56 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Secure by default: six domains and every API
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Scope: any project that has a public surface, an API, a database, messaging,
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a cloud function or a UI. Applies at design, scaffolding, implementation and
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review. A request that breaks one of these gets flagged, not silently done.
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What only a provider dashboard can set (spend cap, WAF, budget alert) is
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never claimed done: write it as a manual step in the project's deploy notes.
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`/guardrails` audits all of it and fixes what the user accepts.
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## Every API and every access
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- Default deny. Authentication and authorization checked server-side on every
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route, function, RPC and webhook, never only at the entry point.
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- Webhooks verify a signature. CORS is an allowlist, never `*` with credentials.
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- Keys are least privilege and server-side. Responses carry only needed fields.
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- Validate every input at the boundary. Rate limit every unauthenticated or
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costly route.
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- Passwords hashed with argon2id (bcrypt or scrypt otherwise), never stored
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or compared in clear, never logged, never a literal in code or config.
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Delegated auth (Supabase, Firebase, Clerk) keeps them out of your tables.
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Reset tokens hashed, single-use, expiring.
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## 1. Hosting
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- Rate limit per IP and per account on login, signup, reset, send and upload.
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- CDN and firewall (WAF, DDoS protection) in front of the origin.
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- Hard spend cap if the host offers one. Otherwise a budget alert plus a
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written kill-switch step.
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## 2. Injection
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- Raw escapes (`$queryRawUnsafe`, `knex.raw`, `text()`, `.raw()`) take
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bound values only; dynamic SQL in a function goes through `format()`
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with `%I` / `%L` and `USING`.
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- A filter object never comes straight from the request: allowlist the
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fields, cast the values. No shell command carries input into a DB tool.
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## 3. Exposure (what the browser can see)
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- No data in the browser console, no source map in production, no debug
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flag in a committed config.
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- Hydrated state, `data-*` attributes, hidden fields and shipped HTML
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comments carry no token, hash, key or secret.
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## 4. Supabase
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- RLS on every table, never a service_role or secret key client-side.
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Full domain: ~/.claude/rules/supabase.md; Read it before writing a
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migration, policy or client (a new file's Write loads no path rule).
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## 5. SMS and email
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- Prior consent recorded per contact: who, when, channel, source, wording.
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No send without a consent row; check the suppression list before each send.
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- Every email has an unsubscribe link and `List-Unsubscribe`. Every marketing
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SMS says STOP, and a STOP reply is processed and stored automatically.
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## 6. Cloud functions
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- Max instances and a timeout on every function, never a self-trigger.
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Full domain: ~/.claude/rules/cloud-functions.md; Read it before
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writing a function (a new file's Write loads no path rule).
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