fix(worker): iCCP-bomb proof asserts the content-rejection property (either content code); docs(docs): RUST.md worker and release workflow wording after the second security pass

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:37:33 +02:00
1 parent a8b644a515
commit 3af2861be7
3 files changed
+46 -25

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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned
CHECK: grep -c "tokio" crates/worker/Cargo.toml; grep -n "vars_os().next().is_some()\|sandbox::apply(\|read_to_end(&mut input)" crates/worker/src/decode.rs | head -3; grep -n "ensure_single_thread()?;\|set_rlimits(limits)?;\|install_seccomp()?;" crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | head -3
EXPECT: 0 ; the three lines appear in that order (env check line < sandbox line < read line) ; the three calls appear in that order
9. seccomp allowlist is the traced set plus the abort path, denies every file and process syscall, and was derived and proven on the musl binary.
CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 13 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-5.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
CHECK: sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; sed -n '/^pub const ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs | grep -c '("'; grep -c "open\|execve\|clone\|socket" <(sed -n '/^pub const ALLOWED_SYSCALLS/,/^];/p' crates/worker/src/sandbox.rs); grep -E "test result: ok. 16 passed|allowlist covers the trace" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-test-build-11.log | sed -E 's/^#[0-9]+ [0-9.]+ //' | sort -u
EXPECT: 7 ; 7 ; 0 ; both lines present
10. The keyed parent never decodes: spawn.rs and webp_check.rs use no image decoder; output capped at 512 KiB; the RIFF check allowlists four chunk types and refuses the rest.
CHECK: grep -c "image::" crates/worker/src/spawn.rs crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 512 \* 1024" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c 'b"VP8X", b"VP8 ", b"VP8L", b"ALPH"' crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs; grep -c "return Err(WebpIssue::ForbiddenChunk(fourcc))" crates/worker/src/webp_check.rs
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Implement R0 per Annex B: Cargo workspace with crates core, wasm, worker; pinned
CHECK: grep -l "libwebp_sys::" crates/worker/src/*.rs; grep -c "// SAFETY:" crates/worker/src/decode.rs; grep -c "MIN_LIBWEBP_VERSION: (u8, u8, u8) = (1, 6, 0)" crates/worker/src/limits.rs; grep -c "the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough" crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs
EXPECT: crates/worker/src/decode.rs only ; >= 4 ; 1 ; 1
12. Test hooks never ship: release build without features; the runtime image is distroless static, non-root, with `run --check` as its command.
CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-2.log
CHECK: grep -n "cargo build -p faunosteo-worker --release --locked" crates/worker/Dockerfile | grep -c "features"; grep -c "FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c "^USER nonroot" crates/worker/Dockerfile; grep -c 'CMD \["run", "--check"\]' crates/worker/Dockerfile; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/worker-image-build-6.log
EXPECT: 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ; exit=0
13. Frontend, live deployment and database untouched; the existing suites still pass.
CHECK: git diff --stat 5fec065..HEAD -- apps/app Dockerfile docker-compose.yml docker/nginx.conf docker/entrypoint.sh supabase packages/domain packages/anatomy packages/pdf packages/supabase | wc -l; tail -1 /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log; grep -E "apps/app test:run:\s+Tests|packages/pdf test:run:\s+Tests|packages/anatomy test:run:\s+Tests" /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/2fbc125b-9811-4458-8ebc-489c2f9255be/scratchpad/pnpm-check.log
+12 -4
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@@ -86,10 +86,18 @@ fn oversized_headers_are_refused_before_decoding() {
#[test]
fn an_iccp_bomb_is_a_content_rejection_not_a_broken_environment() {
expect_rejected(
&fixtures::png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20),
exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT,
);
// The png crate reports the inflated profile as a decoding error; the property proven
// here is that content can only ever be rejected, never classified as a broken
// environment (the outcome R1 alerts on).
let run = spawner().decode(&fixtures::png_iccp_bomb(300 << 20));
match run.outcome {
ChildOutcome::Rejected { code, .. }
if code == exit_codes::DECODE_FAILED || code == exit_codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT => {}
other => panic!(
"expected a content rejection, got {other:?} ({})",
run.stderr
),
}
}
#[test]
+32 -19
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@@ -100,18 +100,25 @@ sandbox in a single-threaded process:
`image::Limits` (sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF
orientation, `resize_to_fill` 512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) through
`libwebp-sys` (C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes in
`exit_codes.rs` (10–18, never 1, 101 or a signal number).
`exit_codes.rs` (10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time
error maps to a content code (`unsupported_type`, `decode_failed`,
`dimensions`, `resource_limit`), so no upload can produce a broken-environment
code.
- the parent side (`spawn::Spawner`, used by the tests now and by R1):
`env_clear`, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the
child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit
(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes 12 to 17,
`Broken{code}` when the child could not even start (usage, non-empty
environment, sandbox failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the
upload), `Signalled{signal}`, `OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
(`Produced`, `Rejected{code}` for the content codes
(`exit_codes::is_content_rejection`, an explicit list), `Broken{code}` when
the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox
failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming
the upload; no content can produce it), `Signalled{signal}`,
`OutputOverflow`, `Timeout`, `Failed`). The
parent **never decodes**: `webp_check::inspect` parses the RIFF container
only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; canvas size from the
headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `,
`ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
only (chunk allowlist `VP8X`, `VP8 `, `VP8L`, `ALPH`; the encoder's structure
enforced: optional `VP8X` first, optional `ALPH` only in an extended file,
exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree
with the canvas; any `EXIF`, `XMP `, `ICCP` or unknown chunk refuses the
output; owner amendment of D-R4). The
child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw
(LRN-044).
- `run --check`: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which
@@ -145,15 +152,18 @@ binary), `run --check` exits 0 with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL
started once with `--read-only --cap-drop ALL`.
- `rust-advisories.yml`: nightly and manual `cargo deny check advisories`,
out of the blocking path on purpose.
- `release-images.yml`: manual only, on `main` or `develop`; the dispatch
input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable;
the RustSec advisories gate runs first; an ephemeral `buildx` builder with
its own cache builds the images (nothing a PR build left in the daemon's
cache mounts or volumes can reach a release image); secrets reach the
shell through env only, the login lives in a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG`
removed at the end; `actions/checkout` pinned to a commit. It pushes
`faunosteo_app:<sha>` and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and prints their
digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
- `release-images.yml`: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice
re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm
(`pnpm audit --prod`) advisories gates run first; a named ephemeral
`buildx` builder (`--builder`, no silent fallback) with its own cache
builds the images; the registry token reaches the login step only, into
a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG` under `RUNNER_TEMP` created before any step and
removed by a literal path; digests read from the build metadata;
`actions/checkout` pinned to a commit. The `if: github.ref` line is not a
boundary (push access and the token's scope are; a dedicated release
runner label is the Step 27 operation). It pushes `faunosteo_app:<sha>`
and `faunosteo_worker:<sha>` and prints their digests. Deploys nothing
(DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
Not measured here: the forge runner's cache behaviour and cold build times
(the runner was not available from this host). The builder image build took
@@ -214,12 +224,15 @@ static binary.
allowlist is that set plus the abort path (`rt_sigaction`,
`rt_sigprocmask`, `getpid`, `gettid`, `tkill`, `tgkill`, `exit`).
- Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
Docker's default seccomp profile: 13 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (`png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox`,
`inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits` (4096²), dimensions 32 px
and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty
environment refused, `--violate` → SIGSYS 31, `--flood` → output cut,
`--alloc-gib 2` → SIGABRT 6 under `RLIMIT_AS`, `--spin` → parent deadline,
`--spin` → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0).
`--spin` → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative
proofs of the argument filters: `--signal-parent` (`tkill` to the parent)
and `--mmap-exec` → SIGSYS; an `iCCP` bomb of 300 MB inflated → a content
rejection, never a broken-environment outcome).
- Findings: with `RLIMIT_CPU` soft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard
limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill;
the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode