fix(worker): security audit of R0 — no core dumps, tkill/tgkill limited to SIGABRT on self, mmap without PROT_EXEC, Broken outcome for a broken child environment, frame vs canvas check, unsafe denied with local allows, sandbox tests and derivation on the release profile (syscall marker); wasm proof exports behind a feature; ci: release-images hardened (typed input via env, advisories gate, ephemeral builder, env secrets + logout, ref gate, pinned checkout)

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:18:53 +02:00
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commit 11813f5560
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@@ -29,9 +29,10 @@ libc.workspace = true
crc32fast = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
# The worker owns I/O (it is the process boundary), so the core's disallowed_methods lint is
# off here; unsafe is allowed for the libwebp FFI only, each block carries a SAFETY comment.
# off here. unsafe stays denied crate-wide; the libwebp FFI and the prctl call carry a local
# #[allow(unsafe_code)] with a SAFETY comment each (forbid would not allow the local override).
[lints.rust]
unsafe_code = "allow"
unsafe_code = "deny"
[lints.clippy]
unwrap_used = "deny"