docs(supabase): V1-2.5 checkpoint decisions, TOTP reuse measured, lost-factor review

IDENTITY 4.1 asserted reuse span (step N and N+1), 4.2 lost authenticator paths and gaps, production prerequisite; V1-2 contract 12.3, 13, 17.10, 17.11; design README accepted deviations; REVUE L15 and object_conflict EN; M7 header.
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@@ -26,9 +26,17 @@ permissions (L14). Everything below is a proposal, not ratified: the owner (2026
Choices to confirm: factor name limit 64 characters (no GoTrue limit documented); no copy button for the setup key.
## Permissions unavailable (checkpoint 2026-11-02)
| Key | FR | EN |
|---|---|---|
| permissions_unavailable.title | Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations (owner wording) | Unable to verify your permissions (proposal) |
| permissions_unavailable.body | La vérification n'a pas abouti, probablement à cause d'un problème de connexion. Cette erreur ne modifie pas vos droits. | The check did not complete, probably because of a connection problem. This error does not change your permissions. |
| common.retry (existing key, reused) | Réessayer (owner wording) | Retry |
## Slices G and H (administration): 203 keys, all proposals
Ratified wordings reused verbatim: §3 round and version statuses, grant kind labels, Fiche historique, Copie de travail, Créer une copie de travail, BDR-095 outcome titles, « Brouillons, revues, versions. », « Espèces du catalogue, actives ou non. », « Une copie de travail active existe déjà (une seule à la fois). » (board annotation « §14.3 » dropped). Choices to confirm: expiry = end of the chosen day in device time, strictly after today; species order 0 to 9999 (SQL unbounded); « relecteur ou relectrice » inside the permissions list; « rôle propriétaire » and « aucune » in that line (not drawn on board 10).
Ratified wordings reused verbatim: §3 round and version statuses, grant kind labels, Fiche historique, Copie de travail, Créer une copie de travail, BDR-095 outcome titles, « Brouillons, revues, versions. », « Espèces du catalogue, actives ou non. », « Une copie de travail active existe déjà (une seule à la fois). » (board annotation « §14.3 » dropped). Choices to confirm: expiry = end of the chosen day Europe/Paris (23:59:59.999, strictly after today in Paris); species order 0 to 9999, checked in SQL (M7); « relecteur ou relectrice » (ratified 2026-11-02) inside the permissions list; « rôle propriétaire » and « aucune » in that line (not drawn on board 10).
| Key | FR | EN |
|---|---|---|
+1 -1
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@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet
- [ ] L owner checkpoint corrections (brief « V1-2.5 : décisions propriétaire au checkpoint », 2026-11-02, on 14ff890; contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-owner-checkpoint-2041.md`, plan `.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-owner-checkpoint-2041.md`): sandbox only, no DEV, no merge, no V1-2.6
- [x] L1 three permission states (creation page + Administration home), reloadAccess, unit + e2e: app 671, e2e:shell 110 + 8 skipped, pgTAP 1941 (fresh sandbox)
- [x] L2 expiry end of day Europe/Paris, species order 0..9 999 in M7, labels, TOTP key test: app 696, supabase 148, pgTAP 1965 fresh + upgrade, types match
- [ ] L3 TOTP reuse measured, lost-authenticator review, decisions in docs
- [x] L3 TOTP reuse measured (code accepted by several sessions in its step and the next, refused at N+2), lost-authenticator review (production prerequisite), decisions in docs; sandbox test 103 + 10 skipped x2
- [ ] L4 gates (check:all, sandbox test-db fresh + upgrade, test, e2e:shell), fresh verifier + security, memory, checkpoint with V1-2.6 scope
- [ ] V1-2.5 catalogue, admin space, rights, species, MFA · V1-2.6 editor level 1 · V1-2.7 preview, review, publication UI · V1-2.8 equine working copy and review preparation · V1-2.9 FR/EN acceptance and closure (owner checkpoints V1-2.3, V1-2.4, V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8, V1-2.9 + each DEV operation of contract §16.11)
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ the equine working copy content work (V1-2.8), any DEV operation (§16.11), reco
- C4 gap fixed: `/app/admin/sheets/new` shows « Accès non autorisé » to any account whose own grants, once
read, hold no active `sheet_editor` grant (display rule; the server refuses creation anyway); unit tests for
a reviewer, a publisher and an owner without the capability. While the grants load the page waits; when
their read failed (or the account itself could not be read) it shows the form and the server decides,
rather than denying an editor for good: a reviewer may then see the form and be refused on submit.
Submitted for the owner's acknowledgement at the checkpoint.
their read failed it shows « Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations » with a Retry button, never the form
(owner decision 2026-11-02; a server refusal of the species read still wins with « Accès non autorisé »;
V1-2 contract §17.11).
- Security MEDIUM fixed: M7 restates the grants of the redefined `get_sheet_version`. LOW fixed: the e2e
enrolment check no longer prints the throwaway setup key on failure.
- Run evidence for the criteria a read-only verifier cannot run (orchestrator runs, sandbox only):
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@@ -96,3 +96,9 @@ no « Sélection : … » tag over the canvas on desktop (`02`), and « Référe
phone instead of a folded section (`03`); `04`, `05` and board `06` A with V1-2.6 (editor,
narrow-screen read-only mode, draft check); `06` B–D, `07`–`09` with V1-2.7 (verification states, review,
publication); the labels of `12` with the step that shows each of them.
Accepted deviations (owner 2026-11-02, V1-2.5): the boards stay as approved, nothing is redrawn.
1. The catalogue selection is shown in the zone panel, not in a « Sélection : … » tag over the drawing (`02`).
Condition: it stays identifiable and accessible (a live region in the panel names the picked zone).
2. On a phone, « Références » is a plain, non-collapsible card (`03`). Condition: it does not hide the
anatomical area (it starts at or below the drawing's bottom, checked at 320 and 375 px).
+2 -2
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@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ Le propriétaire a décidé que les messages techniques restants seraient vérif
| # | Planches | Proposition |
|---|---|---|
| L15 (seconde phrase) | « Ici, consultation seule. » (375 px) ; à 768 px, la phrase d'explication | « Sur cet écran, consultation seule. » / « On this screen, read-only. » (texte de la planche 12). Non arbitré par l'approbation ; à fixer avant le mode lecture seule sur écran étroit (V1-2.6) |
| `object_conflict` (EN) | planche 12 : « A drawing conflicts with an existing file. » | À vérifier à l'intégration ; variante proposée : « A drawing's file content does not match its recorded SHA-256 fingerprint. » |
| L15 (seconde phrase) | « Ici, consultation seule. » (375 px) ; à 768 px, la phrase d'explication | Décidé (propriétaire, 2026-11-02, V1-2.5) : seconde phrase supprimée, le titre seul reste (« L'édition nécessite une largeur d'écran d'au moins 1 024 px. ») ; à appliquer au mode lecture seule (V1-2.6) |
| `object_conflict` (EN) | planche 12 : « A drawing conflicts with an existing file. » | Ratifié (propriétaire, 2026-11-02, V1-2.5) : « The illustration file's contents do not match its recorded SHA-256 hash. » (`catalogue.failure.drawing_hash_mismatch`) |
| 16 autres codes fermés | messages de la planche 12 | Vérifiés à l'intégration, gardés sauf erreur démontrée |
| L30 | messages de refus par code (`verdict.*`, `publish.*`, `review.*`, `rights.*`) | Rédigés avec l'écran qui les affiche : refus d'approbation et de publication en V1-2.7 (planche 12) ; refus des écrans d'habilitations et `mfa_required` en V1-2.5 (contrat §16.6) |
+36 -3
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@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ right (`V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md` §5.6, §5.7). State since V1-2.5:
(§4.1).
Still open: the recovery runbook for a lost factor (V1-2 contract §5.7.7) is
rehearsed at V1-2.9.
rehearsed at V1-2.9; the paths and gaps are reviewed in §4.2.
### 4.1 GoTrue v2.197.0 behaviour, measured on the sandbox (V1-2.5)
@@ -156,8 +156,41 @@ rehearsed at V1-2.9.
- Refresh keeps `aal2`; a new password sign-in starts at `aal1`.
- Email change: refused at `aal1`; from `aal2` the confirmation link opens a
new `aal1` session. Identity linking: 404 `manual_linking_disabled`.
- A TOTP code accepted twice within its 30 s window by two sessions of one
factor (observed, not asserted).
- TOTP code reuse (case 11, asserted): GoTrue keeps no record of used codes.
A code C taken in a fresh 30 s step N is accepted by session A, then by a
second `aal1` session B signed in after A's verify (B proven alive first,
and it reaches `aal2`), then by A again. A session D verifying C in step
N+1 is accepted too (one step of skew); a session E verifying C in step N+2
is refused (422 `mfa_verification_failed`). Measured span of one code: its
own step and the next, 30 to 60 s. Consequence: a code seen over a shoulder
or relayed by a phishing page can be replayed once by another password-holding
session within that span; it does not outlive it. Configuration that ran
the measurement: the sandbox GoTrue (`scripts/db-sandbox.sh`, image
`gotrue:v2.197.0`), which sets no MFA variable, so the image defaults apply.
The CLI and DEV stacks are configured by `supabase/config.toml` `[auth.mfa]`
(`max_enrolled_factors = 10`) and `[auth.mfa.totp]` (enrolment and
verification on), no replay setting either; the same behaviour is expected
there but only the sandbox was measured. No mitigation is added: the span is
a residual risk (V1-2 contract §13).
### 4.2 Lost authenticator: paths and gaps
Review of what happens when a person loses the device holding their TOTP
factor (V1-2 contract §5.6, §5.7.7). It describes; it adds no path and does
not weaken `aal2`.
| Path | What exists | Gap |
|---|---|---|
| Second factor | A factor is enrolled from `aal2`, then any verified factor reaches `aal2`. Recommended for every capability holder, two factors on two independent devices for the owner (§5.6, §5.7.7). | Nothing forces a second factor on a capability holder; a person with one factor and a lost device has no second path. |
| Self-service recovery | None. GoTrue issues no recovery codes. Password change and reset, and removal of a verified factor, need `aal2` (case 7, 4), so a lost factor cannot be removed or bypassed by the person. An ordinary account keeps its `aal1` use of the application; a capability holder loses the administration until recovery. | No recovery code or backup channel. By design. |
| Authorised administrative intervention | Operator procedure of V1-2 §5.6 and §5.7.7, run with server access: sign out every session, delete the factors, ban, new password with the person present, lift the ban, two new factors, list the factors. Never an application path: no RPC, screen or service path resets a factor. | A procedure on paper: not rehearsed (V1-2.9). |
| Identity checks | Out of band, the owner present, the reason recorded before anything changes. | Human control only; nothing in the system verifies it. |
| Audit trail | The operator writes the `auth.mfa_factor_reset` row in the same session; GoTrue keeps its own audit log of the factor and session changes. | The row depends on the operator writing it; a forgotten row is not detected. On a single-owner platform the operator is the owner, so there is no second person to check (the real control is server access). |
Production prerequisite: a recovery runbook rehearsed on the sandbox and
written here before any production use of MFA-protected rights. Until it
exists, the safe lost-factor recovery is missing, and capabilities must not
be granted in production.
## 5. Manual validation (local stack)
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@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ of the document's JSON text in one form, the same for every layer:
| M4 `sheet_access_hardening` | V1-2.1 | `anatomical_catalog_grants` and its RPCs; `has_mfa`, `grant_active`, `caller_has`; `can_read_official_catalog` and the reader row predicate; `can_edit_sheet` redefined (F14); AR-1 B on the platform role RPCs and the private write functions (F19, §5.7), F17, F18; F1, F2, F3 (fork closed), F5, F6, F8, F9, F12 (every catalogue table), F13, F15; asset-row immutability trigger (F16); historical-sheet protection trigger (§14.2); reader column grants narrowed; personal creation and visibility changes refused | no row changes |
| M5 `sheet_review_workflow` | V1-2.1 | version columns `revision`, `authors`, `source_version_id`, `published_review_id`, `document_fingerprint`; sheet column `working_copy_source_version_id`; revision, author and freeze triggers, the historical-sheet write rule; extended immutability guard (§6.8); rounds, comments, acknowledgments; `create_official_sheet`, `create_sheet_draft` adapted, `save_sheet_draft`, submit, withdraw, comment, acknowledge, decide, publish; `create_sheet_working_copy`; species RPCs; catalogue and version read RPCs; upload: `register_sheet_asset` extended, `confirm_sheet_asset_upload` with the storage check (F7), INSERT policy, bucket limit 2 MiB; mirror removal and status check (§12.2); superseded signatures dropped; the content-size CHECK replaced by the text measure (`octet_length(content::text)`, §12.2) | new columns take their defaults on the equine v1 row (`revision` 0, empty author set); its document, status, number and assets unchanged; the new size CHECK is validated against the existing rows when M5 is applied (the equine document measures 184 105 bytes as `content::text`, measured on the sandbox); bucket limit lowered; no round, no grant |
| M6 `sheet_verification_jobs` | V1-2.3 | worker RPCs (claim, input, complete with the verdict structure check, fail), service role only, with the retry delay (hidden `not_before` column on the round, `private.sheet_verification_retry_delay`: owner decision 2026-11-01, replaces « without backoff ») and the retry by cause (definitive codes close at the first occurrence, `private.sheet_worker_final_codes`); written as `20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql`, pgTAP `021`, rehearsed on the sandbox from the state before M4 (M4 to M6 in one `migration up`) and from the state before M6 | none |
| M7 `sheet_admin_reads` | V1-2.5 | read RPCs of the admin space (owner decision 2026-11-02, BDR-097): the official sheet list with its badges (historical, working copy), statuses and round counts, and one sheet's overview (versions, rounds); `get_sheet_version` redefined to return the fingerprint of deprecated versions too (BDR-098); the admin reads for capability holders at `aal2` only (`caller_can_see_official_sheet`); no write path, no grant, no policy or rule change; pgTAP allowed and denied cases | none |
| M7 `sheet_admin_reads` | V1-2.5 | read RPCs of the admin space (owner decision 2026-11-02, BDR-097): the official sheet list with its badges (historical, working copy), statuses and round counts, and one sheet's overview (versions, rounds); `get_sheet_version` redefined to return the fingerprint of deprecated versions too (BDR-098); the admin reads for capability holders at `aal2` only (`caller_can_see_official_sheet`); no write path, no new grant, no policy change; the one rule change is the species sort order: `create_species` and `update_inactive_species` are redefined to refuse an order outside 0..9 999 with `invalid_input` (null keeps today's meaning, owner 2026-11-02), `security definer`, `search_path = ''` and their privileges restated; pgTAP allowed and denied cases | none |
Each migration ships its pgTAP file (allowed and denied cases), regenerated
`database.types.ts`, a `db:sandbox up upgrade` run from the DEV state (with a
@@ -1827,6 +1827,13 @@ Residual risks:
not detectable (§5.5);
- a stolen `aal2` session stays usable until it ends, since no freshness
window or session limit is set (§5.6);
- TOTP code reuse within its window (measured, `IDENTITY.md` §4.1): GoTrue
accepts a used code again, from the same or another session of the account,
in its own 30 s step and the next, and refuses it from the step after; no
mitigation is added, the span is 30 to 60 s;
- production prerequisite: the lost-factor recovery is not rehearsed and no
recovery code exists (`IDENTITY.md` §4.2); the runbook of §5.7.7 is rehearsed
on the sandbox and written before any production use of MFA-protected rights;
- a capability holder can still ask Storage for a signed URL to a draft
drawing through the API; such a URL outlives a later revocation until it
expires;
@@ -2570,7 +2577,7 @@ its `REVUE.md`). **V1-2.4 GRAPHICAL APPROVED.** This record changes no board, no
| Item | Decision | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Approval | the twelve boards `01` to `12` and the complementary page « Accès non autorisé » are approved; they are the design reference of V1-2.5 to V1-2.7 (§11.3); a redesign needs a demonstrated defect or a new owner decision | `docs/design/README.md`, `docs/design/v1-2-4/` |
| `object_conflict` | FR « Le contenu du fichier de l'illustration ne correspond pas à son empreinte SHA-256 enregistrée. »; EN checked at integration with the other messages; board 12 keeps the earlier proposal | §9.3, board 12 |
| `object_conflict` | FR « Le contenu du fichier de l'illustration ne correspond pas à son empreinte SHA-256 enregistrée. »; EN ratified 2026-11-02 (§17.11); board 12 keeps the earlier proposal | §9.3, board 12 |
| L14 | « Access and permissions » in the interface; `capability` stays a technical term | board 10 |
| L20 | « Corriger le brouillon » / « Fix the draft » (content failure); « Modifier le brouillon » / « Edit the draft » (size limit) | board 06 |
| L32 | « Accès non autorisé » / « Access denied », with the explanation and the « Retour au tableau de bord » / « Back to dashboard » link already decided (wordings of board 12) | complementary page, §5.3 |
@@ -2591,6 +2598,48 @@ VERIFIED (BDR-092), V1-2.4 approved (§17.9); V1-2.3 VERIFIED as well (BDR-093).
| Working copy action | « Créer une copie de travail » built in V1-2.5 (board 10), landing on the copy's overview; the editor link arrives with V1-2.6 | §11.1, §16.6 |
| EN term | « Habilitation » reads « Permission » in the English interface; `capability` stays the technical term | §3 |
| Deprecated fingerprint | found while building the catalogue: `PreviewSheet` checks the fingerprint of published and deprecated versions, `get_sheet_version` returned it for published only, so no withdrawn version could open; `get_sheet_version` now returns it for both (redefined in M7, BDR-098) | §10, §12.3 |
| Species RPCs | M7 also redefines `create_species` and `update_inactive_species` with the 0..9 999 order range (§17.11), privileges restated; M5 and earlier migrations untouched (forward-only) | §12.3 |
### 17.11 V1-2.5 checkpoint decisions (owner, 2026-11-02)
The owner accepted the technical results of V1-2.5 at `14ff890` and ratified the following; corrections built
in V1-2.5 lots 1 to 3.
**Permission states.** Three situations are told apart, never one deduced from a technical error. On
`/app/admin/sheets/new` the order is: own grants `loading` (waiting status); the server refused (the species
read answered a `rights.*` kind): « Accès non autorisé » (BDR-094), the server's refusal wins over a failed
client read; own grants `failed`: « Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations », a short explanation and
« Réessayer », never the form; `ready` with an active `sheet_editor` grant: the form; `ready` without it
(reviewer-only, publisher-only, owner without the capability): « Accès non autorisé ». Retry re-reads the
platform roles and the own grants (and the species list when it failed) and keeps the profile, roles and
workspace already held when it fails again. The Administration home replaces its « Vos habilitations » line
with the same notice and Retry while the read failed (waiting status while loading, never « aucune »). The
sheet and species lists keep their grant-dependent actions hidden on a failed read, without a notice. Server
checks and RLS stay mandatory.
**Accepted UX deviations** (the historical boards are unchanged, no graphic redesign; `docs/design/README.md`):
the selection is shown in the zone panel instead of a tag over the drawing, on condition that it stays
identifiable and accessible (an `aria-live` region mounted before any pick, naming the picked zone); the
« Références » card is not collapsible on a phone, on condition that it does not hide the anatomical area
(it starts at or below the drawing's bottom, measured at 320 and 375 px).
**Ratified choices.** MFA factor name: 64 characters at most. TOTP setup key: no Copy button, displayed readable
and selectable while enrolment is open. Capability expiry: valid until the end of the chosen day in
Europe/Paris (the instant stored is 23:59:59.999 of that day with the offset in force then, DST-aware; the
date picker and the display use Paris dates; the backend compares instants, `expires_at > now()`; historical
rows untouched). Species order: an integer from 0 to 9 999, checked server-side (M7). Terminology:
« relecteur ou relectrice ».
**Labels.** L14: « Access and permissions » in the interface, `capability` stays technical. L15: the title
alone, the redundant second sentence is dropped (for V1-2.6). `object_conflict` (EN): « The illustration
file's contents do not match its recorded SHA-256 hash. ». The roughly 350 new labels of V1-2.5 are NOT
approved: they get a separate owner review (`.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md`). The
wordings ratified in V1-2.4 are kept.
**MFA.** TOTP code reuse is recorded as measured (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1, §13). The lost-authenticator paths are
reviewed in `IDENTITY.md` §4.2; no safe, rehearsed recovery exists yet, which is a production prerequisite
(§13). No MFA bypass, no `aal2` weakening, no new path that resets a factor.
---
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*/
import { PASSWORD, confirmedAccount, rest, signIn, sql, stack, uniqueEmail, type Account } from './stack'
import { authRequest, claimsOf, enrolTotp, verifyTotp, type Factor, type MfaResult } from './mfa'
import { TOTP_STEP_SECONDS, totpCode } from './totp'
interface Session {
access: string
@@ -56,6 +57,24 @@ const withFactor = async (tag: string) => {
return { account: a, factor, aal2: sessionOf(verified) }
}
/** Sleeps into the start of a TOTP step with at least `minLeftS` seconds left. */
const intoFreshStep = async (minLeftS: number) => {
const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
const leftMs = stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs)
if (leftMs <= minLeftS * 1000) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, leftMs + 500))
}
/** Sleeps over the next step boundary (the code of the new step is then current). */
const intoNextStep = async () => {
const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs) + 500))
}
/** Challenge then verify with a code fixed by the caller (the secret is never read back). */
const verifyWith = async (token: string, factor: Factor, code: string) => {
const challenge = await authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`, token, {})
if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, { challenge_id: challenge.body.id, code })
}
/** has_mfa() and has_aal2_session() evaluated with `token`'s claims, as PostgREST sets them. */
const helpersFor = async (token: string) => {
const out = await sql(`begin;
@@ -249,4 +268,33 @@ describe('GoTrue v2.197.0 TOTP behaviour (V1-2.5 C1)', () => {
expect([aal(tokens[0]), amr(tokens[0])]).toEqual(['aal1', ['otp']])
expect(await sql(`select email from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`)).toBe(newEmail)
})
it('11. a TOTP code is accepted again within its window: same step, next step, not the one after', async () => {
// Measured, not documented (IDENTITY.md §4.1): GoTrue keeps no used-code
// record in this image. The code C of step N is verified by session A,
// then by a second aal1 session B signed in after A's verify, then by A
// again; C is still accepted one step later and refused two steps later.
const { account: a, factor } = await withFactor('mfa-reuse')
await intoNextStep()
await intoFreshStep(8)
const code = totpCode(factor.secret)
const A = await passwordSession(a.email)
const first = await verifyWith(A.access, factor, code)
expect(outcome(first)).toEqual([200, null])
const B = await passwordSession(a.email)
// B is alive before the code is sent: the refusal below cannot be a dead session.
expect([outcome(await authRequest('GET', '/user', B.access)), aal(B.access)]).toEqual([[200, null], 'aal1'])
const reused = await verifyWith(B.access, factor, code)
expect(outcome(reused)).toEqual([200, null])
expect(aal(reused.body.access_token as string)).toBe('aal2')
expect(outcome(await verifyWith(sessionOf(first).access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null])
// Step N+1 (one step of skew): still accepted.
await intoNextStep()
const D = await passwordSession(a.email)
expect(outcome(await verifyWith(D.access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null])
// Step N+2: refused. The span of C is its step and the next one (30 to 60 s).
await intoNextStep()
const E = await passwordSession(a.email)
expect(outcome(await verifyWith(E.access, factor, code))).toEqual([422, 'mfa_verification_failed'])
}, 180_000)
})
@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@
-- rounds, with the names of the people who acted.
-- Capability holders at aal2 only (`caller_is_catalog_staff`, the predicate
-- of the draft reads); an unknown or forbidden sheet gets one answer. No
-- table, grant, policy or rule changes here. Also: `get_sheet_version`
-- returns the fingerprint of a deprecated version (§10, BDR-098); and
-- `create_species` / `update_inactive_species` refuse a sort order outside
-- 0..9 999 (owner 2026-11-02), their privileges restated.
-- table or policy change here. Rule change limited to the species sort
-- order: `create_species` / `update_inactive_species` refuse an order
-- outside 0..9 999 (owner 2026-11-02), their privileges restated. Also:
-- `get_sheet_version` returns the fingerprint of a deprecated version (§10,
-- BDR-098).
-- ===========================================================================
-- 1. Helpers