diff --git a/.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md b/.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md index 8c3d0ad7..954d4ac8 100644 --- a/.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md +++ b/.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md @@ -26,9 +26,17 @@ permissions (L14). Everything below is a proposal, not ratified: the owner (2026 Choices to confirm: factor name limit 64 characters (no GoTrue limit documented); no copy button for the setup key. +## Permissions unavailable (checkpoint 2026-11-02) + +| Key | FR | EN | +|---|---|---| +| permissions_unavailable.title | Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations (owner wording) | Unable to verify your permissions (proposal) | +| permissions_unavailable.body | La vérification n'a pas abouti, probablement à cause d'un problème de connexion. Cette erreur ne modifie pas vos droits. | The check did not complete, probably because of a connection problem. This error does not change your permissions. | +| common.retry (existing key, reused) | Réessayer (owner wording) | Retry | + ## Slices G and H (administration): 203 keys, all proposals -Ratified wordings reused verbatim: §3 round and version statuses, grant kind labels, Fiche historique, Copie de travail, Créer une copie de travail, BDR-095 outcome titles, « Brouillons, revues, versions. », « Espèces du catalogue, actives ou non. », « Une copie de travail active existe déjà (une seule à la fois). » (board annotation « §14.3 » dropped). Choices to confirm: expiry = end of the chosen day in device time, strictly after today; species order 0 to 9999 (SQL unbounded); « relecteur ou relectrice » inside the permissions list; « rôle propriétaire » and « aucune » in that line (not drawn on board 10). +Ratified wordings reused verbatim: §3 round and version statuses, grant kind labels, Fiche historique, Copie de travail, Créer une copie de travail, BDR-095 outcome titles, « Brouillons, revues, versions. », « Espèces du catalogue, actives ou non. », « Une copie de travail active existe déjà (une seule à la fois). » (board annotation « §14.3 » dropped). Choices to confirm: expiry = end of the chosen day Europe/Paris (23:59:59.999, strictly after today in Paris); species order 0 to 9999, checked in SQL (M7); « relecteur ou relectrice » (ratified 2026-11-02) inside the permissions list; « rôle propriétaire » and « aucune » in that line (not drawn on board 10). | Key | FR | EN | |---|---|---| diff --git a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md index 57c5d1ee..017410ce 100644 --- a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md +++ b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md @@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet - [ ] L owner checkpoint corrections (brief « V1-2.5 : décisions propriétaire au checkpoint », 2026-11-02, on 14ff890; contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-owner-checkpoint-2041.md`, plan `.claude/tasks/plans/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-owner-checkpoint-2041.md`): sandbox only, no DEV, no merge, no V1-2.6 - [x] L1 three permission states (creation page + Administration home), reloadAccess, unit + e2e: app 671, e2e:shell 110 + 8 skipped, pgTAP 1941 (fresh sandbox) - [x] L2 expiry end of day Europe/Paris, species order 0..9 999 in M7, labels, TOTP key test: app 696, supabase 148, pgTAP 1965 fresh + upgrade, types match - - [ ] L3 TOTP reuse measured, lost-authenticator review, decisions in docs + - [x] L3 TOTP reuse measured (code accepted by several sessions in its step and the next, refused at N+2), lost-authenticator review (production prerequisite), decisions in docs; sandbox test 103 + 10 skipped x2 - [ ] L4 gates (check:all, sandbox test-db fresh + upgrade, test, e2e:shell), fresh verifier + security, memory, checkpoint with V1-2.6 scope - [ ] V1-2.5 catalogue, admin space, rights, species, MFA · V1-2.6 editor level 1 · V1-2.7 preview, review, publication UI · V1-2.8 equine working copy and review preparation · V1-2.9 FR/EN acceptance and closure (owner checkpoints V1-2.3, V1-2.4, V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8, V1-2.9 + each DEV operation of contract §16.11) diff --git a/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-admin-catalogue.md b/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-admin-catalogue.md index 58aa4ff6..a757de54 100644 --- a/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-admin-catalogue.md +++ b/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-admin-catalogue.md @@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ the equine working copy content work (V1-2.8), any DEV operation (§16.11), reco - C4 gap fixed: `/app/admin/sheets/new` shows « Accès non autorisé » to any account whose own grants, once read, hold no active `sheet_editor` grant (display rule; the server refuses creation anyway); unit tests for a reviewer, a publisher and an owner without the capability. While the grants load the page waits; when - their read failed (or the account itself could not be read) it shows the form and the server decides, - rather than denying an editor for good: a reviewer may then see the form and be refused on submit. - Submitted for the owner's acknowledgement at the checkpoint. + their read failed it shows « Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations » with a Retry button, never the form + (owner decision 2026-11-02; a server refusal of the species read still wins with « Accès non autorisé »; + V1-2 contract §17.11). - Security MEDIUM fixed: M7 restates the grants of the redefined `get_sheet_version`. LOW fixed: the e2e enrolment check no longer prints the throwaway setup key on failure. - Run evidence for the criteria a read-only verifier cannot run (orchestrator runs, sandbox only): diff --git a/docs/design/README.md b/docs/design/README.md index d32c1e3e..4fb0bde7 100644 --- a/docs/design/README.md +++ b/docs/design/README.md @@ -96,3 +96,9 @@ no « Sélection : … » tag over the canvas on desktop (`02`), and « Référe phone instead of a folded section (`03`); `04`, `05` and board `06` A with V1-2.6 (editor, narrow-screen read-only mode, draft check); `06` B–D, `07`–`09` with V1-2.7 (verification states, review, publication); the labels of `12` with the step that shows each of them. + +Accepted deviations (owner 2026-11-02, V1-2.5): the boards stay as approved, nothing is redrawn. +1. The catalogue selection is shown in the zone panel, not in a « Sélection : … » tag over the drawing (`02`). + Condition: it stays identifiable and accessible (a live region in the panel names the picked zone). +2. On a phone, « Références » is a plain, non-collapsible card (`03`). Condition: it does not hide the + anatomical area (it starts at or below the drawing's bottom, checked at 320 and 375 px). diff --git a/docs/design/v1-2-4/REVUE.md b/docs/design/v1-2-4/REVUE.md index aee456f0..5b1a3235 100644 --- a/docs/design/v1-2-4/REVUE.md +++ b/docs/design/v1-2-4/REVUE.md @@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ Le propriétaire a décidé que les messages techniques restants seraient vérif | # | Planches | Proposition | |---|---|---| -| L15 (seconde phrase) | « Ici, consultation seule. » (375 px) ; à 768 px, la phrase d'explication | « Sur cet écran, consultation seule. » / « On this screen, read-only. » (texte de la planche 12). Non arbitré par l'approbation ; à fixer avant le mode lecture seule sur écran étroit (V1-2.6) | -| `object_conflict` (EN) | planche 12 : « A drawing conflicts with an existing file. » | À vérifier à l'intégration ; variante proposée : « A drawing's file content does not match its recorded SHA-256 fingerprint. » | +| L15 (seconde phrase) | « Ici, consultation seule. » (375 px) ; à 768 px, la phrase d'explication | Décidé (propriétaire, 2026-11-02, V1-2.5) : seconde phrase supprimée, le titre seul reste (« L'édition nécessite une largeur d'écran d'au moins 1 024 px. ») ; à appliquer au mode lecture seule (V1-2.6) | +| `object_conflict` (EN) | planche 12 : « A drawing conflicts with an existing file. » | Ratifié (propriétaire, 2026-11-02, V1-2.5) : « The illustration file's contents do not match its recorded SHA-256 hash. » (`catalogue.failure.drawing_hash_mismatch`) | | 16 autres codes fermés | messages de la planche 12 | Vérifiés à l'intégration, gardés sauf erreur démontrée | | L30 | messages de refus par code (`verdict.*`, `publish.*`, `review.*`, `rights.*`) | Rédigés avec l'écran qui les affiche : refus d'approbation et de publication en V1-2.7 (planche 12) ; refus des écrans d'habilitations et `mfa_required` en V1-2.5 (contrat §16.6) | diff --git a/docs/development/IDENTITY.md b/docs/development/IDENTITY.md index d8715f1d..2c2a549a 100644 --- a/docs/development/IDENTITY.md +++ b/docs/development/IDENTITY.md @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ right (`V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md` §5.6, §5.7). State since V1-2.5: (§4.1). Still open: the recovery runbook for a lost factor (V1-2 contract §5.7.7) is -rehearsed at V1-2.9. +rehearsed at V1-2.9; the paths and gaps are reviewed in §4.2. ### 4.1 GoTrue v2.197.0 behaviour, measured on the sandbox (V1-2.5) @@ -156,8 +156,41 @@ rehearsed at V1-2.9. - Refresh keeps `aal2`; a new password sign-in starts at `aal1`. - Email change: refused at `aal1`; from `aal2` the confirmation link opens a new `aal1` session. Identity linking: 404 `manual_linking_disabled`. -- A TOTP code accepted twice within its 30 s window by two sessions of one - factor (observed, not asserted). +- TOTP code reuse (case 11, asserted): GoTrue keeps no record of used codes. + A code C taken in a fresh 30 s step N is accepted by session A, then by a + second `aal1` session B signed in after A's verify (B proven alive first, + and it reaches `aal2`), then by A again. A session D verifying C in step + N+1 is accepted too (one step of skew); a session E verifying C in step N+2 + is refused (422 `mfa_verification_failed`). Measured span of one code: its + own step and the next, 30 to 60 s. Consequence: a code seen over a shoulder + or relayed by a phishing page can be replayed once by another password-holding + session within that span; it does not outlive it. Configuration that ran + the measurement: the sandbox GoTrue (`scripts/db-sandbox.sh`, image + `gotrue:v2.197.0`), which sets no MFA variable, so the image defaults apply. + The CLI and DEV stacks are configured by `supabase/config.toml` `[auth.mfa]` + (`max_enrolled_factors = 10`) and `[auth.mfa.totp]` (enrolment and + verification on), no replay setting either; the same behaviour is expected + there but only the sandbox was measured. No mitigation is added: the span is + a residual risk (V1-2 contract §13). + +### 4.2 Lost authenticator: paths and gaps + +Review of what happens when a person loses the device holding their TOTP +factor (V1-2 contract §5.6, §5.7.7). It describes; it adds no path and does +not weaken `aal2`. + +| Path | What exists | Gap | +|---|---|---| +| Second factor | A factor is enrolled from `aal2`, then any verified factor reaches `aal2`. Recommended for every capability holder, two factors on two independent devices for the owner (§5.6, §5.7.7). | Nothing forces a second factor on a capability holder; a person with one factor and a lost device has no second path. | +| Self-service recovery | None. GoTrue issues no recovery codes. Password change and reset, and removal of a verified factor, need `aal2` (case 7, 4), so a lost factor cannot be removed or bypassed by the person. An ordinary account keeps its `aal1` use of the application; a capability holder loses the administration until recovery. | No recovery code or backup channel. By design. | +| Authorised administrative intervention | Operator procedure of V1-2 §5.6 and §5.7.7, run with server access: sign out every session, delete the factors, ban, new password with the person present, lift the ban, two new factors, list the factors. Never an application path: no RPC, screen or service path resets a factor. | A procedure on paper: not rehearsed (V1-2.9). | +| Identity checks | Out of band, the owner present, the reason recorded before anything changes. | Human control only; nothing in the system verifies it. | +| Audit trail | The operator writes the `auth.mfa_factor_reset` row in the same session; GoTrue keeps its own audit log of the factor and session changes. | The row depends on the operator writing it; a forgotten row is not detected. On a single-owner platform the operator is the owner, so there is no second person to check (the real control is server access). | + +Production prerequisite: a recovery runbook rehearsed on the sandbox and +written here before any production use of MFA-protected rights. Until it +exists, the safe lost-factor recovery is missing, and capabilities must not +be granted in production. ## 5. Manual validation (local stack) diff --git a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md index 890e1a89..12b5f03a 100644 --- a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md +++ b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md @@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ of the document's JSON text in one form, the same for every layer: | M4 `sheet_access_hardening` | V1-2.1 | `anatomical_catalog_grants` and its RPCs; `has_mfa`, `grant_active`, `caller_has`; `can_read_official_catalog` and the reader row predicate; `can_edit_sheet` redefined (F14); AR-1 B on the platform role RPCs and the private write functions (F19, §5.7), F17, F18; F1, F2, F3 (fork closed), F5, F6, F8, F9, F12 (every catalogue table), F13, F15; asset-row immutability trigger (F16); historical-sheet protection trigger (§14.2); reader column grants narrowed; personal creation and visibility changes refused | no row changes | | M5 `sheet_review_workflow` | V1-2.1 | version columns `revision`, `authors`, `source_version_id`, `published_review_id`, `document_fingerprint`; sheet column `working_copy_source_version_id`; revision, author and freeze triggers, the historical-sheet write rule; extended immutability guard (§6.8); rounds, comments, acknowledgments; `create_official_sheet`, `create_sheet_draft` adapted, `save_sheet_draft`, submit, withdraw, comment, acknowledge, decide, publish; `create_sheet_working_copy`; species RPCs; catalogue and version read RPCs; upload: `register_sheet_asset` extended, `confirm_sheet_asset_upload` with the storage check (F7), INSERT policy, bucket limit 2 MiB; mirror removal and status check (§12.2); superseded signatures dropped; the content-size CHECK replaced by the text measure (`octet_length(content::text)`, §12.2) | new columns take their defaults on the equine v1 row (`revision` 0, empty author set); its document, status, number and assets unchanged; the new size CHECK is validated against the existing rows when M5 is applied (the equine document measures 184 105 bytes as `content::text`, measured on the sandbox); bucket limit lowered; no round, no grant | | M6 `sheet_verification_jobs` | V1-2.3 | worker RPCs (claim, input, complete with the verdict structure check, fail), service role only, with the retry delay (hidden `not_before` column on the round, `private.sheet_verification_retry_delay`: owner decision 2026-11-01, replaces « without backoff ») and the retry by cause (definitive codes close at the first occurrence, `private.sheet_worker_final_codes`); written as `20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql`, pgTAP `021`, rehearsed on the sandbox from the state before M4 (M4 to M6 in one `migration up`) and from the state before M6 | none | -| M7 `sheet_admin_reads` | V1-2.5 | read RPCs of the admin space (owner decision 2026-11-02, BDR-097): the official sheet list with its badges (historical, working copy), statuses and round counts, and one sheet's overview (versions, rounds); `get_sheet_version` redefined to return the fingerprint of deprecated versions too (BDR-098); the admin reads for capability holders at `aal2` only (`caller_can_see_official_sheet`); no write path, no grant, no policy or rule change; pgTAP allowed and denied cases | none | +| M7 `sheet_admin_reads` | V1-2.5 | read RPCs of the admin space (owner decision 2026-11-02, BDR-097): the official sheet list with its badges (historical, working copy), statuses and round counts, and one sheet's overview (versions, rounds); `get_sheet_version` redefined to return the fingerprint of deprecated versions too (BDR-098); the admin reads for capability holders at `aal2` only (`caller_can_see_official_sheet`); no write path, no new grant, no policy change; the one rule change is the species sort order: `create_species` and `update_inactive_species` are redefined to refuse an order outside 0..9 999 with `invalid_input` (null keeps today's meaning, owner 2026-11-02), `security definer`, `search_path = ''` and their privileges restated; pgTAP allowed and denied cases | none | Each migration ships its pgTAP file (allowed and denied cases), regenerated `database.types.ts`, a `db:sandbox up upgrade` run from the DEV state (with a @@ -1827,6 +1827,13 @@ Residual risks: not detectable (§5.5); - a stolen `aal2` session stays usable until it ends, since no freshness window or session limit is set (§5.6); +- TOTP code reuse within its window (measured, `IDENTITY.md` §4.1): GoTrue + accepts a used code again, from the same or another session of the account, + in its own 30 s step and the next, and refuses it from the step after; no + mitigation is added, the span is 30 to 60 s; +- production prerequisite: the lost-factor recovery is not rehearsed and no + recovery code exists (`IDENTITY.md` §4.2); the runbook of §5.7.7 is rehearsed + on the sandbox and written before any production use of MFA-protected rights; - a capability holder can still ask Storage for a signed URL to a draft drawing through the API; such a URL outlives a later revocation until it expires; @@ -2570,7 +2577,7 @@ its `REVUE.md`). **V1-2.4 GRAPHICAL APPROVED.** This record changes no board, no | Item | Decision | Where | |---|---|---| | Approval | the twelve boards `01` to `12` and the complementary page « Accès non autorisé » are approved; they are the design reference of V1-2.5 to V1-2.7 (§11.3); a redesign needs a demonstrated defect or a new owner decision | `docs/design/README.md`, `docs/design/v1-2-4/` | -| `object_conflict` | FR « Le contenu du fichier de l'illustration ne correspond pas à son empreinte SHA-256 enregistrée. »; EN checked at integration with the other messages; board 12 keeps the earlier proposal | §9.3, board 12 | +| `object_conflict` | FR « Le contenu du fichier de l'illustration ne correspond pas à son empreinte SHA-256 enregistrée. »; EN ratified 2026-11-02 (§17.11); board 12 keeps the earlier proposal | §9.3, board 12 | | L14 | « Access and permissions » in the interface; `capability` stays a technical term | board 10 | | L20 | « Corriger le brouillon » / « Fix the draft » (content failure); « Modifier le brouillon » / « Edit the draft » (size limit) | board 06 | | L32 | « Accès non autorisé » / « Access denied », with the explanation and the « Retour au tableau de bord » / « Back to dashboard » link already decided (wordings of board 12) | complementary page, §5.3 | @@ -2591,6 +2598,48 @@ VERIFIED (BDR-092), V1-2.4 approved (§17.9); V1-2.3 VERIFIED as well (BDR-093). | Working copy action | « Créer une copie de travail » built in V1-2.5 (board 10), landing on the copy's overview; the editor link arrives with V1-2.6 | §11.1, §16.6 | | EN term | « Habilitation » reads « Permission » in the English interface; `capability` stays the technical term | §3 | | Deprecated fingerprint | found while building the catalogue: `PreviewSheet` checks the fingerprint of published and deprecated versions, `get_sheet_version` returned it for published only, so no withdrawn version could open; `get_sheet_version` now returns it for both (redefined in M7, BDR-098) | §10, §12.3 | +| Species RPCs | M7 also redefines `create_species` and `update_inactive_species` with the 0..9 999 order range (§17.11), privileges restated; M5 and earlier migrations untouched (forward-only) | §12.3 | + + +### 17.11 V1-2.5 checkpoint decisions (owner, 2026-11-02) + +The owner accepted the technical results of V1-2.5 at `14ff890` and ratified the following; corrections built +in V1-2.5 lots 1 to 3. + +**Permission states.** Three situations are told apart, never one deduced from a technical error. On +`/app/admin/sheets/new` the order is: own grants `loading` (waiting status); the server refused (the species +read answered a `rights.*` kind): « Accès non autorisé » (BDR-094), the server's refusal wins over a failed +client read; own grants `failed`: « Impossible de vérifier vos autorisations », a short explanation and +« Réessayer », never the form; `ready` with an active `sheet_editor` grant: the form; `ready` without it +(reviewer-only, publisher-only, owner without the capability): « Accès non autorisé ». Retry re-reads the +platform roles and the own grants (and the species list when it failed) and keeps the profile, roles and +workspace already held when it fails again. The Administration home replaces its « Vos habilitations » line +with the same notice and Retry while the read failed (waiting status while loading, never « aucune »). The +sheet and species lists keep their grant-dependent actions hidden on a failed read, without a notice. Server +checks and RLS stay mandatory. + +**Accepted UX deviations** (the historical boards are unchanged, no graphic redesign; `docs/design/README.md`): +the selection is shown in the zone panel instead of a tag over the drawing, on condition that it stays +identifiable and accessible (an `aria-live` region mounted before any pick, naming the picked zone); the +« Références » card is not collapsible on a phone, on condition that it does not hide the anatomical area +(it starts at or below the drawing's bottom, measured at 320 and 375 px). + +**Ratified choices.** MFA factor name: 64 characters at most. TOTP setup key: no Copy button, displayed readable +and selectable while enrolment is open. Capability expiry: valid until the end of the chosen day in +Europe/Paris (the instant stored is 23:59:59.999 of that day with the offset in force then, DST-aware; the +date picker and the display use Paris dates; the backend compares instants, `expires_at > now()`; historical +rows untouched). Species order: an integer from 0 to 9 999, checked server-side (M7). Terminology: +« relecteur ou relectrice ». + +**Labels.** L14: « Access and permissions » in the interface, `capability` stays technical. L15: the title +alone, the redundant second sentence is dropped (for V1-2.6). `object_conflict` (EN): « The illustration +file's contents do not match its recorded SHA-256 hash. ». The roughly 350 new labels of V1-2.5 are NOT +approved: they get a separate owner review (`.claude/audits/2026-11-02-v1-2-5-label-proposals.md`). The +wordings ratified in V1-2.4 are kept. + +**MFA.** TOTP code reuse is recorded as measured (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1, §13). The lost-authenticator paths are +reviewed in `IDENTITY.md` §4.2; no safe, rehearsed recovery exists yet, which is a production prerequisite +(§13). No MFA bypass, no `aal2` weakening, no new path that resets a factor. --- diff --git a/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/mfa-behaviour.sandbox.ts b/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/mfa-behaviour.sandbox.ts index 2307a5e0..93861c45 100644 --- a/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/mfa-behaviour.sandbox.ts +++ b/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/mfa-behaviour.sandbox.ts @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ import { PASSWORD, confirmedAccount, rest, signIn, sql, stack, uniqueEmail, type Account } from './stack' import { authRequest, claimsOf, enrolTotp, verifyTotp, type Factor, type MfaResult } from './mfa' +import { TOTP_STEP_SECONDS, totpCode } from './totp' interface Session { access: string @@ -56,6 +57,24 @@ const withFactor = async (tag: string) => { return { account: a, factor, aal2: sessionOf(verified) } } +/** Sleeps into the start of a TOTP step with at least `minLeftS` seconds left. */ +const intoFreshStep = async (minLeftS: number) => { + const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000 + const leftMs = stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs) + if (leftMs <= minLeftS * 1000) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, leftMs + 500)) +} +/** Sleeps over the next step boundary (the code of the new step is then current). */ +const intoNextStep = async () => { + const stepMs = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000 + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, stepMs - (Date.now() % stepMs) + 500)) +} +/** Challenge then verify with a code fixed by the caller (the secret is never read back). */ +const verifyWith = async (token: string, factor: Factor, code: string) => { + const challenge = await authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`, token, {}) + if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge + return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, { challenge_id: challenge.body.id, code }) +} + /** has_mfa() and has_aal2_session() evaluated with `token`'s claims, as PostgREST sets them. */ const helpersFor = async (token: string) => { const out = await sql(`begin; @@ -249,4 +268,33 @@ describe('GoTrue v2.197.0 TOTP behaviour (V1-2.5 C1)', () => { expect([aal(tokens[0]), amr(tokens[0])]).toEqual(['aal1', ['otp']]) expect(await sql(`select email from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`)).toBe(newEmail) }) + + it('11. a TOTP code is accepted again within its window: same step, next step, not the one after', async () => { + // Measured, not documented (IDENTITY.md §4.1): GoTrue keeps no used-code + // record in this image. The code C of step N is verified by session A, + // then by a second aal1 session B signed in after A's verify, then by A + // again; C is still accepted one step later and refused two steps later. + const { account: a, factor } = await withFactor('mfa-reuse') + await intoNextStep() + await intoFreshStep(8) + const code = totpCode(factor.secret) + const A = await passwordSession(a.email) + const first = await verifyWith(A.access, factor, code) + expect(outcome(first)).toEqual([200, null]) + const B = await passwordSession(a.email) + // B is alive before the code is sent: the refusal below cannot be a dead session. + expect([outcome(await authRequest('GET', '/user', B.access)), aal(B.access)]).toEqual([[200, null], 'aal1']) + const reused = await verifyWith(B.access, factor, code) + expect(outcome(reused)).toEqual([200, null]) + expect(aal(reused.body.access_token as string)).toBe('aal2') + expect(outcome(await verifyWith(sessionOf(first).access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null]) + // Step N+1 (one step of skew): still accepted. + await intoNextStep() + const D = await passwordSession(a.email) + expect(outcome(await verifyWith(D.access, factor, code))).toEqual([200, null]) + // Step N+2: refused. The span of C is its step and the next one (30 to 60 s). + await intoNextStep() + const E = await passwordSession(a.email) + expect(outcome(await verifyWith(E.access, factor, code))).toEqual([422, 'mfa_verification_failed']) + }, 180_000) }) diff --git a/supabase/migrations/20261102100000_sheet_admin_reads.sql b/supabase/migrations/20261102100000_sheet_admin_reads.sql index 3dabf4bb..9f0578a0 100644 --- a/supabase/migrations/20261102100000_sheet_admin_reads.sql +++ b/supabase/migrations/20261102100000_sheet_admin_reads.sql @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ -- rounds, with the names of the people who acted. -- Capability holders at aal2 only (`caller_is_catalog_staff`, the predicate -- of the draft reads); an unknown or forbidden sheet gets one answer. No --- table, grant, policy or rule changes here. Also: `get_sheet_version` --- returns the fingerprint of a deprecated version (§10, BDR-098); and --- `create_species` / `update_inactive_species` refuse a sort order outside --- 0..9 999 (owner 2026-11-02), their privileges restated. +-- table or policy change here. Rule change limited to the species sort +-- order: `create_species` / `update_inactive_species` refuse an order +-- outside 0..9 999 (owner 2026-11-02), their privileges restated. Also: +-- `get_sheet_version` returns the fingerprint of a deprecated version (§10, +-- BDR-098). -- =========================================================================== -- 1. Helpers