4.3 KiB
Incident report: two unauthorised read-only runs against DEV (2026-11-01)
Scope rule broken: the owner's briefs forbid any operation on DEV, read-only included. Evidence is
what was collected right after each event, read-only: Docker start times of the eight DEV containers,
the DEV Kong access log and the DEV Storage request log (docker logs). No new connection to DEV was
made to write this report.
Events
| Event 1 | Event 2 | |
|---|---|---|
| Time (UTC) | 2026-11-01 23:03:49 | 2026-11-01 23:10:59 |
| Origin | feater sub-agent securing e2e:sheet-assets (V1-2.3 closure, brief 2026-11-02 §3) |
the orchestrator |
| Cause | cd <worktree> && python3 … & backgrounded the whole list, so the next command ran in the shell's directory, the main checkout /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo (branch feature/v1-1-clients-animals), where the old script still targets DEV |
an unquoted heredoc (python3 - <<EOF) writing a TODO line: bash ran the command substitution of the backticked text pnpm e2e:sheet-assets in the session directory, the same main checkout |
| Command really run | pnpm e2e:sheet-assets → old scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh: release build of upload-sheet-assets, scripts/supabase.sh status -o json (DEV service and anon keys read from the local CLI), then its 11 checks |
the same |
| Environment reached | DEV: the local Supabase CLI stack, through Kong http://127.0.0.1:54321 (Storage and PostgREST) |
the same |
| Requests observed (Kong) | 13, all GET (detail below) | 13, all GET, same detail |
| Writes observed | none: no POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE in the Kong log; Storage log shows only GET (storage.bucket.get, storage.object.get_authenticated) |
none, same evidence |
| DEV containers | not restarted (start times equal to the snapshot of 2026-10-28) | same |
The 13 requests of each event (reconciled)
| Requests | Count | Status |
|---|---|---|
GET /storage/v1/object/anatomical-sheet-assets/0ea5202f…08541.svg (equine drawing; last_modified 2026-10-23, unchanged) |
5 | 200 |
GET /storage/v1/bucket/anatomical-sheet-assets |
3 | 200 |
GET /storage/v1/bucket/anatomical-sheet-assets (anon key and wrong key, the expected refusals) |
2 | 400 |
GET /rest/v1/anatomical_sheet_assets |
3 | 200 |
| Total | 13 |
The checkpoint of 2026-11-02 said « 4 lectures du bucket » plus « 2 refus », which sums to 14: wrong. The log has 3 bucket reads answered 200 and 2 answered 400, five bucket requests in all; the total is 13. The four refusal checks of the script that name another destination (https, a non-local host, no port, port 9) sent nothing to DEV: the upload tool refuses the first three before any request, and port 9 is closed.
What the evidence proves, and what it does not
Proved: no write request reached DEV through Kong, the only route the tool uses (the URL was
http://127.0.0.1:54321); the drawing object kept its 2026-10-23 modification date; no DEV container
restarted. Not proved: the state of DEV's database rows (no query was run, by rule); PostgREST and
PostgreSQL logs were not read. The DEV service key was read from the local CLI config and held in the
process environment of those runs; it was never printed (the script's grep guard) and is the local
demo key (ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6).
Confinement and prevention
- Stopped all work at once after the second event and reported it (checkpoint of 2026-11-02).
- V1-2 branch:
pnpm e2e:sheet-assetsis an alias ofpnpm db:sandbox sheet-assets-e2e(f924ad0); the runner refuses any URL buthttp://127.0.0.1:57800and any key not issued by the sandbox, before building or any request (34a49f5for the branch-neutral message). - develop: bugfix
bugfix/sheet-assets-e2e-sandbox-only(owner authorisation of 2026-11-02): the same runner, byte for byte; on develop it always refuses (no sandbox runner there yet). - Remaining vulnerable entry points (not fixed here; owner authorisation needed): see the census in
the checkpoint (develop
scripts/avatar-e2e.sh; the main checkout onfeature/v1-1-clients-animalsand the worktreeold-958228ahold both old scripts on disk). - Memory: LRN-110 (supersedes LRN-102): quoted heredocs, absolute verified directories, environment validated inside scripts, the same rules in every sub-agent brief; agents and sub-agents are forbidden to run those old commands from other worktrees.