Files
faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-review-security-7.md

89 lines
9.8 KiB
Markdown
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
# Security gate R5.4 (round 7): review files in Rust
Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, HEAD `777c800`. Scope: `git diff c6e0d85..HEAD -- crates/core packages/anatomy/tests docs/development/RUST.md` (26 files). Blind, complete scan. No prior verdict was read.
```
SECURITY — VERDICT: BLOCK(2)
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 26 files
BLOCKING:
1. [HIGH] resource-bound/output-amplification — crates/core/src/curation/draft/changelog.rs:68 (record_row), :116-119 (table built whole); crates/core/src/curation/markdown.rs:52-63 (table), :139-159 (bound checked after the raw rows exist); crates/core/src/curation/draft/pipeline.rs:247-252; docs/development/RUST.md:3206 — the CHANGELOG raw table (rows × authored rationale/title) is fully built, joined and split before MAX_TABLE_COLUMNS_TOTAL is checked, so the declared case "80 KB rationale over 14,000 records" still exhausts memory: a 1.9 MB changes.json aborts at a 3 GB address-space cap; RUST.md's "refused before any row is built" is false — hint: bound before render_changelog builds a row (project rows × widest authored cell per level from the records, or cap the raw length while table() accumulates), and pin it with a pipeline-level test (build + render of the declared case under a memory ceiling), not format_markdown on a hand-built table
2. [HIGH] resource-bound/record-amplification — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:197 (rename), :384 (remove); crates/core/src/curation/draft/records.rs:18-28 (out of diff, same pipeline) — every rename/remove record deep-copies the whole item (before and after) and every record clones the ChangeSummary (title, rationale, question); MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES (200,000) bounds the document after an op, never the sum of the records: an 810 KB changes.json (one 5,000-child add, 400 renames back and forth) reaches 4.3 GB RSS at build, linear at ~10.7 MB per rename; ~1,400 renames exceed the 15 GB dev machine; R5.4's CHANGELOG then serialises each whole item again (compact_value) — hint: bound the records (total values or bytes recorded, checked as each record is pushed, refused with Guard) or record ids/paths and share the ChangeSummary (index or Rc) instead of cloning
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [LOW] new lint relaxation `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]` — crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6, crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6 (integration tests only, same line as every existing test file; not a security-rule suppression)
- [LOW] pre-existing suppression `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:17 (the tool's declared I/O file, context)
- [LOW] error echo size — crates/core/src/curation/report_guard.rs:29-31 (UnsupportedMarkdown carries the whole refused line, multi-MB on stderr; authored content, no secret)
- [LOW] subfolder race — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:353-389 (write_exclusive re-checks the claimed root only, not the subfolders this run created; same-user swap, declared out of model in RUST.md §11.13; unchanged by this diff)
PROOF: semgrep 128 rules on 26 files → 0 findings; checklist 12 checks → 6 findings (2 HIGH, 4 LOW)
```
## Checklist detail
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Hardcoded secret, token, key, credentialed URL | none in the added lines |
| SQL by concatenation | none (no SQL in the diff) |
| Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval, raw) | none |
| Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (offline CLI and pure core) |
| Stack trace or internal path to a user | none (CLI messages to the operator) |
| Secret or PII in a log | none; `println!` lines print file names and counts |
| Tracked `.env` or credential file | only `.env.example` tracked |
| guardrails `scan.py --domain api,supabase` | 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`, `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, outside the diff: dropped) |
| Anti-gaming (new suppressions) | two test-file lint allows, convention of all test files, LOW |
| Report structure forgery (sections, list items, code spans, links, HTML) | held, see below |
| SVG well-formedness and injection | held: serializer escapes `& < > "` and CR/TAB/LF in attributes, `first_unwritable` refuses non-XML-1.0 code points and CR, element and attribute names are fixed, no href or event attribute written |
| Resource bounds and file safety | 2 HIGH (above); quadratic scans and `--out`/`--check` held, see below |
## Finding 1: CHANGELOG raw table amplified before its bound
`render_changelog` builds one row per record, each carrying the change's title and rationale (`changelog.rs:89`, `:94`). `table()` joins every row, wraps it, and joins again. `format_report` then guards each line, and `align` splits every row into owned strings. Only after all of that does it compare `row_width × rows` with `MAX_TABLE_COLUMNS_TOTAL`. So the bound caps the padded copy only. The raw table, which already holds N × R bytes, gets built four to five times first.
Measured with the full pipeline (`build_equine_draft` + `render_draft_artifacts` on the real legacy sources and the committed changeset, plus one appended change of `set` ops):
| changes.json | rationale × set ops | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 545 KB | 20 KB × 3,000 | Guard refusal, peak 373 MB |
| 506 KB | 100 KB × 2,000 | Guard refusal, peak 1.19 GB |
| 1.04 MB | 400 KB × 4,000 | `memory allocation failed`, signal 6, at the 6 GB cap |
| 1.92 MB | 80 KB × 14,000 (the case RUST.md declares held) | `memory allocation failed`, signal 6, at the 3 GB cap |
The 16 MiB read cap allows inputs of hundreds of GB of raw table. Without a ulimit the process grows until the OOM killer acts. The failure is fail-closed: `folders()` finishes before `claim_destination`, so nothing gets written. The impact is availability of the developer machine, and that includes `--check`. The test `an_aligned_table_past_the_bound_is_refused_before_it_is_built` calls `format_markdown` on a table it built by hand, so it cannot see the pipeline's allocation.
## Finding 2: records deep-copy whole items
`ChangeRecord` keeps a `ChangeSummary` clone plus deep copies of `before` and `after`, and for a rename or remove those copies are the whole item (`records.rs:18`). An `add` of a 5,000-child category followed by N renames that swap its id back and forth gives:
| renames | build-only RSS |
|---|---|
| 0 | 56 MB |
| 100 | 1.13 GB |
| 200 | 2.20 GB |
| 400 | 4.34 GB (810 KB changes.json) |
`MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES` is checked on the document after each op, not on what the records accumulate. The cloning lines are R5.3 code, but they sit in a file of this diff (`ops.rs`, whose `apply_rename` the diff modifies), and the R5.4 renderers consume every record. The TypeScript had the same amplification but V8's heap limit stopped it with a clean error. The Rust process has no such ceiling.
## What held
Markdown guard. I ran a differential of `report_guard::format_report` (Rust) against Prettier 3.8.3 `format(…, parser: 'markdown')` with the repository options, on raw reports shaped like the generator's output: list items with title, rationale and question, CHANGELOG rows with `cell()` applied, bibliography and decision lines. Authored texts followed the same preconditions as the code (no backtick; no control character or wiki/liquid bracket in list items). Results:
- 201,000 random probes over the admitted alphabet plus adversarial tokens (`&amp`, `&#`, URL starts, `**`, `_`, `\`, brackets, wide and zero-width characters). 20,969 were admitted and 0 diverged.
- 960 targeted probes: reference-style links with a space, `[a]: b` mid-line, `1.`, `#`, `+`, `>` at a cell start, bare URLs with `_`, `)`, `&`, `x@y`, `**é**`, `a\|b` outside tables, `<3`, `<-`. 689 were admitted and 0 diverged.
None of these forged a section, list item, code span, link or HTML. A newline in a list-item field is refused, and table cells turn newlines into spaces. The guard's scans stayed linear: 18 lines of 4 MB with 20,000 code spans each ran in 1.19 s.
`--check` and `--out`:
- `compare_file` falls back on trees only for `review/app-*` with the declared rule. `compare_drawing` returns an error with no rule, requires the committed file to rebuild byte for byte from its tree, and requires the rule to change it.
- `inside_by_identity` now fails closed with an explicit error.
- Reads stay canonical-inside-seed, regular-file-only and capped at 16 MiB.
- Written names are `Component::Normal` only, and view ids are stable ids.
- Writes use `create_new`, and the existing destination is identity-checked against the seed.
SVG: `drawing_text` refuses unwritable text, and the overlay and the app layer only emit fixed element and attribute names. Depth is bounded by the core reader's prescan before `first_difference` or `TriggerNames::apply` recurse.
## Probes (scratchpad only, no tracked change, nothing deleted)
- `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe/src/main.rs` (guard probe), `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe/src/bin/amp.rs` (pipeline memory probe; `BUILD_ONLY=1` stops after the build)
- `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/fuzz.py`, `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/targeted.py`, `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/prettier.mjs`
- `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/mkchg.py` (finding 1 inputs), `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/mkren.py` (finding 2 inputs)
Memory probes ran under `ulimit -v` (3 to 6 GB). Cargo built into a scratchpad `CARGO_TARGET_DIR`. `git status` stayed clean at `777c800`.