9.8 KiB
Security gate R5.4 (round 7): review files in Rust
Branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD 777c800. Scope: git diff c6e0d85..HEAD -- crates/core packages/anatomy/tests docs/development/RUST.md (26 files). Blind, complete scan. No prior verdict was read.
SECURITY — VERDICT: BLOCK(2)
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 26 files
BLOCKING:
1. [HIGH] resource-bound/output-amplification — crates/core/src/curation/draft/changelog.rs:68 (record_row), :116-119 (table built whole); crates/core/src/curation/markdown.rs:52-63 (table), :139-159 (bound checked after the raw rows exist); crates/core/src/curation/draft/pipeline.rs:247-252; docs/development/RUST.md:3206 — the CHANGELOG raw table (rows × authored rationale/title) is fully built, joined and split before MAX_TABLE_COLUMNS_TOTAL is checked, so the declared case "80 KB rationale over 14,000 records" still exhausts memory: a 1.9 MB changes.json aborts at a 3 GB address-space cap; RUST.md's "refused before any row is built" is false — hint: bound before render_changelog builds a row (project rows × widest authored cell per level from the records, or cap the raw length while table() accumulates), and pin it with a pipeline-level test (build + render of the declared case under a memory ceiling), not format_markdown on a hand-built table
2. [HIGH] resource-bound/record-amplification — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:197 (rename), :384 (remove); crates/core/src/curation/draft/records.rs:18-28 (out of diff, same pipeline) — every rename/remove record deep-copies the whole item (before and after) and every record clones the ChangeSummary (title, rationale, question); MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES (200,000) bounds the document after an op, never the sum of the records: an 810 KB changes.json (one 5,000-child add, 400 renames back and forth) reaches 4.3 GB RSS at build, linear at ~10.7 MB per rename; ~1,400 renames exceed the 15 GB dev machine; R5.4's CHANGELOG then serialises each whole item again (compact_value) — hint: bound the records (total values or bytes recorded, checked as each record is pushed, refused with Guard) or record ids/paths and share the ChangeSummary (index or Rc) instead of cloning
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [LOW] new lint relaxation `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]` — crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6, crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6 (integration tests only, same line as every existing test file; not a security-rule suppression)
- [LOW] pre-existing suppression `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:17 (the tool's declared I/O file, context)
- [LOW] error echo size — crates/core/src/curation/report_guard.rs:29-31 (UnsupportedMarkdown carries the whole refused line, multi-MB on stderr; authored content, no secret)
- [LOW] subfolder race — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:353-389 (write_exclusive re-checks the claimed root only, not the subfolders this run created; same-user swap, declared out of model in RUST.md §11.13; unchanged by this diff)
PROOF: semgrep 128 rules on 26 files → 0 findings; checklist 12 checks → 6 findings (2 HIGH, 4 LOW)
Checklist detail
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Hardcoded secret, token, key, credentialed URL | none in the added lines |
| SQL by concatenation | none (no SQL in the diff) |
| Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval, raw) | none |
| Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (offline CLI and pure core) |
| Stack trace or internal path to a user | none (CLI messages to the operator) |
| Secret or PII in a log | none; println! lines print file names and counts |
Tracked .env or credential file |
only .env.example tracked |
guardrails scan.py --domain api,supabase |
0 FAIL, 1 WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, outside the diff: dropped) |
| Anti-gaming (new suppressions) | two test-file lint allows, convention of all test files, LOW |
| Report structure forgery (sections, list items, code spans, links, HTML) | held, see below |
| SVG well-formedness and injection | held: serializer escapes & < > " and CR/TAB/LF in attributes, first_unwritable refuses non-XML-1.0 code points and CR, element and attribute names are fixed, no href or event attribute written |
| Resource bounds and file safety | 2 HIGH (above); quadratic scans and --out/--check held, see below |
Finding 1: CHANGELOG raw table amplified before its bound
render_changelog builds one row per record, each carrying the change's title and rationale (changelog.rs:89, :94). table() joins every row, wraps it, and joins again. format_report then guards each line, and align splits every row into owned strings. Only after all of that does it compare row_width × rows with MAX_TABLE_COLUMNS_TOTAL. So the bound caps the padded copy only. The raw table, which already holds N × R bytes, gets built four to five times first.
Measured with the full pipeline (build_equine_draft + render_draft_artifacts on the real legacy sources and the committed changeset, plus one appended change of set ops):
| changes.json | rationale × set ops | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 545 KB | 20 KB × 3,000 | Guard refusal, peak 373 MB |
| 506 KB | 100 KB × 2,000 | Guard refusal, peak 1.19 GB |
| 1.04 MB | 400 KB × 4,000 | memory allocation failed, signal 6, at the 6 GB cap |
| 1.92 MB | 80 KB × 14,000 (the case RUST.md declares held) | memory allocation failed, signal 6, at the 3 GB cap |
The 16 MiB read cap allows inputs of hundreds of GB of raw table. Without a ulimit the process grows until the OOM killer acts. The failure is fail-closed: folders() finishes before claim_destination, so nothing gets written. The impact is availability of the developer machine, and that includes --check. The test an_aligned_table_past_the_bound_is_refused_before_it_is_built calls format_markdown on a table it built by hand, so it cannot see the pipeline's allocation.
Finding 2: records deep-copy whole items
ChangeRecord keeps a ChangeSummary clone plus deep copies of before and after, and for a rename or remove those copies are the whole item (records.rs:18). An add of a 5,000-child category followed by N renames that swap its id back and forth gives:
| renames | build-only RSS |
|---|---|
| 0 | 56 MB |
| 100 | 1.13 GB |
| 200 | 2.20 GB |
| 400 | 4.34 GB (810 KB changes.json) |
MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES is checked on the document after each op, not on what the records accumulate. The cloning lines are R5.3 code, but they sit in a file of this diff (ops.rs, whose apply_rename the diff modifies), and the R5.4 renderers consume every record. The TypeScript had the same amplification but V8's heap limit stopped it with a clean error. The Rust process has no such ceiling.
What held
Markdown guard. I ran a differential of report_guard::format_report (Rust) against Prettier 3.8.3 format(…, parser: 'markdown') with the repository options, on raw reports shaped like the generator's output: list items with title, rationale and question, CHANGELOG rows with cell() applied, bibliography and decision lines. Authored texts followed the same preconditions as the code (no backtick; no control character or wiki/liquid bracket in list items). Results:
- 201,000 random probes over the admitted alphabet plus adversarial tokens (
&,&#, URL starts,**,_,\, brackets, wide and zero-width characters). 20,969 were admitted and 0 diverged. - 960 targeted probes: reference-style links with a space,
[a]: bmid-line,1.,#,+,>at a cell start, bare URLs with_,),&,x@y,**é**,a\|boutside tables,<3,<-. 689 were admitted and 0 diverged.
None of these forged a section, list item, code span, link or HTML. A newline in a list-item field is refused, and table cells turn newlines into spaces. The guard's scans stayed linear: 18 lines of 4 MB with 20,000 code spans each ran in 1.19 s.
--check and --out:
compare_filefalls back on trees only forreview/app-*with the declared rule.compare_drawingreturns an error with no rule, requires the committed file to rebuild byte for byte from its tree, and requires the rule to change it.inside_by_identitynow fails closed with an explicit error.- Reads stay canonical-inside-seed, regular-file-only and capped at 16 MiB.
- Written names are
Component::Normalonly, and view ids are stable ids. - Writes use
create_new, and the existing destination is identity-checked against the seed.
SVG: drawing_text refuses unwritable text, and the overlay and the app layer only emit fixed element and attribute names. Depth is bounded by the core reader's prescan before first_difference or TriggerNames::apply recurse.
Probes (scratchpad only, no tracked change, nothing deleted)
/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe/src/main.rs(guard probe),/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe/src/bin/amp.rs(pipeline memory probe;BUILD_ONLY=1stops after the build)/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/fuzz.py,/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/targeted.py,/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/prettier.mjs/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/mkchg.py(finding 1 inputs),/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/scripts/mkren.py(finding 2 inputs)
Memory probes ran under ulimit -v (3 to 6 GB). Cargo built into a scratchpad CARGO_TARGET_DIR. git status stayed clean at 777c800.