fix(worker): security audit of R0 — no core dumps, tkill/tgkill limited to SIGABRT on self, mmap without PROT_EXEC, Broken outcome for a broken child environment, frame vs canvas check, unsafe denied with local allows, sandbox tests and derivation on the release profile (syscall marker); wasm proof exports behind a feature; ci: release-images hardened (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral builder, env secrets + logout, ref gate, pinned checkout)
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
9d3e0294e2
commit
11813f5560
14 files changed
+293
-58
No files matched your search
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
use std::fmt;
|
||||
|
||||
use seccompiler::{BpfProgram, SeccompAction, SeccompFilter, SeccompRule, TargetArch};
|
||||
use seccompiler::{
|
||||
BpfProgram, SeccompAction, SeccompCmpArgLen, SeccompCmpOp, SeccompCondition, SeccompFilter,
|
||||
SeccompRule, TargetArch,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::limits;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@ impl std::error::Error for SandboxError {}
|
||||
/// derivation run of the test stage); a release child always passes `true`.
|
||||
pub fn apply(limits: &Limits, seccomp: bool) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
ensure_single_thread()?;
|
||||
disable_core_dumps()?;
|
||||
set_rlimits(limits)?;
|
||||
if seccomp {
|
||||
install_seccomp()?;
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +95,20 @@ pub fn apply(limits: &Limits, seccomp: bool) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// No core dump of the child: a dump would hold the uploaded photo (personal data) and
|
||||
/// could fill the VPS disk (SIGABRT under `RLIMIT_AS`, SIGSYS, SIGXCPU all dump by default).
|
||||
/// `PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0` is the kernel-side stop, `RLIMIT_CORE 0` the belt.
|
||||
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
|
||||
fn disable_core_dumps() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
// SAFETY: prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) takes no pointer and changes only this process.
|
||||
let rc = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) };
|
||||
if rc != 0 {
|
||||
return Err(SandboxError::Rlimit("PR_SET_DUMPABLE".to_owned()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
rlimit::setrlimit(rlimit::Resource::CORE, 0, 0)
|
||||
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Rlimit(format!("RLIMIT_CORE: {error}")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every syscall name the filter allows, for the derivation script and the tests.
|
||||
pub fn allowed_names() -> Vec<&'static str> {
|
||||
ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
@@ -137,12 +155,46 @@ fn set_rlimits(limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builds the BPF program: allow the listed syscalls, kill the process on anything else.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Argument filters on the abort path and on `mmap`: `tkill`/`tgkill` may only send SIGABRT
|
||||
/// to this very process (the child is single-threaded, so tid == pid), never a signal to the
|
||||
/// keyed parent or a sibling; `mmap` may not map executable memory.
|
||||
pub fn build_filter() -> Result<BpfProgram, SandboxError> {
|
||||
let rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
let pid = u64::from(std::process::id());
|
||||
let sigabrt = u64::try_from(libc::SIGABRT).unwrap_or(6);
|
||||
let prot_exec = u64::try_from(libc::PROT_EXEC).unwrap_or(4);
|
||||
let mut rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = ALLOWED_SYSCALLS
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.chain(ABORT_PATH_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
.map(|(_, number)| (*number, Vec::new()))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
let seccomp_err = |error: seccompiler::BackendError| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string());
|
||||
let eq = |index: u8, value: u64| {
|
||||
SeccompCondition::new(index, SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword, SeccompCmpOp::Eq, value)
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)
|
||||
};
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_tkill,
|
||||
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, sigabrt)?]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
|
||||
);
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_tgkill,
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
SeccompRule::new(vec![eq(0, pid)?, eq(1, pid)?, eq(2, sigabrt)?])
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)?,
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
let no_exec = SeccompCondition::new(
|
||||
2,
|
||||
SeccompCmpArgLen::Qword,
|
||||
SeccompCmpOp::MaskedEq(prot_exec),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(seccomp_err)?;
|
||||
rules.insert(
|
||||
libc::SYS_mmap,
|
||||
vec![SeccompRule::new(vec![no_exec]).map_err(seccomp_err)?],
|
||||
);
|
||||
let filter = SeccompFilter::new(
|
||||
rules,
|
||||
SeccompAction::KillProcess,
|
||||
@@ -150,9 +202,7 @@ pub fn build_filter() -> Result<BpfProgram, SandboxError> {
|
||||
target_arch()?,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))?;
|
||||
filter
|
||||
.try_into()
|
||||
.map_err(|error: seccompiler::BackendError| SandboxError::Seccomp(error.to_string()))
|
||||
filter.try_into().map_err(seccomp_err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn install_seccomp() -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user