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SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 25 files
BLOCKING:
  (none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
  - [MEDIUM] check/declared-tree-rule-too-wide — crates/core/src/curation/draft/svg_compare.rs:104
  - [LOW] check/unchecked-xml-characters — crates/core/src/curation/draft/app_review.rs:33
  - [LOW] check/markdown-structure-injection — crates/core/src/curation/draft/review_report.rs:64
  - [LOW] check/quadratic-renderers — crates/core/src/curation/draft/review_report.rs:223
  - [LOW] anti-gaming/test-clippy-allow (context) — crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6
PROOF: semgrep 162 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 8 checks + anti-gaming + 5 brief probes → 5 findings

R5.4 security gate (fresh), 2026-10-23

Repository /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo, branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD 0a79c52, scope git diff c6e0d85..HEAD (25 existing files). Every changed product file was read whole: crates/core/src/curation/draft/{labels,changelog,review_report,drawing,overlay, app_review,svg_compare,pipeline,stats,ops,mod}.rs, crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs, plus crates/core/src/curation/markdown.rs, anatomy/svg/{serialize,tree}.rs and anatomy/compose.rs where the new code relies on them.

Method

  • semgrep 1.168.0 (EIO_BACKEND=posix), --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off --quiet --json on the 25 files: 162 rules, 0 results, 0 errors. These packs cover Rust thinly, so the manual review carries the weight.
  • Checklist (CLAUDE.md defaults): secrets, SQL concatenation, unsanitized render, authz, error exposure, secrets in logs, tracked .env, guardrails scanner (python3 -B ~/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py <root> --domain api,supabase: 0 FAIL, 1 WARN, 1 MANUAL; the WARN SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER is in supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, outside the delta, so it is not reported here).
  • Anti-gaming: the diff was scanned for new suppressions.
  • Probes, all in the scratchpad: a throwaway crate linking faunosteo-core (feature curation) at /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe.DaWdIB, and import-equine built with CARGO_TARGET_DIR in the scratchpad. --check ran read-only on the repository. --out ran only inside the fresh /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/out.6SamF5. Nothing was deleted, and git status stayed clean.

Findings

1. [MEDIUM] The tree fallback hides more than the declared trigger-name rule

crates/core/src/curation/draft/svg_compare.rs:104-123 (compare_drawing), used by crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:196-215 for review/app-*.svg.

When the bytes differ, both files are parsed with parse_svg. That function builds the tree of the root element only, and it keeps only elements and text (anatomy/svg/tree.rs:155, 182-193). Everything the tree does not carry is therefore never compared:

  • the prolog: XML declaration and its encoding, processing instructions, comments;
  • comments and processing instructions inside the root and after it;
  • entity and character-reference forms, CDATA against escaped text, attribute quoting, <g/> against <g></g>;
  • attribute-value whitespace that the parser normalises.

Measured on the real committed draft/review/app-main.svg against the produced one, with the rule applied:

Committed file changed by compare_drawing
nothing Ok(TreeAfterRule)
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" href="https://attacker.invalid/hide.css"?> and a comment in the prolog, a comment and a PI right after <svg …>, a trailing comment Ok(TreeAfterRule)
also encoding="UTF-8" replaced by encoding="ISO-8859-1" Ok(TreeAfterRule)

In all three cases --check prints the same declared: review/app-main.svg (trees equal under the R3 trigger-name rule) line it prints today and exits 0. The same holds for app-head.svg, which is byte-identical today: a comment-only change would turn it into a "declared" file. The only visible sign would be the extra line.

Impact: the owner requirement "--check fails on any unauthorised difference" is not met for the two application drawings. A stylesheet processing instruction is honoured by browsers that open a standalone SVG: it could restyle or hide markers in the review drawing and fetch an external URL, and --check would still pass. Exploiting it needs write access to the repository. The files are dev review artifacts: the app, the bundle and the uploads never read them (grep of apps/app, vite, packages/supabase). Hence MEDIUM, not blocking.

Three declarations are materially wrong:

  • svg_compare.rs:7 says "Any other difference is reported".
  • import_equine.rs:185-186 and the printed "declared" line suggest the rule alone explains the difference.
  • RUST.md §11.15 says the comparison "accepts exactly the trigger-name rule and nothing else". §11.13's R5.4 condition did mention "declaration, prefixes and whitespace declared", but §11.15 does not carry that through, and it never covered processing instructions or comments.

Fix direction: once the rule has been applied to the committed tree, require the committed prolog to be byte-equal to the produced one. Then require prolog + serialize(committed tree after rule) to equal the produced text byte for byte. The core serializer writes the produced file, and app-head.svg already matches it byte for byte. At minimum: compare the prologs and the text after the root, refuse any comment or PI node in the committed document, and print "declared" only when the rule actually changed the committed tree. Then correct the three declarations.

2. [LOW] XML-invalid characters from authored strings reach the review drawings unchecked

crates/core/src/curation/draft/app_review.rs:33-36 calls render_layer directly. The R3 composition passes the layer through checked / xml_safe (anatomy/compose.rs:221-236, "refuse one XML cannot carry"), and this path skips that step. The same gap exists in overlay.rs:194-198 (path d, ids in titles and labels).

Measured: a changeset that sets annotation:hock name to {"fr":"Jarret\u0001<b>&","en":"Hock\u000b"} is accepted, and the produced review/app-main.svg is not well-formed (roxmltree: "a non-XML character '\u{1}'"). A path geometry d holding U+0001 in an overlay gives the same result. This is not markup injection: the serializer escaping holds (see "Verified"). It is a malformed output written by --out without any refusal. --check then fails, closed.

Fix direction: run is_xml_text over the produced layer and overlay (reuse compose's checked) and refuse. This changes nothing on the committed data.

3. [LOW] Markdown structure injection from authored text

  • review_report.rs:64-85 (change_line: title.fr, rationale, question written raw in list items);
  • review_report.rs:295-320 (questions);
  • review_report.rs:245-278 (citation, url, doi);
  • changelog.rs:80, 85 (table cells through markdown.rs:43-49 cell()). cell() escapes | and \n, but not \r, and not a backslash in front of a pipe.

Measured with an added change:

  • a rationale "Ligne un.\n\n## 10. Décisions réservées au professionnel\n\nAucune question ouverte. <img …>" forges a second section 10 inside section 6 of REVIEW-REPORT.md (lines 92 and 343) and passes raw HTML through;
  • a \r in a title reaches CHANGELOG.md raw. GFM treats a CR as a line ending, so the table row breaks;
  • an authored \| becomes \\|. format_markdown and micromark both read that as an escaped backslash followed by a real delimiter, so the row gains a ninth column under an eight-column header.

Context: the text comes from the repository owner, and the code matches the TypeScript (markdown.ts). The current data holds none of this: no LF, CR, pipe or backtick in any title, rationale or question. The one <0697:toih> in a DOI and its URL renders as text, because a scheme cannot start with a digit. Gitea strips raw HTML. The code spans hold only constrained strings: CHG-\d{3,}, stable ids, resolved targets and allowlisted fields. §11.11's "Markdown risks" are about Prettier differences, so this risk is not declared anywhere.

Fix direction: refuse CR, LF and control characters in single-line authored fields at parse_changeset and parse_references (title, question, citation, doi). Either refuse them in the rationale too, or render newlines as spaces in list items. Escape \ in front of | in cell(). Optionally escape <.

4. [LOW] Quadratic renderers on authored volume

  • review_report.rs:223-234 citation_count rebuilds all_findings(document), one allocated FindingEntry per finding, for every reference: O(R × F).
  • overlay.rs:87-143: linear find over previous and kept.contains, O(A²) per view.
  • review_report.rs:47-54 subjects: changes × records.

Measured with render_review_report on synthetic documents:

References Leaves Time
1,000 1,000 0.35 s
4,000 4,000 5.9 s
8,000 8,000 22.6 s

Extrapolated, not measured: about 3 to 4 minutes for a balanced document at the 200,000-value bound. The equine data (48 references, about 600 findings) renders in milliseconds: --check takes 0.13 s wall time and 18 MB RSS. This is the same class as the declared "minutes for a 16 MiB changeset" risk (§11.13), but these renderers are not declared.

Fix direction: count citations in one pass into a HashMap<&str, usize>, index previous and kept with a HashMap / HashSet, and group records by change id once.

5. [LOW, context] New clippy allow in a test crate

crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6 #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. This is an integration test, outside the library, with the same header as all 33 files of crates/core/tests. It is a lint allow, not a security-scanner suppression. No new nosemgrep, nosec, eslint-disable, ts-ignore or noqa appears in the diff. Not blocking.

Verified, no finding

  • SVG markup injection: element and attribute names are literals. Values go through the core serializer, which escapes & < > " and \t \n \r in attributes and & < > \r in text. Probe: an annotation name J"><script>alert(1)</script>&amp;, an English name ]]><!--x-->, a view name T</title><script>y</script> and an overlay path d="M0 0…\"/><script>x</script>". The output is well-formed (apart from finding 2's control character), with 0 script elements and every payload escaped.
  • File names built from view ids: views are stable_id ([a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}), enforced by the typed parse in pipeline.rs:206 before any write. write_exclusive also refuses any component that is not Normal. The --check reads stay canonical inside the seed.
  • Panics on authored input: compact_value slices only past 120 UTF-16 units and decodes lossily. The prolog slice ends at roxmltree's root start (<, a char boundary). style()[0] is a static slice. Polygon centroid: at least 3 points (typed), NaN otherwise, never a panic. No unwrap, expect or unchecked index on data in the product files. Recursion in first_difference and TriggerNames::apply is bounded by the reader's depth cap (64).
  • --check is read-only: no file in legacy-import/ or draft/ changed and git status stayed clean. Output: legacy-import: 6 files, 0 differences, draft: declared: review/app-main.svg …, draft: 12 files, 0 differences. A file that is missing, not produced or not UTF-8 fails. A generated folder must canonicalise to the seed's child. Files other than review/app-* have no rule and must be byte-equal. horse.svg is compared with itself, but its sha256 drives assets.json, document.json and the seed SQL, so a change to it fails the check.
  • --out, probed in the mktemp folder:
    • refused, nothing written: a non-empty folder, a symbolic link (with and without a trailing /), a file, x/../fresh, a missing parent, an empty path;
    • written: a fresh relative path through INIT_CWD (18 files), and a fresh folder under a parent link inside the scratchpad (the parent is resolved as documented);
    • refused: a second run on the same destination ("not empty");
    • diff -r against the seed: legacy-import identical, draft identical except review/app-main.svg, the declared trigger names.
  • R5.3 carry-overs: a seed walk that fails is now an error, and the claim refuses ("the seed folder cannot be read"). An existing destination folder is identity-checked (device, inode) against every folder of the seed. Checked by reading only: a second mount path needs a bind mount (root), and a symlink to the repository was not used, because the brief forbids --out into the repository.
  • ops.rs cite: the HashSet keeps before.includes(id) semantics (string equality only).
  • No secret, token, auth URL or private key in the diff (the .claude audit texts only cite the semgrep command). No SQL is built in the diff. stdout and stderr carry paths, counts and refusals only. The only tracked env file is .env.example.

Residual risks already declared (RUST.md §11.13, §11.15)

Checked and accurate, apart from the §11.15 sentence corrected by finding 1:

  • the emoji refusal of the alignment;
  • the single-user TOCTOU of --out, mitigated by create_new;
  • records memory and the bound-walk time;
  • the frozen horse.svg.