diff --git a/.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md b/.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md index 88ad14ff..2613ca18 100644 --- a/.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md +++ b/.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The owner has not tried the editor: V1-2.6 is NOT declared functionally validate ## HEAD and commits - Branch `feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets`, pushed, no merge, working tree clean. HEAD: the commit that adds this file (`git log -1 -- .claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-04-v1-2-6-checkpoint.md`); last application code `2057b0e`, last trial - tooling: the host-filter commit right before this report (`git log -1 -- apps/app/vite/trial.config.ts`). + tooling: `git log -1 -- apps/app/vite/trial.config.ts` (the host filter itself is `5207f87`). - Step range `2571978..HEAD`: lots A-M (`2f824a9..7a4ce9e`), lot N owner checkpoint decisions (`be4f468..5e0aa62`), lot O last owner decisions (`a69eba5`, `d74c54e`, `2057b0e`, `fb95255`, `5207f87`, `8531dd3`); docs and `.claude` commits in between. - No file changed under `crates/`, `supabase/seed/`, `apps/app/tests/fixtures/`, `packages/core-wasm/{tests,types}/` @@ -37,15 +37,22 @@ The owner has not tried the editor: V1-2.6 is NOT declared functionally validate - Then (fourth fresh verifier and auditor: OPTIONS pre-flights answered by Vite's CORS before any host check, and the hot-reload WebSocket upgrade bypassing the middlewares): the trial sets `cors: false` and `ws: false` and closes `/__open-in-editor`. Probed: OPTIONS with Host localhost or 10.0.0.1 → 403 (trial host → 404, no CORS); - WebSocket upgrade → refused for every Host; `/__open-in-editor` and `/__OPEN-IN-EDITOR` → 404; no + WebSocket upgrade → never answered 101 (then closed at once, see below); `/__open-in-editor` and `/__OPEN-IN-EDITOR` → 404; no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`; /login 200; the LAN journey passed again; stopped, `down`, 0 containers, 0 listeners, password deleted. Security of the host-filter commit (`fb95255..671a1bd`): PASS. +- Security of `671a1bd..b2941eb` (cors/ws/open-in-editor): PASS, two LOW: an upgrade request was held open by the + proxy's upgrade listener (not refused), and the guide's CORS sentence was exact for Vite only (the proxied + Supabase routes keep the stack's CORS headers). Both fixed after: every upgrade socket is destroyed at once, + `/__open-in-editor` also matched by connect's own route, the guide reworded. Probed on the running trial: an + upgrade request (trial host, localhost, /auth/v1/health) gets an empty reply in 0.01 s; `/__open-in-editor` → 404 + for any Host; OPTIONS with Host 10.0.0.1 → 403; evil.example → 403; /login 200; LAN journey passed; stopped, + `down`, 0 containers, 0 listeners, password deleted. Its own security run follows this report. ## Audits and reviews - Security (fresh auditor): full range `2571978..25bdac4` PASS (0 blocking); scoped `25bdac4..fb95255` PASS: worktree serving on the LAN closed, PGPASSWORD closed, cleartext LAN traffic re-rated LOW (documented in the guide: trusted - network only, the TOTP enrolment key also travels in clear). Kept LOW: Vite's `/__open-in-editor` reachable from the - LAN (opens a file in the owner's editor, returns nothing), the allow list includes tests and node_modules, the + network only, the TOTP enrolment key also travels in clear). `/__open-in-editor` closed (8531dd3). Kept LOW: the + allow list includes tests and node_modules, the default trial host is the first `hostname -I` address (the guide says how to force 192.168.1.100), template SQL in e2e helpers, trial gateway without a Host check (loopback only), an unproven sign-out copy-rewrite window, AAL2 claim after a factor removal (§13, production prerequisite).