fix(worker): security audit of R0 — no core dumps, tkill/tgkill limited to SIGABRT on self, mmap without PROT_EXEC, Broken outcome for a broken child environment, frame vs canvas check, unsafe denied with local allows, sandbox tests and derivation on the release profile (syscall marker); wasm proof exports behind a feature; ci: release-images hardened (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral builder, env secrets + logout, ref gate, pinned checkout)

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:18:53 +02:00
1 parent 9d3e0294e2
commit 11813f5560
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@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ pub const ENCODE_FAILED: i32 = 16;
pub const OUTPUT_FAILED: i32 = 17;
pub const INTERNAL: i32 = 18;
/// Codes that judge the content (the upload is refused); every other non-zero code means
/// the child's environment is broken and the parent must alert rather than reject.
pub fn is_content_rejection(code: i32) -> bool {
(INPUT_TOO_LARGE..=OUTPUT_FAILED).contains(&code)
}
/// Stable name of an exit code for logs and tests.
pub fn name(code: i32) -> &'static str {
match code {