diff --git a/.claude/audits/2026-11-01-dev-read-incidents.md b/.claude/audits/2026-11-01-dev-read-incidents.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daad0743 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/audits/2026-11-01-dev-read-incidents.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# Incident report: two unauthorised read-only runs against DEV (2026-11-01) + +Scope rule broken: the owner's briefs forbid any operation on DEV, read-only included. Evidence is +what was collected right after each event, read-only: Docker start times of the eight DEV containers, +the DEV Kong access log and the DEV Storage request log (`docker logs`). No new connection to DEV was +made to write this report. + +## Events + +| | Event 1 | Event 2 | +|---|---|---| +| Time (UTC) | 2026-11-01 23:03:49 | 2026-11-01 23:10:59 | +| Origin | feater sub-agent securing `e2e:sheet-assets` (V1-2.3 closure, brief 2026-11-02 §3) | the orchestrator | +| Cause | `cd && python3 … &` backgrounded the whole list, so the next command ran in the shell's directory, the main checkout `/home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo` (branch `feature/v1-1-clients-animals`), where the old script still targets DEV | an unquoted heredoc (`python3 - <`, `pnpm --dir `, `[ "$(pwd -P)" = ]` before acting); never `cd X && cmd &`. Validate the environment before any side effect (target URL, key issuer, container name) inside the script itself, so its safety never depends on cwd. Put these rules in every sub-agent brief that may run shell commands, with the explicit ban on running scripts from other worktrees. +Supersedes [[LRN-102]].