docs(supabase): V1-2.5 checkpoint decisions, TOTP reuse measured, lost-factor review
IDENTITY 4.1 asserted reuse span (step N and N+1), 4.2 lost authenticator paths and gaps, production prerequisite; V1-2 contract 12.3, 13, 17.10, 17.11; design README accepted deviations; REVUE L15 and object_conflict EN; M7 header.
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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*/
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import { PASSWORD, confirmedAccount, rest, signIn, sql, stack, uniqueEmail, type Account } from './stack'
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import { authRequest, claimsOf, enrolTotp, verifyTotp, type Factor, type MfaResult } from './mfa'
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import { TOTP_STEP_SECONDS, totpCode } from './totp'
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interface Session {
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access: string
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@@ -56,6 +57,24 @@ const withFactor = async (tag: string) => {
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return { account: a, factor, aal2: sessionOf(verified) }
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}
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/** Sleeps into the start of a TOTP step with at least `minLeftS` seconds left. */
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const intoFreshStep = async (minLeftS: number) => {
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const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
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const leftMs = stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs)
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if (leftMs <= minLeftS * 1000) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, leftMs + 500))
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}
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/** Sleeps over the next step boundary (the code of the new step is then current). */
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const intoNextStep = async () => {
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const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs) + 500))
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}
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/** Challenge then verify with a code fixed by the caller (the secret is never read back). */
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const verifyWith = async (token: string, factor: Factor, code: string) => {
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const challenge = await authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`, token, {})
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if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
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return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, { challenge_id: challenge.body.id, code })
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}
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/** has_mfa() and has_aal2_session() evaluated with `token`'s claims, as PostgREST sets them. */
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const helpersFor = async (token: string) => {
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const out = await sql(`begin;
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@@ -249,4 +268,33 @@ describe('GoTrue v2.197.0 TOTP behaviour (V1-2.5 C1)', () => {
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expect([aal(tokens[0]), amr(tokens[0])]).toEqual(['aal1', ['otp']])
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expect(await sql(`select email from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`)).toBe(newEmail)
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})
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it('11. a TOTP code is accepted again within its window: same step, next step, not the one after', async () => {
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// Measured, not documented (IDENTITY.md §4.1): GoTrue keeps no used-code
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// record in this image. The code C of step N is verified by session A,
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// then by a second aal1 session B signed in after A's verify, then by A
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// again; C is still accepted one step later and refused two steps later.
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const { account: a, factor } = await withFactor('mfa-reuse')
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await intoNextStep()
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await intoFreshStep(8)
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const code = totpCode(factor.secret)
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const A = await passwordSession(a.email)
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const first = await verifyWith(A.access, factor, code)
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expect(outcome(first)).toEqual([200, null])
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const B = await passwordSession(a.email)
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// B is alive before the code is sent: the refusal below cannot be a dead session.
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expect([outcome(await authRequest('GET', '/user', B.access)), aal(B.access)]).toEqual([[200, null], 'aal1'])
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const reused = await verifyWith(B.access, factor, code)
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expect(outcome(reused)).toEqual([200, null])
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expect(aal(reused.body.access_token as string)).toBe('aal2')
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expect(outcome(await verifyWith(sessionOf(first).access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null])
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// Step N+1 (one step of skew): still accepted.
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await intoNextStep()
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const D = await passwordSession(a.email)
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expect(outcome(await verifyWith(D.access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null])
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// Step N+2: refused. The span of C is its step and the next one (30 to 60 s).
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await intoNextStep()
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const E = await passwordSession(a.email)
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expect(outcome(await verifyWith(E.access, factor, code))).toEqual([422, 'mfa_verification_failed'])
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}, 180_000)
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})
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