docs(docs): R5.3 fourth final round declared (RUST.md §11.12-11.13), security final4, verify record

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@@ -52,3 +52,9 @@ Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`. Fresh verifier,
- Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13, one family: a null or primitive among the children of an added item. TS: TypeError where walked (refused), skipped by a reference rename's citation walk (accepted if later removed), gate if kept. Rust: tolerated by touch/walk (accepted), refused by rename's item_at_mut. Three splits; §11.12 claimed "both refuse" for the null child, false. Differential: 82,000 random changesets, 13,758 accepted identical (document, records, stats, map), 63 schema + 34 references probes agree. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET (19 tests).
- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final3.md`), LOW only: reads follow folder links out of the seed; shape comparison ignores array length; a folder appearing after the claim accepted; seed guard wiring untested; `set name.fr.x` records `before: null`; lint allows (context).
- Fixed: non-object children refused at the add (3 TS-frozen cases, 1 declared refusal); reads confined to the canonical seed; array length compared; only folders this run created; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` + fixture unit test. Declared: replaced-string `before` (TS same), memory factor ~2x TS.
## Fourth final round on 6c0fe88
- Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13: records differ (document identical) on array index keys in authored values or field segments (JSON.parse puts them first) and on integers beyond 2^53 (JSON.parse rounds; a Rust record held 9007199254740993 while document.json printed ...992); §11.12 declared-case count wrong. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET; 25,000 random changesets: 0 accept/refuse splits, 4,331 accepted identical.
- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final4.md`): MEDIUM a present non-list `children` replaced by `[]` (author data lost); LOW `--check` lists through a top-level folder link, mount alias of the seed, walk cost understated (8.2 MB file ~36 s, cap-bound worst case ~45 min), fixture in shared temp, context items.
- Fixed: `text::js_normalize` (key order + big integers at parse) and `text::js_insert` (field path writes); non-list `children`/`categories` refused at add, `children_path` never replaces; `--check` requires each generated folder to be the seed's own; `inside_by_identity` (dev, ino of every ancestor); `MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES` 200,000; fixture under target/. Cases frozen from TS: 2 key-order, 1 integer, 1 declared non-list children; Rust tests: big integer from raw text, value bound.
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
```
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 35 files
BLOCKING:
(none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [MEDIUM] author-data-silently-replaced (non-array `children` of an added item) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252 + crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246
- [LOW] check-lists-through-top-level-folder-link — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193 (listed, :164)
- [LOW] seed-containment-is-path-based (bind-mount alias) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230 (inside, :253)
- [LOW] declared-depth-walk-cost-understates-cap-bound-worst-case — crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110 / docs/development/RUST.md:3046
- [LOW] unit-test-fixture-in-shared-temp-with-fixed-name — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383
- [LOW] context: clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file (project convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7
- [LOW] context: seed SQL rendered by string formatting from pipeline values — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29
PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 35 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 7 findings (1 MEDIUM, 6 LOW)
```
# R5.3 draft, security gate (fresh, final 4)
Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, HEAD `6c0fe88`, scope `git diff 5e114da..HEAD`
(35 files, 11 commits), with attention to `86273b6`. Read whole: `bin/import_equine.rs`,
`curation/draft/{shape,ops,apply,schema,targets,fields,records,rename,stats,migration_map,seed,pipeline,mod}.rs`,
`curation/mod.rs`, `scripts/import-equine.sh`, the `package.json` line, the binary and
integration tests that touch the file system, the oracle generator's write guard
(`MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1` only). Every probe ran in
`/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/sec4.j5fliv`
on a copy of the seed, through a probe binary that is `import_equine.rs` byte for byte except
the `SEED` constant (pointed at the copy). Nothing ran `--out` against the repository, nothing
was deleted, `git status` is clean after the run.
## Semgrep
`semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten
--metrics=off` on the 35 existing files of the diff: 129 rules run, 0 findings, 0 errors.
The rulesets carry almost no Rust rules; the Rust code was covered by reading and probing.
## Checklist
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Hardcoded secret / token / key / auth URL | none (grep over the 35 files) |
| SQL by string interpolation | `seed.rs` renders the seed file by formatting: LOW context below, not a runtime query |
| Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval…) | not applicable (Rust CLI and library, no DOM) |
| Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (no endpoint) |
| Stack trace / internal path to an end user | not applicable (errors go to the local developer's stderr) |
| Secret / PII in a log | none (stdout/stderr carry paths, counts and refusals) |
| Tracked `.env` / credential file | only `.env.example` tracked |
| Guardrails scanner (`--domain api,supabase`) | 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`, `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, outside the diff, dropped), 1 MANUAL |
| New suppressions (anti-gaming) | no `nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `ts-ignore`, `noqa`; one clippy allow in a new test file (LOW context below) |
## Owner requirements, verified
- Seed never modified automatically: every read goes through `read()` (canonical path inside
the canonical seed, regular file, 16 MiB cap). Probed: `curation/` as a folder link out of
the seed and `changes.json` as a file link out of it are both refused (`leads outside the
seed folder`); a folder link that stays inside the seed is accepted.
- `--check` writes nothing: only `canonicalize`, `metadata`, `read`, `read_dir` on that path.
Probe copy: 12 files, 0 differences, nothing new under the fixture seed (`find -newer`).
- `--out` refusals, probed on the fixture seed: a link to the seed and to `draft/` (as the
destination and as its parent), a link chain `p/q` ending in a seed link, the seed path
itself plus `/new`, `legacy-import/new`, `INIT_CWD` set inside the seed, `..`, an empty path,
`/`: all refused, nothing created. A relative `INIT_CWD` is ignored. A valid destination
gets 12 files identical to the seed (`diff -rq`), a second run on it is refused `not empty`.
Files are `create_new`, folders `create_dir` tracked in `created`, so an entry that appears
after the claim is refused. File names are pipeline constants.
- Strict changeset validation, depth and resource caps: `deny_unknown_fields`, the `op`
discriminator, non-empty strings, the shape comparison (now with array length), reserved
NUL keys at parse and in field paths, 8 field segments, serde_json's 128 parse depth, 64
document levels after each op (iterative walk), 16 MiB per file. Recursive walks
(`reserved_key`, `first_mismatch`, `strip_marks`, `walk`, `touch_tree`, `js_deep_equal`) are
all bounded by the 128 parse depth or the 64-level check.
- `86273b6`: `assert_object_children` refuses a non-object entry of a `children` or
`categories` list (explicit stack); the length arm of `first_mismatch` sits before the
element arm; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` with its fixture test refuses before any
`create_dir`. All correct. One gap left next to the first: MEDIUM below.
## Findings
### MEDIUM: a non-array `children` on an added item is silently replaced by `[]`
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252` (`assert_object_children` skips a `children`
value that is not an array) and `crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246`
(`children_path` overwrites any present non-array `children` with `[]`). An `add` whose value
carries `"children"` as an object, a string or `null`, followed by an `add` (or a `move`)
into that item, is accepted: the strict gate never sees the author's value, which is gone
from `document.json` and the migration map. Probed on the real equine changeset plus one
level-A change: `"children": {"author-note": {"id": "kept", ...}}` (a whole nested finding
written as an object instead of an array), `"children": "author text"` and
`"children": null` all give `probe-node.children = [probe-child]`, exit 0, 12 files written.
Only the add record's `after` keeps the value; no R5.3 output shows it (the CHANGELOG is
R5.4). Parity with the TypeScript `childrenOf`, and not declared: §11.12 says "a lean leaf
gets `children: []` appended on demand", which covers an absent key, not a present value
replaced. This breaks the owner's "author data never dropped silently" through a plausible
typo (object in place of array). Non-blocking: no security boundary is crossed.
Hint: in `assert_object_children`, refuse a present `children` or `categories` key whose
value is not an array (same message family, same place as the entry check), or make
`children_path` refuse a present non-array value and append `[]` only when the key is absent.
Declare the split in the §11.12 table with a frozen TypeScript case.
### LOW: `--check` lists through a top-level folder link
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193` calls `listed(&target, ...)` on
`SEED/legacy-import` or `SEED/draft` without checking the folder itself: `read_dir` follows
it when it is a link. Probed with `legacy-import` pointing out of the seed: the reads are
refused (`missing: ...`), but `not produced: private-name.txt` and `not produced:
sub/deep.txt` print the names of files outside the seed, subfolders included. Read-only,
names only, same user. §11.12's "`--check` lists a link without walking into it" holds for
entries, not for the generated folder itself.
Hint: canonicalize the target and require `inside(&canonical, &seed)` before listing, or
refuse a target whose `symlink_metadata` is a link.
### LOW: the seed guard is path-based, a mount alias passes it
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230` compares canonical paths (`starts_with`).
`canonicalize` resolves links, not mounts: if the seed (or the repository) is reachable
through a second path (bind mount, the same NAS share mounted twice), `--out
<alias>/.../equine/new` passes `inside` and creates a new folder inside the official seed.
Only new files (never an overwrite, never a delete); the user must type the alias. Reasoned,
not probed (a mount needs privileges).
Hint: also compare `(dev, ino)` (`std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt`) of the canonical parent and
each of its ancestors with the seed folder's; a bind mount root shares the source's pair.
### LOW: the declared depth-walk cost understates the cap-bound worst case
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110` runs `assert_depth` over the whole document
after every op; RUST.md:3046 declares it with one sample ("a 2.4 MB changeset takes about
10 s"). The sample is right (probe: 2.3 MB, one 1 M-node add then 2,000 sets, 12.4 s,
455 MB). The worst case inside the 16 MiB read cap is two orders larger: 8.2 MB, one 4 M-node
add then 1,000 sets, 35.7 s and 1.7 GB, so about 30 ms per op, and the remaining 8 MB holds
about 94,000 more ops: roughly 45 minutes of CPU before the final gate refuses. Twenty
thousand plain sets on the real document take 0.9 s, so ordinary changesets are not affected.
Local developer tool, interruptible. The declaration is not wrong, it is incomplete.
Hint: state the cap-bound figure in §11.13, or bound the work: a total node cap on the
document after each op (also bounds memory), or a depth check limited to the subtree the op
wrote.
### LOW: unit-test fixture at a fixed name in the shared temp folder
`crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383`: `env::temp_dir().join("faunosteo-import-equine-claim")`
with `create_dir_all`. On a multi-user host another account can pre-create or link that
name. The test only runs refusals, so the worst outcome is a failed test or an empty folder
created where the link points. The integration test already uses the private
`CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR`.
Hint: put the fixture under the target folder (for example
`concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../../target/...")`) or a per-run name created
exclusively.
### LOW (context): clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file
`crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods,
clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. A determinism and robustness lint (no I/O, no
clock in the core), not a security scanner suppression. The same line heads the ten other
core test files. The binary's `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` was already present at
`5e114da`. Not blocking.
### LOW (context): seed SQL rendered by string formatting
`crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29` (`sql_text`) and `:90` (`document_literal`). Every
interpolated value is a pipeline constant, a sha256 hex, a derived uuid or a byte count;
quotes are doubled (correct with `standard_conforming_strings` on, the PostgreSQL default);
the document is embedded in a `$equine_doc$` literal and refused if it holds the tag; the
formatted JSON always ends with `}`, so no tag can form at the closing boundary. This
generates a reviewed seed file, it is not a runtime query. No action.
## Residual risks declared in RUST.md §11.13
Memory without a cap beyond 16 MiB per file: confirmed (1.7 GB from an 8.2 MB file), in line
with the declaration. Single-user check-then-use window on reads and `--out`: confirmed as
described, every file stays `create_new`. Lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys: as declared. The
quadratic walk: LOW above.