)
const fresh = await loadCore()
expect(fresh.core_version()).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/)
expect(JSON.parse(fresh.call('pretty_json', '[1.0]'))).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: '[\n 1\n]',
})
})
it('may keep answering after a plain panic, which is why no instance is reused after any trap', async () => {
const poisoned = await loadCore()
expect(() => poisoned.panic_for_test()).toThrow(WebAssembly.RuntimeError)
// Not asserted either way: the instance's stack pointer is undefined from here on.
const fresh = await loadCore()
expect(fresh.core_version()).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/)
})
})
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
/**
* R0 proof: the core's JSON output is byte-identical to `JSON.stringify(v, null, 2)` on the
* real documents, optional fields stay absent and nullable fields stay `null`, and the
* current Zod readers accept what the core writes (review I.2, D-R11).
*/
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import { ReportZoneSchema, SheetRefSchema } from '@faunosteo/domain'
import type { ReportZone, SheetRef } from '../types/index'
import { callCore, loadCore, type CoreModule } from '../src/index'
import { coreBuilt } from './helpers/core'
const FIXTURES = [
'apps/app/tests/fixtures/report-v3.demo.json',
'apps/app/tests/fixtures/report-v2.full.json',
'supabase/seed/anatomical-sheets/equine/draft/document.json',
'supabase/seed/anatomical-sheets/equine/draft/report-migration-map.json',
]
const NUMBER_CASES = [
1523, 1715.4285714285713, 0.85, 1e21, 1e-7, 0.000001, -0,
123456789012345680000, 5e-324, 1.7976931348623157e308, 100, -2.5, 0.1,
1.5e300, 12345678901234567890,
]
function repoFile(relative: string): string {
return readFileSync(
fileURLToPath(new URL(`../../../${relative}`, import.meta.url)),
'utf8',
)
}
function prettyByCore(core: CoreModule, text: string): string {
const outcome = callCore<string>(core, 'pretty_json', text)
if (!outcome.ok) throw new Error(`${outcome.kind}: ${outcome.detail ?? ''}`)
return outcome.value
}
describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)('serialisation contract (wasm)', () => {
it.each(FIXTURES)(
'%s: core pretty output equals JSON.stringify(…, null, 2)',
async (relative) => {
const core = await loadCore()
const text = repoFile(relative)
const expected = JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2)
expect(prettyByCore(core, text)).toBe(expected)
},
)
it('prints every number as JavaScript does', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
const text = JSON.stringify(NUMBER_CASES)
expect(prettyByCore(core, text)).toBe(
JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2),
)
})
it('writes optional fields absent and nullable fields null, readable by the Zod schemas', async () => {
const core = await loadCore()
const bare = callCore<ReportZone>(
core,
'report_zone',
JSON.stringify({ annotationId: 'hip', viewId: 'main' }),
)
expect(bare).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: { annotationId: 'hip', viewId: 'main' },
})
if (!bare.ok) return
expect(Object.keys(bare.value)).toEqual(['annotationId', 'viewId'])
expect(ReportZoneSchema.parse(bare.value)).toEqual(bare.value)
const full = callCore<ReportZone>(
core,
'report_zone',
JSON.stringify({
viewId: 'main',
annotationId: 'hip',
side: 'left',
unresolved: true,
extra: 1,
}),
)
expect(full).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: {
annotationId: 'hip',
viewId: 'main',
side: 'left',
unresolved: true,
},
})
const sheet = callCore<SheetRef>(
core,
'sheet_ref',
JSON.stringify({
sheetId: 'faunosteo-cheval',
versionId: null,
documentSha256: 'a'.repeat(64),
}),
)
expect(sheet.ok && sheet.value.versionId).toBeNull()
if (sheet.ok) expect(SheetRefSchema.parse(sheet.value)).toEqual(sheet.value)
const refused = callCore(
core,
'report_zone',
JSON.stringify({ annotationId: 'a', viewId: 'v', unresolved: false }),
)
expect(refused).toMatchObject({ ok: false, kind: 'invalid_shape' })
})
})
+26
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@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
/**
* R0 measurement: served size of the module and instantiate time (D-R13 budget, enforced
* from R2 on the real core; R0 records the skeleton's numbers).
*/
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { gzipSync } from 'node:zlib'
import { coreWasmPath, loadCore } from '../src/index'
import { coreBuilt } from './helpers/core'
/** D-R13: the served module (compressed) stays under this many bytes. */
const COMPRESSED_BUDGET_BYTES = 600_000
describe.skipIf(!coreBuilt)('module size and instantiate time (wasm)', () => {
it('stays under the compressed budget and reports its numbers', async () => {
const bytes = readFileSync(coreWasmPath())
const gzip = gzipSync(bytes, { level: 9 }).length
const started = performance.now()
await loadCore()
const instantiateMs = performance.now() - started
console.info(
`[core-wasm] faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: ${bytes.length} bytes raw, ${gzip} bytes gzip-9, instantiate ${instantiateMs.toFixed(1)} ms`,
)
expect(gzip).toBeLessThanOrEqual(COMPRESSED_BUDGET_BYTES)
})
})
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"lib": ["ES2022", "DOM"],
"module": "ESNext",
"moduleResolution": "bundler",
"strict": true,
"noUnusedLocals": true,
"noUnusedParameters": true,
"noFallthroughCasesInSwitch": true,
"noImplicitReturns": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"resolveJsonModule": true,
"isolatedModules": true,
"types": ["node", "vitest/globals"],
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["src", "tests", "types"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "pkg"]
}
+6
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Side of a bilateral zone.
*/
export type LateralSide = "left" | "right";
+17
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { LateralSide } from "./LateralSide";
import type { Vertebra } from "./Vertebra";
/**
* A zone of an observation. Unknown keys are ignored on input, as the Zod schema strips
* them; optional fields are written only when set.
*/
export type ReportZone = { annotationId: string, viewId: string, side?: LateralSide, vertebrae?: Array<Vertebra>,
/**
* Annotation name at selection time (or legacy name at migration).
*/
labelFrSnapshot?: string, labelEnSnapshot?: string,
/**
* Set by the migration when the legacy id has no canonical annotation.
*/
unresolved?: true, };
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* Reference of the anatomical sheet a report was written against (`Report.sheet`).
*/
export type SheetRef = { sheetId: string,
/**
* Database version id once the sheet lives in the database; `null` for a bundled draft.
*/
versionId: string | null,
/**
* sha256 of the document file the report was written against.
*/
documentSha256: string, };
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
/**
* One vertebra of a spine zone: the region code and the 1-based index in that region.
*/
export type Vertebra = { region: string, index: number, };
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
// Types of the core contracts, generated by ts-rs from crates/core (`pnpm rust:check`
// regenerates them; CI fails when the committed files drift from the Rust structs).
export type { LateralSide } from './LateralSide'
export type { ReportZone } from './ReportZone'
export type { SheetRef } from './SheetRef'
export type { Vertebra } from './Vertebra'
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config'
export default defineConfig({
test: {
environment: 'node',
globals: true,
include: ['tests/**/*.test.ts'],
},
})
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@@ -146,6 +146,30 @@ importers:
specifier: ^3.2.7
version: 3.2.7(@types/node@20.19.41)(happy-dom@20.10.6)(jiti@2.7.0)(lightningcss@1.32.0)(tsx@4.23.15)
packages/core-wasm:
devDependencies:
'@faunosteo/domain':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../domain
'@types/node':
specifier: ^20.19.41
version: 20.19.41
eslint:
specifier: ^9.17.0
version: 9.39.4(jiti@2.7.0)
globals:
specifier: ^15.14.0
version: 15.15.0
typescript:
specifier: ^5.7.2
version: 5.9.3
typescript-eslint:
specifier: ^8.19.0
version: 8.59.3(eslint@9.39.4(jiti@2.7.0))(typescript@5.9.3)
vitest:
specifier: ^3.2.7
version: 3.2.7(@types/node@20.19.41)(happy-dom@20.10.6)(jiti@2.7.0)(lightningcss@1.32.0)(tsx@4.23.15)
packages/domain:
dependencies:
zod:
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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# Pinned toolchain, identical to docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm)
# and crates/worker/Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24). Bump the three together.
# A native rustup installs this channel on first use (`rustup show` from the repository);
# the wasm32 target is added by hand (`rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown`) and by the
# builder image; the worker image never needs it.
[toolchain]
channel = "1.99.0"
components = ["rustfmt", "clippy"]
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
edition = "2024"
max_width = 100
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Every technical check a branch must pass before a merge, in one command: `pnpm check:all`.
# It runs on the development machine; no CI is configured on the forge today, and a future
# runner calls these same stages (docs/development/RUST.md §4). Stops at the first failure.
# Needs the native Rust toolchain (RUST.md §1) and Docker for the image stages. The local
# Supabase stack is not required: the SQL suite runs on PGlite inside `pnpm test:run`, and
# `pnpm db:test` is the real-stack complement after a change under supabase/.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
stage() {
printf '\n== %s (%s)\n' "$1" "$(date +%H:%M:%S)"
}
stage "rust: fmt, clippy, tests, ts-rs export, cargo-deny (native toolchain)"
bash scripts/rust-check.sh
stage "rust: committed TypeScript types match the Rust contracts (no modified or new file)"
drift="$(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types)"
if [ -n "$drift" ]; then
echo "packages/core-wasm/types differs from the committed types:" >&2
echo "$drift" >&2
exit 1
fi
stage "rust: RustSec advisories (warn-only until the CI/CD step; the release gate blocks)"
# Out of the blocking path on purpose (RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW VIII.3); printed here because
# no nightly job runs yet. Needs the network for the advisory database.
(cd . && . scripts/rust-env.sh && cargo deny check advisories) \
|| echo "== advisories: findings or no network above; review before a release"
stage "wasm: browser module (the core-wasm proofs run on it in the Node pipeline)"
bash scripts/wasm-build.sh
stage "node: typecheck, tests, lint, build"
pnpm check
stage "docker: application image"
docker build -t faunosteo:check .
stage "docker: worker sandbox tests and seccomp derivation on the musl binary that ships"
pnpm worker:test
stage "docker: worker runtime image starts read-only"
pnpm worker:image
docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
faunosteo_worker:dev run --check
stage "all checks passed"
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# The Rust quality gate, one file for every environment: `pnpm rust:check` runs it on the
# native toolchain of the development machine (rustup selects the channel pinned by
# rust-toolchain.toml); `pnpm rust:check:docker` runs the same file inside the reference
# builder image (docker/rust-builder.Dockerfile) when a reproducible run is wanted.
# The worker's sandbox tests are feature-gated (`test-hooks`) and run only in its own
# Alpine/musl image (crates/worker/Dockerfile stage `test`, `pnpm worker:test`): the seccomp
# allowlist is derived for the musl static binary that ships. The plain `cargo test` below
# therefore covers the worker's unit tests and the whole of core and wasm.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
. scripts/rust-env.sh
cargo fmt --all --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings
cargo test --workspace --locked
# Exports the TypeScript types of the contracts (ts-rs) into packages/core-wasm/types.
# `git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types` must stay
# empty afterwards (scripts/check-all.sh, .gitea/workflows/ci.yml): the committed types
# never drift from the Rust structs, and a new type file counts as drift.
cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts --locked
cargo deny check licenses bans sources
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# Sourced by the Rust scripts (never executed): puts the user-level rustup toolchain on
# PATH when the calling shell did not. Non-interactive shells skip ~/.bashrc, so editor
# tasks, git hooks and agent shells start without ~/.cargo/bin. rustup then selects the
# channel pinned by rust-toolchain.toml. Nothing here installs anything. The directory is
# appended, never prepended (the guard only fires when no cargo is on PATH, and the system
# tools used by the scripts must keep resolving first), and only when it is absolute.
cargo_bin="${CARGO_HOME:-$HOME/.cargo}/bin"
case "$cargo_bin" in
/*) ;;
*) cargo_bin="" ;;
esac
if ! command -v cargo >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -n "$cargo_bin" ] && [ -x "$cargo_bin/cargo" ]; then
PATH="$PATH:$cargo_bin"
export PATH
fi
unset cargo_bin
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Builds the browser module of crates/wasm into packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored).
# `pnpm wasm:build` runs it on the native toolchain (wasm32-unknown-unknown target and the
# wasm-bindgen CLI installed by rustup / cargo install, docs/development/RUST.md §1);
# `pnpm wasm:build:docker` runs the same file inside the reference builder image.
# The wasm-bindgen CLI must be the exact version of the wasm-bindgen crate in Cargo.lock
# (wasm-bindgen >= 0.2.128 refuses a mismatch at runtime; we refuse it up front).
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
. scripts/rust-env.sh
lock_version="$(awk '/^name = "wasm-bindgen"$/ { getline; sub(/^version = "/, ""); sub(/"$/, ""); print; exit }' Cargo.lock)"
if ! command -v wasm-bindgen >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "wasm-bindgen CLI not found on PATH: cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version ${lock_version} --locked" >&2
exit 1
fi
cli_version="$(wasm-bindgen --version | awk '{ print $2 }')"
if [ "$lock_version" != "$cli_version" ]; then
echo "wasm-bindgen crate ${lock_version} (Cargo.lock) != wasm-bindgen-cli ${cli_version} on PATH: cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version ${lock_version} --locked" >&2
exit 1
fi
# `proofs`: the R0 trap exports; dropped when R2 builds the module the application ships.
cargo build -p faunosteo-wasm --release --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --locked --features proofs
out=packages/core-wasm/pkg
rm -rf packages/core-wasm/pkg
wasm-bindgen --target web --out-dir "$out" --out-name faunosteo_wasm \
target/wasm32-unknown-unknown/release/faunosteo_wasm.wasm
raw=$(wc -c < "$out/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm")
gz=$(gzip -9 -c "$out/faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm" | wc -c)
echo "faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: ${raw} bytes raw, ${gz} bytes gzip -9"