Re-audit findings: the ceiling now also counts terminal rows whose keys still
wait in the purge queue (contract wording kept honest, residual named);
confirm_asset_upload refuses an object larger than the declared size;
can_upload_avatar_object joins profiles.active; pgTAP covers the null
sha256 guard on a live lease, the three service_role revocations, the
queued-purge accounting and the deactivated-account upload (plan 137).
Worker: cleartext http only for localhost, a dotted-quad loopback address or
a non-numeric single-label name (numeric and hex hosts refused, tests added).
Security audit (PASS, 2 MEDIUM + LOW): the global ceiling summed every
non-deleted row, so rejected uploads ratcheted it toward storage_full with no
disk used → in-flight rows by declared size, clean rows by byte_size, nothing
else (pgTAP: rejected rows do not count, in-flight rows do); confirm refuses a
deactivated account like begin; complete_avatar_job refuses a null sha256;
begin / confirm / remove granted to authenticated only. Worker: SUPABASE_URL
over http:// accepted only for loopback or a single-label Docker service
name; ureq proxy(None); the job's keys must embed its owner and asset ids;
backend_failure / claim_failed / sweep_failure lines carry the closed kind and
the HTTP status, never the library's error text. e2e: uuid shape checked
before the psql query. Contract revision 2 (oracle fixes).