95 lines
5.9 KiB
Markdown
95 lines
5.9 KiB
Markdown
# PDF import hardening — BLK-009 analysis
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Status 2026-10-11: analysis requested by the user after Step 6. Nothing here is
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implemented; §4 says what can land now and §5 what must land before the
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import is opened to external users.
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## 1. The problem
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`readReportArchive` loads the whole PDF with pdf-lib (`PDFDocument.load`)
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before looking for the attachment. pdf-lib's parser inflates every object
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stream (`/ObjStm`) and cross-reference stream eagerly with its own, uncapped
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inflater. Measured by the security audit: a 408 KB PDF expanded to 400 MB in
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1.4 s (468 MB RSS); a 131 KB PDF to 128 MB. The ratio is about 1000:1, so the
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50 MiB file cap still allows tens of gigabytes of expansion. Our 16 MiB caps
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protect the attachment stream only, which the reader inflates itself.
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Effect: a crafted PDF freezes the practitioner's tab or kills it (out of
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memory). No code execution, no data access. A file size limit cannot help: the
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amplification lives inside the compression.
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Why `/ObjStm` cannot simply be refused: pdf-lib's `save()` writes object
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streams by default (`useObjectStreams: true`), so every Faunosteo PDF
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produced so far carries them, and refusing them would refuse the archive.
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## 2. What the reader actually needs from the file
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One embedded file stream, found through its `/Filespec`, and the document
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keyword stamp. A PDF stream object can never live inside an object stream:
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the `EmbeddedFile` dictionary and its data are always in clear text in the
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file (`<< /Type /EmbeddedFile /Filter /FlateDecode /Length N … >> stream …
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endstream`). Only the small dictionary objects (Filespec, Info, catalog) may
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be packed into object streams.
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So the attachment can be located by scanning the bytes, without parsing the
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PDF object graph at all.
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## 3. Options
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| Option | Protection | Cost | Verdict |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| A. Byte-scan reader: find `/Type /EmbeddedFile` streams, read `/Length` (direct integer, as pdf-lib writes it; fall back to `endstream` search), inflate with the existing capped `inflateFlate`, parse JSON; no `PDFDocument.load` on import | removes pdf-lib from the import path entirely: the only inflation is our capped one | one module (~120 lines) + tests on every fixture (v2, bare v3, envelope, object streams on/off, several streams, foreign PDF) | **recommended, can land now** |
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| B. Export with `useObjectStreams: false` | the Filespec name, the Info keywords and the Filespec→EF link become visible to a byte scan, so the filename-first rule and the `attachment_stripped` detection keep working without the object graph; files a few KB larger | one save option; older PDFs keep their object streams, which A tolerates | **recommended with A** |
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| C. Load in a Web Worker with a timeout and a memory budget | contains the damage (the tab survives, the worker dies) | worker bundling, message protocol, no memory cap API in browsers (only termination on timeout) | defence in depth, later |
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| D. Pre-scan declared `/Length` of `/ObjStm` streams and refuse above a sum | partial: declared lengths are the compressed sizes, the expansion is unknown | small | insufficient alone |
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| E. Replace pdf-lib's parser (fork `@cantoo/pdf-lib`, or `pdf.js` for reading) | maintained parser; pdf.js has its own limits | dependency change, larger bundle | evaluate for Step 14 (server-side import) |
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With A, the import path reads bytes, finds at most a few streams, inflates one
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under 16 MiB, parses JSON under the existing schema caps. pdf-lib stays on
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the export side (trusted inputs) and in the `report:compare` CLI (operator
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tool, Node, acceptable risk but same fix applies).
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Edge cases A must handle: several `EmbeddedFile` streams (pick the one whose
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Filespec name starts with `osteo-report` when visible, else the first whose
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inflated content parses as a report or an envelope); `/Length` as an indirect
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reference (pdf-lib writes direct lengths; other producers may not: fall back
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to scanning for `endstream`); `\r\n` versus `\n` after `stream`; encrypted
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PDFs (today loaded with `ignoreEncryption`: the attachment stream of an
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encrypted file is encrypted too and would fail to inflate → `no_attachment`,
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same outcome as today in practice); the 50 MiB file cap stays as the scan
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bound.
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## 4. What can be done now (before merge of Step 6, or as the next chore)
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1. Option A in `packages/pdf/src/attachment/scan.ts`, used by
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`readReportArchive`; `readAttachedDocument(pdfDoc)` kept for the CLI until
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it moves to the scanner too.
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2. Option B on export (`pdfDoc.save({ useObjectStreams: false })`): no visible
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change; goldens unaffected (they record drawn text, images, links); the
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envelope roundtrip tests prove the reader still finds the attachment in
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both layouts.
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3. Tests: every existing import fixture through the scanner; a crafted
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object-stream bomb (the audit's recipe: a few hundred KB inflating to
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hundreds of MB) imports in milliseconds without inflating it; a PDF with
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two embedded files; a PDF whose `/Length` is indirect.
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4. Docs: `docs/PDF-FORMAT.md` "Reading an archive" and "Known limits".
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Estimated size: one executor phase, about 300 lines including tests.
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## 5. Prerequisites before external users (Step 7+ sync, Step 14 worker)
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- Option A merged and the CLI on the scanner; no `PDFDocument.load` on any
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untrusted input in the browser.
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- Option C or a server-side import (Step 14) with a hard memory and time
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budget per file, for any path that still parses PDF objects.
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- Dependency decision on pdf-lib (unmaintained since 2021): keep it for
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generation only, or move to the maintained fork; recorded as a Step 14
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question.
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- Report collection caps on read (observations, zones, findings per
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observation) so a hostile report cannot freeze the editor before the
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export's own caps refuse it.
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- The remaining low findings of the Step 6 audits: `<use>` nesting budget in
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the sanitiser (today bounded by the rasterizer), the decoder memory
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envelope of PNG logos (bounded by the 4096² cap, about 430 MB worst case
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for four logos).
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