Commit Graph
60 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bchanot 1550d2160a test(tests): R4.4 layout timing on L and CAP; ledger rows of the text and layout cases point at cargo 2026-10-18 21:51:40 +02:00
bchanot 70007e0c93 feat(domain): R4.4 layout to a draw log: text rules, AFM metrics, dates (O4, O5, O6) and the page layouts (O1)
pdf::write: text (safe_text with the frozen V8 classes, js_upper from the O4 tables,
js_trim, measure = Σ(WX || 250 + KPX) × size / 1000 over WinAnsi bytes, wrap_lines on JS
\s), afm_data generated by scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs from O5 and O4, dates (Date.UTC years
0-99 → 19xx, fr-FR / en-US long dates), input checks (branding and labels schemas,
snapshot gate with the R3 SVG reader, sheet mismatch, page caps), the header, footer,
observation and conclusion layouts into a DrawLog (per page, footers last, links by page).
cargo: O4 55,992 widths bit-exact, 1,168 wraps, safeText over every code point, upper
1,580, O6 6,468 cells + 22; O1 12 runs 2,124 ops equal at full precision; the Step 6 text
and image goldens (24) derive from the log. ts-rs: ExportInput, ExportErrorKind,
ExportWarning, LogoSlot.
2026-10-18 21:47:40 +02:00
bchanot 71bcb742c9 feat(domain): R4.4 scaffold of the pdf writer module (feature pdf-write, text contract, test targets) 2026-10-18 21:31:10 +02:00
bchanot 8ddf185aa6 fix(app): import worker hardenings from the security gate; restore_copy size cap in the core
Page messages validated by field (size and chunk length as safe byte counts, length within
the buffer); the task post wrapped so a refused clone leaves no orphan worker; a second
ready ignored; the 16 MiB copy cap enforced in facade::restore_copy as well as in the
worker (the uncommitted part of R4.3a). Gate verdict PASS, 7 LOW.
2026-10-18 19:07:06 +02:00
bchanot 52471dbbc0 feat(domain): R4.3a FileBytes sink and the bytes entries of the wasm facade
FileBytes gathers a file chunk by chunk in linear memory (capacity reserved from the
announced size, refused above the PDF cap); SheetHandle.import_pdf_bytes and
restore_copy_bytes consume it, so the worker streams file.stream() and the file lives
once, never as a JavaScript ArrayBuffer nor as a JSON-wrapped string. restore_copy:
strict UTF-8, one BOM, the OD-3 budget, draft.restore's kinds. Node: same envelopes as
import_pdf on the 51 O8 cases; rescue-copy parity with draft.restore.
2026-10-18 17:45:39 +02:00
bchanot cad485b13c test(tests): fix the pinned value count past the depth cap (65 + 1000 + 65); doc comment 2026-10-18 16:35:54 +02:00
bchanot 593893a7c2 fix(domain): OD-3 value count runs past the depth cap; the rescue-copy guard covers the archive text
Security gate finding (R4.2): prescan stopped counting once the depth exceeded 64, so a
16 MiB rescue copy nested 65 deep passed the value budget with 66 values and built its
792 MiB tree. The count now runs to the end (the depth verdict unchanged, the PDF probe
unchanged); the class is in the budget suite (48 MiB, refused) and pinned in cargo.
2026-10-18 16:28:32 +02:00
bchanot 2661a68b16 test(tests): R4.2 seeded mutation robustness of the PDF reader (no panic on content) 2026-10-18 16:17:36 +02:00
bchanot ebcae06ac1 test(tests): R4.2 ledger: reader rows point at their cargo tests, census checks they exist
69 ported rows of scan, inflate, read and the security import cases now name the O7/O9
cargo tests; r4-ledger.mjs refuses a ported cargo target absent from cargo test --list.
2026-10-18 16:14:10 +02:00
bchanot 6ee04c96c5 feat(domain): R4.2e OD-3 value cap (400,000), rescue-copy guard, 1 GiB linear ceiling, budget measurements
json_js::MAX_JSON_VALUES from the R4.2e measurements (CAP envelope 39,652 values, 612-leaf
export 23,803; ~100 B of tree per value, a 16 MiB dense document 784 MiB with the cap off,
16 MiB with it); draft.restore refuses an over-budget copy as invalid; --max-memory 1 GiB
proven to trap on the proofs build; cargo pdf_budget prints the value table, the Node
budget suite prints the per-class cost (fresh instance, W4 asserted).
2026-10-18 16:06:36 +02:00
bchanot f8579bc19a feat(domain): R4.2d attachment probe, import_pdf and SheetHandle.import_pdf on the wasm facade
locate_attachment (shared 16 MiB budget, JS-path steps in the TypeScript order, OD-3 cap
hook off until measured), pdf::import, facade import_pdf with the PdfImportKind kinds
(ts-rs exported). cargo: O7 144 inputs (locate, read, archive rows) and O8 51 cases equal
to the R3 path, 3 OD-4 differences declared (lone surrogate in an overwritten duplicate
value). Node through the shipped module: the same O8 outcomes, every reference PDF.
Module 421.7 KB gzip (W1 budget 600 KB).
2026-10-18 15:55:46 +02:00
bchanot 9850a8341a feat(domain): R4.2c json_js: JS-path side effects of the attachment probe
starts_json_object, depth and value prescan (OD-3 proxy), TextDecoder-parity lossy decode
(400-case oracle generated by scripts/r4-utf8-oracle.mjs, 0 difference), overflow → null
rewrite with the JSON number grammar, lone-surrogate neutralised probe (OD-4).
2026-10-18 15:44:54 +02:00
bchanot 55819fbd32 feat(domain): R4.2b inflate_flate on miniz_oxide with DecompressionStream verdicts (O9 26/26)
Non-wrapping output buffer growing to limit + 1, trailing bytes refused, Adler-32 checked;
12 flate rows of O7 and the browser columns agree.
2026-10-18 15:44:53 +02:00
bchanot a3fc44fd3a feat(domain): R4.2a pdf::read scan, strings and stamp (port of scan.ts, JS regex semantics explicit)
find_embedded_files, decode_pdf_string, has_archive_stamp on the frozen O7 oracle: 144 PDF
inputs, 178 candidates, 19 string rows, all equal to the TypeScript.
2026-10-18 15:44:52 +02:00
bchanot 09ce18b6dc test(tests): R4 oracle plumbing for the cargo reader suites (inputs, generators, sha256) 2026-10-18 15:32:37 +02:00
bchanot 21d34fb9a7 feat(domain): R4.2 scaffold of the pdf reader module (feature pdf-read, miniz_oxide)
Module layout of plan §B.1.1 for the reader (read/{scan,strings,stamp,inflate,probe},
json_js), shared constants and types, index_of; feature-gated test targets; the wasm
facade enables the feature; rust-check runs the gated clippy and tests.
2026-10-18 15:29:58 +02:00
bchanot 4439fd2420 test(tests): R4.1e browser harness and TS baselines (Chromium, Firefox, WebKit)
Playwright harness under scripts/browser: 127.0.0.1 server with the DEPLOY
CSP, export and import baselines of the TypeScript engine under a 4 GiB RSS
watchdog (not a guaranteed memory limit), O9 browser columns in
inflate.browsers.json (26 rows agree with Node in all three engines).
Results of 2026-10-18 committed; the O9 Node test no longer expects browser
columns in inflate.json.
2026-10-18 15:05:28 +02:00
bchanot 4bdfda59ba test(tests): R4.1f O10 report:compare outputs and the R4 test ledger (299 cases) 2026-10-18 06:00:34 +02:00
bchanot 516342beca test(tests): R4.1c text, AFM, dates and PNG oracles (O4, O5, O6) 2026-10-18 05:37:18 +02:00
bchanot 96df15edae test(tests): R4.1d O7 reader outcomes (155 inputs, regex-semantics rows) and O9 inflate verdicts (Node) 2026-10-18 05:35:12 +02:00
bchanot 7a4297933d test(tests): R4.1d O8 differential tolerance corpus on the full R3 import path (51 cases) 2026-10-18 05:21:10 +02:00
bchanot 6882c6da4a feat(anatomy): an unnamed trigger carries the opened view's name per language 2026-10-15 01:00:44 +02:00
bchanot 23895b9351 fix(anatomy): url() locality skips CSS whitespace only (security audit R3 pass 2) 2026-10-15 00:40:30 +02:00
bchanot 157c854ed1 fix(anatomy): prescan closers searched after their opener; ASCII-only href trim; root painting attributes removed (security audit R3) 2026-10-15 00:25:43 +02:00
bchanot 43a370aed1 feat(anatomy): text and output caps, hostile corpus through the shipped wasm within budgets; SheetSession poisons on non-closed throws 2026-10-14 23:55:22 +02:00
bchanot 842797b440 feat(anatomy): view.canvas op on the loaded sheet; drawings read once at load 2026-10-14 23:51:45 +02:00
bchanot 1ec9316a73 feat(anatomy): canvas and highlight composition in Rust (O1 + O3 tree-equal) 2026-10-14 23:50:14 +02:00
bchanot 67d9af3f79 feat(anatomy): annotation layer in Rust (O2 exact, attribute order kept) 2026-10-14 23:48:07 +02:00
bchanot ab41084a36 test(anatomy): clippy collapse in the sanitiser oracle test 2026-10-14 23:46:17 +02:00
bchanot 85c2183791 feat(anatomy): Rust SVG reader: tree, allowlist sanitiser, reference graph, serialiser (O4/O5 green) 2026-10-14 23:46:10 +02:00
bchanot a7b3d7a4c1 feat(anatomy): prescan caps attributes, namespace declarations and raw markup counts 2026-10-14 23:38:54 +02:00
bchanot e3168215f7 test(pdf): R3 O4 corpus edge cases (Number() values, namespaces, BOM, refused subtrees); roxmltree dependency 2026-10-14 23:34:34 +02:00
bchanot 5f53aaa222 feat(anatomy): bounded SVG markup prescan before any parser (R3) 2026-10-14 23:32:50 +02:00
bchanot b440a2f3fa test(pdf): R3 freeze O4/O5 sanitiser verdicts on the hostile corpus and the product SVGs 2026-10-14 23:30:56 +02:00
bchanot d1aa35e97c test(pdf): R3 freeze O3 highlighted compositions as trees 2026-10-14 23:29:05 +02:00
bchanot 969b872b98 test(anatomy): R3 freeze O2 layer trees with attribute order 2026-10-14 23:27:46 +02:00
bchanot 20d03cf7fd fix(domain): refuse lone UTF-16 surrogates instead of replacing them (L1)
serde_json already refuses a lone surrogate escape; the U+FFFD pre-pass
is gone and parse_json classifies the refusal (strict escape scan, on
failure only) so callers name it: closed kind lone_surrogate from
operation inputs, sheet.check, draft.restore and archive.import.
Oracles untouched: the two L1 cases and the Zod verdict now assert that
TypeScript kept the surrogate and Rust refuses the text.
2026-10-14 21:49:28 +02:00
bchanot 36316cf67f fix(domain): sheet.check reads its document without an intermediate copy; RUST.md states the copy behaviour exactly
Second security pass on e49009e: PASS with two LOW items, both applied.
Module 1,044,559 B raw / 340,154 B gzip; core 135, core-wasm 25, app 313.
2026-10-14 01:07:17 +02:00
bchanot e49009e363 fix(domain): security audit follow-ups — deserialise JSON by reference, literal delete paths in the wasm build
The security gate (PASS, 0 blocking) reported LOW items: an imported
attachment's Value was copied for the wrapper and the snapshot gate (a
hostile 16 MiB attachment multiplied linear memory), and wasm-build.sh
deleted its outputs through a variable. Every JSON input is now read with
T::deserialize(&Value) (same errors, no copy); one deserialiser instead of
two also shrinks the shipped module from 1,180,281 to 1,046,498 bytes raw
(372,132 → 340,929 gzip). The two outputs are removed on their literal
paths. RUST.md records the numbers, the quarantine retention and the
base-image tag residual.
2026-10-14 01:02:30 +02:00
bchanot 21906c4358 feat(domain): R2.2 report migration, rebase, sheet snapshot and layered archive reading in Rust; draft restore and archive import operations
migrateReportV2ToV3 / readReportDocument (version read on the raw value,
JS truthiness kept, a malformed mapped path still fails the read),
rebaseReportOnSheet (??= labels, archived names first-match),
buildSheetSnapshot / assertSnapshot (raw depth, shape, caps in UTF-16 and
UTF-8, integrity), readArchiveDocument (layered: report first, wrapper,
snapshot gate, sheet invariant, unsupported_envelope origin quirk).
Checked against 84 cases frozen from the TypeScript and 765 Zod verdicts
(one declared difference: L1, a lone surrogate reads as U+FFFD), the
ported report and archive suites and the 612 legacy leaves. Facade:
draft.restore (content kinds invalid / unsupported_version, rebase_failed
never a content kind), archive.import (incompatible_version with found,
no_attachment), archive.snapshot.
2026-10-14 00:28:02 +02:00
bchanot 6c0533c1da feat(workspace): R2 facade operations for the editor rules, the publish check and the sheet index data
Free ops: sheet.check, report.new, report.add_observation,
report.remove_observation, report.move_observation, vertebra.select.
Sheet ops: index_data, zone.click, zone.add_sides, zone.remove_at,
vertebra.initial, vertebra.sync, finding.toggle. Input contracts exported
to TypeScript; a JavaScript index that names no position removes nothing
in the filters and is refused by the move (the TypeScript swap would have
written a hole). Shipped module 999 KB raw, 319 KB gzip (budget 600 KB).
2026-10-14 00:19:20 +02:00
bchanot 3639c8778e feat(domain): R2.3 editor rules in Rust — zone click chain, reducers, finding toggle, vertebra selection, report operations
zoneInteraction (decision + reducers, collectVertebrae concatenated-key
dedup, syncVertebrae Map order), FindingsTreePicker.toggleLeaf (clicked
leaf by position, parents first-wins), VertebraPicker toggle/all/none and
the store's newReport/add/remove/move, checked against 49 cases frozen
from the TypeScript (41 byte-equal, 8 equal up to key order: contract
order replaces insertion order, D-R11) and the 13-case service suite.
Typed error kinds where the TypeScript would throw or corrupt a list.
2026-10-14 00:17:22 +02:00
bchanot 0c47d0f837 feat(domain): R2.2 sheet integrity rules, publish check, SheetIndexData and SQL conformance in Rust
The 21 rules of validateSheetDocument ported with identical codes,
severities, paths and messages (frozen from the TypeScript on 26
conformance fixtures), createEmptySheetDocument, the publish check
(strict shape then rules), and the index data React reads once (positions
with Map semantics, names, spine ids, finding-path keys). The fixtures
also carry the codes private.sheet_document_issues returns: a cargo test
generates supabase/tests/011_sheet_conformance.sql and refuses drift
(PGlite 12/12 files, real stack 446/446). .prettierignore keeps the
byte-exact oracles and generated fixtures out of pnpm format.
2026-10-14 00:17:21 +02:00
bchanot 343d6f4c1f feat(workspace): R2.4 core runtime — lazy load, poison on trap, offline re-instantiation, per-generation sheet handles
packages/core-wasm: browser-safe CoreRuntime (synchronous calls once ready;
a WebAssembly.RuntimeError poisons the instance, the call answers internal,
a fresh instance comes from the kept compiled module and a glue record
imported in advance; at most 3 recoveries per page; retry after a load
failure), SheetSession (handle rebuilt per instance generation, never
called on a dropped one; invalid_sheet without poisoning), Node source.
crates/wasm: SheetHandle (sheet held in the module memory). Two builds:
pkg/ shipped without trap exports (checked), pkg-proofs/ for the trap
tests; BUILD_STAMP (hash of the Rust sources) refused when missing or
stale by the vitest global setup instead of skipping. Failure envelope
carries a numeric found version; compact JS-number output.
2026-10-14 00:12:04 +02:00
bchanot 22fea8736d feat(domain): Rust sheet index and loaded sheet (bundle payload → document, migration map, positions)
Lookups follow the TypeScript index: by-id maps keep the last duplicate as
new Map does, spine annotations and finding paths take the first match as
Array.find does; a document without a main view cannot be indexed.
2026-10-14 00:05:26 +02:00
bchanot ee0700887f feat(domain): R2.1 Rust contracts of the sheet, report and archive documents
Sheet document v2, report v3 / v2 / identity, migration map, sheet snapshot,
branding, PDF labels and archive envelope ported from the Zod schemas with
their exact semantics: strict objects where Zod is strict, optional fields
absent (never null), nullable fields required, integers as JavaScript
numbers, UTF-16 caps, hand-checked patterns, url crate for .url(), lone
surrogate escapes read as U+FFFD (L1, owner confirmation pending).
Fields in Zod schema order (PDF labels in the engine dictionary order):
the curated and legacy sheets, the demo report and the three frozen
archive envelopes print byte for byte as their Zod / attachment form.
ts-rs types regenerated; plan rev 2 after three plan challenges.
2026-10-14 00:04:01 +02:00
bchanot 273914d825 fix(supabase): ceiling measured on bytes present in the bucket plus pending claims without bytes; confirm fails closed on an unsized object; cleartext host must start with a letter
Third audit (BLOCK 1): counting terminal rows while queued let begin spam
pin the ceiling with declared sizes. The ceiling now sums storage.objects
sizes of the bucket (whatever the row's state) plus the declared size of
pending_upload rows whose quarantine object has not landed: a claim dies
with its row, a present object counts whatever its row says, no full scan of
the assets history. confirm_asset_upload treats an object without a size as
upload_missing. pgTAP (plan 138): rejected rows without bytes weigh nothing,
pending claims fill, superseded claims vanish, present bytes fill, unsized
object refused. Worker: a single-label cleartext host must start with an
ASCII letter (0X… hex forms refused, test added); STORAGE.md names the
native-run search-domain residual.
2026-10-13 20:07:22 +02:00
bchanot c386a08b0b fix(supabase): second security pass — ceiling counts queued purges, confirm refuses more than declared, upload predicate needs an active account; worker cleartext host check strict
Re-audit findings: the ceiling now also counts terminal rows whose keys still
wait in the purge queue (contract wording kept honest, residual named);
confirm_asset_upload refuses an object larger than the declared size;
can_upload_avatar_object joins profiles.active; pgTAP covers the null
sha256 guard on a live lease, the three service_role revocations, the
queued-purge accounting and the deactivated-account upload (plan 137).
Worker: cleartext http only for localhost, a dotted-quad loopback address or
a non-numeric single-label name (numeric and hex hosts refused, tests added).
2026-10-13 19:58:54 +02:00
bchanot cd2dbb3b79 fix(supabase): security pass on the files foundation — ceiling counts live bytes only, confirm checks the account, null sha256 refused, browser RPCs one role; worker: cleartext only on loopback or a service name, no env proxy, key ownership cross-check, no library text in logs
Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every
non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no
disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing
else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a
deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256;
begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL
over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service
name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids;
backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and
the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked
before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).
2026-10-13 19:49:58 +02:00
bchanot 0c6053c174 feat(workspace): real-stack avatar e2e, compose worker service, STORAGE.md contract
packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts (pnpm e2e:avatar through
scripts/avatar-e2e.sh: worker container on the Supabase network, 5 s sweep,
no quarantine grace; a fresh account per run): clean upload and owner-only
download (Bob, anon, quarantine key, direct final-key write refused),
replacement purged after the grace (queue clock shifted through psql), late
bytes through a still-valid signed upload URL swept, hostile and corrupted
uploads rejected with closed codes, removal with the purge queue drained.
Worker: the Storage API answers a missing object with HTTP 400 and
statusCode 404; normalised to 404 so a purge of a never-written key is acked.
docker-compose.yml: service worker under the worker profile (read-only,
cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, 512m, 1 cpu, 64 pids, .env.worker, external
Supabase network). docs/development/STORAGE.md: the implementation contract.
2026-10-13 19:39:51 +02:00