feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow
M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
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@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
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import { nodeCoreRuntime } from '@faunosteo/core-wasm/node'
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import type { CoreRuntime } from '@faunosteo/core-wasm'
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import { publishSheetVersion, SheetPublishError } from '../src'
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import type { FaunosteoClient, SheetCheckOutcome, SheetValidator } from '../src'
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/** The real core's `sheet.check` (R2): the gate is never tested against a stub verdict. */
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let core: CoreRuntime
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beforeAll(async () => {
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core = await nodeCoreRuntime()
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})
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const validate: SheetValidator = (content) =>
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core.call('sheet.check', JSON.stringify(content)) as SheetCheckOutcome
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/**
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* Stub of the two client calls publishSheetVersion makes. The real RPC is
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* covered by supabase/tests/005_anatomical_sheets.sql; here the point is the
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* order of the gate: no RPC call unless the document is publishable.
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*/
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function stubClient(content: unknown) {
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const rpcCalls: unknown[] = []
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const client = {
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from: () => ({
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select: () => ({
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eq: () => ({
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single: async () => ({ data: { content }, error: null }),
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}),
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}),
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}),
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rpc: async (name: string, args: unknown) => {
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rpcCalls.push([name, args])
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return { data: 'published-id', error: null }
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},
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}
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return { client: client as unknown as FaunosteoClient, rpcCalls }
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}
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const publishable = {
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schema_version: 2,
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species_id: 'equine',
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name: { fr: 'Test', en: 'Test' },
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description: {},
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scope_disclaimer: {},
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attribution: { authors: [], license: null, notes: null },
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vertebral_config: { regions: [] },
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references: [],
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categories: [],
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views: [
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{
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id: 'view-main',
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kind: 'main',
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name: { fr: 'Vue', en: 'View' },
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svg_asset_id: '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',
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view_box: null,
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},
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],
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annotations: [],
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finding_zones: [],
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}
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describe('publishSheetVersion', () => {
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it('refuses publication when the validator cannot run (fail closed)', async () => {
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const { client, rpcCalls } = stubClient(publishable)
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const unavailable: SheetValidator = () => ({
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ok: false,
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kind: 'core_unavailable',
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})
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await expect(
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publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', unavailable),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'validator_unavailable' })
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expect(rpcCalls).toEqual([])
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})
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it('calls the RPC once the document passes shape and integrity checks', async () => {
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const { client, rpcCalls } = stubClient(publishable)
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await expect(publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', validate)).resolves.toBe(
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'published-id',
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)
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expect(rpcCalls).toEqual([['publish_sheet_version', { version_id: 'v1' }]])
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})
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it('refuses a document with integrity errors before any RPC', async () => {
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const { client, rpcCalls } = stubClient({
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...publishable,
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views: [{ ...publishable.views[0], svg_asset_id: null }],
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})
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await expect(publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', validate)).rejects.toThrow(
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/view\.asset\.missing/,
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)
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expect(rpcCalls).toEqual([])
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})
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it('refuses a document that does not match the schema', async () => {
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const { client, rpcCalls } = stubClient({ schema_version: 1 })
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await expect(
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publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', validate),
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).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SheetPublishError)
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await expect(
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publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', validate),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'invalid_shape' })
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expect(rpcCalls).toEqual([])
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})
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it('refuses a document carrying a lone surrogate as content, before any RPC (L1)', async () => {
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const { client, rpcCalls } = stubClient({
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...publishable,
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name: { fr: 'Vue \ud800', en: 'View' },
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})
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await expect(
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publishSheetVersion(client, 'v1', validate),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'invalid_shape' })
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expect(rpcCalls).toEqual([])
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})
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})
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@@ -55,6 +55,19 @@ const expectedColumns = {
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'updated_at',
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'workspace_id',
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],
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anatomical_catalog_grants: [
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'expires_at',
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'grant_kind',
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'granted_at',
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'granted_by',
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'id',
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'reason',
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'revocation_reason',
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'revoked_at',
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'revoked_by',
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'user_id',
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'verification_note',
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],
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anatomical_sheet_assets: [
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'byte_size',
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'content_type',
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@@ -66,18 +79,58 @@ const expectedColumns = {
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'sheet_id',
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'uploaded_at',
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],
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anatomical_sheet_review_acknowledgments: [
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'created_at',
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'group_digest',
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'group_key',
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'id',
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'review_id',
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'reviewer',
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],
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anatomical_sheet_review_comments: ['author', 'body', 'created_at', 'group_key', 'id', 'review_id'],
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anatomical_sheet_reviews: [
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'attempts',
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'authors',
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'created_at',
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'decided_at',
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'decided_by',
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'decision_note',
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'failure_code',
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'failure_outcome',
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'id',
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'lease_token',
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'locked_at',
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'revision',
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'round',
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'status',
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'submission_note',
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'submitted_at',
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'submitted_by',
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'verdict',
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'verified_at',
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'verified_with',
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'version_id',
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'withdrawal_note',
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'withdrawn_at',
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'withdrawn_by',
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],
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anatomical_sheet_versions: [
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'authors',
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'change_note',
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'content',
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'created_at',
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'created_by',
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'deprecated_at',
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'deprecated_by',
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'document_fingerprint',
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'document_schema_version',
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'id',
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'published_at',
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'published_by',
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'published_review_id',
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'revision',
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'sheet_id',
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'source_version_id',
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'status',
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'updated_at',
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'version_number',
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@@ -100,6 +153,7 @@ const expectedColumns = {
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'status',
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'updated_at',
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'visibility',
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'working_copy_source_version_id',
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],
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assets: [
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'attempts',
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@@ -197,15 +251,26 @@ const expectedFunctionArgs = {
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complete_avatar_job: ['asset_id', 'byte_size', 'lock_token', 'sha256'],
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confirm_asset_upload: ['asset_id'],
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confirm_sheet_asset_upload: ['asset_id'],
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create_anatomical_sheet: [
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'description',
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'document',
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'name',
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'official',
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'slug',
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'species_id',
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'visibility',
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],
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acknowledge_sheet_review_group: ['group_digest', 'group_key', 'review_id'],
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activate_species: ['id'],
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comment_sheet_review: ['body', 'group_key', 'review_id'],
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create_official_sheet: ['document', 'slug'],
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create_species: ['id', 'name_en', 'name_fr', 'sort_order'],
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create_sheet_working_copy: ['slug', 'source_version_id'],
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decide_sheet_review: ['approve', 'note', 'review_id'],
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get_sheet_asset_state: ['asset_id'],
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get_sheet_version: ['version_id'],
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grant_catalog_right: ['expires_at', 'kind', 'reason', 'user_id', 'verification_note'],
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list_catalog_grants: [],
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list_catalog_species: [],
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list_official_catalog: [],
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lookup_catalog_account: ['email'],
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rename_species: ['id', 'name_en', 'name_fr'],
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revoke_catalog_right: ['grant_id', 'reason'],
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save_sheet_draft: ['change_note', 'document', 'expected_revision', 'version_id'],
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submit_sheet_review: ['expected_revision', 'note', 'version_id'],
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update_inactive_species: ['id', 'name_en', 'name_fr', 'sort_order'],
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withdraw_sheet_review: ['note', 'review_id'],
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create_animal: [
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'birth_date',
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'birth_year',
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@@ -247,11 +312,10 @@ const expectedFunctionArgs = {
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deprecate_sheet_version: ['reason', 'version_id'],
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end_animal_client_relation: ['ended_on', 'expected_revision', 'relation_id'],
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expire_pending_uploads: ['max_age_seconds'],
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fork_anatomical_sheet: ['name', 'slug', 'source_version_id', 'visibility'],
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grant_platform_role: ['role', 'target_user_id'],
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list_client_animals: ['after_id', 'after_sort', 'client_id', 'page_size'],
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mark_quarantine_purged: ['asset_id'],
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publish_sheet_version: ['version_id'],
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publish_sheet_version: ['review_id'],
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register_sheet_asset: ['byte_size', 'file_name', 'sha256', 'sheet_id'],
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reject_avatar_job: ['asset_id', 'lock_token', 'reason'],
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remove_avatar: [],
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@@ -276,7 +340,6 @@ const expectedFunctionArgs = {
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],
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set_animal_archived: ['animal_id', 'archived'],
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set_client_archived: ['archived', 'client_id'],
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set_sheet_visibility: ['sheet_id', 'visibility'],
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update_animal: [
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'animal_id',
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'birth_date',
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@@ -26,6 +26,34 @@ create table auth.users (
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updated_at timestamptz default now()
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);
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-- MFA state read by the V1-2 assurance checks (private.has_aal2_session,
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-- private.has_verified_totp). Types, names and NOT NULL columns as in GoTrue
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-- v2.197.0 (checked on the pinned image by tests/sandbox/mfa.sandbox.ts);
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-- the columns the migrations never read are left out.
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create type auth.aal_level as enum ('aal1', 'aal2', 'aal3');
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create type auth.factor_type as enum ('totp', 'webauthn', 'phone', 'recovery_code');
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create type auth.factor_status as enum ('unverified', 'verified');
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create table auth.sessions (
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id uuid primary key,
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user_id uuid not null references auth.users (id) on delete cascade,
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created_at timestamptz,
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updated_at timestamptz,
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factor_id uuid,
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aal auth.aal_level,
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not_after timestamptz
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);
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create table auth.mfa_factors (
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id uuid primary key,
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user_id uuid not null references auth.users (id) on delete cascade,
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friendly_name text,
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factor_type auth.factor_type not null,
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status auth.factor_status not null,
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created_at timestamptz not null,
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updated_at timestamptz not null
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);
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create or replace function auth.uid()
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returns uuid
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language sql
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@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
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/**
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* GoTrue MFA calls of the sandbox (real GoTrue v2.197.0): enrol a TOTP factor,
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* challenge and verify it to reach `aal2`, remove it. Every call carries the
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* user's own access token, as the browser does. TOTP secrets and tokens stay
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* in memory and are never printed.
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*/
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import { stack } from './stack'
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import { msToNextStep, totpCode } from './totp'
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export interface Factor {
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id: string
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secret: string
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}
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export interface MfaResult {
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status: number
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body: Record<string, unknown>
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}
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async function authRequest(
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method: string,
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path: string,
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token: string,
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body?: unknown,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const res = await fetch(stack.authUrl + path, {
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method,
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headers: {
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apikey: stack.anonKey,
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Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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},
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body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
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})
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const text = await res.text()
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let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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// not JSON: keep an empty body
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}
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return { status: res.status, body: parsed }
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}
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/** POST /factors: a new unverified TOTP factor (the secret is shown once). */
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export async function enrolTotp(
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token: string,
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name: string,
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): Promise<{ status: number; factor: Factor | null; body: MfaResult['body'] }> {
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const res = await authRequest('POST', '/factors', token, {
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factor_type: 'totp',
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friendly_name: name,
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})
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const totp = res.body.totp as { secret?: string } | undefined
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const factor =
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res.status === 200 && typeof res.body.id === 'string' && totp?.secret
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? { id: res.body.id, secret: totp.secret }
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: null
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return { status: res.status, factor, body: res.body }
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}
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/** Challenge then verify with the current code; resolves with the new session (aal2 on success). */
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export async function verifyTotp(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const challenge = await authRequest(
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'POST',
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`/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`,
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token,
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{},
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)
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if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
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return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, {
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challenge_id: challenge.body.id,
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code: totpCode(factor.secret),
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})
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}
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/**
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* Verify with a code of a step not used before for this factor: GoTrue refuses
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* a code it already accepted, so a second verification waits for the next step.
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*/
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export async function verifyTotpFreshStep(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, msToNextStep() + 200))
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return verifyTotp(token, factor)
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}
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export function unenrol(token: string, factorId: string): Promise<MfaResult> {
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return authRequest('DELETE', `/factors/${factorId}`, token)
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}
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/** The claims of an access token (payload only; the signature is not checked here). */
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export function claimsOf(token: string): Record<string, unknown> {
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const payload = token.split('.')[1] ?? ''
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return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as Record<
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string,
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unknown
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>
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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/**
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* V1-2.1 on the throwaway stack with REAL GoTrue and PostgreSQL: the AR-1 B
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* path proven with real TOTP factors and real sessions (pgTAP uses fabricated
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* auth rows), and the last-owner race under two concurrent transactions (F18).
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* Contract docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §5.7, §15. Run through
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* `pnpm db:sandbox test tests/sandbox/sheets.sandbox.ts`.
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*/
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import { confirmedAccount, rpc, sql, errorCode, type Account } from './stack'
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import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp, claimsOf } from './mfa'
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/** Enrols and verifies a TOTP factor, returning a fresh aal2 access token. */
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async function stepUp(account: Account): Promise<string> {
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const enrol = await enrolTotp(account.token, 'device')
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if (!enrol.factor) throw new Error(`enrol failed: ${JSON.stringify(enrol.body)}`)
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const verified = await verifyTotp(account.token, enrol.factor)
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const token = verified.body.access_token as string
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if (!token) throw new Error(`verify failed: ${JSON.stringify(verified.body)}`)
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return token
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}
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describe('AR-1 B on real GoTrue', () => {
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let owner: Account
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let ownerAal2: string
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let target: Account
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beforeAll(async () => {
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owner = await confirmedAccount('ar1-owner')
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target = await confirmedAccount('ar1-target')
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// Bootstrap the owner role through the operator path (no JWT).
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await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${owner.id}', 'owner')`)
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// The target holds a verified factor (a grant needs one).
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await stepUp(target)
|
||||
ownerAal2 = await stepUp(owner)
|
||||
}, 120_000)
|
||||
|
||||
it('refuses a platform role change from the aal1 session', async () => {
|
||||
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, owner.token)
|
||||
expect(claimsOf(owner.token).aal).toBe('aal1')
|
||||
expect([res.status, errorCode(res)]).toEqual([403, '42501'])
|
||||
expect((res.body as { message?: string }).message).toBe('mfa_required')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('allows the change from a live aal2 session, then reads it back', async () => {
|
||||
expect(claimsOf(ownerAal2).aal).toBe('aal2')
|
||||
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, ownerAal2)
|
||||
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where user_id = '${target.id}' and role = 'support' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('refuses a grant to an account with no verified factor', async () => {
|
||||
const noFactor = await confirmedAccount('ar1-nofactor')
|
||||
const res = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: noFactor.id, role: 'moderator' }, ownerAal2)
|
||||
expect([res.status, (res.body as { message?: string }).message]).toEqual([400, 'target_factor_missing'])
|
||||
await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${noFactor.id}'`)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
afterAll(async () => {
|
||||
for (const a of [owner, target]) if (a?.id) await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${a.id}'`).catch(() => {})
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('last-owner race (F18)', () => {
|
||||
it('two concurrent revocations of two owners leave one owner', async () => {
|
||||
const a = await confirmedAccount('f18-a')
|
||||
const b = await confirmedAccount('f18-b')
|
||||
const aAal2 = await stepUp(a)
|
||||
const bAal2 = await stepUp(b)
|
||||
await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${a.id}', 'owner')`)
|
||||
await sql(`select private.assign_platform_role(null, '${b.id}', 'owner')`)
|
||||
// Neutralise every other owner so a and b are the only two.
|
||||
await sql(`update public.profile_roles set revoked_at = now(), revoke_reason = 'f18 test'
|
||||
where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null and user_id not in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
|
||||
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('2')
|
||||
|
||||
// Each revokes the other, concurrently.
|
||||
const [ra, rb] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: b.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race a' }, aAal2),
|
||||
rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: a.id, role: 'owner', reason: 'race b' }, bAal2),
|
||||
])
|
||||
const statuses = [ra.status, rb.status]
|
||||
// The invariant that F18 broke: the two cannot both pass and leave zero
|
||||
// owners. Exactly one succeeds; the other is refused (last_owner when it
|
||||
// reaches the guard, or forbidden when it lost its own ownership first);
|
||||
// one owner always remains.
|
||||
expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 200), JSON.stringify([ra.body, rb.body])).toHaveLength(1)
|
||||
expect(statuses.filter((s) => s !== 200)).toHaveLength(1)
|
||||
expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
|
||||
|
||||
await sql(`delete from auth.users where id in ('${a.id}', '${b.id}')`)
|
||||
}, 120_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* RFC 6238 TOTP codes for the sandbox MFA tests (contract
|
||||
* docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §15): HMAC-SHA1, 30 s steps,
|
||||
* 6 digits, the parameters GoTrue v2.197.0 uses. Node `crypto` only, no
|
||||
* dependency. The secret stays in the test's memory: never printed, logged or
|
||||
* written anywhere.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'
|
||||
|
||||
const BASE32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'
|
||||
export const TOTP_STEP_SECONDS = 30
|
||||
|
||||
function base32Decode(text: string): Buffer {
|
||||
const clean = text.replace(/=+$/, '').toUpperCase()
|
||||
const bytes: number[] = []
|
||||
let buffer = 0
|
||||
let bits = 0
|
||||
for (const char of clean) {
|
||||
const value = BASE32.indexOf(char)
|
||||
if (value < 0) throw new Error('totp: secret is not base32')
|
||||
buffer = (buffer << 5) | value
|
||||
bits += 5
|
||||
if (bits >= 8) {
|
||||
bits -= 8
|
||||
bytes.push((buffer >> bits) & 0xff)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Buffer.from(bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** The 6-digit code of `secret` for the step holding `at` (ms since epoch). */
|
||||
export function totpCode(secret: string, at = Date.now()): string {
|
||||
const counter = Buffer.alloc(8)
|
||||
counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(Math.floor(at / 1000 / TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)))
|
||||
const mac = createHmac('sha1', base32Decode(secret)).update(counter).digest()
|
||||
const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f
|
||||
const value = (mac.readUInt32BE(offset) & 0x7fffffff) % 1_000_000
|
||||
return value.toString().padStart(6, '0')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Milliseconds until the next step starts (a fresh code). */
|
||||
export function msToNextStep(at = Date.now()): number {
|
||||
const step = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
|
||||
return step - (at % step)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ import {
|
||||
sql,
|
||||
sqlOutcome,
|
||||
stack,
|
||||
} from './stack'
|
||||
import { enrolTotp, verifyTotp } from './mfa'
|
||||
import {
|
||||
uniqueEmail,
|
||||
type Account,
|
||||
} from './stack'
|
||||
@@ -194,11 +197,18 @@ describe('reads and refusals per role', () => {
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('stores an oversized correlation header as null and keeps a short token', async () => {
|
||||
// AR-1 B: the role RPCs need a live aal2 session and a factored target, so
|
||||
// the seed owner steps up and b enrols a factor before the grant.
|
||||
const owner = await signIn(
|
||||
'owner@faunosteo.local',
|
||||
'LocalDev-only-password-1',
|
||||
)
|
||||
const token = owner.body.access_token as string
|
||||
const ownerToken = owner.body.access_token as string
|
||||
const ownerEnrol = await enrolTotp(ownerToken, 'owner device')
|
||||
const token = (await verifyTotp(ownerToken, ownerEnrol.factor!)).body
|
||||
.access_token as string
|
||||
const bEnrol = await enrolTotp(b.token, 'b device')
|
||||
await verifyTotp(b.token, bEnrol.factor!)
|
||||
const grant = await rpc(
|
||||
'grant_platform_role',
|
||||
{ target_user_id: b.id, role: 'support' },
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user