fix(worker): second security pass — content-only rejection codes (resource_limit, explicit list), negative proofs of the seccomp argument filters, PR_GET_DUMPABLE self-check, strict WebP chunk structure, iCCP-bomb fixture, separate test target cache; ci: release-images builder actually used (job-level DOCKER_CONFIG, --builder), literal cleanup path, token scoped to the login step, npm advisories gate, digests from build metadata
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@@ -17,11 +17,13 @@ use crate::{exit_codes, webp_check};
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pub enum ChildOutcome {
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/// A 512 × 512 WebP whose container passed the parent's check.
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Produced(Vec<u8>),
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/// The child refused the input with one of its content exit codes (12 to 17).
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/// The child refused the input with one of its content exit codes
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/// (`exit_codes::is_content_rejection`).
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Rejected { code: i32, name: &'static str },
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/// The child could not even start properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox
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/// failure, internal error): the confinement environment is broken, not the upload.
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/// R1 alerts and stops on this outcome instead of rejecting the job.
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/// The child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox failure,
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/// encode or output failure, internal error): the confinement environment is broken,
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/// not the upload. No content can produce this outcome (every decode-time error maps
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/// to a content code). R1 alerts and stops on it instead of rejecting the job.
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Broken { code: i32, name: &'static str },
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/// The child died from a signal (SIGSYS 31 = seccomp, SIGABRT 6 = allocation failure,
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/// SIGXCPU 24 = CPU limit, SIGKILL 9 = the parent).
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