fix(worker): second security pass — content-only rejection codes (resource_limit, explicit list), negative proofs of the seccomp argument filters, PR_GET_DUMPABLE self-check, strict WebP chunk structure, iCCP-bomb fixture, separate test target cache; ci: release-images builder actually used (job-level DOCKER_CONFIG, --builder), literal cleanup path, token scoped to the login step, npm advisories gate, digests from build metadata

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:36:30 +02:00
1 parent 11813f5560
commit a8b644a515
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
default = []
# Extra subcommands and flags for the sandbox tests and the seccomp derivation
# (crates/worker/Dockerfile stage `test`); never part of a release build.
test-hooks = ["dep:crc32fast"]
test-hooks = ["dep:crc32fast", "dep:flate2"]
[dependencies]
image.workspace = true
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ seccompiler.workspace = true
rlimit.workspace = true
libc.workspace = true
crc32fast = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
# Already in the tree through png: used by the iCCP-bomb fixture only.
flate2 = { version = "1.1", optional = true }
# The worker owns I/O (it is the process boundary), so the core's disallowed_methods lint is
# off here. unsafe stays denied crate-wide; the libwebp FFI and the prctl call carry a local