docs(docs): RUST.md §10.4 browser results of the Rust import; TODO R4.2 closed, journal

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@@ -284,3 +284,4 @@ Owner validated R4.0 plan with conditions (BDR-057, plan §A.6, LRN-059/060). R3
- 2026-10-18 owner iPhone run of the Safari fix: all OK → check green (1015) → gitflow finish fcff92b. Owner go R4.1: feature/rust-r4-pdf-core cut from develop.
- 2026-10-18 R4.1 freeze done on feature/rust-r4-pdf-core (eff5405..4439fd2): O1-O13 generators + oracles committed, ledger 299 rows (150 ported / 28 replaced / 88 kept / 33 deleted), browser harness scripts/browser (Chromium 156, Firefox 157, WebKit 27.2, 4 GiB RSS watchdog = not guaranteed limit). TS baselines: CAP export stopped by ceiling in all 3 engines, L peak content 0.8-1.35 GB, import 226 files same outcome everywhere; O9 browsers = Node on 26 rows. Repo +5.92 MB stored vs ~5 MB approved. Frozen step6/r2/r3 goldens untouched. .gitleaks.toml narrow allowlist for compare.json. Next: checkpoint report to owner, then R4.2.
- 2026-10-18 owner validated R4.1 (fixtures 5.92 MB kept incl. real raster; gitleaks exception OK if narrow; decoy-first OD-4 kept in register, risk to explain before R4.3; UPNG/text oracles kept; headless OK for R4.1). Go R4.2 (reader, inflate, JSON pre-scan, UTF-8 parity, wasm facade, memory protections). Hard stop end of R4.2 before any import switch; budgets whole-browser; gains compared on identical perimeters. No merge, no R5, no release/prod.
- 2026-10-18 R4.2 done on feature/rust-r4-pdf-core (21d34fb..): pdf::read (scan, strings, stamp, inflate, probe), json_js, import_pdf, SheetHandle.import_pdf; O7 144/144, O9 38/38, O8 51 (4 declared: 3 OD-4 lone surrogate in overwritten dup value, 1 OD-3 values-1m), reference PDFs all import, through wasm too. OD-3: MAX_JSON_VALUES 400,000 (10 × CAP envelope 39,652), rescue copy guarded, --max-memory 1 GiB trap proven; hostile 16 MiB: 784 MiB → 16 MiB linear. Security gate BLOCK(1) (count stopped past depth cap → bypass) fixed 593893a, re-gate PASS. Browser run 3 engines: 666/678 agree, W4 max 68 MiB, W2 46 ms; open: after-GC residue 11.7 MiB first import (one-time), worker holds file twice on 50 MiB inputs (WebKit 324 MiB). Module 422 KB gzip. STOP before R4.3: owner to confirm thresholds.
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@@ -220,8 +220,9 @@ feat/findings-tree-v2 merged (FindingsTreePicker tracked in HEAD); all work belo
- [x] R4.2b `pdf/read/inflate.rs` (miniz_oxide, zlib framing, DecompressionStream verdicts): cargo tests on O9 (26 rows) + O7 flate inputs; Node verdict pinned, browsers agree (inflate.browsers.json)
- [x] R4.2c `pdf/json_js.rs`: `{` probe after BOM/whitespace, depth 64 + value-count pre-scan (OD-3 budget hook), lossy UTF-8 + one BOM (TextDecoder parity), overflow → null rewrite, lone-surrogate-neutralised probe through parse_json, versioned check; unit tests + text parity cases
- [x] R4.2d `pdf/read/probe.rs` locate_attachment (shared 16 MiB budget, `break` on oversized, cancelled inflation not charged), `pdf/import.rs` (read → session::import_archive), op `pdf.import` + `SheetHandle.importPdf(bytes)` on the wasm facade, ts-rs `PdfImportKind`; cargo tests on O7 locate/readAttachedDocument/readReportArchive rows, O8 differential (51), Node tests through the wasm build on O2/O3/O8/hostile
- [~] R4.2e (Node part done: cap 400,000 = 10 × CAP envelope 39,652 values, rescue copy guarded, 1 GiB ceiling proven; browser run pending) OD-3: measurement harness (fresh wasm instance per case, time, linear memory; Node) on the hostile classes (16 MiB token-dense attachment, 16 MiB rescue copy, 50 MiB file, 16 MiB inflation, 32 candidates) + browser harness (worker page, content-process RSS, same perimeter as the TS import baseline); value budget = 10 × largest legitimate archive; `--max-memory`; W1 module size; thresholds table for the owner
- [ ] R4.2f record: RUST.md §10.3 (reader, parity, budgets, thresholds, residual risks), decoy-first (OD-4) risk explanation + proof it blocks no legitimate Faunosteo document, ledger `ported` targets exist, suites green (rust:check, wasm:build, check); STOP for the owner before R4.3
- [x] R4.2e (Node part done: cap 400,000 = 10 × CAP envelope 39,652 values, rescue copy guarded, 1 GiB ceiling proven; browser run pending) OD-3: measurement harness (fresh wasm instance per case, time, linear memory; Node) on the hostile classes (16 MiB token-dense attachment, 16 MiB rescue copy, 50 MiB file, 16 MiB inflation, 32 candidates) + browser harness (worker page, content-process RSS, same perimeter as the TS import baseline); value budget = 10 × largest legitimate archive; `--max-memory`; W1 module size; thresholds table for the owner
- [ ] R4.2e follow-ups for R4.3: worker holds the File ArrayBuffer and its linear copy together (50 MiB file: WebKit content peak 324 MiB vs 76 TS) → release the buffer after the glue copy or read in chunks; after-GC residue 11.7 MiB first import (one-time, +1.9 then −0.2 on repeats) → owner decides the §B.3 criterion; `scripts/browser/lib/import-inputs.mjs` shortcut: copy of import-baseline's listing, fold into one module when import-baseline is retired (R4.8)
- [x] R4.2f (done 2026-10-18; RUST.md §10.3 + §10.4; STOP for the owner before R4.3) record: RUST.md §10.3 (reader, parity, budgets, thresholds, residual risks), decoy-first (OD-4) risk explanation + proof it blocks no legitimate Faunosteo document, ledger `ported` targets exist, suites green (rust:check, wasm:build, check); STOP for the owner before R4.3
- [ ] R4.3 import worker + rescue copy (B.1.5, OD-1 applied, browser proof per slice from here)
- [ ] J1 owner checkpoint (plan A.4)
- [ ] R4.4 layout → draw log
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@@ -1194,3 +1194,92 @@ Residual risks and open points for the owner (R4.2 checkpoint):
- The probe parses the candidate twice (version check, then the session),
as the TypeScript did; the peak is one tree since the first is dropped. A
single parse would need the gated session reader to take a value.
### 10.4 R4.2: the Rust import in the browsers (2026-10-18, `scripts/browser/results/2026-10-18-r4-import.json`)
Harness `scripts/browser/r4-import.mjs` (README there): the shape plan §B.1.5
gives the application at R4.3, a module worker created for one import, the
compiled `WebAssembly.Module` posted by the main thread, the `File` read in
the worker, one `SheetHandle.import_pdf`, the worker terminated; the same
226 files, engines, groups and RSS metrics as the TypeScript baseline of
10.2 (`compare-imports.mjs` prints both side by side). Chromium 156 headless
shell, Firefox 157, WebKit 27.2 (WPE), headless only; the 4 GiB RSS watchdog
is not a guaranteed memory limit. Module `ba070c29…`, 1,252,727 B, memory
maximum 16,384 pages (1 GiB).
Agreement: 666 of 678 (engine, file) pairs give the same outcome as the TS
import (editor ↔ `ok`, error ↔ a failure kind). The 12 others are the four
declared files in each engine: `values-1m` (OD-3), `surrogate-content-
overwritten`, `surrogate-version-overwritten`, `two-files-decoy-first`
(OD-4). Mapped to the §B.1.8 messages, no other difference.
Legitimate groups, TS → Rust (median ms on the Node clock, with the Rust
page clock after the slash; max RSS growth MiB summed / content):
| Engine | base | r3 | step6 | tolerance | read |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chromium ms | 53 → 65 / 32 | 63 → 80 / 43 | 61 → 65 / 41 | 57 → 63 / 31 | 66 → 68 / 29 |
| Chromium MiB | 28 / 23 → 17 / 15 | 44 / 38 → 16 / 16 | 39 / 33 → 17 / 17 | 105 / 99 → 18 / 16 | 75 / 68 → 117 / 115 |
| Firefox ms | 39 → 67 / 22 | 73 → 55 / 30 | 69 → 54 / 28 | 53 → 46 / 21 | 78 → 45 / 21 |
| Firefox MiB | 63 / 14 → 52 / 9 | 54 / 33 → 60 / 35 | 52 / 32 → 52 / 26 | 153 / 131 → 58 / 35 | 86 / 61 → 154 / 127 |
| WebKit ms | 52 → 45 / 25 | 62 → 55 / 37 | 66 → 50 / 33 | 59 → 44 / 26 | 75 → 43 / 24 |
| WebKit MiB | 52 / 50 → 61 / 59 | 54 / 52 → 71 / 67 | 53 / 51 → 60 / 59 | 102 / 100 → 70 / 67 | 101 / 99 → 324 / 299 |
The durations are not strictly like for like: the TS baseline ran the whole
application (the core loads during the import), the Rust page compiles the
module at page load (8 to 25 ms) and builds a `SheetHandle` per import
(about 21 ms in Chromium). The hostile `tolerance` group costs a fifth of
the TS memory under Rust. The `read` group costs more: its 20 to 50 MiB
inputs are held twice in the worker, the `File`'s ArrayBuffer and the glue's
copy in linear memory (54 MiB), and WebKit adds more on top
(`size-exactly-50mib`: Chromium 117 against 56 MiB, Firefox 154 against 79,
WebKit 324 against 76). R4.3 releases the buffer after the copy or reads the
file in chunks. Chromium main-thread long tasks during the imports: 0 (W5).
Hostile classes, Rust (Chromium / Firefox / WebKit; linear memory is the
instance's, the same in every engine; the GC delta is Chromium's content
process after the worker is terminated and a GC forced):
| Class | Outcome | Page ms | Summed peak MiB | Content peak MiB | Linear MiB | GC delta MiB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| L envelope | ok | 46 / 36 / 45 | 4 / 11 / 9 | 6 / 9 / 7 | 4.6 | 11.7 |
| CAP envelope | ok | 88 / 77 / 83 | 31 / 20 / 39 | 29 / 18 / 35 | 13.9 | 14.2 |
| 16 MiB dense numbers | attachment_stripped | 183 / 199 / 130 | 45 / 47 / 124 | 47 / 45 / 114 | 20.0 | 11.8 |
| 16 MiB dense strings | attachment_stripped | 153 / 188 / 122 | 43 / 48 / 122 | 47 / 45 / 113 | 20.0 | 11.1 |
| 16 MiB at depth 64 | attachment_stripped | 180 / 198 / 136 | 45 / 47 / 123 | 48 / 45 / 114 | 20.0 | 12.2 |
| 16 MiB rescue copy | invalid | 178 / 190 / 164 | 113 / 145 / 234 | 115 / 143 / 225 | 52.0 | 15.4 |
| 16 MiB inflation | attachment_stripped | 43 / 37 / 43 | 20 / 12 / 13 | 18 / 10 / 11 | 35.3 | 11.1 |
| 16 MiB + 1 bomb | attachment_stripped | 50 / 44 / 49 | 5 / 8 / 10 | 7 / 7 / 8 | 67.3 | 12.1 |
| 32 bombs | attachment_stripped | 218 / 221 / 203 | 68 / 64 / 81 | 66 / 61 / 77 | 67.9 | 12.6 |
| 50 MiB file | no_attachment | 176 / 217 / 127 | 113 / 115 / 317 | 115 / 113 / 295 | 53.9 | 11.3 |
- W4: linear memory at most 67.9 MiB on every hostile class (budget 256).
- The ceiling: in the three engines, `allocate_for_test(256)` returns and
`allocate_for_test(1100)` throws `RuntimeError` (proofs build, linear
257 MiB). Cap off, the 16 MiB dense document reaches 788 MiB of linear
memory and 817 to 851 MiB of content-process peak in about 1 s; with the
cap, 45 to 114 MiB.
- Worker start, median (max): Chromium 6.3 (40.6) ms, Firefox 10.0 (20.0),
WebKit 5.0 (8.0). W2: the L envelope imports in 46 ms page-to-result in
Chromium, CAP in 88 ms. The structured clone of the compiled Module works
in the three engines (236 of 236 workers ready from the clone). No CSP
violation in any page or worker under the production policy with
`'wasm-unsafe-eval'`.
- The §B.3 "content process back within 10 MiB after GC" check is not met
as written on a first import: 3 of 238 Chromium runs; the median delta is
11.7 MiB (7.3 to 13.3; hostile max 15.4). It is a one-time cost, not a
leak: three imports in one page give +11.6, +1.9, −0.2 MiB (L) and +11.0,
+1.4, +0.2 (dense); an empty module worker leaves about 2 MiB, an
instantiated one 3.7, the cloned Module is not the cause (the same without
it). Firefox and WebKit got 5 s idle only (indicative: Firefox +4.8 then
flat, WebKit +24.5 / +43.2 then down to −3). Owner decision: the criterion
counts the first import, or the growth per import.
- Seen once in a WebKit smoke run before the full run: 2 of 3 repeated
imports of the 16 MiB dense document ended with a worker `error` event,
text not captured then; not reproduced in two targeted reruns nor in the
full run (0 failures across 242 WebKit workers). Error text is captured
now; to watch at J1.
Not measured: real devices and browsers (J1), forced GC in Firefox and
WebKit, CPU throttling, the hostile classes on the TS side, the negative
CSP proof (without the keyword), the application's own worker (R4.3).