chore(memory): DEV read incident report, LRN-110 supersedes LRN-102
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
34a49f5769
commit
8191e3a42c
2 files changed
+68
No files matched your search
@@ -709,6 +709,7 @@ Supersedes [[LRN-100]].
|
||||
**Context**: any shell-written file holding backticks: Rust/TS doc comments, markdown, commit bodies, python snippets passed via `python3 - <<EOF`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Application**: always quote delimiter (`<<'EOF'`, `<<'PYEOF'`) unless expansion wanted; prefer Write/Edit tools for prose; before commit grep added lines for `uid=`, `gid=`, home paths and empty backtick pairs; treat `command not found` lines during a file write as corruption signal, re-read file.
|
||||
- **Status (2026-11-02)**: superseded by LRN-110
|
||||
|
||||
## LRN-103 — SVG pointer-events all hits the stroke area even unpainted: hitboxes declare stroke none + visibleFill (2026-11-01)
|
||||
**Pattern**: SVG `pointer-events="all"` hits fill AND stroke area whether painted or not. Transparent hitbox with no own `stroke-width` inherits ancestor's: root `stroke-width="2000"` widened every point hitbox, last one took 13 of 19 equine clicks (Chromium, WebKit). `stroke="none"` alone does not shrink hit area under `all`.
|
||||
@@ -758,3 +759,11 @@ Supersedes [[LRN-100]].
|
||||
**Context**: V1-2.3 verify child, `rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24` build (musl mallocng), distroless runtime, 2026-11-01. At-caps fixture under full filter died SIGSYS; strace derivation (`crates/worker/scripts/derive-seccomp.sh`) in Docker test stage showed `brk` only missing call. Decode traces (R1) showed neither `brk` nor `mprotect`. Owner approved `brk` in shared filter (brief 2026-11-01), wording of this entry owner-validated.
|
||||
|
||||
**Application**: new child command or new input path (bigger frames, other library) → rerun seccomp derivation inside real image on that path before trusting allowlist; add a syscall only when trace proves it, with trace as justification; never infer from native glibc runs.
|
||||
|
||||
## LRN-110 — Bash traps that reached DEV: backgrounded cd list, unquoted heredoc backticks; absolute verified cwd, env validated in-script, rules in sub-agent briefs (2026-11-02)
|
||||
**Pattern**: two Bash traps made a DEV-targeting test run from the main checkout (2026-11-01, 23:03:49 and 23:10:59 UTC, 13 GET each on DEV, no write seen). (1) `cd /path && cmd &` backgrounds the whole AND-list in a subshell: the caller's cwd never changes, next commands run where the shell was. (2) Unquoted heredoc (`<<EOF`) runs command substitution on backticks and `$(…)` in its body: a TODO text holding `` `pnpm e2e:sheet-assets` `` executed that command (LRN-102 had already caught `` `id` ``; its rule was not applied).
|
||||
|
||||
**Context**: orchestrator shell writes (python via `python3 - <<EOF`, markdown, TODO, commit bodies) and sub-agent test commands in a multi-worktree repo whose other checkouts still hold old scripts that read DEV keys (`supabase status`). Rule: a wrong cwd must never be able to reach DEV.
|
||||
|
||||
**Application**: quote every heredoc delimiter (`<<'EOF'`, `<<'PYEOF'`) unless expansion is wanted, pass values as arguments; prefer Write/Edit for prose. Run commands with an absolute, verified directory (`git -C <abs>`, `pnpm --dir <abs>`, `[ "$(pwd -P)" = <abs> ]` before acting); never `cd X && cmd &`. Validate the environment before any side effect (target URL, key issuer, container name) inside the script itself, so its safety never depends on cwd. Put these rules in every sub-agent brief that may run shell commands, with the explicit ban on running scripts from other worktrees.
|
||||
Supersedes [[LRN-102]].
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user