11 KiB
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 35 files
BLOCKING:
(none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [MEDIUM] author-data-silently-replaced (non-array `children` of an added item) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252 + crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246
- [LOW] check-lists-through-top-level-folder-link — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193 (listed, :164)
- [LOW] seed-containment-is-path-based (bind-mount alias) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230 (inside, :253)
- [LOW] declared-depth-walk-cost-understates-cap-bound-worst-case — crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110 / docs/development/RUST.md:3046
- [LOW] unit-test-fixture-in-shared-temp-with-fixed-name — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383
- [LOW] context: clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file (project convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7
- [LOW] context: seed SQL rendered by string formatting from pipeline values — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29
PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 35 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 7 findings (1 MEDIUM, 6 LOW)
R5.3 draft, security gate (fresh, final 4)
Branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD 6c0fe88, scope git diff 5e114da..HEAD
(35 files, 11 commits), with attention to 86273b6. Read whole: bin/import_equine.rs,
curation/draft/{shape,ops,apply,schema,targets,fields,records,rename,stats,migration_map,seed,pipeline,mod}.rs,
curation/mod.rs, scripts/import-equine.sh, the package.json line, the binary and
integration tests that touch the file system, the oracle generator's write guard
(MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1 only). Every probe ran in
/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/sec4.j5fliv
on a copy of the seed, through a probe binary that is import_equine.rs byte for byte except
the SEED constant (pointed at the copy). Nothing ran --out against the repository, nothing
was deleted, git status is clean after the run.
Semgrep
semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off on the 35 existing files of the diff: 129 rules run, 0 findings, 0 errors.
The rulesets carry almost no Rust rules; the Rust code was covered by reading and probing.
Checklist
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Hardcoded secret / token / key / auth URL | none (grep over the 35 files) |
| SQL by string interpolation | seed.rs renders the seed file by formatting: LOW context below, not a runtime query |
| Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval…) | not applicable (Rust CLI and library, no DOM) |
| Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (no endpoint) |
| Stack trace / internal path to an end user | not applicable (errors go to the local developer's stderr) |
| Secret / PII in a log | none (stdout/stderr carry paths, counts and refusals) |
Tracked .env / credential file |
only .env.example tracked |
Guardrails scanner (--domain api,supabase) |
0 FAIL, 1 WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, outside the diff, dropped), 1 MANUAL |
| New suppressions (anti-gaming) | no nosemgrep, nosec, eslint-disable, ts-ignore, noqa; one clippy allow in a new test file (LOW context below) |
Owner requirements, verified
- Seed never modified automatically: every read goes through
read()(canonical path inside the canonical seed, regular file, 16 MiB cap). Probed:curation/as a folder link out of the seed andchanges.jsonas a file link out of it are both refused (leads outside the seed folder); a folder link that stays inside the seed is accepted. --checkwrites nothing: onlycanonicalize,metadata,read,read_diron that path. Probe copy: 12 files, 0 differences, nothing new under the fixture seed (find -newer).--outrefusals, probed on the fixture seed: a link to the seed and todraft/(as the destination and as its parent), a link chainp/qending in a seed link, the seed path itself plus/new,legacy-import/new,INIT_CWDset inside the seed,.., an empty path,/: all refused, nothing created. A relativeINIT_CWDis ignored. A valid destination gets 12 files identical to the seed (diff -rq), a second run on it is refusednot empty. Files arecreate_new, folderscreate_dirtracked increated, so an entry that appears after the claim is refused. File names are pipeline constants.- Strict changeset validation, depth and resource caps:
deny_unknown_fields, theopdiscriminator, non-empty strings, the shape comparison (now with array length), reserved NUL keys at parse and in field paths, 8 field segments, serde_json's 128 parse depth, 64 document levels after each op (iterative walk), 16 MiB per file. Recursive walks (reserved_key,first_mismatch,strip_marks,walk,touch_tree,js_deep_equal) are all bounded by the 128 parse depth or the 64-level check. 86273b6:assert_object_childrenrefuses a non-object entry of achildrenorcategorieslist (explicit stack); the length arm offirst_mismatchsits before the element arm;claim_destination(typed, seed)with its fixture test refuses before anycreate_dir. All correct. One gap left next to the first: MEDIUM below.
Findings
MEDIUM: a non-array children on an added item is silently replaced by []
crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252 (assert_object_children skips a children
value that is not an array) and crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246
(children_path overwrites any present non-array children with []). An add whose value
carries "children" as an object, a string or null, followed by an add (or a move)
into that item, is accepted: the strict gate never sees the author's value, which is gone
from document.json and the migration map. Probed on the real equine changeset plus one
level-A change: "children": {"author-note": {"id": "kept", ...}} (a whole nested finding
written as an object instead of an array), "children": "author text" and
"children": null all give probe-node.children = [probe-child], exit 0, 12 files written.
Only the add record's after keeps the value; no R5.3 output shows it (the CHANGELOG is
R5.4). Parity with the TypeScript childrenOf, and not declared: §11.12 says "a lean leaf
gets children: [] appended on demand", which covers an absent key, not a present value
replaced. This breaks the owner's "author data never dropped silently" through a plausible
typo (object in place of array). Non-blocking: no security boundary is crossed.
Hint: in assert_object_children, refuse a present children or categories key whose
value is not an array (same message family, same place as the entry check), or make
children_path refuse a present non-array value and append [] only when the key is absent.
Declare the split in the §11.12 table with a frozen TypeScript case.
LOW: --check lists through a top-level folder link
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193 calls listed(&target, ...) on
SEED/legacy-import or SEED/draft without checking the folder itself: read_dir follows
it when it is a link. Probed with legacy-import pointing out of the seed: the reads are
refused (missing: ...), but not produced: private-name.txt and not produced: sub/deep.txt print the names of files outside the seed, subfolders included. Read-only,
names only, same user. §11.12's "--check lists a link without walking into it" holds for
entries, not for the generated folder itself.
Hint: canonicalize the target and require inside(&canonical, &seed) before listing, or
refuse a target whose symlink_metadata is a link.
LOW: the seed guard is path-based, a mount alias passes it
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230 compares canonical paths (starts_with).
canonicalize resolves links, not mounts: if the seed (or the repository) is reachable
through a second path (bind mount, the same NAS share mounted twice), --out <alias>/.../equine/new passes inside and creates a new folder inside the official seed.
Only new files (never an overwrite, never a delete); the user must type the alias. Reasoned,
not probed (a mount needs privileges).
Hint: also compare (dev, ino) (std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt) of the canonical parent and
each of its ancestors with the seed folder's; a bind mount root shares the source's pair.
LOW: the declared depth-walk cost understates the cap-bound worst case
crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110 runs assert_depth over the whole document
after every op; RUST.md:3046 declares it with one sample ("a 2.4 MB changeset takes about
10 s"). The sample is right (probe: 2.3 MB, one 1 M-node add then 2,000 sets, 12.4 s,
455 MB). The worst case inside the 16 MiB read cap is two orders larger: 8.2 MB, one 4 M-node
add then 1,000 sets, 35.7 s and 1.7 GB, so about 30 ms per op, and the remaining 8 MB holds
about 94,000 more ops: roughly 45 minutes of CPU before the final gate refuses. Twenty
thousand plain sets on the real document take 0.9 s, so ordinary changesets are not affected.
Local developer tool, interruptible. The declaration is not wrong, it is incomplete.
Hint: state the cap-bound figure in §11.13, or bound the work: a total node cap on the
document after each op (also bounds memory), or a depth check limited to the subtree the op
wrote.
LOW: unit-test fixture at a fixed name in the shared temp folder
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383: env::temp_dir().join("faunosteo-import-equine-claim")
with create_dir_all. On a multi-user host another account can pre-create or link that
name. The test only runs refusals, so the worst outcome is a failed test or an empty folder
created where the link points. The integration test already uses the private
CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR.
Hint: put the fixture under the target folder (for example
concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../../target/...")) or a per-run name created
exclusively.
LOW (context): clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file
crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7 #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. A determinism and robustness lint (no I/O, no
clock in the core), not a security scanner suppression. The same line heads the ten other
core test files. The binary's #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)] was already present at
5e114da. Not blocking.
LOW (context): seed SQL rendered by string formatting
crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29 (sql_text) and :90 (document_literal). Every
interpolated value is a pipeline constant, a sha256 hex, a derived uuid or a byte count;
quotes are doubled (correct with standard_conforming_strings on, the PostgreSQL default);
the document is embedded in a $equine_doc$ literal and refused if it holds the tag; the
formatted JSON always ends with }, so no tag can form at the closing boundary. This
generates a reviewed seed file, it is not a runtime query. No action.
Residual risks declared in RUST.md §11.13
Memory without a cap beyond 16 MiB per file: confirmed (1.7 GB from an 8.2 MB file), in line
with the declaration. Single-user check-then-use window on reads and --out: confirmed as
described, every file stays create_new. Lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys: as declared. The
quadratic walk: LOW above.