Merge feature/security-baseline into develop

2026-09-22 17:53:46 +02:00
parent 0d2e96819a 26c8e345c5
commit a6c416e1cf
10 changed files with 116 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -98,3 +98,13 @@ in repo, live apply = user.
 main install.sh never aborts; keep-existing [Y/n]; skipped without TTY). Script parses lines
 (`sed -n s/^KEY=//p`), never sources → no code exec as root from config. Alt rejected: sed placeholders into
 deployed script — config + code mixed, every re-run overwrites values. Status: done in repo.
+
+## BDR-013 — security baseline always-on in install.sh: fail2ban (all-ports), unattended-upgrades, sshd limits
+2026-09-22. User: "fail2ban and the like, systematically". Chose no-prompt Linux-block steps: (1) fail2ban sshd
+jail `backend = systemd` + `banaction = %(banaction_allports)s` → SSH port irrelevant (old server banned 22 while
+sshd on 337, LRN-012); `ignoreip` = loopback + RFC1918 static (no LAN detection; trade-off: compromised LAN host
+never banned); 5/10m/1h from RECOVERY doc 01. (2) `20auto-upgrades` file instead of interactive dpkg-reconfigure.
+(3) sshd drop-in limited to PermitRootLogin/MaxAuthTries/LoginGraceTime, `sshd -t` gated, rejected file removed +
+install continues. Declined by user: auditd rules, ufw whitelist (site-specific ports, lockout risk → would be an
+offer, not systematic). Not included by design: PasswordAuthentication no / AllowUsers / X11Forwarding no
+(lockout or workflow risk). Status: done in repo (feature/security-baseline), live apply = user.
@@ -59,3 +59,7 @@ end-of-install offers (BDR-011). cloudpex tracked; site values → /etc/cloudpex
 main→develop (a210d01 dtach was main-only), feature finished via lib → develop 836bb67. Not applied live.
 Flagged: secrets in NAS transfert/root (BLK-005), remote-install.sh BRANCH=master stale vs main, gitea-deploy/
 untracked, remote feature branch left on origin (lib deletes local only).
+Later same day: security baseline always-on in install.sh (fail2ban all-ports + RFC1918 ignore, unattended-
+upgrades file, sshd limits drop-in sshd -t gated) on feature/security-baseline (BDR-013, LRN-012: old jail
+banned 22 not 337). auditd + ufw declined. shellcheck/bash -n CLEAN, stub harness incl. sshd -t reject path,
+configparser + apt-config checks. Branch pushed, NOT finished (no merge signal). Live apply = user runbook.
@@ -85,3 +85,11 @@ here). Old-server earlyoom file valid as-is. Env-file syntax check: `sh -n`.
 Extract functions (`sed -n '/^fn()/,/^}/p'`) into scratch, define `sudo(){ echo "SUDO: $*"; }` + `systemctl`
 + `findmnt` stubs, override `confirm` per scenario, `</dev/null` for no-TTY. Covers every branch, prints exact
 sudo calls, `set -e` behaviour included. Gotcha: `unset -f` on an overridden fn removes it entirely.
+
+## LRN-012 — fail2ban jail must match the real sshd port, or ban all ports
+2026-09-22. Old server: sshd `Port 337`, fail2ban sshd jail with default `port = ssh` (=22) → bans hit port 22
+only, SSH on 337 stayed open to the banned IP. Silent, no error. Fix options: `port = 337` (needs detection /
+templating, drifts if port changes) or `banaction = %(banaction_allports)s` (offender blocked everywhere, port
+irrelevant) — chose allports. Offline checks without fail2ban installed: python `configparser` with
+BasicInterpolation resolves `%(x)s` refs and proves the file parses; apt.conf → `apt-config
+--config-file=<f> dump APT::Periodic`. sshd drop-ins can't be `sshd -t`-tested without root (host keys).
@@ -50,3 +50,13 @@ Root cause: /tmp is tmpfs (50% RAM) → agents fill it → RAM halved + ENOSPC b
 - [x] reconcile: merge main (a210d01 dtach) into develop via lib helper
 - [x] gitflow finish feature → develop (explicit user signal: "puis merge")
 - [x] runbook for live apply on this machine
+
+## Feature — security baseline in install.sh (2026-09-22)
+Branch: feature/security-baseline (off develop). Scope approved: fail2ban, unattended-upgrades, sshd hardening. auditd + ufw declined.
+- [x] etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf — sshd jail, backend systemd, allports ban, RFC1918 ignoreip
+- [x] etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades — Periodic Update-Package-Lists + Unattended-Upgrade = 1
+- [x] etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf — PermitRootLogin no, MaxAuthTries 3, LoginGraceTime 20
+- [x] install.sh: install_fail2ban / install_unattended_upgrades / harden_sshd (sshd -t gated), called in Linux block
+- [x] README.md (table, step 13, packages) + CLAUDE.md layout
+- [x] shellcheck + bash -n; stub harness harden_sshd (accept / reject paths); configparser check of jail file
+- [x] commit; registries (BDR-013, LRN-012); runbook. No finish without explicit signal.
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ etc/profile.d/disk-usage-warning.sh     login-time low-disk warning → /etc/pro
 etc/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf                 disk-backed /tmp cleanup rules (offer: /tmp on disk)
 etc/systemd/ssh.service.d/override.conf sshd OOM-exempt drop-in (offer: SSH memory guard)
 etc/default/earlyoom                    earlyoom args, spare sshd / kill node first (same offer)
+etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf          sshd jail: journal backend, all-ports ban, LAN ignored (always)
+etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades      unattended security upgrades on (always)
+etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf sshd limits that cannot lock out, sshd -t gated (always)
 cloudpex/{cloudpex,install.sh,README.md} on-demand SMB mount helper → /usr/local/bin; site values
                                         prompted at install → /etc/cloudpex.conf, never in the script (FR docs)
 .claude/{tasks,memory,audits}/   Claude working state
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ curl -fsSL https://git.bchanot.fr/bchanot/config/raw/branch/master/remote-instal
 | `etc/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf` | Cleanup rules for a disk-backed `/tmp` (wiped at boot, 10-day purge). Deployed by the `/tmp` on disk offer. |
 | `etc/systemd/ssh.service.d/override.conf` | `ssh.service` drop-in: sshd exempt from the OOM killer + memory reclaim protection. Deployed by the SSH memory guard offer. |
 | `etc/default/earlyoom` | earlyoom arguments: spare sshd/systemd, kill node/java first. Deployed by the SSH memory guard offer. |
+| `etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf` | fail2ban sshd jail: journal backend, all-ports ban, 5 tries / 10 min / 1 h, private LAN never banned. Deployed on every Linux install. |
+| `etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades` | Enables unattended security upgrades (what `dpkg-reconfigure` writes). Deployed on every Linux install. |
+| `etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf` | sshd limits that cannot lock you out: `PermitRootLogin no`, `MaxAuthTries 3`, `LoginGraceTime 20`. Deployed on every Linux install after `sshd -t`. |
 | `vim/vimrc`          | Vim config: pathogen, molokai, syntastic (C with `-Wall -Werror -Wextra`), NERDTree, 42-style canonical class generators (`:ClassH`, `:ClassC`). |
 | `vim/autoload/`      | `pathogen.vim` plugin loader (committed).                      |
 | `vim/colors/`        | `molokai.vim` colorscheme (committed).                         |
@@ -66,8 +69,9 @@ What it does:
 10. On Linux, installs **code-server** (VS Code in the browser) via its vendor script — skipped if already present — and enables the `code-server@$USER` systemd service.
 11. On Linux, sets up **RDP remote login** via `gnome-remote-desktop` (Wayland-native): installs the daemon + `openssl`, generates a self-signed TLS cert once, and prompts interactively for shared "gate" credentials (skipped when no terminal is attached, or already set). Disables `xrdp` if present; opens UFW port `3389` only when UFW is already active.
 12. On Linux, installs the **`cloudpex`** NAS mount helper to `/usr/local/bin` via `cloudpex/install.sh`, which prompts for the NAS host, share name, SMB user, mount point and SMB version and writes them to `/etc/cloudpex.conf` (root, `0600`; an existing config is shown and kept unless you say `n`; skipped when no terminal is attached). Nothing is mounted, no password stored, see [`cloudpex/README.md`](cloudpex/README.md).
-13. On Linux, at the very end, **offers** (`[y/N]`, skipped when no terminal is attached) to move **`/tmp` to disk**: Ubuntu mounts `/tmp` as a RAM-backed tmpfs capped at 50% of RAM, which agent runs fill, halving the RAM and breaking every shell with "No space left on device". Accepting masks `tmp.mount` and installs `etc/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf` (wipe at boot, 10-day purge). Effective at the next reboot.
-14. On Linux, at the very end, **offers** to keep **SSH reachable under memory pressure**: installs the `ssh.service` drop-in (`OOMScoreAdjust=-1000`, `MemoryMin=256M`) and `earlyoom` with `etc/default/earlyoom` (kills the largest process, `node`/`java` first and never `sshd`, once free RAM and swap both drop under 10%). Restarting `ssh` keeps open sessions. Note: `MemoryMin` protects the sshd daemon only; login sessions live in `user.slice`, so no setting can reserve RAM for a future shell. earlyoom acting in time is the real protection.
+13. On Linux, installs the **security baseline**, always, no prompt: **fail2ban** (+ `nftables`) with `etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf` (sshd jail reading the journal, bans the offending IP on every port so the SSH port does not matter, 5 failures in 10 min → 1 h ban, loopback and private LAN ranges never banned); **unattended-upgrades** enabled through `etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades`; and the **sshd drop-in** `etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf` (`PermitRootLogin no`, `MaxAuthTries 3`, `LoginGraceTime 20`), checked with `sshd -t` and removed again if sshd rejects it, then `reload ssh`. Authentication methods, port and user lists are left as they are.
+14. On Linux, at the very end, **offers** (`[y/N]`, skipped when no terminal is attached) to move **`/tmp` to disk**: Ubuntu mounts `/tmp` as a RAM-backed tmpfs capped at 50% of RAM, which agent runs fill, halving the RAM and breaking every shell with "No space left on device". Accepting masks `tmp.mount` and installs `etc/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf` (wipe at boot, 10-day purge). Effective at the next reboot.
+15. On Linux, at the very end, **offers** to keep **SSH reachable under memory pressure**: installs the `ssh.service` drop-in (`OOMScoreAdjust=-1000`, `MemoryMin=256M`) and `earlyoom` with `etc/default/earlyoom` (kills the largest process, `node`/`java` first and never `sshd`, once free RAM and swap both drop under 10%). Restarting `ssh` keeps open sessions. Note: `MemoryMin` protects the sshd daemon only; login sessions live in `user.slice`, so no setting can reserve RAM for a future shell. earlyoom acting in time is the real protection.

 ### Packages installed (apt)

@@ -79,6 +83,7 @@ What it does:
 - **Docker**: `docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin` (via Docker's repo)
 - **Remote access**: `gnome-remote-desktop openssl` (apt) + `code-server` (via its vendor install script, not apt) — RDP remote login + browser VS Code
 - **pipx**: `PyMuPDF` (`pymupdf`), `Markdown` (`markdown_py`)
+- **Security baseline (Linux, always)**: `fail2ban nftables unattended-upgrades`
 - **Optional (end-of-install offer, Linux)**: `earlyoom`

 The script is re-runnable: each run re-backs up to `~/Oldconfig` (overwriting the previous backup), re-clones plugins, skips Docker if already installed, and re-deploys the `bin/` scripts.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Automatic security updates, deployed by install.sh. Same content as
+// `dpkg-reconfigure -plow unattended-upgrades` writes, without the prompt.
+APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1";
+APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# fail2ban local settings, deployed by install.sh. Debian's defaults-debian.conf
+# enables the sshd jail; this file decides how it bans.
+[DEFAULT]
+# Never ban loopback or the private LAN ranges: five typos from the LAN must not
+# lock the admin out for an hour. Trade-off: a compromised LAN host is never banned.
+ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16
+bantime  = 1h
+findtime = 10m
+maxretry = 5
+banaction = nftables
+banaction_allports = nftables[type=allports]
+
+[sshd]
+enabled = true
+# Read the journal directly: works with or without /var/log/auth.log (rsyslog).
+backend = systemd
+journalmatch = _SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service + _COMM=sshd
+# Ban the offender on every port, so the port sshd listens on is irrelevant. The
+# previous server's jail banned port 22 only while sshd listened on 337.
+banaction = %(banaction_allports)s
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# sshd hardening, deployed by install.sh. Only settings that cannot lock anyone
+# out: authentication methods, ports and user lists are left to the host.
+PermitRootLogin no
+MaxAuthTries 3
+LoginGraceTime 20
@@ -141,6 +141,46 @@ install_cloudpex() {
 	bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/cloudpex/install.sh"
 }

+# fail2ban: bans an IP on every port after repeated SSH failures. The sshd jail
+# reads the journal (works with or without /var/log/auth.log) and bans all ports,
+# so the port sshd listens on does not matter — the previous server's jail only
+# banned port 22 while sshd listened on 337. Private LAN ranges are never banned.
+# nftables is the ban backend. Idempotent: config overwritten, service restarted.
+install_fail2ban() {
+	echo "Installing fail2ban (sshd jail, all-ports ban)"
+	sudo apt-get install -y fail2ban nftables
+	sudo install -D -m 0644 "$SCRIPT_DIR/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf" \
+		/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf
+	sudo systemctl enable fail2ban
+	sudo systemctl restart fail2ban
+}
+
+# Automatic security updates: the file dpkg-reconfigure would write, deployed
+# directly so the install stays non-interactive. Idempotent.
+install_unattended_upgrades() {
+	echo "Enabling unattended security upgrades"
+	sudo apt-get install -y unattended-upgrades
+	sudo install -D -m 0644 "$SCRIPT_DIR/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades" \
+		/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades
+}
+
+# sshd hardening drop-in (PermitRootLogin, MaxAuthTries, LoginGraceTime): only
+# settings that cannot lock anyone out; authentication methods stay untouched.
+# Validated with sshd -t before the reload. A rejected file is removed rather than
+# left in place, so sshd keeps starting on the next boot; the install goes on and
+# the warning tells you.
+harden_sshd() {
+	echo "Deploying sshd hardening drop-in"
+	sudo install -D -m 0644 "$SCRIPT_DIR/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf" \
+		/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf
+	if ! sudo sshd -t; then
+		sudo rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/20-hardening.conf
+		echo "sshd rejected 20-hardening.conf — removed, sshd config unchanged" >&2
+		return 0
+	fi
+	sudo systemctl reload ssh
+}
+
 # Yes/no prompt for the optional system changes offered at the end of the install.
 # Declines (returns 1) when no terminal is attached (curl | bash), so an offer is
 # skipped with a hint instead of blocking; re-run ./install.sh from a terminal to
@@ -245,6 +285,11 @@ if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then

 	# On-demand NAS mount helper (cloudpex/).
 	install_cloudpex
+
+	# Security baseline: brute-force bans, automatic security updates, sshd limits.
+	install_fail2ban
+	install_unattended_upgrades
+	harden_sshd
 else
 	echo "apt-get not found — skipping system packages (install vim/git manually)."
 fi