Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every
non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no
disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing
else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a
deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256;
begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL
over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service
name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids;
backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and
the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked
before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).
Keyed parent on ureq 3 (rustls + ring, bundled roots), no async runtime:
config from the environment (secret never printed, JWT expiry logged), JSON
line logs with a field allowlist (child stderr escaped and truncated), strict
key validation before any URL, Backend trait over PostgREST RPCs and Storage
objects with closed error kinds, one job per claim with the STORAGE.md §3.4
mapping (content codes, processing_error on signals / timeout / overflow,
Broken stops the loop with exit 20, a refused commit deletes nothing), sweeper
(expire pending, purge queue, quarantine leftovers), per-stage watchdog
(exit 21), WORKER_ONCE for tests, run --check extended. 11 loop tests on a
fake backend and decoder; sandbox tests and seccomp derivation unchanged
(the child still makes the same 7 syscalls); image 11.6 MB.