probe.py observes a running target the user owns and names, driven by a plan built from the static findings. Five probes: anon-read, cross-user, no-auth route, CORS reflection, capped rate-limit burst. GET/HEAD/OPTIONS only, --authorized gate, secrets from the environment, same-host redirect only, bounded request budget. SKILL STEP 5, checks.md reference, docs. Suite guardrails-probe.test.sh (16 checks) against a localhost fixture.
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name, effort, description, argument-hint
| name | effort | description | argument-hint |
|---|---|---|---|
| guardrails | high | Use when auditing a project against the baseline guardrails: hosting (rate limit, CDN and firewall, spend cap), accessibility (keyboard, visible focus, alt text, field labels), Supabase (RLS on every table, owner-scoped policies, no service_role key client-side), SMS and email (recorded consent, unsubscribe, STOP), cloud functions (no self-trigger, instance cap, budget stop), plus API and access hygiene (auth on every route, CORS, secrets, password storage). Runs a deterministic scanner, judges each hit, writes .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md. Optional read-only live probe confirms a hole from outside on a target the user owns and names. Triggers: "guardrails", "garde-fous", "RLS activée ?", "audit supabase", "consentement sms", "plafond de dépense", "mots de passe en clair ?", "teste la sécurité de base du projet", "teste-le en conditions réelles", "sonde le projet en direct". Headers and TLS → /harden; secrets, CVE, OWASP → /cso; full WCAG → /web-validate. | [project path] [--domain api,hosting,a11y,supabase,messaging,functions] [--exclude paths] [--live <url you own>] |
/guardrails
Checks a project against rules/secure-by-default.md. A scanner reads the
tree as data and finds what text can prove. This skill then judges the hits,
covers what text cannot prove, lists what only a dashboard can set, and, on
request, probes a running target the user owns to confirm a hole from outside.
The scanner proves absence of a protection, never presence of security. A clean scan means "no static finding", and the report says exactly that. A live probe proves the opposite direction: that a door is actually open.
STEP 1: Scope
Work in the project the user names, else the current directory. Say in one
line what you will scan. Domains: api, hosting, a11y, supabase,
messaging, functions. The scanner skips the ones that do not apply.
STEP 2: Run the scanner
python3 -B "$HOME/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py" <path>
Add --domain a,b to narrow, --exclude a/b,c to skip copies or
vendored code, --json for machine output. Exit 0 means no
FAIL, 1 means at least one, 2 is a usage error. It never executes project
code. Severities:
- FAIL: a protection is provably absent or a key is exposed.
- WARN: a pattern that is often wrong; judgment needed.
- MANUAL: only a provider dashboard can set or show it.
STEP 3: Judge every FAIL and WARN
Read the file around each line. Label it CONFIRMED, FALSE POSITIVE (say why)
or ACCEPTED RISK (the user decides, never you). A key sitting in a
git-ignored env file is not reported, that is where local keys belong; whether
it ever reached git history is a separate check (gitleaks git <repo>).
Heuristic blind spots are in references/checks.md: check them before
calling a hit false.
STEP 4: Cover what the scanner cannot
Read the code for the domains that apply and answer, with file:line evidence:
- API: does each route check authorization on the object, not only authentication? Is any id in a URL usable to read another user's data? Where is a password written? Trace sign-up and password change to the column: an argon2id, bcrypt or scrypt hash is what must land there.
- Supabase: does each policy name the right owner column, per operation? Is every table created in the dashboard also covered? Give the user the live queries from the reference file.
- Messaging: does consent get written at the sign-up point with source and wording? Is a STOP reply wired from the provider webhook to the store?
- Functions: trace every trigger to the resource it writes, including queues, storage events, schedulers and third-party webhooks.
- A11y: with a dev server running, walk the main flow with Tab only
(
/browse). Otherwise mark the keyboard walk-through as not done.
STEP 5: Live probe (only on --live, read-only)
The static scan shows a protection is missing in the code. A probe shows the door is actually open. Run it only when the user asks, and only against a target the user owns and names: their local dev server first, a staging or production URL only on an explicit, specific go. Never a URL you inferred, never a third party.
- Build the plan
references/checks.mddescribes. From the static findings fill a JSON plan:base_url, the Supabaseurlandtables, theroutes(mark the ones meant to be public),cors, and arate_limitroute if the user wants that one burst. Secrets never go in the plan or the command line: exportGUARDRAILS_ANON_KEYand, for the cross-user probe,GUARDRAILS_JWT2, from test keys, neverservice_role. - Run it, confirming ownership with
--authorized:It sends GET, HEAD and OPTIONS only (the rate-limit burst is the one POST, opt-in in the plan, capped at 25 requests). It never writes data, never follows a redirect to another host, and stops at a request budget. Exit 1 means at least one OPEN verdict.python3 -B "$HOME/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/probe.py" \ plan.json --authorized - Cross the verdicts with the static findings. A verdict is an observation, not a conclusion: OPEN means the request returned data or a 200, CLOSED means it was refused or empty. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN in the probe leads the report. A CLOSED probe on a static FAIL still needs the fix: the dev target may differ from production.
- Guardrails on the probe itself: read-only, test keys only, the loopback or a URL the user named. A login burst can lock the user's own account, so run it only with a throwaway test account and the user's go. Never fuzz, never POST to anything but a named login route, never probe a target you were not told to. That is pentest territory, another contract.
STEP 6: Manual checklist
Print each MANUAL item as a step the user performs: spend cap, WAF and DDoS rules, budget alert wired to a stop, live RLS queries. Provider limits change: name the setting, tell the user to confirm it in the current provider docs. Never run a live probe against production without the user's explicit go, and never claim a MANUAL item done.
STEP 7: Report
Write .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md: one table per domain with status PASS,
FAIL, WARN, MANUAL or N/A, the evidence, and the fix in one line. PASS means
"no static finding". When a live probe ran, add a line for its verdict next
to the matching static finding. Keep it short; no filler sections.
STEP 8: Hand over
Reply with counts, the FAILs with file:line and a one-line fix each, any OPEN
probe verdicts, and the MANUAL items. This skill audits; it does not fix. A
fix goes through /bugfix, /feat or /hotfix.