forked from bchanot/claude
docs(guardrails): injection and exposure in the skill, the rule catalogue, the probe plan and secure-by-default; a11y handed to /a11y
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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# Secure by default: five domains and every API
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# Secure by default: six domains and every API
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Scope: any project that has a public surface, an API, a database, messaging,
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a cloud function or a UI. Applies at design, scaffolding, implementation and
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@@ -25,13 +25,20 @@ never claimed done: write it as a manual step in the project's deploy notes.
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- Hard spend cap if the host offers one. Otherwise a budget alert plus a
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written kill-switch step.
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## 2. Accessibility
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- Everything reachable and usable by keyboard, focus always visible.
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`:focus-visible` styled, never `outline: none` without a replacement.
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- Every image has an `alt` (empty when decorative). Every field has a label;
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a placeholder is not a label.
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## 2. Injection
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- Raw escapes (`$queryRawUnsafe`, `knex.raw`, `text()`, `.raw()`) take
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bound values only; dynamic SQL in a function goes through `format()`
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with `%I` / `%L` and `USING`.
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- A filter object never comes straight from the request: allowlist the
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fields, cast the values. No shell command carries input into a DB tool.
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## 3. Supabase
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## 3. Exposure (what the browser can see)
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- No data in the browser console, no source map in production, no debug
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flag in a committed config.
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- Hydrated state, `data-*` attributes, hidden fields and shipped HTML
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comments carry no token, hash, key or secret.
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## 4. Supabase
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- RLS enabled on every table, in the migration that creates it.
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- Policies limited to the owner: `(select auth.uid())` per operation, role
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`authenticated`. No `using (true)` on writes, no anon write.
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@@ -40,13 +47,13 @@ never claimed done: write it as a manual step in the project's deploy notes.
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- Views `security_invoker`. `security definer` functions pin `search_path`
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and revoke execute from anon. Buckets private by default.
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## 4. SMS and email
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## 5. SMS and email
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- Prior consent recorded per contact: who, when, channel, source, wording.
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No send without a consent row; check the suppression list before each send.
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- Every email has an unsubscribe link and `List-Unsubscribe`. Every marketing
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SMS says STOP, and a STOP reply is processed and stored automatically.
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## 5. Cloud functions
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## 6. Cloud functions
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- No function re-triggers itself: never write to the resource that fires it,
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never invoke itself. If unavoidable, guard with an idempotency flag.
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- Max instances (or reserved concurrency) and a timeout on every function.
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+20
-13
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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---
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name: guardrails
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effort: high
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description: 'Use when auditing a project against the baseline guardrails and fixing what fails: hosting (rate limit, CDN and firewall, spend cap), accessibility (keyboard, visible focus, alt text, field labels), Supabase (RLS on every table, owner-scoped policies, no service_role key client-side), SMS and email (recorded consent, unsubscribe, STOP), cloud functions (no self-trigger, instance cap, budget stop), plus API and access hygiene (auth on every route, CORS, secrets, password storage). Runs a deterministic scanner, judges each hit, writes .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md, then proposes fixes, applies only the ones the user accepts (bugfixer executor, fresh verifier and security gates) and re-scans to prove each one fixed. Optional read-only live probe confirms a hole from outside on a target the user owns and names. Triggers: "guardrails", "garde-fous", "RLS activée ?", "audit supabase", "consentement sms", "plafond de dépense", "mots de passe en clair ?", "teste la sécurité de base du projet", "corrige les garde-fous", "teste-le en conditions réelles", "sonde le projet en direct". Headers and TLS → /harden; secrets, CVE, OWASP → /cso; full WCAG → /web-validate.'
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argument-hint: '[project path] [--domain api,hosting,a11y,supabase,messaging,functions] [--exclude paths] [--live <url you own>] [--report-only]'
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description: 'Use when auditing a project against the baseline guardrails and fixing what fails. Headers and TLS → /harden; secrets, CVE, dependencies → /cso; keyboard, alt, labels → /a11y. Domains: hosting (rate limit, CDN, spend cap), Supabase (RLS, owner policies, no service_role client-side), SMS and email (consent, unsubscribe, STOP), cloud functions (no self-trigger, instance cap, budget stop), injection (SQL from input, raw escapes, NoSQL, shell into DB tools), exposure (console data, source maps, hydrated state, error bodies, debug mode, wide responses), plus API hygiene (auth, CORS, secrets, passwords). Scanner, judgment, .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md, fixes applied only on acceptance (bugfixer, verifier and security gates), re-scanned to prove them; optional read-only probe of a target you own. Triggers: "guardrails", "garde-fous", "RLS activée ?", "faille sql", "fuite navigateur", "plafond de dépense", "mots de passe en clair ?", "corrige les garde-fous", "sonde le projet en direct".'
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argument-hint: '[project path] [--domain api,hosting,supabase,messaging,functions,injection,exposure] [--exclude paths] [--live <url you own>] [--report-only]'
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---
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# /guardrails
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@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ROUTING: follow `$HOME/.claude/lib/effort-shift.md` (phases via
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## STEP 1: Scope
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Work in the project the user names, else the current directory. Say in one
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line what you will scan. Domains: `api`, `hosting`, `a11y`, `supabase`,
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`messaging`, `functions`. The scanner skips the ones that do not apply.
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line what you will scan. Domains: `api`, `hosting`, `supabase`,
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`messaging`, `functions`, `injection`, `exposure`. The scanner skips the ones that do not apply.
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`--report-only` stops after STEP 7: audit, no fix.
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## STEP 2: Run the scanner
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@@ -71,21 +71,27 @@ Read the code for the domains that apply and answer, with file:line evidence:
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wording? Is a STOP reply wired from the provider webhook to the store?
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- **Functions**: trace every trigger to the resource it writes, including
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queues, storage events, schedulers and third-party webhooks.
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- **A11y**: with a dev server running, walk the main flow with Tab only
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(`/browse`). Otherwise mark the keyboard walk-through as not done.
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- **Injection**: for each INJ hit, trace the interpolated value to its
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source. A constant, an allowlisted identifier or a value already cast to
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a number is a FALSE POSITIVE; anything that can come from a request,
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a file or another user's row is CONFIRMED.
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- **Exposure**: read the code behind each EXP hit: is the logged object,
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the hydrated key or the returned row really user data? With `--live`
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against a production build (STEP 5), the probe answers for served
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source maps, error bodies and sensitive keys; without it, say so.
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## STEP 5: Live probe (only on `--live`, read-only)
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The static scan shows a protection is missing in the code. A probe shows the
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door is actually open. Run it only when the user asks, and only against a
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target the user owns and names: their local dev server first, a staging or
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production URL only on an explicit, specific go. Never a URL you inferred,
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production URL only on an explicit, specific go. The `exposure` block runs against a production build or a staging URL (`next build && next start`, `vite preview`, framework debug off): a dev server serves source maps and tracebacks by design, so its exposure OPEN verdicts are dev artefacts, reported as such, with no proposal and no re-pass requirement. Never a URL you inferred,
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never a third party.
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1. **Build the plan** `references/checks.md` describes. From the static
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findings fill a JSON plan: `base_url`, the Supabase `url` and `tables`,
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the `routes` (mark the ones meant to be public), `cors`, and a
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`rate_limit` route if the user wants that one burst. Secrets never go in
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`rate_limit` route if the user wants that one burst. Add an `exposure` block (`{}` for the defaults, `error_routes` for a route you own that answers an error to a malformed id, never a path you guess) so the probe reads source maps, error bodies and response keys; every path in the plan starts with `/`. Secrets never go in
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the plan or the command line: export `GUARDRAILS_ANON_KEY` and, for the
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cross-user probe, `GUARDRAILS_JWT2`, from test keys, never `service_role`.
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2. **Run it**, confirming ownership with `--authorized`:
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@@ -100,7 +106,7 @@ never a third party.
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replays it.
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3. **Cross the verdicts with the static findings.** A verdict is an
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observation, not a conclusion: OPEN means the request returned data or a
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200, CLOSED means it was refused or empty. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN in
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200, CLOSED means it was refused or empty. SKIPPED and ERROR mean the target was not observed: never read either as proof of a fix. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN in
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the probe leads the report. A CLOSED probe on a static FAIL still needs the
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fix: the dev target may differ from production.
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4. **Guardrails on the probe itself**: read-only, test keys only, the
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@@ -137,9 +143,9 @@ route). FALSE POSITIVE and ACCEPTED RISK get no proposal. Each proposal:
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- **number, rule, file(s)**, and the problem in one line;
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- **the fix**, concrete: file:line and the change, the SQL for a migration,
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the label text for a field. Root cause, never a mask: a missing RLS gets
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the parameter binding for a query. Root cause, never a mask: a missing RLS gets
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owner policies in the same migration, not a disabled check;
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- **choices the user sees** (label wording, CORS origins, owner column,
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- **choices the user sees** (allowlisted filter fields, CORS origins, owner column,
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rate-limit numbers), each with your proposed value, named so the user can
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change it;
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- **risk**: what it can break. `BREAKING` when it changes a contract a client
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@@ -150,7 +156,8 @@ route). FALSE POSITIVE and ACCEPTED RISK get no proposal. Each proposal:
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that must turn CLOSED, and a project test when one fits naturally.
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MANUAL items stay user steps (STEP 6), never proposals. A live OPEN verdict
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with no static finding gets a proposal whose proof is the probe alone.
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with no static finding gets a proposal whose proof is the probe alone,
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unless STEP 5 marked it a dev artefact.
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Save the proposals to `.claude/tasks/plans/<YYYY-MM-DD>-guardrails-<HHMM>.md`
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and append them to the report. In the reply, show them as a numbered list,
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@@ -163,7 +170,7 @@ stop the turn:
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```
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Which fixes do I apply? "all" (every proposal except DECISION ones),
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numbers ("1,3,5-7"), "none", or an amendment ("2 with the label 'Email'").
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numbers ("1,3,5-7"), "none", or an amendment ("2 with the fields ['id','status']").
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A DECISION proposal needs its number plus your choice.
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```
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@@ -26,15 +26,34 @@ default; a judged hit can be a false positive.
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| HOST-WAF-DDOS | MANUAL | firewall, DDoS and bot rules are dashboard settings | enable and confirm in the dashboard |
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| HOST-SPEND-CAP | MANUAL | hard spend cap is a plan setting | enable the cap; else budget alert plus a written kill switch |
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## a11y
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## injection
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Patterns are per language: a Postgres `$1` placeholder, a tagged template
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(`sql\`…\``, `sql<T>\`…\``), an argv array and test or fixture paths are
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silent by design.
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| A11Y-IMG-ALT | FAIL | `img` or `Image` without `alt` | describe it, or `alt=""` if decorative |
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| A11Y-FIELD-LABEL | FAIL | native input, select, textarea with no label | `label for`, wrapping label or `aria-label` |
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| A11Y-CLICK-NO-KEYBOARD | FAIL | click handler on a div or span lacking role, tabindex or key handler | use a `button` |
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| A11Y-FOCUS-OUTLINE | FAIL / WARN | focus outline removed; WARN when a `:focus-visible` style exists elsewhere | style `:focus-visible` instead |
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| A11Y-TABINDEX-POSITIVE | WARN | `tabindex` above 0 | use 0 or -1 and fix the DOM order |
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| INJ-SQL-RAW-UNSAFE | FAIL | `$queryRawUnsafe`, `$executeRawUnsafe`, `knex.raw`, `sequelize.query`, `Sequelize.literal`, Django `.objects.raw()` / `.extra()`, SQLAlchemy `text()` fed a variable; ActiveRecord `where("… #{}")` | bind the values, or the tagged `$queryRaw` |
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| INJ-SQL-CONCAT | FAIL | a SQL statement (select … from … where, insert into, update … set, delete … where, create/drop/alter) built with `${}`, `+`, an f-string, `%`, `.format`, PHP `$var`, Ruby `#{}`, `format!`, `Sprintf` | placeholders and a parameter list |
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| INJ-SQL-DYNAMIC-EXEC | WARN | plpgsql `EXECUTE '…' \|\| x` | `format('… %I %L', …)` and `USING` |
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| INJ-POSTGREST-FILTER | WARN | supabase-js `.or()`, `.filter()`, `.not()`, `.match()`, `.textSearch()` with an interpolated string, in a file that uses supabase | `.eq()` and friends, validated values |
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| INJ-NOSQL-OPERATOR | WARN | Mongo `$where` with a string; a filter taken from `req.body`, `req.query` or `req.params` | allowlist the fields, cast to string, `sanitizeFilter` |
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| INJ-SHELL-DB-TOOL | FAIL | a shell call naming psql, mysql, mysqldump, pg_dump, mongosh, redis-cli, sqlite3… with an interpolated argument | an argv array, no shell, validated input |
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## exposure
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| EXP-CONSOLE-DATA | WARN | `console.log/info/debug/dir/table` in client-reachable code with a data argument (user, session, response, token, body…); string literals are ignored | strip console calls in the production build, log server-side |
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| EXP-SOURCEMAP-PUBLIC | FAIL / WARN | `productionBrowserSourceMaps: true`, vite `sourcemap: true` or `'inline'`, `GENERATE_SOURCEMAP=true` in a committed non-dev env file, webpack `devtool` readable maps (FAIL in `webpack.prod*`, WARN elsewhere), a real `.map` under `public/` or `static/` (any size; vendored and `.min.` maps excluded); angular `sourceMap: true` (WARN) | off, or `hidden` and upload to the error tracker |
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| EXP-HYDRATED-SENSITIVE | WARN | a token, secret, key, password or ssn-like key returned by `getServerSideProps`, `getStaticProps`, a Remix `loader`, a SvelteKit `load` or set on `window.__STATE__`; a TS type member is skipped | return only the fields the page renders |
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| EXP-MARKUP-COMMENT | WARN | `<!-- -->` shipped to the browser (html, astro, php, ejs, hbs, twig, njk, liquid) with todo, fixme, debug, password, token, internal, staging, admin… | delete it, or move it to a code comment the build strips |
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| EXP-DATA-ATTR-SENSITIVE | WARN | `data-*` attribute or hidden input named secret, api-key, password, jwt, private, credential (csrf, xsrf, authenticity, nonce excluded) | keep it server-side, send an opaque id |
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| EXP-ERROR-STACK | FAIL | in a route file: `err.stack`, the error object, `traceback.format_exc()` or `getTraceAsString()` in a response | generic message out, full error in the server log |
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| EXP-ERROR-MESSAGE | WARN | in a route file: `err.message`, `str(e)`, `$e->getMessage()` sent as is | map to a safe message; validation errors are fine, DB errors are not |
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| EXP-DEBUG-ON | FAIL | `DEBUG = True` in a settings module (not dev/local/test), `APP_DEBUG=true` / `FLASK_DEBUG=1` in a committed non-dev env file, `app.debug = True`, `consider_all_requests_local = true`, `errorhandler()` mounted without an environment guard | env-driven, false in production |
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| EXP-RESPONSE-WIDE | WARN | a route returning `select *` / `select('*')` on a users-like table, or a single-line Prisma `findUnique/findFirst/findMany` without `select` or `omit` | an explicit field list |
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## supabase
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@@ -85,7 +104,16 @@ The scanner is regex over text. It cannot see:
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- whether consent was actually collected before the stored timestamp
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- whether a STOP reply reaches your store from the provider webhook
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- loops through queues, storage events, schedulers or third-party webhooks
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- keyboard traps, focus order, modal focus handling, color contrast
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- a SQL string assembled across several lines, or passed through a
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variable before the query call (trace it by hand)
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- whether a template literal's tag parameterizes: tagged templates are
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trusted
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- built output (`dist/`, `.next/`) and runtime state such as
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`__NEXT_DATA__`: only the live probe sees a served map or a hydrated
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token
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- a multi-line Prisma call or a value object spread into state: the
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single-line rules stay silent
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- what the console or an XHR carries once the page runs: a browser walk
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- client-reachable code in unusual layouts (the rule uses path and
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`use client` heuristics, `.astro` is never flagged)
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- values built at runtime, minified bundles, anything over 1 MB
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@@ -105,11 +133,9 @@ project: a contact form beside it and no subscriber storage gives WARN.
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The scanner skips log files and cache directories, and never follows symlinks.
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By design the scanner ignores: policies granted only to `service_role`,
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fields that are never rendered (`hidden`, `display: none`), click handlers
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that only stop propagation or sit on `role="presentation"`, focus styles
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that swap the outline for a border or shadow, UI route components, keys
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UI route components, keys
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inside git-ignored env files, and password literals in test, fixture and
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i18n files.
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i18n files, tagged SQL templates, placeholders with a separate parameter list, an argv array handed to a DB tool, console calls in server code, logging calls that carry a stack, `sourcemap: 'hidden'`, a debug flag read from the environment, dev, local and test env files and settings modules, minified files and built directories, and a hidden input or data attribute named csrf, xsrf, authenticity or nonce.
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## Live Supabase checks (the user runs them in the SQL editor)
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@@ -176,12 +202,14 @@ one opt-in POST burst for the rate-limit check, and stops at a request budget.
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"cors": true,
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"cors_path": "/api/v1/notes",
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"rate_limit": {"path": "/api/v1/auth/login", "method": "POST",
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"count": 20, "body": "{\"email\":\"t@t.io\",\"password\":\"x\"}"}
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"count": 20, "body": "{\"email\":\"t@t.io\",\"password\":\"x\"}"},
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"exposure": {"error_routes": ["/api/v1/notes/not-a-number"]}
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}
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```
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Environment, from test keys only, never `service_role`:
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`GUARDRAILS_ANON_KEY` (anon-read), `GUARDRAILS_JWT2` (cross-user).
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The fields probe sends `GUARDRAILS_JWT2` as a bearer when it is set. Every path in the plan starts with `/`: a path that could leave the named host is a usage error.
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| Probe | id | OPEN means | Read it against |
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|---|---|---|---|
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@@ -190,18 +218,21 @@ Environment, from test keys only, never `service_role`:
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| no-auth route | `no-auth:<path>` | the route answered 200 with no token | API-ROUTE-NO-AUTH, object authz |
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| cors-reflect | `cors-reflect` | a foreign origin was reflected with credentials | API-CORS-WILDCARD |
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| rate-limit | `rate-limit` | the burst saw no 429 | HOST-NO-RATE-LIMIT |
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| sourcemap | `sourcemap:<script>` | a source map with sources answered 200 for a page script, or the script carries an inline map | EXP-SOURCEMAP-PUBLIC |
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| error-body | `error-body:<path>` | a 404 or a named error route returned a stack trace or an internal path | EXP-ERROR-STACK, EXP-DEBUG-ON |
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| fields | `fields:<path>` | a JSON 200 carried a password, salt, token, key or secret-like key (identifier-shaped names printed, never values) | EXP-RESPONSE-WIDE, EXP-HYDRATED-SENSITIVE |
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A verdict is an observation, not a verdict on the project. OPEN is a returned
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200 or returned rows; CLOSED is a refusal or an empty body; SKIPPED is a
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missing key; ERROR is a transport failure. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN leads
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the report. A CLOSED probe on a static FAIL still needs the fix: the dev
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target may differ from production.
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target may differ from production. An exposure target the probe could not observe (unreachable page, no same-host script, a refused or non-JSON route, a map fetch that failed) is SKIPPED or ERROR, never CLOSED. Run the exposure block against a production build or a staging URL: a dev server serves maps and tracebacks by design, and its OPEN verdicts are dev artefacts, not findings.
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Safety, enforced by the script and by the skill: `--authorized` is required;
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read-only methods only; the loopback or a URL the user named, never one you
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inferred; a login burst only with a throwaway test account on the user's go,
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because it can lock the user's own account; a redirect to another host is
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never followed, so a key never leaves the named host. Fuzzing, writes beyond
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never followed, so a key never leaves the named host. A script on another host is never fetched. An error route is a path you own and name; the probe never guesses one beyond its single random 404. Fuzzing, writes beyond
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the named login route, or probing a third party are out of scope: that is
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pentest, another contract.
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@@ -4,5 +4,7 @@
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{"id": 3, "prompt": "Audit my Firebase functions: can any of them loop on itself or run up the bill?", "expected": "Scans functions domain only, reports max instances status and any trigger that writes its own collection, MANUAL item for a budget alert wired to an automatic stop, no live call to the provider"},
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{"id": 4, "prompt": "est-ce que les mots de passe sont stockés en clair quelque part dans ~/Documents/zenquality ?", "expected": "Runs the scanner's api domain, reads every API-PASSWORD-* hit in context, traces the sign-up and password-change write points to the password_hash column by hand, names the hashing function found, reports with file:line, fixes nothing"},
|
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{"id": 5, "prompt": "teste les garde-fous sur ~/Documents/game puis sonde-le en direct, le dev tourne sur http://localhost:5173", "expected": "Runs the static scan first, then builds a probe plan from the findings, exports test keys from the environment, runs probe.py --authorized against the localhost target only, reports OPEN verdicts next to the matching static FAIL, never writes data, never probes a target the user did not name"},
|
||||
{"id": 6, "prompt": "corrige les garde-fous qui échouent sur ~/Documents/faunosteo, je veux valider chaque correction avant", "expected": "Scans and judges, proposes numbered fixes with risks and visible choices, stops for approval, applies only the accepted ones on a bugfix branch through a contract whose oracles are scan.py --assert-absent, runs the verify-secure gates, re-scans against the baseline, reports fixed and still open, waits for a go before committing"}
|
||||
{"id": 6, "prompt": "corrige les garde-fous qui échouent sur ~/Documents/faunosteo, je veux valider chaque correction avant", "expected": "Scans and judges, proposes numbered fixes with risks and visible choices, stops for approval, applies only the accepted ones on a bugfix branch through a contract whose oracles are scan.py --assert-absent, runs the verify-secure gates, re-scans against the baseline, reports fixed and still open, waits for a go before committing"},
|
||||
{"id": 7, "prompt": "cherche les failles d'injection SQL dans ~/Documents/zenquality", "expected": "Runs the scanner's injection domain, traces each INJ hit to the source of the interpolated value, labels constants and cast values FALSE POSITIVE, proposes parameterized rewrites with the binding as a visible choice, applies only after acceptance with --assert-absent oracles"},
|
||||
{"id": 8, "prompt": "est-ce que mon site laisse voir trop de choses dans le navigateur ? console, network, inspecteur", "expected": "Runs the exposure domain, reads each EXP hit in context, offers the live probe with an exposure block against a production build the user names, reports source maps served, error bodies and sensitive keys next to the static findings, never prints a response value, marks dev-server OPENs as dev artefacts"}
|
||||
]
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user