M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
92 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* V1-2.1 on the throwaway stack with REAL GoTrue and PostgreSQL: the AR-1 B
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* path proven with real TOTP factors and real sessions (pgTAP uses fabricated
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* auth rows), and the last-owner race under two concurrent transactions (F18).
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* Contract docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §5.7, §15. Run through
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* `pnpm db:sandbox test tests/sandbox/sheets.sandbox.ts`.
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*/
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import { confirmedAccount, rpc, sql, errorCode, type Account } from './stack'
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import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp, claimsOf } from './mfa'
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/** Enrols and verifies a TOTP factor, returning a fresh aal2 access token. */
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async function stepUp(account: Account): Promise<string> {
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const enrol = await enrolTotp(account.token, 'device')
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if (!enrol.factor) throw new Error(`enrol failed: ${JSON.stringify(enrol.body)}`)
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const verified = await verifyTotp(account.token, enrol.factor)
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const token = verified.body.access_token as string
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if (!token) throw new Error(`verify failed: ${JSON.stringify(verified.body)}`)
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return token
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}
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describe('AR-1 B on real GoTrue', () => {
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let owner: Account
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let ownerAal2: string
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let target: Account
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beforeAll(async () => {
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owner = await confirmedAccount('ar1-owner')
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target = await confirmedAccount('ar1-target')
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// Bootstrap the owner role through the operator path (no JWT).
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${owner.id}', 'owner')`)
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// The target holds a verified factor (a grant needs one).
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await stepUp(target)
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ownerAal2 = await stepUp(owner)
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}, 120_000)
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it('refuses a platform role change from the aal1 session', async () => {
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, owner.token)
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expect(claimsOf(owner.token).aal).toBe('aal1')
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expect([res.status, errorCode(res)]).toEqual([403, '42501'])
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expect((res.body as { message?: string }).message).toBe('mfa_required')
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})
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it('allows the change from a live aal2 session, then reads it back', async () => {
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expect(claimsOf(ownerAal2).aal).toBe('aal2')
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, ownerAal2)
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expect(res.status).toBe(200)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where user_id = '${target.id}' and role = 'support' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
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})
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it('refuses a grant to an account with no verified factor', async () => {
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const noFactor = await confirmedAccount('ar1-nofactor')
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const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: noFactor.id, role: 'moderator' }, ownerAal2)
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expect([res.status, (res.body as { message?: string }).message]).toEqual([400, 'target_factor_missing'])
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await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${noFactor.id}'`)
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})
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afterAll(async () => {
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for (const a of [owner, target]) if (a?.id) await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`).catch(() => {})
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})
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})
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describe('last-owner race (F18)', () => {
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it('two concurrent revocations of two owners leave one owner', async () => {
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const a = await confirmedAccount('f18-a')
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const b = await confirmedAccount('f18-b')
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const aAal2 = await stepUp(a)
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const bAal2 = await stepUp(b)
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${a.id}', 'owner')`)
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${b.id}', 'owner')`)
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// Neutralise every other owner so a and b are the only two.
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await sql(`update public.profile_roles set revoked_at = now(), revoke_reason = 'f18 test'
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where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null and user_id not in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('2')
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// Each revokes the other, concurrently.
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const [ra, rb] = await Promise.all([
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rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: b.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race a' }, aAal2),
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rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: a.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race b' }, bAal2),
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])
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const statuses = [ra.status, rb.status]
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// The invariant that F18 broke: the two cannot both pass and leave zero
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// owners. Exactly one succeeds; the other is refused (last_owner when it
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// reaches the guard, or forbidden when it lost its own ownership first);
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// one owner always remains.
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expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 200), JSON.stringify([ra.body, rb.body])).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(statuses.filter((s) => s !== 200)).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
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await sql(`delete from auth.users where id in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
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}, 120_000)
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})
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