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# PDF import hardening — BLK-009 analysis
Status 2026-10-11: analysis requested by the user after Step 6. §4 landed the
same day on `feature/step-06-pdf-archives` (options A + B, see §4 for the
commit); §5 lists what must land before the import is opened to external
users.
## 1. The problem
`readReportArchive` loads the whole PDF with pdf-lib (`PDFDocument.load`)
before looking for the attachment. pdf-lib's parser inflates every object
stream (`/ObjStm`) and cross-reference stream eagerly with its own, uncapped
inflater. Measured by the security audit: a 408 KB PDF expanded to 400 MB in
1.4 s (468 MB RSS); a 131 KB PDF to 128 MB. The ratio is about 1000:1, so the
50 MiB file cap still allows tens of gigabytes of expansion. Our 16 MiB caps
protect the attachment stream only, which the reader inflates itself.
Effect: a crafted PDF freezes the practitioner's tab or kills it (out of
memory). No code execution, no data access. A file size limit cannot help: the
amplification lives inside the compression.
Why `/ObjStm` cannot simply be refused: pdf-lib's `save()` writes object
streams by default (`useObjectStreams: true`), so every Faunosteo PDF
produced so far carries them, and refusing them would refuse the archive.
## 2. What the reader actually needs from the file
One embedded file stream, found through its `/Filespec`, and the document
keyword stamp. A PDF stream object can never live inside an object stream:
the `EmbeddedFile` dictionary and its data are always in clear text in the
file (`<< /Type /EmbeddedFile /Filter /FlateDecode /Length N … >> stream …
endstream`). Only the small dictionary objects (Filespec, Info, catalog) may
be packed into object streams.
So the attachment can be located by scanning the bytes, without parsing the
PDF object graph at all.
## 3. Options
| Option | Protection | Cost | Verdict |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| A. Byte-scan reader: find `/Type /EmbeddedFile` streams, read `/Length` (direct integer, as pdf-lib writes it; fall back to `endstream` search), inflate with the existing capped `inflateFlate`, parse JSON; no `PDFDocument.load` on import | removes pdf-lib from the import path entirely: the only inflation is our capped one | one module (~120 lines) + tests on every fixture (v2, bare v3, envelope, object streams on/off, several streams, foreign PDF) | **recommended, can land now** |
| B. Export with `useObjectStreams: false` | the Filespec name, the Info keywords and the Filespec→EF link become visible to a byte scan, so the filename-first rule and the `attachment_stripped` detection keep working without the object graph; files a few KB larger | one save option; older PDFs keep their object streams, which A tolerates | **recommended with A** |
| C. Load in a Web Worker with a timeout and a memory budget | contains the damage (the tab survives, the worker dies) | worker bundling, message protocol, no memory cap API in browsers (only termination on timeout) | defence in depth, later |
| D. Pre-scan declared `/Length` of `/ObjStm` streams and refuse above a sum | partial: declared lengths are the compressed sizes, the expansion is unknown | small | insufficient alone |
| E. Replace pdf-lib's parser (fork `@cantoo/pdf-lib`, or `pdf.js` for reading) | maintained parser; pdf.js has its own limits | dependency change, larger bundle | evaluate for Step 14 (server-side import) |
With A, the import path reads bytes, finds at most a few streams, inflates one
under 16 MiB, parses JSON under the existing schema caps. pdf-lib stays on
the export side (trusted inputs) and in the `report:compare` CLI (operator
tool, Node, acceptable risk but same fix applies).
Edge cases A must handle: several `EmbeddedFile` streams (pick the one whose
Filespec name starts with `osteo-report` when visible, else the first whose
inflated content parses as a report or an envelope); `/Length` as an indirect
reference (pdf-lib writes direct lengths; other producers may not: fall back
to scanning for `endstream`); `\r\n` versus `\n` after `stream`; encrypted
PDFs (today loaded with `ignoreEncryption`: the attachment stream of an
encrypted file is encrypted too and would fail to inflate → `no_attachment`,
same outcome as today in practice); the 50 MiB file cap stays as the scan
bound.
## 4. Done 2026-10-11 (feature/step-06-pdf-archives, commit: see commit 60ee712)
1. Option A in `packages/pdf/src/attachment/scan.ts`
(`findEmbeddedFiles`, `readAttachmentBytes`, `hasArchiveStamp`), used by
`readReportArchive`; `readAttachedDocument(bytes)` takes the file bytes
and the `report:compare` CLI runs on the scanner too. No
`PDFDocument.load` remains under `packages/pdf/src` or `apps/app/scripts`.
2. Option B on export (`pdfDoc.save({ useObjectStreams: false })`): no visible
change; goldens unchanged (they record drawn text, images, links); the
envelope roundtrip tests prove the reader finds the attachment in both
layouts.
3. Tests (`packages/pdf/tests/scan.test.ts`): the three frozen fixtures (object
streams) and a fresh export; two embedded files with a decoy first;
indirect and wrong `/Length`; `\r\n` after `stream`; `/Type/EmbeddedFile`
without a space; hex and literal names and keywords; garbage inputs and
the 32-candidate cap; a 64 MiB object-stream bomb next to the real
attachment (report in milliseconds, RSS flat) and an `EmbeddedFile` bomb
(inflation cancelled at 16 MiB, `no_attachment`).
4. Docs: `docs/PDF-FORMAT.md` "Reading an archive" and "Known limits".
Known trade-off: a stamped PDF saved before this change (object streams)
hides its `/Keywords`, so a stripped attachment on such a file reads as
`no_attachment` instead of `attachment_stripped`.
## 5. Prerequisites before external users (Step 7+ sync, Step 14 worker)
- Option A merged and the CLI on the scanner; no `PDFDocument.load` on any
untrusted input in the browser.
- Done at R4 (2026-10-18, `docs/development/RUST.md` §10.3 to §10.5): the
reader runs in Rust inside a disposable worker; the inflate bound and the
hostile classes were measured in Chromium 156, Firefox 157 and WebKit 27.2
(headless): a 16 MiB + 1 bomb costs 63 MiB of linear memory and is
refused, 32 bombs 68, a 16 MiB token-dense document 16 MiB under the
400,000-value cap (784 MiB with it off), the 1 GiB module ceiling traps;
the application build answers the same outcome and message as the
TypeScript reader on 666 of 678 (file, engine) pairs, the other 12 being
the four declared hostile files. Device run (J1, `R4_J1.md`): the owner
reports the functional checks executed on 2026-10-18 with no failure;
the device list, versions, scenario coverage, timings and memory
observations are recorded in `R4_J1_RESULTS.md` as they are confirmed.
The gate below stays open: imports are not offered to external users.
- Done: the candidate CPU/byte budget on the scanner: one 16 MiB budget of
retained and parsed content shared by every candidate (a cancelled
inflation is not charged, so up to 32 oversized streams may each cost one
capped inflation of CPU, bounded, no memory retained), a monotonic
`endstream` search over candidates sorted by data offset and bounded to
the cap, and no JSON parse for a candidate not opening on `{` or nesting
brackets deeper than 64 levels (linear byte pre-scan, strings skipped).
- Option C or a server-side import (Step 14) with a hard memory and time
budget per file, for any path that still parses PDF objects.
- Dependency decision on pdf-lib (unmaintained since 2021): keep it for
generation only, or move to the maintained fork; recorded as a Step 14
question.
- Report collection caps on read (observations, zones, findings per
observation) so a hostile report cannot freeze the editor before the
export's own caps refuse it.
- The remaining low findings of the Step 6 audits: `<use>` nesting budget in
the sanitiser (today bounded by the rasterizer on the PDF path; since R3 the
Rust reader refuses reference cycles and expansions over 50,000 elements,
`docs/development/RUST.md` §9.2, and the engine gets it when R4 switches it to
that reader: still open for the PDF path), the decoder memory
envelope of PNG logos (bounded by the 4096² cap, about 430 MB worst case
for four logos).