docs(docs): R5.3 fourth final round declared (RUST.md §11.12-11.13), security final4, verify record
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
07d63076d3
commit
3ece1a64b1
3 files changed
+211
-12
No files matched your search
@@ -52,3 +52,9 @@ Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`. Fresh verifier,
|
||||
- Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13, one family: a null or primitive among the children of an added item. TS: TypeError where walked (refused), skipped by a reference rename's citation walk (accepted if later removed), gate if kept. Rust: tolerated by touch/walk (accepted), refused by rename's item_at_mut. Three splits; §11.12 claimed "both refuse" for the null child, false. Differential: 82,000 random changesets, 13,758 accepted identical (document, records, stats, map), 63 schema + 34 references probes agree. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET (19 tests).
|
||||
- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final3.md`), LOW only: reads follow folder links out of the seed; shape comparison ignores array length; a folder appearing after the claim accepted; seed guard wiring untested; `set name.fr.x` records `before: null`; lint allows (context).
|
||||
- Fixed: non-object children refused at the add (3 TS-frozen cases, 1 declared refusal); reads confined to the canonical seed; array length compared; only folders this run created; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` + fixture unit test. Declared: replaced-string `before` (TS same), memory factor ~2x TS.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fourth final round on 6c0fe88
|
||||
|
||||
- Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13: records differ (document identical) on array index keys in authored values or field segments (JSON.parse puts them first) and on integers beyond 2^53 (JSON.parse rounds; a Rust record held 9007199254740993 while document.json printed ...992); §11.12 declared-case count wrong. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET; 25,000 random changesets: 0 accept/refuse splits, 4,331 accepted identical.
|
||||
- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final4.md`): MEDIUM a present non-list `children` replaced by `[]` (author data lost); LOW `--check` lists through a top-level folder link, mount alias of the seed, walk cost understated (8.2 MB file ~36 s, cap-bound worst case ~45 min), fixture in shared temp, context items.
|
||||
- Fixed: `text::js_normalize` (key order + big integers at parse) and `text::js_insert` (field path writes); non-list `children`/`categories` refused at add, `children_path` never replaces; `--check` requires each generated folder to be the seed's own; `inside_by_identity` (dev, ino of every ancestor); `MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES` 200,000; fixture under target/. Cases frozen from TS: 2 key-order, 1 integer, 1 declared non-list children; Rust tests: big integer from raw text, value bound.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
```
|
||||
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
|
||||
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
|
||||
SCOPE: 35 files
|
||||
BLOCKING:
|
||||
(none)
|
||||
REPORTED (non-blocking):
|
||||
- [MEDIUM] author-data-silently-replaced (non-array `children` of an added item) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252 + crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246
|
||||
- [LOW] check-lists-through-top-level-folder-link — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193 (listed, :164)
|
||||
- [LOW] seed-containment-is-path-based (bind-mount alias) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230 (inside, :253)
|
||||
- [LOW] declared-depth-walk-cost-understates-cap-bound-worst-case — crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110 / docs/development/RUST.md:3046
|
||||
- [LOW] unit-test-fixture-in-shared-temp-with-fixed-name — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383
|
||||
- [LOW] context: clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file (project convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7
|
||||
- [LOW] context: seed SQL rendered by string formatting from pipeline values — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29
|
||||
PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 35 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 7 findings (1 MEDIUM, 6 LOW)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
# R5.3 draft, security gate (fresh, final 4)
|
||||
|
||||
Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, HEAD `6c0fe88`, scope `git diff 5e114da..HEAD`
|
||||
(35 files, 11 commits), with attention to `86273b6`. Read whole: `bin/import_equine.rs`,
|
||||
`curation/draft/{shape,ops,apply,schema,targets,fields,records,rename,stats,migration_map,seed,pipeline,mod}.rs`,
|
||||
`curation/mod.rs`, `scripts/import-equine.sh`, the `package.json` line, the binary and
|
||||
integration tests that touch the file system, the oracle generator's write guard
|
||||
(`MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1` only). Every probe ran in
|
||||
`/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/sec4.j5fliv`
|
||||
on a copy of the seed, through a probe binary that is `import_equine.rs` byte for byte except
|
||||
the `SEED` constant (pointed at the copy). Nothing ran `--out` against the repository, nothing
|
||||
was deleted, `git status` is clean after the run.
|
||||
|
||||
## Semgrep
|
||||
|
||||
`semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten
|
||||
--metrics=off` on the 35 existing files of the diff: 129 rules run, 0 findings, 0 errors.
|
||||
The rulesets carry almost no Rust rules; the Rust code was covered by reading and probing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
| Check | Result |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Hardcoded secret / token / key / auth URL | none (grep over the 35 files) |
|
||||
| SQL by string interpolation | `seed.rs` renders the seed file by formatting: LOW context below, not a runtime query |
|
||||
| Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval…) | not applicable (Rust CLI and library, no DOM) |
|
||||
| Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (no endpoint) |
|
||||
| Stack trace / internal path to an end user | not applicable (errors go to the local developer's stderr) |
|
||||
| Secret / PII in a log | none (stdout/stderr carry paths, counts and refusals) |
|
||||
| Tracked `.env` / credential file | only `.env.example` tracked |
|
||||
| Guardrails scanner (`--domain api,supabase`) | 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`, `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, outside the diff, dropped), 1 MANUAL |
|
||||
| New suppressions (anti-gaming) | no `nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `ts-ignore`, `noqa`; one clippy allow in a new test file (LOW context below) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Owner requirements, verified
|
||||
|
||||
- Seed never modified automatically: every read goes through `read()` (canonical path inside
|
||||
the canonical seed, regular file, 16 MiB cap). Probed: `curation/` as a folder link out of
|
||||
the seed and `changes.json` as a file link out of it are both refused (`leads outside the
|
||||
seed folder`); a folder link that stays inside the seed is accepted.
|
||||
- `--check` writes nothing: only `canonicalize`, `metadata`, `read`, `read_dir` on that path.
|
||||
Probe copy: 12 files, 0 differences, nothing new under the fixture seed (`find -newer`).
|
||||
- `--out` refusals, probed on the fixture seed: a link to the seed and to `draft/` (as the
|
||||
destination and as its parent), a link chain `p/q` ending in a seed link, the seed path
|
||||
itself plus `/new`, `legacy-import/new`, `INIT_CWD` set inside the seed, `..`, an empty path,
|
||||
`/`: all refused, nothing created. A relative `INIT_CWD` is ignored. A valid destination
|
||||
gets 12 files identical to the seed (`diff -rq`), a second run on it is refused `not empty`.
|
||||
Files are `create_new`, folders `create_dir` tracked in `created`, so an entry that appears
|
||||
after the claim is refused. File names are pipeline constants.
|
||||
- Strict changeset validation, depth and resource caps: `deny_unknown_fields`, the `op`
|
||||
discriminator, non-empty strings, the shape comparison (now with array length), reserved
|
||||
NUL keys at parse and in field paths, 8 field segments, serde_json's 128 parse depth, 64
|
||||
document levels after each op (iterative walk), 16 MiB per file. Recursive walks
|
||||
(`reserved_key`, `first_mismatch`, `strip_marks`, `walk`, `touch_tree`, `js_deep_equal`) are
|
||||
all bounded by the 128 parse depth or the 64-level check.
|
||||
- `86273b6`: `assert_object_children` refuses a non-object entry of a `children` or
|
||||
`categories` list (explicit stack); the length arm of `first_mismatch` sits before the
|
||||
element arm; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` with its fixture test refuses before any
|
||||
`create_dir`. All correct. One gap left next to the first: MEDIUM below.
|
||||
|
||||
## Findings
|
||||
|
||||
### MEDIUM: a non-array `children` on an added item is silently replaced by `[]`
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252` (`assert_object_children` skips a `children`
|
||||
value that is not an array) and `crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246`
|
||||
(`children_path` overwrites any present non-array `children` with `[]`). An `add` whose value
|
||||
carries `"children"` as an object, a string or `null`, followed by an `add` (or a `move`)
|
||||
into that item, is accepted: the strict gate never sees the author's value, which is gone
|
||||
from `document.json` and the migration map. Probed on the real equine changeset plus one
|
||||
level-A change: `"children": {"author-note": {"id": "kept", ...}}` (a whole nested finding
|
||||
written as an object instead of an array), `"children": "author text"` and
|
||||
`"children": null` all give `probe-node.children = [probe-child]`, exit 0, 12 files written.
|
||||
Only the add record's `after` keeps the value; no R5.3 output shows it (the CHANGELOG is
|
||||
R5.4). Parity with the TypeScript `childrenOf`, and not declared: §11.12 says "a lean leaf
|
||||
gets `children: []` appended on demand", which covers an absent key, not a present value
|
||||
replaced. This breaks the owner's "author data never dropped silently" through a plausible
|
||||
typo (object in place of array). Non-blocking: no security boundary is crossed.
|
||||
Hint: in `assert_object_children`, refuse a present `children` or `categories` key whose
|
||||
value is not an array (same message family, same place as the entry check), or make
|
||||
`children_path` refuse a present non-array value and append `[]` only when the key is absent.
|
||||
Declare the split in the §11.12 table with a frozen TypeScript case.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW: `--check` lists through a top-level folder link
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193` calls `listed(&target, ...)` on
|
||||
`SEED/legacy-import` or `SEED/draft` without checking the folder itself: `read_dir` follows
|
||||
it when it is a link. Probed with `legacy-import` pointing out of the seed: the reads are
|
||||
refused (`missing: ...`), but `not produced: private-name.txt` and `not produced:
|
||||
sub/deep.txt` print the names of files outside the seed, subfolders included. Read-only,
|
||||
names only, same user. §11.12's "`--check` lists a link without walking into it" holds for
|
||||
entries, not for the generated folder itself.
|
||||
Hint: canonicalize the target and require `inside(&canonical, &seed)` before listing, or
|
||||
refuse a target whose `symlink_metadata` is a link.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW: the seed guard is path-based, a mount alias passes it
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230` compares canonical paths (`starts_with`).
|
||||
`canonicalize` resolves links, not mounts: if the seed (or the repository) is reachable
|
||||
through a second path (bind mount, the same NAS share mounted twice), `--out
|
||||
<alias>/.../equine/new` passes `inside` and creates a new folder inside the official seed.
|
||||
Only new files (never an overwrite, never a delete); the user must type the alias. Reasoned,
|
||||
not probed (a mount needs privileges).
|
||||
Hint: also compare `(dev, ino)` (`std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt`) of the canonical parent and
|
||||
each of its ancestors with the seed folder's; a bind mount root shares the source's pair.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW: the declared depth-walk cost understates the cap-bound worst case
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110` runs `assert_depth` over the whole document
|
||||
after every op; RUST.md:3046 declares it with one sample ("a 2.4 MB changeset takes about
|
||||
10 s"). The sample is right (probe: 2.3 MB, one 1 M-node add then 2,000 sets, 12.4 s,
|
||||
455 MB). The worst case inside the 16 MiB read cap is two orders larger: 8.2 MB, one 4 M-node
|
||||
add then 1,000 sets, 35.7 s and 1.7 GB, so about 30 ms per op, and the remaining 8 MB holds
|
||||
about 94,000 more ops: roughly 45 minutes of CPU before the final gate refuses. Twenty
|
||||
thousand plain sets on the real document take 0.9 s, so ordinary changesets are not affected.
|
||||
Local developer tool, interruptible. The declaration is not wrong, it is incomplete.
|
||||
Hint: state the cap-bound figure in §11.13, or bound the work: a total node cap on the
|
||||
document after each op (also bounds memory), or a depth check limited to the subtree the op
|
||||
wrote.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW: unit-test fixture at a fixed name in the shared temp folder
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383`: `env::temp_dir().join("faunosteo-import-equine-claim")`
|
||||
with `create_dir_all`. On a multi-user host another account can pre-create or link that
|
||||
name. The test only runs refusals, so the worst outcome is a failed test or an empty folder
|
||||
created where the link points. The integration test already uses the private
|
||||
`CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR`.
|
||||
Hint: put the fixture under the target folder (for example
|
||||
`concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../../target/...")`) or a per-run name created
|
||||
exclusively.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW (context): clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods,
|
||||
clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. A determinism and robustness lint (no I/O, no
|
||||
clock in the core), not a security scanner suppression. The same line heads the ten other
|
||||
core test files. The binary's `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` was already present at
|
||||
`5e114da`. Not blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
### LOW (context): seed SQL rendered by string formatting
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29` (`sql_text`) and `:90` (`document_literal`). Every
|
||||
interpolated value is a pipeline constant, a sha256 hex, a derived uuid or a byte count;
|
||||
quotes are doubled (correct with `standard_conforming_strings` on, the PostgreSQL default);
|
||||
the document is embedded in a `$equine_doc$` literal and refused if it holds the tag; the
|
||||
formatted JSON always ends with `}`, so no tag can form at the closing boundary. This
|
||||
generates a reviewed seed file, it is not a runtime query. No action.
|
||||
|
||||
## Residual risks declared in RUST.md §11.13
|
||||
|
||||
Memory without a cap beyond 16 MiB per file: confirmed (1.7 GB from an 8.2 MB file), in line
|
||||
with the declaration. Single-user check-then-use window on reads and `--out`: confirmed as
|
||||
described, every file stays `create_new`. Lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys: as declared. The
|
||||
quadratic walk: LOW above.
|
||||
+35
-12
@@ -2885,7 +2885,7 @@ until the switch; no fingerprint change; the cleaned `horse.svg` is read as froz
|
||||
re-cleaned; the review drawings and the two Markdown reports are R5.4. Contract
|
||||
`.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/core/src/curation/draft` (2,877 lines, feature `curation`):
|
||||
`crates/core/src/curation/draft` (2,912 lines, feature `curation`):
|
||||
|
||||
| Module | Ports |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -2916,18 +2916,19 @@ Parity, every expectation written by the TypeScript (`tests/curation_draft.rs`,
|
||||
- the 612 legacy leaves through the core's `read_report_document` on the produced map: 442
|
||||
identical, 141 moved, 29 removed, every resolved leaf a leaf of the produced document, the
|
||||
29 flagged paths exactly those the map sends to null, the FR snapshots kept;
|
||||
- 77 synthetic changesets on the mini sheet (`oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`,
|
||||
generator `packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`): 11 accepted
|
||||
- 81 synthetic changesets on the mini sheet (`oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`,
|
||||
generator `packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`): 14 accepted
|
||||
cases (every op kind, numeric and anchored positions, subtree scopes with skipped equal
|
||||
values, the review rule on levels A, B and C, the five rename cascades and a reference
|
||||
rename, re-homing, two chained changes, the two migration-map debt cases below) byte for
|
||||
rename, re-homing, two chained changes, the two migration-map debt cases below, the three
|
||||
`JSON.parse` cases of the aligned paragraph) byte for
|
||||
byte on the formatted document, the records, the stats, the migration map and the seed
|
||||
SQL; 63 refusals (23 schema, `null` on `scope`, `position` and `field` and the shape
|
||||
family below included, 40 applier, integrity and shape gates included) refused alike, with
|
||||
the same reason: the same message for an op or change refusal (change id and op index
|
||||
included), the same stage for a schema or gate refusal; 7 references files refused alike;
|
||||
two declared
|
||||
differences below (one refusal, one acceptance), each held by its own test.
|
||||
four declared synthetic cases below (three refusals, one acceptance), each held by its own
|
||||
test (14 compared + 63 refused alike + 4 declared = 81).
|
||||
|
||||
Differences declared (none reachable by the committed files, since the folders are
|
||||
reproduced byte for byte):
|
||||
@@ -2943,6 +2944,7 @@ reproduced byte for byte):
|
||||
| a `set` field path ending in `__proto__` (`name.__proto__`) | the prototype setter swallowed the write: change accepted, one record, the document unchanged (or, when the holder was absent, `description: {}` added by `writeField`) | the key is written and the strict document gate refuses it (the R5.2 family: a name of `Object.prototype` is a plain key) |
|
||||
| an authored key starting with NUL (`"\u0000touched"`) in a value, or a field path segment starting with NUL (`name.\u0000touched`) | refused at the strict document gate when the key reaches the document, accepted when a later op overwrites or removes it | refused (`reserved key`): at parse for a value, at the op for a field path; the prefix is reserved for the applier's transient touch marks, which the cleanup strips at every depth, so a written key would be lost while a record claims it (found by the final gates, test `a_reserved_or_unbounded_field_path_is_refused_without_writing`) |
|
||||
| a null, a string, a number or a boolean among the `children` or `categories` of an added item | a TypeError where a walk met it (`descendants`, the review marking: refused), silently skipped by a rename's citation walk (accepted when a later op removed the item), refused by the gate when it stayed | refused at the add (`… entry that is not an object`), whatever follows (three cases frozen from the TypeScript, one declared: `declared-children-string-renamed-then-removed`) |
|
||||
| a `children` or `categories` of an added item that is present but not a list (an object, a string, `null`) | replaced by `[]` when a later op added under the item (`childrenOf`): the author's value lost without a word | refused at the add (`… that is not a list`); `children_path` never replaces a present value (declared case `declared-children-object-then-added-to`) |
|
||||
| a `set` whose path goes through a string (`name.fr.x`): `writeField` replaces the string by an object | `before` recorded as undefined (null), the replaced string in no record; refused by the gate unless a later op overwrites the field | the same (kept, recorded here) |
|
||||
| a field path of more than 8 segments (the deepest settable path has 2) | accepted, the gate refused the stray keys | refused at the op: a resource bound (20,000 segments overflowed the stack before it) |
|
||||
| a document nested more than 64 levels after an op (the equine document has 10), by repeated `add` or `move`, or a deep value | accepted when valid | refused at the op: a resource bound checked after every op with an iterative walk (test `the_document_cannot_be_nested_past_the_bound_by_repeated_adds`) |
|
||||
@@ -2963,6 +2965,14 @@ findings only (33) and no reference, so the equine map is untouched. A future ch
|
||||
renaming a view, zone, region, category or a cited reference must not be published before
|
||||
the fix (a declared behaviour change on both sides, after R5).
|
||||
|
||||
Aligned on `JSON.parse`, not a difference: an authored value keeps JavaScript's key order (array
|
||||
index keys such as `"1"` first, ascending, then the others in insertion order) and an integer
|
||||
beyond 2^53 is read as the double JavaScript holds (`9007199254740993` → `9007199254740992`),
|
||||
at parse (`text::js_normalize`) and when a field path writes a key (`text::js_insert`), so a
|
||||
record never holds a value its own document lacks (found by the fourth final verifier; cases
|
||||
`js-index-key-in-value-overwritten`, `js-index-segment-overwritten`, test
|
||||
`an_integer_beyond_2_53_is_read_as_the_double_json_parse_gives`).
|
||||
|
||||
Aligned on Zod, not a difference: serde's derives read a struct from a positional array
|
||||
(`"title": ["Titre", "Title"]`, a whole change or reference as an array) and a unit enum
|
||||
variant from a one-key map (`"level": {"A": null}`, `scope`, `review_status`, `laterality`,
|
||||
@@ -3030,7 +3040,15 @@ seed guard tested only as a bare function, `before: null` over a replaced string
|
||||
non-object children refused at the add; reads confined to the seed by canonical path; array
|
||||
length compared; only folders this run created are used; `claim_destination` takes the seed
|
||||
and is tested on a fixture (`the_claim_refuses_a_destination_inside_the_seed_and_creates_nothing`).
|
||||
Declared: the replaced-string `before`, the memory factor.
|
||||
Declared: the replaced-string `before`, the memory factor. Fourth final round on 6c0fe88:
|
||||
verifier ECARTS(2) (C1, C2, C4 to C12 met, 0 accept/refuse split in 25,000 random changesets;
|
||||
records differing from the TypeScript on array index keys and on integers beyond 2^53; the
|
||||
declared-case count wrong) and security PASS with one MEDIUM (a present non-list `children`
|
||||
silently replaced by `[]`) and LOWs (`--check` listing through a generated folder that is a
|
||||
link, a mount alias of the seed, the walk cost understated, the claim test fixture in the
|
||||
shared temporary folder). Fixed: `js_normalize` and `js_insert`; non-list `children` and
|
||||
`categories` refused at the add and never replaced; `--check` confined to the seed's folders;
|
||||
the identity guard; a 200,000-value bound; the fixture under `target/`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.13 Checkpoint R5.3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3040,16 +3058,21 @@ the readers of imported PDFs (`archive/read.rs`, `report/read.rs`, `pdf/import.r
|
||||
accept an object written as an array or an enum written as a map where the frozen Zod reader
|
||||
refused it. Not probed on those readers, not changed: a fix there needs the owner's per-file go.
|
||||
|
||||
Residual risks, measured by the final security gate and kept: memory has no cap beyond the
|
||||
16 MiB read bound (a hostile 211 KB changeset of subtree sets on a 2,000-node addition asks
|
||||
for more than 2 GB; the port clones the op into every record where the TypeScript shared it,
|
||||
about twice its memory); the depth check walks the document
|
||||
after every op (a 2.4 MB changeset takes about 10 s); `--out` assumes a single-user machine
|
||||
Residual risks, measured by the final security gates and kept: the document is bounded (64
|
||||
levels, 200,000 values, checked after every op; the equine document has 10 and 6,374), but
|
||||
the records are not: a hostile changeset of subtree sets with a large value still costs
|
||||
memory in proportion to ops × items × value size (211 KB asked for more than 2 GB before the
|
||||
value bound; the port clones the op into every record where the TypeScript shared it, about
|
||||
twice its memory); the bound walk runs after every op (at most 200,000 values each, a few
|
||||
milliseconds; a 16 MiB changeset of tiny ops could take minutes); `--out` assumes a single-user machine
|
||||
(a concurrent process able to write the destination's parent could still swap a component
|
||||
between a check and its use, never overwriting: every file is `create_new`); invalid UTF-8
|
||||
and repeated keys are read as the TypeScript read them. Residual risks of the slice: the
|
||||
`--check` allowance for the six R5.4 files hides nothing about the
|
||||
produced files but means the draft folder is not yet compared whole (R5.4 removes it); the
|
||||
seed guard of `--out` compares canonical paths and file identity (device, inode) of every
|
||||
ancestor, so a second mount path of the seed is refused too; `--check` refuses a generated
|
||||
folder that is not itself a folder of the seed (a link there is never listed through); the
|
||||
touch marks are a reserved prefix (a NUL character starts it), refused in any authored value
|
||||
at parse and in any field path segment at the op, and removed after each change, so no mark
|
||||
reaches a record or the document; the migration-map replay quirk above
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user