fix(worker): iCCP-bomb proof asserts the content-rejection property (either content code); docs(docs): RUST.md worker and release workflow wording after the second security pass
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned
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CHECK: grep -c "tokio" crates/worker/Cargo.toml; grep -n "vars_os().next().is_some()\|sandbox::apply(\|read_to_end(&mut input)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs | head -3; grep -n "ensure_single_thread()?;\|set_rlimits(limits)?;\|install_seccomp()?;" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | head -3
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EXPECT: 0 ; the three lines appear in that order (env check line < sandbox line < read line) ; the three calls appear in that order
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9. seccomp allowlist is the traced set plus the abort path, denies every file and process syscall, and was derived and proven on the musl binary.
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CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 13 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-5.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
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CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 16 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-11.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
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EXPECT: 7 ; 7 ; 0 ; both lines present
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10. The keyed parent never decodes: spawn.rs and webp_check.rs use no image decoder; output capped at 512 KiB; the RIFF check allowlists four chunk types and refuses the rest.
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CHECK: grep -c "image::" crates/worker/src/spawn.rs crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 512 \* 1024" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c 'b"VP8X", b"VP8 ", b"VP8L", b"ALPH"' crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc))" crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned
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CHECK: grep -l "libwebp_sys::" crates/worker/src/*.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY:" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION: (u8, u8, u8) = (1, 6, 0)" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c "the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough" crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs
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EXPECT: crates/worker/src/decode.rs only ; >= 4 ; 1 ; 1
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12. Test hooks never ship: release build without features; the runtime image is distroless static, non-root, with `run --check` as its command.
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CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-2.log
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CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-6.log
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EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; exit=0
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13. Frontend, live deployment and database untouched; the existing suites still pass.
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CHECK: git diff --stat 5fec065..HEAD -- apps/app Dockerfile docker-compose.yml docker/nginx.conf docker/entrypoint.sh supabase packages/domain packages/anatomy packages/pdf packages/supabase | wc -l; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log; grep -E "apps/app test:run:\s+Tests|packages/pdf test:run:\s+Tests|packages/anatomy test:run:\s+Tests" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log
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@@ -86,10 +86,18 @@ fn oversized_headers_are_refused_before_decoding() {
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#[test]
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fn an_iccp_bomb_is_a_content_rejection_not_a_broken_environment() {
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expect_rejected(
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&fixtures::png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20),
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exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT,
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);
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// The png crate reports the inflated profile as a decoding error; the property proven
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// here is that content can only ever be rejected, never classified as a broken
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// environment (the outcome R1 alerts on).
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let run = spawner().decode(&fixtures::png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20));
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match run.outcome {
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ChildOutcome::Rejected { code, .. }
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if code == exit_codes::DECODE_FAILED || code == exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT => {}
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other => panic!(
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"expected a content rejection, got {other:?} ({})",
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run.stderr
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),
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}
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}
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#[test]
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+32
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@@ -100,18 +100,25 @@ sandbox in a single-threaded process:
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`image::Limits` (sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF
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orientation, `resize_to_fill` 512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) through
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`libwebp-sys` (C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes in
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`exit_codes.rs` (10–18, never 1, 101 or a signal number).
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`exit_codes.rs` (10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time
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error maps to a content code (`unsupported_type`, `decode_failed`,
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`dimensions`, `resource_limit`), so no upload can produce a broken-environment
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code.
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- the parent side (`spawn::Spawner`, used by the tests now and by R1):
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`env_clear`, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the
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child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit
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(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes 12 to 17,
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`Broken{code}` when the child could not even start (usage, non-empty
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environment, sandbox failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the
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upload), `Signalled{signal}`, `OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
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(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes
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(`exit_codes::is_content_rejection`, an explicit list), `Broken{code}` when
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the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox
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failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming
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the upload; no content can produce it), `Signalled{signal}`,
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`OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
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parent **never decodes**: `webp_check::inspect` parses the RIFF container
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only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; canvas size from the
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headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `,
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`ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
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only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; the encoder's structure
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enforced: optional `VP8X` first, optional `ALPH` only in an extended file,
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exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree
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with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `, `ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the
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output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
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child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw
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(LRN-044).
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- `run --check`: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which
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@@ -145,15 +152,18 @@ binary), `run --check` exits 0 with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL
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started once with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL`.
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- `rust-advisories.yml`: nightly and manual `cargo deny check advisories`,
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out of the blocking path on purpose.
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- `release-images.yml`: manual only, on `main` or `develop`; the dispatch
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input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable;
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the RustSec advisories gate runs first; an ephemeral `buildx` builder with
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its own cache builds the images (nothing a PR build left in the daemon's
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cache mounts or volumes can reach a release image); secrets reach the
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shell through env only, the login lives in a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG`
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removed at the end; `actions/checkout` pinned to a commit. It pushes
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`faunosteo_app:<sha>` and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and prints their
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digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
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- `release-images.yml`: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice
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re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm
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(`pnpm audit --prod`) advisories gates run first; a named ephemeral
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`buildx` builder (`--builder`, no silent fallback) with its own cache
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builds the images; the registry token reaches the login step only, into
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a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG` under `RUNNER_TEMP` created before any step and
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removed by a literal path; digests read from the build metadata;
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`actions/checkout` pinned to a commit. The `if: github.ref` line is not a
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boundary (push access and the token's scope are; a dedicated release
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runner label is the Step 27 operation). It pushes `faunosteo_app:<sha>`
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and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and prints their digests. Deploys nothing
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(DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
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Not measured here: the forge runner's cache behaviour and cold build times
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(the runner was not available from this host). The builder image build took
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@@ -214,12 +224,15 @@ static binary.
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allowlist is that set plus the abort path (`rt_sigaction`,
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`rt_sigprocmask`, `getpid`, `gettid`, `tkill`, `tgkill`, `exit`).
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- Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
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Docker's default seccomp profile: 13 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
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Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
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`inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits` (4096²), dimensions 32 px
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and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty
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environment refused, `--violate` → SIGSYS 31, `--flood` → output cut,
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`--alloc-gib 2` → SIGABRT 6 under `RLIMIT_AS`, `--spin` → parent deadline,
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`--spin` → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0).
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`--spin` → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative
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proofs of the argument filters: `--signal-parent` (`tkill` to the parent)
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and `--mmap-exec` → SIGSYS; an `iCCP` bomb of 300 MB inflated → a content
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rejection, never a broken-environment outcome).
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- Findings: with `RLIMIT_CPU` soft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard
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limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill;
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the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode
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