chore(memory): V1-2.6 checkpoint report, upgrade closing

This commit is contained in:
bchanot committed 2026-11-04 23:43:16 +01:00
1 parent 72b742f9d3
commit fe724b263e
1 file changed
+11 -4
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The owner has not tried the editor: V1-2.6 is NOT declared functionally validate
## HEAD and commits
- Branch `feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets`, pushed, no merge, working tree clean. HEAD: the commit that adds this file
(`git log -1 -- .claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md`); last application code `2057b0e`, last trial
tooling: the host-filter commit right before this report (`git log -1 -- apps/app/vite/trial.config.ts`).
tooling: `git log -1 -- apps/app/vite/trial.config.ts` (the host filter itself is `5207f87`).
- Step range `2571978..HEAD`: lots A-M (`2f824a9..7a4ce9e`), lot N owner checkpoint decisions (`be4f468..5e0aa62`),
lot O last owner decisions (`a69eba5`, `d74c54e`, `2057b0e`, `fb95255`, `5207f87`, `8531dd3`); docs and `.claude` commits in between.
- No file changed under `crates/`, `supabase/seed/`, `apps/app/tests/fixtures/`, `packages/core-wasm/{tests,types}/`
@@ -37,15 +37,22 @@ The owner has not tried the editor: V1-2.6 is NOT declared functionally validate
- Then (fourth fresh verifier and auditor: OPTIONS pre-flights answered by Vite's CORS before any host check, and
the hot-reload WebSocket upgrade bypassing the middlewares): the trial sets `cors: false` and `ws: false` and
closes `/__open-in-editor`. Probed: OPTIONS with Host localhost or 10.0.0.1 → 403 (trial host → 404, no CORS);
WebSocket upgrade → refused for every Host; `/__open-in-editor` and `/__OPEN-IN-EDITOR` → 404; no
WebSocket upgrade → never answered 101 (then closed at once, see below); `/__open-in-editor` and `/__OPEN-IN-EDITOR` → 404; no
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin`; /login 200; the LAN journey passed again; stopped, `down`, 0 containers,
0 listeners, password deleted. Security of the host-filter commit (`fb95255..671a1bd`): PASS.
- Security of `671a1bd..b2941eb` (cors/ws/open-in-editor): PASS, two LOW: an upgrade request was held open by the
proxy's upgrade listener (not refused), and the guide's CORS sentence was exact for Vite only (the proxied
Supabase routes keep the stack's CORS headers). Both fixed after: every upgrade socket is destroyed at once,
`/__open-in-editor` also matched by connect's own route, the guide reworded. Probed on the running trial: an
upgrade request (trial host, localhost, /auth/v1/health) gets an empty reply in 0.01 s; `/__open-in-editor` → 404
for any Host; OPTIONS with Host 10.0.0.1 → 403; evil.example → 403; /login 200; LAN journey passed; stopped,
`down`, 0 containers, 0 listeners, password deleted. Its own security run follows this report.
## Audits and reviews
- Security (fresh auditor): full range `2571978..25bdac4` PASS (0 blocking); scoped `25bdac4..fb95255` PASS: worktree
serving on the LAN closed, PGPASSWORD closed, cleartext LAN traffic re-rated LOW (documented in the guide: trusted
network only, the TOTP enrolment key also travels in clear). Kept LOW: Vite's `/__open-in-editor` reachable from the
LAN (opens a file in the owner's editor, returns nothing), the allow list includes tests and node_modules, the
network only, the TOTP enrolment key also travels in clear). `/__open-in-editor` closed (8531dd3). Kept LOW: the
allow list includes tests and node_modules, the
default trial host is the first `hostname -I` address (the guide says how to force 192.168.1.100), template SQL in
e2e helpers, trial gateway without a Host check (loopback only), an unproven sign-out copy-rewrite window, AAL2
claim after a factor removal (§13, production prerequisite).