chore(memory): db:trial accounts and equine drawing checkpoint, host observation

This commit is contained in:
bchanot committed 2026-11-11 23:04:22 +01:00
1 parent 3189a1917d
commit 7a6eccf824
2 files changed
+6 -1

No files matched your search

+1
View File
@@ -550,3 +550,4 @@ R5.4: `draft/{labels,changelog,review_report,drawing,overlay,app_review,svg_comp
- db:trial first create 2026-11-11 at 255dd67 (owner go): 6 containers, net, 2 volumes as planned, loopback ports only, DEV and sandbox unchanged, 17 migrations, equine draft equal. Interrupted at check 3: TR_PW in db container log, image migrate.sh ALTER USER logged during init. LRN-123..126 written. Owner decision pending.
- db:trial TR_PW leak 2026-11-11: owner-ordered one-off rotation (5 roles, auth/storage/rest recreated, old pw refused, services ok, DEV/sandbox unchanged); fix 5f63d22 -c log_statement=none on server cmdline (harness 373/0, control 372/1, verifier CONFORME, security PASS); LRN-127. Real proof pending: create on fresh volume.
- db:trial MFA rule 2026-11-11 (owner): owner grant with 1 verified TOTP on trial only (45d7453, harness 375/0, verifier CONFORME, security PASS), BDR-112 narrows BDR-083; production rule unchanged. App on LAN 192.168.1.100:5194 (BDR-111). Accounts owner@trial.local, praticien@trial.local created by owner, 1 verified factor each, no role yet.
- db:trial equine drawing imported 2026-11-11 (owner go): pre-checks (gateway faunosteo_trial, key iss/signature, historical sheet, sha256/size vs assets.json/draft/row, bucket empty), R5.5 --check plan, `pnpm db:trial assets` 1/1 confirmed, object re-downloaded byte-identical, 2nd --check nothing to do, draft=document.json, seed=HEAD, no secret in logs, DEV/sandbox unchanged. App exposure 192.168.1.100:5194 noted (BDR-111); host Valheim argv password noted separately in TODO.
+5 -1
View File
@@ -694,7 +694,8 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet
- [ ] Test anomaly A (owner 2026-11-09, separate from U1/U2): fictitious fingerprints `'a'.repeat(64)` from worker stand-ins (`packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheet-fixtures.ts:115` openRound, `sheets-concurrency.sandbox.ts:168`, `sheets-perf.sandbox.ts:169`); 7 published/deprecated sandbox versions fail `check_published`. Fix: real fingerprint through the core (as e2e `fingerprintOf`, `apps/app/e2e/support/catalogue.ts:88`); never weaken the publish gate or the reader check. Needs its own go.
- [ ] Test anomaly B (owner 2026-11-09, separate from U1/U2): `packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheets-admin.sandbox.ts:181-195` creates the historical working copy and never archives it; slot taken → `admin.spec.ts:717` fails x4. Fix test independence and cleanup; the existing copy `8c315a12-20d4-4432-9db3-7cb88b27a5b4` stays untouched until the owner authorises. Linked: RR-13, the admin.spec confirmation line above.
- [ ] Test anomaly C (owner 2026-11-09, separate from U1/U2): integrity failure invisible in catalogue cards; implemented as lot R4; failure shown, never hidden or bypassed.
- [ ] Dedicated persistent manual trial stack (owner 2026-11-09, D8; brief « Après R0 — Implémentation technique », contract .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-09-db-trial-stack-1809.md): [x] lot A suites' guard · [x] lot A2 trial dev server target (R13) · [x] lot B1 foundation · [x] lot B2 backups, restore, migrate, rotation · [x] lot B3 accounts, grants, drawings, app · [x] lot C docs · [x] reviews (verifier ECARTS owner-gated only, security PASS, code review + 2 re-reviews fixed: d3bdbbe, f2cbf68) · [x] first create 2026-11-11 at 255dd67 (owner go) · [ ] post-create checks: INTERRUPTED at check 3, TR_PW in the db container log (image migrate.sh); owner decided 2026-11-11 (rotation + fix, sub-item below); the app, its LAN routing and assets not run yet
- [ ] Dedicated persistent manual trial stack (owner 2026-11-09, D8; brief « Après R0 — Implémentation technique », contract .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-09-db-trial-stack-1809.md): [x] lot A suites' guard · [x] lot A2 trial dev server target (R13) · [x] lot B1 foundation · [x] lot B2 backups, restore, migrate, rotation · [x] lot B3 accounts, grants, drawings, app · [x] lot C docs · [x] reviews (verifier ECARTS owner-gated only, security PASS, code review + 2 re-reviews fixed: d3bdbbe, f2cbf68) · [x] first create 2026-11-11 at 255dd67 (owner go) · [x] post-create checks: interrupted at check 3 (TR_PW in the db container log), owner decided 2026-11-11 (rotation + fix, sub-item below) · [x] accounts 2026-11-11 (owner brief « Checkpoint sécurité et autorisation des comptes »): owner@trial.local owner+admin, praticien@trial.local admin+sheet_editor, 1 verified TOTP each (BDR-112), roles/rights/audit/aal2 refusals/secrets/persistence checked · [x] equine drawing 2026-11-11 (owner brief « Autorisation de l'import équin »): `pnpm db:trial assets`, 1/1 uploaded and confirmed, object re-downloaded through the gateway byte-identical, second read-only pass nothing to do, draft = document.json, seed = HEAD · [ ] owner browser checks (owner Droits at aal2, praticien draft read-only « Consulter le brouillon »); no working copy without a go
- app exposure (owner 2026-11-11, BDR-111): `pnpm db:trial app` listens on 192.168.1.100:5194 only (not 0.0.0.0; Host allowlist answers 403 to other names; 127.0.0.1:5194 closed). The accounts brief authorised 127.0.0.1:5194; the owner moved it to the LAN address the same day. No wider LAN exposure (other port, 0.0.0.0, firewall change) without a distinct decision.
- shortcut: `pnpm db:trial app` takes no lock (scripts/db-trial.sh, comment above cmd_app): stop, backup, migrate, destroy, restore or rotate-* started in another terminal in the second before Vite listens on 5194 goes ahead. Upgrade: a dedicated app lock, shared by app and exclusive for those commands.
- [x] init log leak: the image's /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/migrate.sh runs `ALTER USER supabase_admin WITH PASSWORD '…'` while the init server logs statements, before /etc/postgresql.schema.sql (db container log line 379). Owner 2026-11-11 « Correction minimale de la fuite TR_PW »: [x] one-off TR_PW rotation (5 roles, auth/storage/rest recreated, old password refused on scram, services ok; the db container log and frozen env keep the dead old value, allowed) · [x] fix 5f63d22 `-c log_statement=none` on the server command line (contract .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-11-trial-init-log-leak-1907.md, harness 373/0, control 372/1, verifier CONFORME, security PASS, LRN-127) · [ ] real proof: a create on a fresh volume with the log scan (needs its own go) · not closed, named in SUPABASE.md §5.2: init error statements, migrate.sh argv, db-sandbox.sh same DB_INIT
- [ ] arbitration 1: narrow the file-wide `# shellcheck disable=SC2016` of db-trial-check.sh to its lines; a readable reason on every directive
@@ -708,6 +709,9 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet
- [ ] MANDATORY before merging V1-2 into develop (owner 2026-11-03): registry id reconciliation. LRN-095 collides: develop 09655b2 « Port a safe runner verbatim… » (2026-11-02) vs V1-2 « pgTAP across PGlite and the real Supabase image… » (2026-10-28, cited by BDR-084 and the V1-2.1 TODO lines). BLK-013 exists on develop only (« e2e:avatar on develop reached DEV »): `memory.sh` on V1-2 would hand out BLK-013 again, so a V1-2 blocker needs its id checked against develop first. Same for the TODO release-readiness ids: RR-11 is develop's (« sandbox-only e2e follow-ups »), V1-2 uses RR-12. No renumbering during V1-2.6 unless needed; renumber one side and patch its citers at the merge
- [ ] V1-2.5 catalogue, admin space, rights, species, MFA · V1-2.6 editor level 1 · V1-2.7 preview, review, publication UI · V1-2.8 equine working copy and review preparation · V1-2.9 FR/EN acceptance and closure (owner checkpoints V1-2.3, V1-2.4, V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8, V1-2.9 + each DEV operation of contract §16.11)
## Host observations (outside Faunosteo; recorded at the owner's request, values never written)
- [ ] 2026-11-11, seen in `ps` during the db:trial secret scan: a local Valheim game server process (`valheim_server.x86_64`, not part of Faunosteo) carries a password in its command-line arguments, readable by every local user through `ps` or `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`. The value was neither recorded nor reproduced. Owner action, outside this repository: move the password out of argv (config or environment file), then change it.
## Release readiness track (owner 2026-10-25, distinct from the functional roadmap; nothing here authorises a release or exposure)
Inventory: `.claude/audits/2026-10-25-functional-inventory.md`. Each item: treat or qualify before any release or public exposure; not fixed now unless an active critical flaw is shown.
- [ ] RR-1 npm advisories (57, pre-existing; published severity kept apart from Faunosteo exposure). Zod 3.25.76 GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 first: Zod parses only forms, the practitioner cache and one RPC result, no collection schema found; untrusted files go through the Rust core caps (PDF 50 MiB / 16 MiB attachment, depth 64, 400k values; sessionStorage value budget). Plan zod 4 as its own chore; drop zod from core-wasm `dependencies` if only its tests use it