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faunosteo/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-reserves.md

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Contract: V1-2.3 owner reserves (brief « Décisions V1-2.3 / M6 et clôture des dernières réserves »)

Owner brief 2026-11-01 on 96b19e5: M6 parameters approved (five worker codes, 5 attempts, lease 10 min, verdict 3 MiB child / 4 MiB SQL, worker-verify, verify-e2e); brk approved in the shared seccomp filter; verdict CHANGES REQUIRED until the proofs below exist. Branch feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets. Sandbox stack only; DEV (containers supabase_*_faunosteo, its queues, purges, secrets and accounts) untouched; no merge; no V1-2.4; no deploy; STOP at the checkpoint. The base contract 2026-11-01-v1-2-3-worker-verification.md (W1-W8) still holds, W6 pnpm e2e:avatar unchanged replaced by Q1.

Criteria

  • Q1 Avatar e2e isolated: pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e runs the existing avatar suite (packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts, every case kept) against the sandbox, with the real worker image in its default mode (avatars + sweep) on the sandbox network only, after M6. No DEV container, network, key or queue is reachable from the run: the suite needs its database container named explicitly (no DEV default), its purge acceleration touches only the run's own account, its accounts are throwaway with random passwords. scripts/avatar-e2e.sh (DEV) is not run. DEV container start times unchanged after every run.
  • Q2 Retry delay (owner decision §4): a technical failure reported by fail_sheet_verification makes the round claimable again only after 2 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s (after attempts 1, 2, 3, 4); attempt 1 immediate; the fifth failure closes the round verification_failed / unavailable as before. Persisted in SQL (a hidden column on the round, not granted to authenticated), so no worker sleeps and any worker honours it; RPC names, arguments and answers unchanged. Verdict failures (validation, integrity) are never retried (complete). Unchanged: attempt counter, lease, dead-lease interruption path (immediate, the lease being the wait), stale and malformed protections (a stale fail writes nothing, delay included). pgTAP: each delay, no claim before it, claim after it, stale fail, final attempt. Sandbox e2e: a technical failure retried by the real worker no earlier than its delay, the worker serving another round meanwhile.
  • Q3 Input limits: at the maximum the policy allows (document 2 097 152 bytes of content::text, base 2 097 152, four drawings totalling 6 291 456 bytes, each at most 2 097 152) the child under the full sandbox and the real worker on the sandbox both produce a verdict accepted by SQL, within the 120 s budget, measured; just beyond: document and drawing at +1 byte refused before the worker (save, registration, bucket), drawings over the total or the count → verdict failed verification.validation.caps (business, not a worker failure), input over 12 MiB refused by the child. The two tracked misclassifications (resource_limit for a header over 64 KiB, drawing_missing for an object over the policy) asserted as current behaviour, labelled tracked, never presented as fixed.
  • Q4 brk bounded: the verify child under the real filter and limits is still killed or aborted by RLIMIT_AS (large and small-chunk growth), the mmap exec and signal argument filters, and a denied syscall; no other syscall added.
  • Q5 Sandbox account password: no password literal for throwaway sandbox accounts in the sandbox script and its test helpers; generated per run, never written to Git, a log or a command line. The DEV seed accounts (supabase/seed.sql) and DEV secrets untouched.
  • Q6 Memory: LRN with the owner's wording (scoped to the M6 worker musl image, not generalised).
  • Q7 Docs describe only what is implemented (V1-2 contract §6.4, §6.5, §12.3, §16.4; STORAGE.md §3.6; RUST.md §13; SUPABASE.md sandbox table; CLAUDE.md lines); the four residual risks tracked in TODO, open.
  • Q8 Gates on the final HEAD: PGlite, sandbox test-db and types --check, test, verify-e2e, avatar-e2e, upgrade rehearsals (before M6, before M4), pnpm worker:test, pnpm worker:image, pnpm check:all, pnpm e2e:shell; 42 hostile SVG kept in the child proofs; fresh security review and fresh verifier.

Out of scope

DEV and production (every §16.11 operation, including the queue inventory, which stays owed), screens, V1-2.4 onwards, merge, deploy; fixing the two tracked misclassifications.