The Rust pipeline is the official seed writer (pnpm import:equine); sheet-ref.json
and report-migration-map.json carry 12d78872...74e2 and the v1 block, the only two
seed files changed. 27c7383c...2660 stays a registered alias, honoured only through
LoadedSheet::recognises_historical_stamp (verified v1, recomputed document). M1: the
snapshot of an old report keeps its stamp; export, archive reader strict. Historical
oracles run in their pre-switch context; equivalence is crate-private.
canonical_json (RFC 8785), sheet_fingerprint behind feature fingerprint,
TRUSTED_ALIASES (one equine pair), equivalence and check_declared; tests against
the RFC vectors, the V8 numbers, an independent Node reference and the archives.
No consumer wired: the switch is a rehearsed patch under .claude/tasks/plans.
Core rules curation::upload (manifest, local destination, bytes through the SVG reader,
plan from observed state); binary upload-sheet-assets over ureq (handshake, no overwrite,
confirm after verify, bounded retries, key never printed); pnpm assets:upload repointed,
e2e:sheet-assets for the local stack. 4 MiB cap on changes.json and references.json.
FLOOR clarification for audit prose with its negative proof.
crates/core/src/curation/draft behind the curation feature: strict changeset and references parsing as JSON.parse + Zod, the six ops, rename cascades, the B/C review rule, the R2 shape and integrity gate, migration map, document stats, seed SQL. import-equine writes both folders; --check reproduces legacy-import/ and the R5.3 draft files byte for byte (12 files, 0 differences), --out claims an absent or empty, non-symlink destination and never deletes. Parity: 825 records, 46 changes, stats, 612 leaves 442/141/29, 58 synthetic TypeScript cases (oracle r5/curation-synthetic.json).
pdf::write: text (safe_text with the frozen V8 classes, js_upper from the O4 tables,
js_trim, measure = Σ(WX || 250 + KPX) × size / 1000 over WinAnsi bytes, wrap_lines on JS
\s), afm_data generated by scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs from O5 and O4, dates (Date.UTC years
0-99 → 19xx, fr-FR / en-US long dates), input checks (branding and labels schemas,
snapshot gate with the R3 SVG reader, sheet mismatch, page caps), the header, footer,
observation and conclusion layouts into a DrawLog (per page, footers last, links by page).
cargo: O4 55,992 widths bit-exact, 1,168 wraps, safeText over every code point, upper
1,580, O6 6,468 cells + 22; O1 12 runs 2,124 ops equal at full precision; the Step 6 text
and image goldens (24) derive from the log. ts-rs: ExportInput, ExportErrorKind,
ExportWarning, LogoSlot.
docs/development/R4_J1.md: the two LAN surfaces (dev server, production build behind the
DEPLOY CSP through serve.mjs --host on the DEV origin), the kit folder generated by
scripts/r4-j1-kit.mjs (reference PDFs, the O8 hostile corpus with expected messages,
rescue copies), twelve checks per device, what to report.
Same perimeter as the TS baseline (226 files, 3 engines, real Home page): 666/678 outcome
and message agreements, the 12 others the 4 declared files; W5 0 long tasks (TS 91 and
173 ms); 50 MiB file in WebKit 145/126 MiB against 324 with the worker read and 76 for the
TS. CSP: editor opens with the keyword, the engine message without, in 3 engines, the
worker's wasm-eval refusal reported by Chromium and Firefox. Leak series on the app:
Chromium ≤ 2 MiB per import after init, Firefox GC sawtooth reclaimed, WebKit grows with
same-tab navigations (control too) and levels off on one page; 20/20 WebKit workers closed.
Streaming into FileBytes removes the file's JavaScript copy in Chromium and Firefox
(50 MiB: 65 and 67 MiB summed growth against 56 and 79 for the TypeScript); WebKit keeps
about 180 MiB for any file read inside a worker (272 against 76), a main-thread BYOB read
feeding the worker's sink measured at 106. Corpus 666/678 on the stream path. Leak series
(3 engines × 3 documents × 3 repetitions): Chromium ≤ 0.5 MiB over the last 5, Firefox
within ±3 (idle only), WebKit copy +13 then level (12-import series −2.3). 20 dense
imports in WebKit: no worker error event.
r4-import.mjs runs the 226 baseline files and the hostile classes through a disposable
module worker calling SheetHandle.import_pdf in Chromium 156, Firefox 157 and WebKit 27.2
under the RSS watchdog (not a guaranteed limit); compare-imports.mjs prints TS vs Rust;
serve.mjs gains opt-in mounts (/r4/, /pkg/). Results 2026-10-18-r4-import.json: 666/678
agreements, the 12 others are the 4 declared files; W4 met (max 68 MiB linear); the
1 GiB ceiling traps in every engine.
69 ported rows of scan, inflate, read and the security import cases now name the O7/O9
cargo tests; r4-ledger.mjs refuses a ported cargo target absent from cargo test --list.
locate_attachment (shared 16 MiB budget, JS-path steps in the TypeScript order, OD-3 cap
hook off until measured), pdf::import, facade import_pdf with the PdfImportKind kinds
(ts-rs exported). cargo: O7 144 inputs (locate, read, archive rows) and O8 51 cases equal
to the R3 path, 3 OD-4 differences declared (lone surrogate in an overwritten duplicate
value). Node through the shipped module: the same O8 outcomes, every reference PDF.
Module 421.7 KB gzip (W1 budget 600 KB).
starts_json_object, depth and value prescan (OD-3 proxy), TextDecoder-parity lossy decode
(400-case oracle generated by scripts/r4-utf8-oracle.mjs, 0 difference), overflow → null
rewrite with the JSON number grammar, lone-surrogate neutralised probe (OD-4).
Module layout of plan §B.1.1 for the reader (read/{scan,strings,stamp,inflate,probe},
json_js), shared constants and types, index_of; feature-gated test targets; the wasm
facade enables the feature; rust-check runs the gated clippy and tests.
Playwright harness under scripts/browser: 127.0.0.1 server with the DEPLOY
CSP, export and import baselines of the TypeScript engine under a 4 GiB RSS
watchdog (not a guaranteed memory limit), O9 browser columns in
inflate.browsers.json (26 rows agree with Node in all three engines).
Results of 2026-10-18 committed; the O9 Node test no longer expects browser
columns in inflate.json.
The security gate (PASS, 0 blocking) reported LOW items: an imported
attachment's Value was copied for the wrapper and the snapshot gate (a
hostile 16 MiB attachment multiplied linear memory), and wasm-build.sh
deleted its outputs through a variable. Every JSON input is now read with
T::deserialize(&Value) (same errors, no copy); one deserialiser instead of
two also shrinks the shipped module from 1,180,281 to 1,046,498 bytes raw
(372,132 → 340,929 gzip). The two outputs are removed on their literal
paths. RUST.md records the numbers, the quarantine retention and the
base-image tag residual.
Dockerfile stage 0 (rust:1.99.0-bookworm, wasm32 target, wasm-bindgen-cli
at the builder's pinned version, cargo cache mounts) builds the shipped
module with scripts/wasm-build.sh (WASM_BUILD_SHIPPED_ONLY=1); the Node
stage copies packages/core-wasm (manifest + pkg/); the runner gzips the
module and nginx serves it with gzip_static (application/wasm, 1,180,153
bytes raw, 372,275 served). docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh runs the real
image behind the DEPLOY.md CSP in headless Chromium: with
'wasm-unsafe-eval' a report is created and a zone click is applied by the
core with no script or wasm violation; without it the editor shows the
degraded notice, stays put and leaves the draft untouched; /login,
/app/account and / never request the module (15/15 checks).
packages/core-wasm: browser-safe CoreRuntime (synchronous calls once ready;
a WebAssembly.RuntimeError poisons the instance, the call answers internal,
a fresh instance comes from the kept compiled module and a glue record
imported in advance; at most 3 recoveries per page; retry after a load
failure), SheetSession (handle rebuilt per instance generation, never
called on a dropped one; invalid_sheet without poisoning), Node source.
crates/wasm: SheetHandle (sheet held in the module memory). Two builds:
pkg/ shipped without trap exports (checked), pkg-proofs/ for the trap
tests; BUILD_STAMP (hash of the Rust sources) refused when missing or
stale by the vitest global setup instead of skipping. Failure envelope
carries a numeric found version; compact JS-number output.
Owner run: the CLI prints 'All services bind to 0.0.0.0' and ignored the
rootless daemon's default address; the gateway could not share 54321/54324
with 0.0.0.0 listeners. Now: Kong serves the API directly; the DEV gateway
serves only Mailpit with basic auth on <DEV host>:54325; ENVIRONMENTS.md §3
gives the exact UFW rules (interface-scoped deny on 54322-54324, two cases
by current UFW state), rollback and impact; dev:net-check proves the
allowed surfaces from a distinct Docker network (5/5 OK) and prints the
refusal checks to run from another device, since a rootless container's
traffic to the host is delivered locally and cannot see the LAN firewall.
LRN-053 corrects LRN-052.
The Supabase CLI publishes 54321-54324 on every interface with no bind
option. Design: the rootless daemon binds published ports on loopback by
default (~/.config/docker/daemon.json {"ip":"127.0.0.1"}, owner action,
not applied), and the DEV gateway (Compose service dev-gateway, profile
dev, container faunosteo_dev_gateway) re-publishes only the API (Kong) and
Mailpit behind HTTP basic auth on FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST; Studio and PostgreSQL
stay loopback (SSH tunnel for Studio). pnpm dev:gateway generates the Mailpit
credentials (gitignored; htpasswd 644 because the rootless container user
cannot read a 600 file, hash only). pnpm dev:net-check probes from a
throwaway container on its own Docker network: app, API health, REST 401,
Mailpit 401/200, PostgreSQL and Studio closed. Gateway proven on alternate
ports (health 200, password login 200, Mailpit 401 / 200).