docs(docs): R4.11 dependency maintenance: RUST.md §10.13 table and TLS proof, CHANGELOG, contract, previous contract's redaction rule made generic, TODO
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@@ -2387,3 +2387,52 @@ showed.
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- Safari iOS stays NON TESTÉ until the owner reports results from the real
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iPhone. A simulator never stands for it and is never a memory proof;
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nothing is reported PASS for it in the meantime.
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### 10.13 R4.11: dependency maintenance before the R4 merge (2026-10-21)
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Owner's ask: three advisories reported by the R4.10 checks, verified and
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updated where the affected versions were present, minimal updates, one
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commit each, no architecture change, no exclusion to silence an alert.
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| Advisory | Component, path | Before | After | Audit | Residual |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0382, rustls-webpki: certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates | the worker's HTTPS client only (`ureq 3.4.2` → `rustls 0.23.46` → `rustls-webpki`); the core and the wasm crate have no TLS | 0.103.15 | 0.103.16 (7a7b71c, `Cargo.lock` only) | `cargo deny check advisories` ok; `tests/tls.rs` below | the worker talks to one managed Supabase origin over HTTPS; the advisory concerned a chain built through a distrusted intermediate, which only an attacker in the network path could present |
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| RUSTSEC-2026-0381, webpki-roots: bundled roots allow trust in distrusted emSign intermediates | same path (`ureq` → `webpki-roots`, the worker's trust store, no system store in the distroless image) | 1.0.9 | 1.0.10 (7a7b71c) | same | same; the store is bundled at build time, so a future root change needs a rebuild of the worker image |
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| GHSA-wrjc-x8rr-h8h6, react-router: open redirect via backslash in `<Link>` and `useNavigate` (moderate) | the application (`react-router-dom` → `react-router`), BrowserRouter SPA | 7.15.1 | 7.18.4 (c9dab63, `^7.18.4` in `apps/app/package.json`) | `pnpm audit --prod`: no known vulnerability; app suite 59 files / 429 cases, the routing, guard, auth and redirect suites among them | the only destination from untrusted data is the `next` query value, rebuilt by `safeNextPath` from a URL parsed against a sentinel origin (`/\host` and `//host` fall back): not reachable before the update either; every other `to` is a literal |
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| GHSA-chx6-hx7r-mcp5, react-router: unauthenticated DoS via inefficient route matching (high) | same | 7.15.1 | 7.18.4 | same | server-side route matching; the application matches in the visitor's own tab, no server runs the router |
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| GHSA-qwww-vcr4-c8h2 (RSC CSRF, high), GHSA-h8fp-f39c-q6mh (RSC error handler XSS), GHSA-337j-9hxr-rhxg (SSR hydration constructor injection) | same | 7.15.1 | 7.18.4 | same | RSC and SSR modes: the application uses neither (no loader, action, server or hydration) |
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React Router 7.16 to 7.18.4 are patch-level releases for this application
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(the 7.x changelog: framework-mode and data-mode fixes, precomputed route
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matchers, URL normalisation); no API the application calls changed, the
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typecheck and the suites pass unchanged, and the shipped module bytes are
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the same (1,535,289 B raw, 519,795 B gzip: the lockfile change touches no
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wasm input).
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TLS proof (`crates/worker/tests/tls.rs`, a604c07): an in-process rustls
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server presents a self-signed certificate for 127.0.0.1; the `HttpBackend`
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built from `https://127.0.0.1:<port>` must answer `Network` naming the
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certificate, the service key must not appear in the message, and the server
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must see the connection dropped during the handshake, never a request.
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Negative run: with `disable_verification(true)` on the agent (a temporary
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edit of `http.rs`, reverted) the server answers `[]` and the call succeeds,
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so the test fails as it should. The proof covers validation being active on
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the worker's client with its bundled store, not the emSign distrust itself
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(that would need the distrusted chain). Dev-dependencies added for it:
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`rustls` (already in the tree through ureq, same features) and `rcgen`
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0.14.10 (the rustls project's generator, `ring` provider, no `pem`): the
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test build adds `rcgen`, `time` and `yasna`; the lockfile also lists
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rcgen's optional `x509-parser` family, not compiled. The test runs natively
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in `rust:check` and in the worker image's musl `test` stage.
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Checks on a604c07: `pnpm rust:check` green (fmt, clippy, tests, ts-rs,
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`cargo deny check licenses bans sources`); `cargo deny check advisories`
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ok (it was failing on the two RUSTSEC ids); `pnpm audit --prod`: no known
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vulnerability (the dev-only `tinypool` advisories of the full audit stay,
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vitest's, outside this maintenance); `pnpm check:all` green (17:27:54:
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Rust, wasm, Node, app image, worker sandbox tests and runtime image); the
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goldens, oracles and R4 digests untouched (`git diff --stat 8943bf3 --
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apps/app/tests/fixtures crates/core/tests` empty). Nothing is called fixed
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because it compiles: the Rust ids are gone from the advisory check and the
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npm ones from the production audit, and the two reachable behaviours
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(certificate validation, `next` redirection) have a test each.
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