238 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
238 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
```
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SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
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TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
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SCOPE: 31 files
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BLOCKING:
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(none)
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REPORTED (non-blocking):
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- [MEDIUM] unbounded-nesting-stack-overflow — crates/core/src/curation/draft/fields.rs:111
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- [MEDIUM] out-writes-not-exclusive-toctou — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:232
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- [LOW] reserved-nul-key-bypass-via-field-path — crates/core/src/curation/draft/fields.rs:83
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- [LOW] out-dotdot-and-parent-creation — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:192
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- [LOW] out-inside-seed-not-refused — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:186
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- [LOW] init-cwd-base-resolution — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:223
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- [LOW] args-non-utf8-panic — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:282
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- [LOW] core-no-io-lint-partial (pre-existing, context) — clippy.toml:4
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- [LOW] suppressions (context) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7 (new), crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:15 (pre-existing)
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PROOF: semgrep 163 rules on 31 files → 0 findings; checklist 18 checks → 9 findings (0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH, 2 MEDIUM, 7 LOW)
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```
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Security gate, fresh run, 2026-10-23. Scope: `git diff 5e114da..HEAD` (HEAD 8654905, branch
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`feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`), 31 changed files, all present. Product files read whole:
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`crates/core/src/curation/draft/*.rs` (11), `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs`,
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`crates/core/src/curation/mod.rs`, `crates/core/Cargo.toml`, `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs`,
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`packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`, `scripts/import-equine.sh`,
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`package.json`. Docs and `.claude` files grepped for secrets only.
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Semgrep's packs carry few Rust rules, so the Rust review below is manual. Two behaviours were
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confirmed by a scratch probe (a throwaway binary in the session scratchpad linking
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`faunosteo-core` with `curation`, run on the mini baseline of `oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`;
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nothing in the repository was touched). `import-equine --out` was never run: its behaviour is
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traced by reading. `import-equine --check` was run as the brief allows: `legacy-import: 6 files,
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0 differences`, `draft: 6 files, 0 differences`, 6 pending R5.4 files listed, exit 0, `git status`
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clean afterwards.
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## Checklist
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| # | Check | Result |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1 | Hardcoded secret, token, key, auth URL (diff incl. docs, `.claude`, oracle JSON) | none |
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| 2 | SQL by interpolation (`seed.rs`) | none, see note A |
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| 3 | Unsanitized render / eval | n/a (no web output; the TS test has no eval) |
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| 4 | Sensitive endpoint without authz | n/a (no endpoint; seed SQL design pre-existing) |
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| 5 | Stack trace / internal path to an end user | none (dev CLI, stderr to the developer) |
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| 6 | Secret / PII in a log | none |
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| 7 | Tracked `.env` / credential file | none in the diff (repo tracks `.env.example` only) |
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| 8 | Guardrails scanner (`api,supabase`) | 0 FAIL; 1 WARN `SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER` in `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, outside the diff, dropped (gate rule) |
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| 9 | Panics from `changes.json` / `references.json`: indexing, unwrap, byte slicing | none, see note B |
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| 10 | Unbounded recursion, depth and resource caps | MEDIUM-1 |
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| 11 | Reserved NUL-key refusal | LOW-1 |
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| 12 | `--out` claim: symlinks, trailing `/`, `.` / `..`, TOCTOU | MEDIUM-2, LOW-2, LOW-3 |
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| 13 | `INIT_CWD` | LOW-4 |
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| 14 | `--check` writes nothing | verified (run + read: no write call on that path) |
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| 15 | Generator writes outside `crates/core/tests/oracles/r5/` | none: one constant path, `curation-synthetic.json`, only under `MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1` |
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| 16 | Core has no fs / env / clock access | holds by inspection; lint partial, LOW-6 |
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| 17 | CLI argument handling | LOW-5 |
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| 18 | New suppressions (anti-gaming) | LOW-7 (context, non-blocking) |
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## Findings
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### MEDIUM-1: nesting built by ops is unbounded, a small `changes.json` aborts the tool
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- Files: `crates/core/src/curation/draft/fields.rs:83-89` (`split_field`, no segment cap) and
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`:111-126` (`write_field` creates one object per segment); first recursive walker hit
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`crates/core/src/curation/draft/records.rs:114-123` (`strip_marks`, called at
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`apply.rs:114`); same class in `records.rs:88-105` (`touch_tree`), `targets.rs:298-322`
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(`walk`), `apply.rs:129` (`doc.clone()` + `from_value`), and the recursive `Value` drop.
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- serde_json's 128-level parse limit (no `unbounded_depth` feature) caps each authored value,
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but the ops build depth past it. A `set` whose `field` is `name` followed by N `.a` segments
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creates N nested objects in one op.
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- Probe, release build (the profile `scripts/import-equine.sh` uses): N = 10,000 is refused cleanly
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(`curated document is not shape-valid: unknown field 'a'`). N = 20,000 (a ~40 KB
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`changes.json`) gives `thread 'main' has overflowed its stack`, `fatal runtime error: stack
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overflow, aborting`, exit 134. The debug build (`cargo run` without `--release`) has larger
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frames and a lower threshold.
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- The finding tree has the same problem, by analysis only (not run): repeated `add` ops (each up to
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~63 finding levels under the parse limit) or `move` chains deepen the tree without limit.
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`walk` clones the growing path for every entry, so memory grows with depth² before the stack
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overflows.
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- Impact: the process aborts where it should give a typed refusal. It still fails closed: the
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pipeline (`folders()`) runs before `claim_destination`, so no folder is created and nothing is
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written. The input is a committed, owner-authored file. Robustness of a dev tool, and a gap in
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the "depth and resource caps kept" requirement. Not exploitable beyond a crash.
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- Fix: cap `split_field` segments, refusing beyond the deepest settable path (`name.fr`,
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`count_range.min`, `geometry.cx`: 2 segments, so a cap of 4 is generous). Cap the finding tree
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depth with an iterative check after each `add` and `move`, e.g. a `MAX_FINDING_DEPTH` constant
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that refuses with the change id and op index.
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### MEDIUM-2: `--out` writes are not exclusive, so the claim can be raced
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- File: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:232-247` (`write`: `fs::create_dir_all` at :239,
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`fs::write` at :242), together with `:186-219` (`claim_destination`).
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- The claim checks the folder once: absent then `mkdir`, or existing and empty. The writes then
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use `create_dir_all`, which follows an existing symlink, and `fs::write`, which is `O_CREAT |
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O_TRUNC` and follows symlinks. Anything planted between the claim and the writes is followed or
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truncated. That could be `<out>/draft` turned into a symlink to the real seed `draft/`, or a
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file created early. The claimed path could also be swapped for a symlink before `canonicalize`
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(:218). An existing empty folder is accepted whatever its owner and mode. The cross-user vector
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is an empty, world-writable folder pre-created by another account in a shared location.
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- The doc comment at :182-185 says "created here, so nothing can appear between the check and the
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writes". That holds against a symlink at the final component (`mkdir` gives `EEXIST`), but not
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against entries created inside the folder afterwards.
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- Impact: a concurrent same-user process, or a hostile local account on a multi-user host, can
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redirect or overwrite files. On the single-user dev machine this needs an attacker who already
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has the user's rights. It is still an overstatement of the "never overwrites" guarantee the
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owner asked for, and the std-only fix is cheap.
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- Fix: create every subfolder under the root with `fs::create_dir`, never `_all` (fails on any
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existing entry and does not follow a final symlink). Write every file with
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`OpenOptions::new().write(true).create_new(true)` (`O_EXCL`: refuses an existing file or
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symlink). Optionally refuse an existing claimed folder that is not owned by the current uid or
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is group/world-writable (`std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt`). Correct the comment.
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### LOW-1: the reserved NUL-key refusal does not cover dotted `field` segments
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- Files: `crates/core/src/curation/draft/schema.rs:389-410` (`reserved_key` scans JSON object keys
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only), `fields.rs:83-89` (`split_field` accepts any non-empty segment), `records.rs:16`
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(`TOUCH_MARK = "\u{0}touched"`), `records.rs:114-123` (`strip_marks` removes that key at every
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level).
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- Probe: `{"op":"set","target":"finding:hip/hip-dysfunctions/mobility","field":"name.\u0000touched","value":"author text"}`
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is accepted. The document's `name` stays `{"fr":"mobility fr","en":"mobility en"}` and a record
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`field="name.\0touched" after="author text"` is still emitted. The authored value is dropped
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silently while the trace (the R5.4 CHANGELOG) claims the write. Any other NUL-prefixed segment,
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e.g. `name.\u0000other`, is refused by the strict shape gate. The TypeScript kept the key and
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refused at that gate.
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- No review-rule bypass: the first segment must be settable, so the mark cannot be set at item
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level. Every authored JSON key holding the mark is refused at parse.
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- Fix: refuse a `field` segment that starts with `\0` (in `split_field` or the `SetOp` parse),
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with the same "reserved key" message.
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### LOW-2: `..` is kept and resolved after symlinks, and a failed claim leaves created folders
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- File: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:192-200`.
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- Rebuilding the path from `components()` drops a trailing `/` and inner `.` components, which is
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correct: a final symlink is then refused by `symlink_metadata`, dangling links included.
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`..` is kept, though, and the kernel resolves it after any symlinked component.
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`--out link/../new` creates `<parent of link target>/new`, not the lexical `./new`.
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`--out link/..` is always refused (the parent of the target is never empty).
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- In the absent branch, `create_dir_all(parent)` runs before the final `create_dir`. A claim that
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then fails, e.g. `--out link/new/..` (`mkdir ..` gives `EEXIST`), leaves `<link target>/new`
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behind, created through the symlink, while the tool prints "nothing written".
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- Parent symlinks are followed by design (doc comment), but the resolved destination is printed
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only after the files are written.
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- Fix: refuse any `Component::ParentDir`. Create only the final component, refusing a missing
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parent, or document the parent creation. Print the canonical destination before the first
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write.
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### LOW-3: a destination inside the official seed tree is not refused
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- File: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:186-219`.
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- `--out supabase/seed/anatomical-sheets/equine/x` passes the claim, being absent, and writes
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`x/legacy-import/...` and `x/draft/...` inside the seed. Committed files are never overwritten,
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and the populated folders (`legacy-import/`, `draft/`) are refused as not empty. The owner
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requirement "never modifies the official seed automatically" holds, since this needs an
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explicitly typed path. But generated folders can land untracked in the seed, and `--check` then
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reports them as "not produced".
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- Fix: refuse when the canonical destination is under `fs::canonicalize(SEED)`, or under the
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repository root.
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### LOW-4: `INIT_CWD` and the base of a relative `--out`
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- Files: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:223-229`, `scripts/import-equine.sh:12`.
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- Any absolute `INIT_CWD` in the environment is trusted, including one inherited or left stale by
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an outer pnpm. Without pnpm, the script `cd`s to the repository root, so a relative `--out` from
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`bash scripts/import-equine.sh` resolves against the repository root, not the caller's folder.
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The doc says "else the current one". If `current_dir()` fails, the base becomes empty and the
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path stays relative to a cwd that no longer exists, which fails harmlessly. Not dangerous with
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the claim rules (new or empty folder only), but surprising.
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- Fix: print the resolved destination before claiming, and state in the doc that direct runs
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resolve from the repository root. Or refuse a relative `--out` when `INIT_CWD` is unset.
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### LOW-5: a non-UTF-8 argument panics
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- File: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:282` (`env::args()` panics on non-Unicode argv).
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Self-inflicted, CLI only, not reachable from `changes.json`.
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- Fix: `env::args_os()` and a usage error on a non-UTF-8 argument.
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### LOW-6 (pre-existing, context): the core's no-I/O guarantee is only partly lint-enforced
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- File: `clippy.toml:4-14` (not in this diff). `disallowed-methods` lists `fs::read`,
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`read_to_string`, `write`, `File::open`, `File::create`, `env::var`, `var_os` and the clocks.
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It does not list `fs::create_dir(_all)`, `remove_file`, `remove_dir(_all)`, `read_dir`,
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`rename`, `copy`, `metadata`, `symlink_metadata`, `canonicalize`, `OpenOptions::open`,
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`env::current_dir`, `env::args(_os)` or `process::Command::new`.
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- A grep of `crates/core/src/curation/` finds no `std::fs`, `std::env`, `std::process`,
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`OpenOptions` or `unsafe`, and no `allow(clippy` in the draft modules. The claim holds today by
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inspection, not by lint.
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- Fix: extend the list so a future library change cannot add file system access unnoticed.
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### LOW-7 (context): suppressions
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- New: `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7`
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`#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. This is a
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test target, the established pattern of the crate's integration tests (`anatomy_*`,
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`archive_rules`, `curation_format`, `curation_legacy` and others), and the pattern `clippy.toml`
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itself documents ("Tests ... allow these lints locally where they own I/O"). It allows a
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robustness/architecture lint, not a security scanner (`nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable
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security`), so it is not counted as an un-gated suppression.
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- Pre-existing: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:15` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]`
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(present at 5e114da, line 11).
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- No `nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `ts-ignore` or `noqa` was added in product files.
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## Notes (verified, no finding)
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A. Seed SQL (`seed.rs`). Every single-quoted value is a constant or derived from one:
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`sheet_id_for(EQUINE_SPECIES_ID, EQUINE_SHEET_VERSION)`, sha256 hex, the uuid asset id, `usize`,
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`horse.svg`, the description and the change note. Quotes are doubled, and backslashes are literal
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under `standard_conforming_strings`. Author data reaches only the dollar-quoted document literal,
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which is refused when the JSON contains `$equine_doc$`. The close cannot overlap the body's tail,
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because the body is a pretty-printed JSON object trimmed to its final `}`, so no suffix of it is a
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prefix of the tag. Ported verbatim from `seed.ts`.
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B. Panics. Library unwrap/expect are denied by workspace lints. Every index is guarded:
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`numbers[0..3]` after `len == 4`, `ids[0]`/`[1]`/`[2..]` after the `ids.len() >= 2` check for
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findings, and `split_field(..)?[0]` on a non-empty split. Byte slices cut on ASCII `:` and `/`
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(char boundaries). `Vec::insert` is bounded by `insertion_index` (checked `<= len`, `After` gives
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at most `len`). `Vec::remove` uses an index `locate` just resolved. `move` re-locates the
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destination after the removal. `u64` positions saturate and are refused by the range check.
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The only aborts found are the stack overflows of MEDIUM-1 (`panic = "abort"` in release; a stack
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overflow aborts in any profile).
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C. Strict validation. `deny_unknown_fields` on every authored struct; the `op` tag is removed
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before strict parsing of the variant. `.optional()` semantics: `null` is refused, absent is
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accepted. `CHG-\d{3,}` ids, duplicate change and reference ids, level C without a question, the
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reserved `CHG-000` and empty ops or citations are all refused. Repeated JSON keys keep the last
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value, as `JSON.parse` does. `references.json` is parsed into the strict `Reference`.
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D. `--check` only reads: `fs::read`, `read_dir`, `is_dir`. `listed` follows directory symlinks in
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the seed. A loop ends in an `ELOOP` error and a symlinked file is only compared, never printed.
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These are trusted, committed contents.
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E. The oracle generator writes only
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`crates/core/tests/oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json` (`resolve(HERE, '../../../crates/core/tests/oracles/r5')`,
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a constant), only when `MAKE_R5_ORACLES === '1'`, and otherwise just compares.
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`crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs` only reads.
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F. Secrets: none in the 31 files (diff grep for key, token, password, bearer, `service_role`, JWT,
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PEM, cloud key prefixes and `user:pass@` URLs; semgrep `p/secrets` 0). The references use example
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URLs without credentials.
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