pdf::write: text (safe_text with the frozen V8 classes, js_upper from the O4 tables,
js_trim, measure = Σ(WX || 250 + KPX) × size / 1000 over WinAnsi bytes, wrap_lines on JS
\s), afm_data generated by scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs from O5 and O4, dates (Date.UTC years
0-99 → 19xx, fr-FR / en-US long dates), input checks (branding and labels schemas,
snapshot gate with the R3 SVG reader, sheet mismatch, page caps), the header, footer,
observation and conclusion layouts into a DrawLog (per page, footers last, links by page).
cargo: O4 55,992 widths bit-exact, 1,168 wraps, safeText over every code point, upper
1,580, O6 6,468 cells + 22; O1 12 runs 2,124 ops equal at full precision; the Step 6 text
and image goldens (24) derive from the log. ts-rs: ExportInput, ExportErrorKind,
ExportWarning, LogoSlot.
Page messages validated by field (size and chunk length as safe byte counts, length within
the buffer); the task post wrapped so a refused clone leaves no orphan worker; a second
ready ignored; the 16 MiB copy cap enforced in facade::restore_copy as well as in the
worker (the uncommitted part of R4.3a). Gate verdict PASS, 7 LOW.
FileBytes gathers a file chunk by chunk in linear memory (capacity reserved from the
announced size, refused above the PDF cap); SheetHandle.import_pdf_bytes and
restore_copy_bytes consume it, so the worker streams file.stream() and the file lives
once, never as a JavaScript ArrayBuffer nor as a JSON-wrapped string. restore_copy:
strict UTF-8, one BOM, the OD-3 budget, draft.restore's kinds. Node: same envelopes as
import_pdf on the 51 O8 cases; rescue-copy parity with draft.restore.
Security gate finding (R4.2): prescan stopped counting once the depth exceeded 64, so a
16 MiB rescue copy nested 65 deep passed the value budget with 66 values and built its
792 MiB tree. The count now runs to the end (the depth verdict unchanged, the PDF probe
unchanged); the class is in the budget suite (48 MiB, refused) and pinned in cargo.
69 ported rows of scan, inflate, read and the security import cases now name the O7/O9
cargo tests; r4-ledger.mjs refuses a ported cargo target absent from cargo test --list.
json_js::MAX_JSON_VALUES from the R4.2e measurements (CAP envelope 39,652 values, 612-leaf
export 23,803; ~100 B of tree per value, a 16 MiB dense document 784 MiB with the cap off,
16 MiB with it); draft.restore refuses an over-budget copy as invalid; --max-memory 1 GiB
proven to trap on the proofs build; cargo pdf_budget prints the value table, the Node
budget suite prints the per-class cost (fresh instance, W4 asserted).
locate_attachment (shared 16 MiB budget, JS-path steps in the TypeScript order, OD-3 cap
hook off until measured), pdf::import, facade import_pdf with the PdfImportKind kinds
(ts-rs exported). cargo: O7 144 inputs (locate, read, archive rows) and O8 51 cases equal
to the R3 path, 3 OD-4 differences declared (lone surrogate in an overwritten duplicate
value). Node through the shipped module: the same O8 outcomes, every reference PDF.
Module 421.7 KB gzip (W1 budget 600 KB).
starts_json_object, depth and value prescan (OD-3 proxy), TextDecoder-parity lossy decode
(400-case oracle generated by scripts/r4-utf8-oracle.mjs, 0 difference), overflow → null
rewrite with the JSON number grammar, lone-surrogate neutralised probe (OD-4).
find_embedded_files, decode_pdf_string, has_archive_stamp on the frozen O7 oracle: 144 PDF
inputs, 178 candidates, 19 string rows, all equal to the TypeScript.
Module layout of plan §B.1.1 for the reader (read/{scan,strings,stamp,inflate,probe},
json_js), shared constants and types, index_of; feature-gated test targets; the wasm
facade enables the feature; rust-check runs the gated clippy and tests.
Playwright harness under scripts/browser: 127.0.0.1 server with the DEPLOY
CSP, export and import baselines of the TypeScript engine under a 4 GiB RSS
watchdog (not a guaranteed memory limit), O9 browser columns in
inflate.browsers.json (26 rows agree with Node in all three engines).
Results of 2026-10-18 committed; the O9 Node test no longer expects browser
columns in inflate.json.
serde_json already refuses a lone surrogate escape; the U+FFFD pre-pass
is gone and parse_json classifies the refusal (strict escape scan, on
failure only) so callers name it: closed kind lone_surrogate from
operation inputs, sheet.check, draft.restore and archive.import.
Oracles untouched: the two L1 cases and the Zod verdict now assert that
TypeScript kept the surrogate and Rust refuses the text.
The security gate (PASS, 0 blocking) reported LOW items: an imported
attachment's Value was copied for the wrapper and the snapshot gate (a
hostile 16 MiB attachment multiplied linear memory), and wasm-build.sh
deleted its outputs through a variable. Every JSON input is now read with
T::deserialize(&Value) (same errors, no copy); one deserialiser instead of
two also shrinks the shipped module from 1,180,281 to 1,046,498 bytes raw
(372,132 → 340,929 gzip). The two outputs are removed on their literal
paths. RUST.md records the numbers, the quarantine retention and the
base-image tag residual.
migrateReportV2ToV3 / readReportDocument (version read on the raw value,
JS truthiness kept, a malformed mapped path still fails the read),
rebaseReportOnSheet (??= labels, archived names first-match),
buildSheetSnapshot / assertSnapshot (raw depth, shape, caps in UTF-16 and
UTF-8, integrity), readArchiveDocument (layered: report first, wrapper,
snapshot gate, sheet invariant, unsupported_envelope origin quirk).
Checked against 84 cases frozen from the TypeScript and 765 Zod verdicts
(one declared difference: L1, a lone surrogate reads as U+FFFD), the
ported report and archive suites and the 612 legacy leaves. Facade:
draft.restore (content kinds invalid / unsupported_version, rebase_failed
never a content kind), archive.import (incompatible_version with found,
no_attachment), archive.snapshot.
Free ops: sheet.check, report.new, report.add_observation,
report.remove_observation, report.move_observation, vertebra.select.
Sheet ops: index_data, zone.click, zone.add_sides, zone.remove_at,
vertebra.initial, vertebra.sync, finding.toggle. Input contracts exported
to TypeScript; a JavaScript index that names no position removes nothing
in the filters and is refused by the move (the TypeScript swap would have
written a hole). Shipped module 999 KB raw, 319 KB gzip (budget 600 KB).
zoneInteraction (decision + reducers, collectVertebrae concatenated-key
dedup, syncVertebrae Map order), FindingsTreePicker.toggleLeaf (clicked
leaf by position, parents first-wins), VertebraPicker toggle/all/none and
the store's newReport/add/remove/move, checked against 49 cases frozen
from the TypeScript (41 byte-equal, 8 equal up to key order: contract
order replaces insertion order, D-R11) and the 13-case service suite.
Typed error kinds where the TypeScript would throw or corrupt a list.
The 21 rules of validateSheetDocument ported with identical codes,
severities, paths and messages (frozen from the TypeScript on 26
conformance fixtures), createEmptySheetDocument, the publish check
(strict shape then rules), and the index data React reads once (positions
with Map semantics, names, spine ids, finding-path keys). The fixtures
also carry the codes private.sheet_document_issues returns: a cargo test
generates supabase/tests/011_sheet_conformance.sql and refuses drift
(PGlite 12/12 files, real stack 446/446). .prettierignore keeps the
byte-exact oracles and generated fixtures out of pnpm format.
packages/core-wasm: browser-safe CoreRuntime (synchronous calls once ready;
a WebAssembly.RuntimeError poisons the instance, the call answers internal,
a fresh instance comes from the kept compiled module and a glue record
imported in advance; at most 3 recoveries per page; retry after a load
failure), SheetSession (handle rebuilt per instance generation, never
called on a dropped one; invalid_sheet without poisoning), Node source.
crates/wasm: SheetHandle (sheet held in the module memory). Two builds:
pkg/ shipped without trap exports (checked), pkg-proofs/ for the trap
tests; BUILD_STAMP (hash of the Rust sources) refused when missing or
stale by the vitest global setup instead of skipping. Failure envelope
carries a numeric found version; compact JS-number output.
Lookups follow the TypeScript index: by-id maps keep the last duplicate as
new Map does, spine annotations and finding paths take the first match as
Array.find does; a document without a main view cannot be indexed.
Sheet document v2, report v3 / v2 / identity, migration map, sheet snapshot,
branding, PDF labels and archive envelope ported from the Zod schemas with
their exact semantics: strict objects where Zod is strict, optional fields
absent (never null), nullable fields required, integers as JavaScript
numbers, UTF-16 caps, hand-checked patterns, url crate for .url(), lone
surrogate escapes read as U+FFFD (L1, owner confirmation pending).
Fields in Zod schema order (PDF labels in the engine dictionary order):
the curated and legacy sheets, the demo report and the three frozen
archive envelopes print byte for byte as their Zod / attachment form.
ts-rs types regenerated; plan rev 2 after three plan challenges.
Third audit (BLOCK 1): counting terminal rows while queued let begin spam
pin the ceiling with declared sizes. The ceiling now sums storage.objects
sizes of the bucket (whatever the row's state) plus the declared size of
pending_upload rows whose quarantine object has not landed: a claim dies
with its row, a present object counts whatever its row says, no full scan of
the assets history. confirm_asset_upload treats an object without a size as
upload_missing. pgTAP (plan 138): rejected rows without bytes weigh nothing,
pending claims fill, superseded claims vanish, present bytes fill, unsized
object refused. Worker: a single-label cleartext host must start with an
ASCII letter (0X… hex forms refused, test added); STORAGE.md names the
native-run search-domain residual.
Re-audit findings: the ceiling now also counts terminal rows whose keys still
wait in the purge queue (contract wording kept honest, residual named);
confirm_asset_upload refuses an object larger than the declared size;
can_upload_avatar_object joins profiles.active; pgTAP covers the null
sha256 guard on a live lease, the three service_role revocations, the
queued-purge accounting and the deactivated-account upload (plan 137).
Worker: cleartext http only for localhost, a dotted-quad loopback address or
a non-numeric single-label name (numeric and hex hosts refused, tests added).
Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every
non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no
disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing
else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a
deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256;
begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL
over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service
name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids;
backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and
the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked
before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).
packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts (pnpm e2e:avatar through
scripts/avatar-e2e.sh: worker container on the Supabase network, 5 s sweep,
no quarantine grace; a fresh account per run): clean upload and owner-only
download (Bob, anon, quarantine key, direct final-key write refused),
replacement purged after the grace (queue clock shifted through psql), late
bytes through a still-valid signed upload URL swept, hostile and corrupted
uploads rejected with closed codes, removal with the purge queue drained.
Worker: the Storage API answers a missing object with HTTP 400 and
statusCode 404; normalised to 404 so a purge of a never-written key is acked.
docker-compose.yml: service worker under the worker profile (read-only,
cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, 512m, 1 cpu, 64 pids, .env.worker, external
Supabase network). docs/development/STORAGE.md: the implementation contract.