feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow

M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow
(applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14.

- Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live
  auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader
  predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14).
- AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor,
  race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on
  the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17).
- Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/
  author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/
  comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the
  stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy,
  uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket.
  F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3).
- O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and
  the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted.
- Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate
  deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state.

Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) /
122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and
M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint,
build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
This commit is contained in:
bchanot committed 2026-10-28 15:52:49 +01:00
1 parent 9c13bae4bc
commit 77e5fa4cf5
33 files changed
+4613 -1617

No files matched your search

+103
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
/**
* GoTrue MFA calls of the sandbox (real GoTrue v2.197.0): enrol a TOTP factor,
* challenge and verify it to reach `aal2`, remove it. Every call carries the
* user's own access token, as the browser does. TOTP secrets and tokens stay
* in memory and are never printed.
*/
import { stack } from './stack'
import { msToNextStep, totpCode } from './totp'
export interface Factor {
id: string
secret: string
}
export interface MfaResult {
status: number
body: Record<string, unknown>
}
async function authRequest(
method: string,
path: string,
token: string,
body?: unknown,
): Promise<MfaResult> {
const res = await fetch(stack.authUrl + path, {
method,
headers: {
apikey: stack.anonKey,
Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
})
const text = await res.text()
let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>
} catch {
// not JSON: keep an empty body
}
return { status: res.status, body: parsed }
}
/** POST /factors: a new unverified TOTP factor (the secret is shown once). */
export async function enrolTotp(
token: string,
name: string,
): Promise<{ status: number; factor: Factor | null; body: MfaResult['body'] }> {
const res = await authRequest('POST', '/factors', token, {
factor_type: 'totp',
friendly_name: name,
})
const totp = res.body.totp as { secret?: string } | undefined
const factor =
res.status === 200 && typeof res.body.id === 'string' && totp?.secret
? { id: res.body.id, secret: totp.secret }
: null
return { status: res.status, factor, body: res.body }
}
/** Challenge then verify with the current code; resolves with the new session (aal2 on success). */
export async function verifyTotp(
token: string,
factor: Factor,
): Promise<MfaResult> {
const challenge = await authRequest(
'POST',
`/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`,
token,
{},
)
if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, {
challenge_id: challenge.body.id,
code: totpCode(factor.secret),
})
}
/**
* Verify with a code of a step not used before for this factor: GoTrue refuses
* a code it already accepted, so a second verification waits for the next step.
*/
export async function verifyTotpFreshStep(
token: string,
factor: Factor,
): Promise<MfaResult> {
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, msToNextStep() + 200))
return verifyTotp(token, factor)
}
export function unenrol(token: string, factorId: string): Promise<MfaResult> {
return authRequest('DELETE', `/factors/${factorId}`, token)
}
/** The claims of an access token (payload only; the signature is not checked here). */
export function claimsOf(token: string): Record<string, unknown> {
const payload = token.split('.')[1] ?? ''
return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as Record<
string,
unknown
>
}
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
/**
* V1-2.1 on the throwaway stack with REAL GoTrue and PostgreSQL: the AR-1 B
* path proven with real TOTP factors and real sessions (pgTAP uses fabricated
* auth rows), and the last-owner race under two concurrent transactions (F18).
* Contract docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §5.7, §15. Run through
* `pnpm db:sandbox test tests/sandbox/sheets.sandbox.ts`.
*/
import { confirmedAccount, rpc, sql, errorCode, type Account } from './stack'
import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp, claimsOf } from './mfa'
/** Enrols and verifies a TOTP factor, returning a fresh aal2 access token. */
async function stepUp(account: Account): Promise<string> {
const enrol = await enrolTotp(account.token, 'device')
if (!enrol.factor) throw new Error(`enrol failed: ${JSON.stringify(enrol.body)}`)
const verified = await verifyTotp(account.token, enrol.factor)
const token = verified.body.access_token as string
if (!token) throw new Error(`verify failed: ${JSON.stringify(verified.body)}`)
return token
}
describe('AR-1 B on real GoTrue', () => {
let owner: Account
let ownerAal2: string
let target: Account
beforeAll(async () => {
owner = await confirmedAccount('ar1-owner')
target = await confirmedAccount('ar1-target')
// Bootstrap the owner role through the operator path (no JWT).
await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${owner.id}', 'owner')`)
// The target holds a verified factor (a grant needs one).
await stepUp(target)
ownerAal2 = await stepUp(owner)
}, 120_000)
it('refuses a platform role change from the aal1 session', async () => {
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, owner.token)
expect(claimsOf(owner.token).aal).toBe('aal1')
expect([res.status, errorCode(res)]).toEqual([403, '42501'])
expect((res.body as { message?: string }).message).toBe('mfa_required')
})
it('allows the change from a live aal2 session, then reads it back', async () => {
expect(claimsOf(ownerAal2).aal).toBe('aal2')
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, ownerAal2)
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where user_id = '${target.id}' and role = 'support' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
})
it('refuses a grant to an account with no verified factor', async () => {
const noFactor = await confirmedAccount('ar1-nofactor')
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: noFactor.id, role: 'moderator' }, ownerAal2)
expect([res.status, (res.body as { message?: string }).message]).toEqual([400, 'target_factor_missing'])
await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${noFactor.id}'`)
})
afterAll(async () => {
for (const a of [owner, target]) if (a?.id) await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`).catch(() => {})
})
})
describe('last-owner race (F18)', () => {
it('two concurrent revocations of two owners leave one owner', async () => {
const a = await confirmedAccount('f18-a')
const b = await confirmedAccount('f18-b')
const aAal2 = await stepUp(a)
const bAal2 = await stepUp(b)
await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${a.id}', 'owner')`)
await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${b.id}', 'owner')`)
// Neutralise every other owner so a and b are the only two.
await sql(`update public.profile_roles set revoked_at = now(), revoke_reason = 'f18 test'
where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null and user_id not in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('2')
// Each revokes the other, concurrently.
const [ra, rb] = await Promise.all([
rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: b.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race a' }, aAal2),
rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: a.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race b' }, bAal2),
])
const statuses = [ra.status, rb.status]
// The invariant that F18 broke: the two cannot both pass and leave zero
// owners. Exactly one succeeds; the other is refused (last_owner when it
// reaches the guard, or forbidden when it lost its own ownership first);
// one owner always remains.
expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 200), JSON.stringify([ra.body, rb.body])).toHaveLength(1)
expect(statuses.filter((s) => s !== 200)).toHaveLength(1)
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
await sql(`delete from auth.users where id in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
}, 120_000)
})
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
/**
* RFC 6238 TOTP codes for the sandbox MFA tests (contract
* docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §15): HMAC-SHA1, 30 s steps,
* 6 digits, the parameters GoTrue v2.197.0 uses. Node `crypto` only, no
* dependency. The secret stays in the test's memory: never printed, logged or
* written anywhere.
*/
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'
const BASE32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'
export const TOTP_STEP_SECONDS = 30
function base32Decode(text: string): Buffer {
const clean = text.replace(/=+$/, '').toUpperCase()
const bytes: number[] = []
let buffer = 0
let bits = 0
for (const char of clean) {
const value = BASE32.indexOf(char)
if (value < 0) throw new Error('totp: secret is not base32')
buffer = (buffer << 5) | value
bits += 5
if (bits >= 8) {
bits -= 8
bytes.push((buffer >> bits) & 0xff)
}
}
return Buffer.from(bytes)
}
/** The 6-digit code of `secret` for the step holding `at` (ms since epoch). */
export function totpCode(secret: string, at = Date.now()): string {
const counter = Buffer.alloc(8)
counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(Math.floor(at / 1000 / TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)))
const mac = createHmac('sha1', base32Decode(secret)).update(counter).digest()
const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f
const value = (mac.readUInt32BE(offset) & 0x7fffffff) % 1_000_000
return value.toString().padStart(6, '0')
}
/** Milliseconds until the next step starts (a fresh code). */
export function msToNextStep(at = Date.now()): number {
const step = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
return step - (at % step)
}
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ import {
sql,
sqlOutcome,
stack,
} from './stack'
import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp } from './mfa'
import {
uniqueEmail,
type Account,
} from './stack'
@@ -194,11 +197,18 @@ describe('reads and refusals per role', () => {
})
it('stores an oversized correlation header as null and keeps a short token', async () => {
// AR-1 B: the role RPCs need a live aal2 session and a factored target, so
// the seed owner steps up and b enrols a factor before the grant.
const owner = await signIn(
'owner@faunosteo.local',
'LocalDev-only-password-1',
)
const token = owner.body.access_token as string
const ownerToken = owner.body.access_token as string
const ownerEnrol = await enrolTotp(ownerToken, 'owner device')
const token = (await verifyTotp(ownerToken, ownerEnrol.factor!)).body
.access_token as string
const bEnrol = await enrolTotp(b.token, 'b device')
await verifyTotp(b.token, bEnrol.factor!)
const grant = await rpc(
'grant_platform_role',
{ target_user_id: b.id, role: 'support' },