fix(worker): second security pass — content-only rejection codes (resource_limit, explicit list), negative proofs of the seccomp argument filters, PR_GET_DUMPABLE self-check, strict WebP chunk structure, iCCP-bomb fixture, separate test target cache; ci: release-images builder actually used (job-level DOCKER_CONFIG, --builder), literal cleanup path, token scoped to the login step, npm advisories gate, digests from build metadata

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:36:30 +02:00
1 parent 11813f5560
commit a8b644a515
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+11 -3
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@@ -13,11 +13,18 @@ pub const DIMENSIONS: i32 = 15;
pub const ENCODE_FAILED: i32 = 16;
pub const OUTPUT_FAILED: i32 = 17;
pub const INTERNAL: i32 = 18;
/// The decoders' allocation or complexity budget was exceeded by the content.
pub const RESOURCE_LIMIT: i32 = 19;
/// Codes that judge the content (the upload is refused); every other non-zero code means
/// the child's environment is broken and the parent must alert rather than reject.
/// Codes that judge the content (the upload is refused). Every other non-zero code means
/// the child's environment is broken (`Broken` outcome: the parent alerts rather than
/// rejects). Explicit list on purpose: a new code never lands in the wrong class by
/// accident, and no content can produce a "broken" code.
pub fn is_content_rejection(code: i32) -> bool {
(INPUT_TOO_LARGE..=OUTPUT_FAILED).contains(&code)
matches!(
code,
INPUT_TOO_LARGE | UNSUPPORTED_TYPE | DECODE_FAILED | DIMENSIONS | RESOURCE_LIMIT
)
}
/// Stable name of an exit code for logs and tests.
@@ -34,6 +41,7 @@ pub fn name(code: i32) -> &'static str {
ENCODE_FAILED => "encode_failed",
OUTPUT_FAILED => "output_failed",
INTERNAL => "internal",
RESOURCE_LIMIT => "resource_limit",
_ => "unknown",
}
}