claude_mac/lib/seo-data

seo-data — GSC + CrUX data layer for /seo FULL audits

Small, isolated engine that gives the /seo skill real Google data instead of guesses: Search Console (queries, positions, indexation) and CrUX (Core Web Vitals field data — real users, not lab simulation). It knows nothing about SEO scoring; it only turns Google APIs into normalized JSON. The seo-analyzer agent consumes that JSON in STEP 4 (Core Web Vitals) and the new "Performance GSC" subsection; the /seo skill selects the account and property in STEP 0 of a FULL audit (not needed for LOCAL).

Multi-account by design: the token store is keyed by a user-chosen label, and every call takes --account/--property explicitly. Two audits running at the same time (two sites, two sessions) never share mutable state — nothing is written to disk during an audit, only at make seo-connect.

Setup

One-time per Google account:

make seo-connect                                        # from the claude-config repo
bash ~/.claude/lib/seo-data/connect.sh --label <label>  # from ANY directory (venv must exist)

make seo-connect creates ~/.claude/.venv-seo-data/ (isolated venv, deps pinned in requirements.txt), installs google-auth, google-auth-oauthlib, requests, then delegates to connect.sh. The wrapper sources ~/.claude/.env internally, prefers the venv python, and runs connect.py: it opens a browser for OAuth consent and takes a label (e.g. client-a) to key the account — pick a name, not an email, since the store never stores or requests the account's email. Once the venv exists, connect.sh alone connects further accounts from anywhere (the /seo connect [label] skill verb uses exactly this path).

Before running it, set these 3 keys in ~/.claude/.env (the canonical vault; link.sh only symlinks the repo's .env to it and warns with a cp .env.example .env hint if it's missing — it never creates the vault itself):

GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=<your-client-id>.apps.googleusercontent.com
GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=<your-client-secret>
CRUX_API_KEY=<your-crux-api-key>

• GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID / GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET — OAuth2 "Desktop app" credentials from the Google Cloud Console (APIs & Services → Credentials). Shared across every account you connect; the OAuth scope requested is https://www.googleapis.com/auth/webmasters.readonly only — read-only Search Console, nothing can be modified or deleted via this token.
• CRUX_API_KEY — a Chrome UX Report API key (restrict it to CrUX + PageSpeed in the Console). Get one at https://developer.chrome.com/docs/crux/api. No OAuth involved: CrUX is public field data, gated by API key only, independent of any connected account.

make seo-connect is idempotent and rerunnable — connecting a second account just runs it again with a different label; reusing an existing label prompts to overwrite.

fetch.sh contract

lib/seo-data/fetch.sh is the one stable entrypoint analyzers call. It sources ~/.claude/.env, prefers the isolated venv (falls back to system python3 for stdlib-only paths), dispatches to google_seo.py or tokenstore.py, and never prints a secret to stdout or stderr.

fetch.sh accounts
  → {"status":"ok","accounts":[{"label":"…","properties":[…],"granted_at":"…"}]}   # [] if none connected

fetch.sh crux    --url https://ex.com [--strategy mobile|desktop]
  → {"status":"ok","source":"crux","lcp_p75_ms":…,"inp_p75_ms":…,"cls_p75":…}      # a missing metric omits its key
  → {"status":"degraded","reason":"no_crux_key"|"no_field_data"|"rate_limited"}
  # a 404 on page-level data retries at origin-level before degrading

fetch.sh queries --account client-a --property sc-domain:ex.com [--days 90] [--dim query|page]
  → {"status":"ok","source":"gsc","dimension":"query","rows":[{"key":"…","clicks":…,"impressions":…,"ctr":…,"position":…}]}
  → {"status":"degraded","reason":"no_credentials"|"token_revoked"|"network_error"|"rate_limited"}

fetch.sh inspect --account client-a --property … --url https://ex.com/page
  → {"status":"ok","source":"gsc","indexed":true,"coverage":"…","last_crawl":"…",
     "rich_results":{"verdict":"PASS|FAIL|NEUTRAL|VERDICT_UNSPECIFIED|ABSENT",
                     "types":[{"type":"FAQ","items":2,"errors":2,"warnings":1,
                               "issues":["Missing field 'acceptedAnswer'"]}]}}
  → {"status":"degraded","reason":"…"}

  rich_results rides the SAME URL-Inspection response — Google already sends
  it, `inspect` used to discard it. No extra call, quota or OAuth scope.
  It is the only programmatic structured-data validation in the system.
    • verdict PARTIAL is never emitted — the API reserves it as unused.
    • verdict ABSENT is SYNTHETIC (not a Google enum): the API omits
      richResultsResult entirely when it detects no rich results. Surfaced
      as a value rather than a missing key, because a caller cannot tell an
      absent key apart from a check that never ran. ABSENT = "none
      detected", never "invalid".
    • errors/warnings count issue INSTANCES; issues[] is deduped — the same
      issueMessage repeats across every affected item.

fetch.sh cannibal --account client-a --property … [--days 90] [--rows 1000]
  → {"status":"ok","source":"gsc","days":90,"rows_scanned":1000,"capped":true,
     "conflict_count":12,
     "conflicts":[{"query":"plombier paris","pages":3,"total_impressions":2400,
                   "urls":[{"url":…,"clicks":…,"impressions":…,"position":…}]}]}
  → {"status":"degraded","reason":"…"}                # no account → NOT auditable

  Keyword cannibalisation from Google's own data: queries where 2+ of OUR
  pages compete. Groups query+page rows; conflicts ranked by total
  impressions, and within each the strongest page first. `capped:true` means
  the row window was full — more conflicts exist past the cut, say so.
  Same auth, same quota family, no new scope: the API always accepted several
  dimensions at once, this engine only ever asked for one.
    • NOT the 30/70 duplication rule. This is a SERP fact Google measured.
      30/70 is content similarity, which has no data source here — doing it
      naively (compare two same-template pages without stripping nav/footer)
      returns ~95% similar for every site, a confident false positive. It stays
      an LLM judgement, labelled as one.
    • `queries` now takes `--dim query,page` (comma-separated) and `--rows`.
      Rows gained a `keys` list; `key` stays as keys[0], so the single-dim
      consumer is untouched.

fetch.sh sitemap --url https://ex.com/sitemap.xml
  → {"status":"ok","source":"sitemap","index":false,"count":86,"dropped":0,
     "urls":["https://ex.com/", …]}
  → {"status":"ok","index":true,"children_total":4,"children_read":4,
     "children_failed":0,"count":312,…}          # <sitemapindex>, one level deep
  → {"status":"degraded","reason":"fetch_failed"|"parse_failed"|"no_urls"
                                  |"unsafe_xml_dtd"}

  No auth, no Google, no venv: stdlib only (urllib + xml.etree + gzip).
  Gives STEP 9's COVERAGE line the denominator it was told to print and never
  had, and STEP 5 a real sampling frame. Dedupes, strips whitespace, handles
  .xml.gz. Caps: 50 children of an index, 50k URLs, 20 MB read — each cut is
  REPORTED (children_skipped / truncated), never silent.

    • NOT a security boundary. urllib fetches these, so nothing here reaches a
      shell. The CONSUMER interpolates them into curl, so seo-analyzer runs
      lib/url-guard.sh at the point of use — same contract as the sameAs check.
      A second copy of the guard here would only drift.
    • `unsafe_xml_dtd`: a sitemap NEVER has a DTD (sitemaps.org is <?xml?> then
      <urlset xmlns=>). Any doctype/entity is refused BEFORE parsing. xml.etree
      does not expand external entities, but it IS billion-laughs-vulnerable —
      1 KB expands to gigabytes, and the 20 MB read ceiling bounds the input,
      not the expansion. Refusing the construct beats depending on parser
      internals AND keeps this stdlib-only; defusedxml would drag in a venv for
      a document type that has no legitimate DTD.

fetch.sh forget --label client-a
  → {"status":"ok","removed":true|false}          # false = label wasn't in the store

fetch.sh forget --all
  → {"status":"ok","cleared":<n>}                 # n = accounts removed

Rules that hold for every subcommand:

• JSON always on stdout, never empty. Even an unexpected error (HTTP 403/5xx, timeout, DNS failure) prints {"status":"degraded","reason":"unexpected_error"} — never a raw traceback.
• status is "ok" or "degraded" on exit 0; "error" on exit 2. Analyzers branch on this field; "error" only shows up on bad usage, reason is informational otherwise.
• Exit code 0 on ok and on degraded. The engine never fails the process just because Google data isn't available — that's a normal, expected outcome the analyzer handles by falling back. Exit code 2 is reserved for bad usage: unknown subcommand, missing required flag, invalid argument — those paths emit {"status":"error",...} instead.
• --store is accepted uniformly by every subcommand for consistent fetch.sh dispatch, even though crux ignores it (CrUX needs no account).
• Never prints a secret. No env var, refresh token, or access token ever reaches stdout or stderr, including in error paths.

Two env vars exist for testing, never for normal use: SEO_DATA_ENV_FILE overrides which env file is sourced (tests point it at /dev/null so a real ~/.claude/.env on the machine can never leak into a test run), and SEO_DATA_DEBUG=1 re-enables stderr for local debugging (stderr is suppressed by default so library warnings can't leak a secret into an agent's context).

Token store

~/.claude/seo-data/tokens.json — refresh tokens, keyed by the label chosen at make seo-connect, one entry per connected account:

{
  "version": 1,
  "accounts": {
    "client-a": {
      "refresh_token": "<opaque>",
      "scopes": ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/webmasters.readonly"],
      "granted_at": "2026-07-09T12:00:00+00:00",
      "properties": ["sc-domain:site-a.com", "https://www.site-a.com/"]
    }
  }
}

Security posture:

• File 0600, directory 0700. tokenstore.save_account re-asserts both permissions on every write.
• Written only at connect time, atomically. tmp → fsync → os.replace (atomic rename), under an exclusive fcntl lock, so two simultaneous make seo-connect runs can't corrupt the file. Audits never write to this file — access tokens are exchanged in memory and never persisted, so two audits running concurrently never contend on it.
• Keyed by label, not email. Identifying accounts by email would require widening the OAuth scope just for identification; the label the user picks at connect time is sufficient and keeps the scope at webmasters.readonly only (least privilege).
• Refresh tokens are redacted from list. fetch.sh accounts (and tokenstore.py list) return label, properties, and granted_at only — the refresh_token field is intentionally never included in that output.
• Allowlisted in gitleaks. The store lives under ~/.claude/, outside this repo, so it's never committed directly — but make scan-secrets also sweeps ~/.claude for stray copies of secrets. .gitleaks.toml has an explicit [allowlist].paths entry for (^|/)\.claude/seo-data/tokens\.json$, the same treatment ~/.claude/.env already gets, so a legitimate local secret store doesn't drown real findings in false positives.
• Also gitignored (.venv-seo-data/ and seo-data/tokens.json in .gitignore) as a second, belt-and-suspenders guard in case a relative path ever put either under the repo tree.
• Removal is local-only. fetch.sh forget --label <x> / --all (the /seo forget skill verb) deletes the stored refresh token — it does NOT revoke the OAuth grant at Google's end. For a real revocation, visit https://myaccount.google.com/permissions with the account concerned and remove the app's access; the deleted local token then becomes useless everywhere, including to anyone who copied it beforehand.

Graceful degradation

Missing API key, no connected account, or a revoked/expired token is a normal outcome, not a failure:

• No CRUX_API_KEY → crux returns {"status":"degraded","reason":"no_crux_key"}.
• No account connected, or the store has no refresh token for the given --account → queries/inspect return {"status":"degraded","reason":"no_credentials"}.
• Refresh token revoked at Google's end → {"status":"degraded","reason":"token_revoked"} (a transient network blip during refresh is classified "network_error" instead, so a flaky connection never forces the user back through OAuth).
• Rate limited (HTTP 429) on any Google API → {"status":"degraded","reason":"rate_limited"}.

In every case: exit code 0, valid JSON on stdout, no crash. The /seo FULL audit continues on the anonymous PageSpeed API (lab data) instead of CrUX field data, and the report surfaces the fix as a user action: make seo-connect. doctor.sh also flags both non-fatally as WARN: a missing CRUX_API_KEY warns on its own, while no connected Google account is the one that names make seo-connect.

Testing

make test
# or, to run only this engine's suite:
bash lib/seo-data/seo-data.test.sh

The suite is network-free: google_seo.py reads fixtures from lib/seo-data/fixtures/ (crux_mobile.json, gsc_queries.json, gsc_inspect.json) whenever SEO_DATA_MOCK_DIR is set, instead of calling Google's APIs. Degradation paths run with real env vars unset (env -u CRUX_API_KEY, env -u SEO_DATA_MOCK_DIR) to exercise the no-key/no-creds branches deterministically. Every fetch.sh invocation in the tests also sets SEO_DATA_ENV_FILE=/dev/null so a machine with a live ~/.claude/.env never lets real credentials leak into a test run.