feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow
M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
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@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
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/**
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* GoTrue MFA calls of the sandbox (real GoTrue v2.197.0): enrol a TOTP factor,
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* challenge and verify it to reach `aal2`, remove it. Every call carries the
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* user's own access token, as the browser does. TOTP secrets and tokens stay
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* in memory and are never printed.
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*/
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import { stack } from './stack'
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import { msToNextStep, totpCode } from './totp'
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export interface Factor {
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id: string
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secret: string
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}
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export interface MfaResult {
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status: number
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body: Record<string, unknown>
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}
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async function authRequest(
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method: string,
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path: string,
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token: string,
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body?: unknown,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const res = await fetch(stack.authUrl + path, {
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method,
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headers: {
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apikey: stack.anonKey,
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Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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},
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body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
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})
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const text = await res.text()
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let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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// not JSON: keep an empty body
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}
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return { status: res.status, body: parsed }
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}
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/** POST /factors: a new unverified TOTP factor (the secret is shown once). */
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export async function enrolTotp(
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token: string,
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name: string,
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): Promise<{ status: number; factor: Factor | null; body: MfaResult['body'] }> {
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const res = await authRequest('POST', '/factors', token, {
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factor_type: 'totp',
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friendly_name: name,
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})
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const totp = res.body.totp as { secret?: string } | undefined
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const factor =
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res.status === 200 && typeof res.body.id === 'string' && totp?.secret
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? { id: res.body.id, secret: totp.secret }
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: null
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return { status: res.status, factor, body: res.body }
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}
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/** Challenge then verify with the current code; resolves with the new session (aal2 on success). */
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export async function verifyTotp(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const challenge = await authRequest(
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'POST',
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`/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`,
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token,
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{},
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)
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if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
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return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, {
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challenge_id: challenge.body.id,
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code: totpCode(factor.secret),
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})
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}
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/**
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* Verify with a code of a step not used before for this factor: GoTrue refuses
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* a code it already accepted, so a second verification waits for the next step.
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*/
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export async function verifyTotpFreshStep(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, msToNextStep() + 200))
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return verifyTotp(token, factor)
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}
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export function unenrol(token: string, factorId: string): Promise<MfaResult> {
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return authRequest('DELETE', `/factors/${factorId}`, token)
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}
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/** The claims of an access token (payload only; the signature is not checked here). */
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export function claimsOf(token: string): Record<string, unknown> {
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const payload = token.split('.')[1] ?? ''
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return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as Record<
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string,
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unknown
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>
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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/**
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* V1-2.1 on the throwaway stack with REAL GoTrue and PostgreSQL: the AR-1 B
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* path proven with real TOTP factors and real sessions (pgTAP uses fabricated
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* auth rows), and the last-owner race under two concurrent transactions (F18).
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* Contract docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §5.7, §15. Run through
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* `pnpm db:sandbox test tests/sandbox/sheets.sandbox.ts`.
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*/
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import { confirmedAccount, rpc, sql, errorCode, type Account } from './stack'
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import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp, claimsOf } from './mfa'
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/** Enrols and verifies a TOTP factor, returning a fresh aal2 access token. */
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async function stepUp(account: Account): Promise<string> {
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const enrol = await enrolTotp(account.token, 'device')
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if (!enrol.factor) throw new Error(`enrol failed: ${JSON.stringify(enrol.body)}`)
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const verified = await verifyTotp(account.token, enrol.factor)
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const token = verified.body.access_token as string
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if (!token) throw new Error(`verify failed: ${JSON.stringify(verified.body)}`)
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return token
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}
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describe('AR-1 B on real GoTrue', () => {
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let owner: Account
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let ownerAal2: string
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let target: Account
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beforeAll(async () => {
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owner = await confirmedAccount('ar1-owner')
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target = await confirmedAccount('ar1-target')
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// Bootstrap the owner role through the operator path (no JWT).
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${owner.id}', 'owner')`)
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// The target holds a verified factor (a grant needs one).
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await stepUp(target)
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ownerAal2 = await stepUp(owner)
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}, 120_000)
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it('refuses a platform role change from the aal1 session', async () => {
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, owner.token)
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expect(claimsOf(owner.token).aal).toBe('aal1')
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expect([res.status, errorCode(res)]).toEqual([403, '42501'])
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expect((res.body as { message?: string }).message).toBe('mfa_required')
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})
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it('allows the change from a live aal2 session, then reads it back', async () => {
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expect(claimsOf(ownerAal2).aal).toBe('aal2')
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, ownerAal2)
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expect(res.status).toBe(200)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where user_id = '${target.id}' and role = 'support' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
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})
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it('refuses a grant to an account with no verified factor', async () => {
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const noFactor = await confirmedAccount('ar1-nofactor')
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: noFactor.id, role: 'moderator' }, ownerAal2)
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expect([res.status, (res.body as { message?: string }).message]).toEqual([400, 'target_factor_missing'])
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await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${noFactor.id}'`)
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})
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afterAll(async () => {
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for (const a of [owner, target]) if (a?.id) await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`).catch(() => {})
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})
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})
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describe('last-owner race (F18)', () => {
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it('two concurrent revocations of two owners leave one owner', async () => {
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const a = await confirmedAccount('f18-a')
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const b = await confirmedAccount('f18-b')
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const aAal2 = await stepUp(a)
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const bAal2 = await stepUp(b)
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${a.id}', 'owner')`)
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${b.id}', 'owner')`)
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// Neutralise every other owner so a and b are the only two.
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await sql(`update public.profile_roles set revoked_at = now(), revoke_reason = 'f18 test'
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where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null and user_id not in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('2')
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// Each revokes the other, concurrently.
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const [ra, rb] = await Promise.all([
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rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: b.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race a' }, aAal2),
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rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: a.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race b' }, bAal2),
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])
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const statuses = [ra.status, rb.status]
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// The invariant that F18 broke: the two cannot both pass and leave zero
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// owners. Exactly one succeeds; the other is refused (last_owner when it
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// reaches the guard, or forbidden when it lost its own ownership first);
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// one owner always remains.
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expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 200), JSON.stringify([ra.body, rb.body])).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(statuses.filter((s) => s !== 200)).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
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await sql(`delete from auth.users where id in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
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}, 120_000)
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})
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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/**
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* RFC 6238 TOTP codes for the sandbox MFA tests (contract
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* docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §15): HMAC-SHA1, 30 s steps,
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* 6 digits, the parameters GoTrue v2.197.0 uses. Node `crypto` only, no
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* dependency. The secret stays in the test's memory: never printed, logged or
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* written anywhere.
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*/
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import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'
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const BASE32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'
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export const TOTP_STEP_SECONDS = 30
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function base32Decode(text: string): Buffer {
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const clean = text.replace(/=+$/, '').toUpperCase()
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const bytes: number[] = []
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let buffer = 0
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let bits = 0
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for (const char of clean) {
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const value = BASE32.indexOf(char)
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if (value < 0) throw new Error('totp: secret is not base32')
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buffer = (buffer << 5) | value
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bits += 5
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if (bits >= 8) {
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bits -= 8
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bytes.push((buffer >> bits) & 0xff)
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}
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}
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return Buffer.from(bytes)
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}
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/** The 6-digit code of `secret` for the step holding `at` (ms since epoch). */
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export function totpCode(secret: string, at = Date.now()): string {
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const counter = Buffer.alloc(8)
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counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(Math.floor(at / 1000 / TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)))
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const mac = createHmac('sha1', base32Decode(secret)).update(counter).digest()
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const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f
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const value = (mac.readUInt32BE(offset) & 0x7fffffff) % 1_000_000
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return value.toString().padStart(6, '0')
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}
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/** Milliseconds until the next step starts (a fresh code). */
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export function msToNextStep(at = Date.now()): number {
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const step = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
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return step - (at % step)
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}
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@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ import {
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sql,
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sqlOutcome,
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stack,
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} from './stack'
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import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp } from './mfa'
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import {
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uniqueEmail,
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type Account,
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} from './stack'
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@@ -194,11 +197,18 @@ describe('reads and refusals per role', () => {
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})
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it('stores an oversized correlation header as null and keeps a short token', async () => {
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// AR-1 B: the role RPCs need a live aal2 session and a factored target, so
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// the seed owner steps up and b enrols a factor before the grant.
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const owner = await signIn(
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'owner@faunosteo.local',
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'LocalDev-only-password-1',
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)
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const token = owner.body.access_token as string
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const ownerToken = owner.body.access_token as string
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const ownerEnrol = await enrolTotp(ownerToken, 'owner device')
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const token = (await verifyTotp(ownerToken, ownerEnrol.factor!)).body
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.access_token as string
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const bEnrol = await enrolTotp(b.token, 'b device')
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await verifyTotp(b.token, bEnrol.factor!)
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const grant = await rpc(
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'grant_platform_role',
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{ target_user_id: b.id, role: 'support' },
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