forked from bchanot/claude
bmottin
5efc506197
`${1,,}` is bash 4.0+. macOS ships bash 3.2 as /bin/bash, where it raises
"bad substitution"; the subshell then exited 1 — read as "not local" — so
`url-guard.sh host` returned rc 0 for localhost, 127.x, 10.x, 192.168.x,
172.16-31.x, 169.254.169.254 and metadata.google.internal. The guard failed
OPEN on every Mac, and url-guard.test.sh recorded it as 13 "got[0] want[2]".
`shopt -s nocasematch` (bash 3.1+) keeps both the ASCII-only folding that
LC_ALL=C gives and the no-fork property the lowercase expansion had.
Verified on /bin/bash 3.2: the ten local/private/metadata targets now return
rc 2 (case-folded variants included), legitimate hosts still rc 0.
89 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
89 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Validate a host or URL BEFORE it reaches a shell command or curl.
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# Echoes the value on stdout when safe; exits 2 with a reason on stderr.
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#
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# HOST="$(bash ~/.claude/lib/url-guard.sh host "$RAW")" || exit 2
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# URL="$(bash ~/.claude/lib/url-guard.sh url "$RAW")" || exit 2
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#
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# WHY: /seo and /geo interpolate externally-supplied strings into ~10 curl
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# commands (seo-analyzer.md:254+, geo-analyzer.md:248+). Today $DOMAIN is typed
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# by the operator, so the risk is self-inflicted. The sitemap crawl (C1) changes
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# that: URLs then come from the TARGET'S OWN SERVER — a remote file whose bytes
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# reach a shell. Inside the double quotes those curls use, the characters that
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# break out are $ ` \ " — so a <loc> of
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# https://x/$(cat ${HOME}/.claude/.env)
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# would read GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET and CRUX_API_KEY straight out of the
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# vault and into a request. Allowlist, per CLAUDE.md: explicit allowlist beats
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# implicit denylist.
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#
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# DNS-level SSRF (a public hostname that RESOLVES to a private address, or
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# rebinds between check and connect): this NAME-level guard does not catch it —
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# closing it needs resolve-then-pin at the HTTP layer. That is now DONE for the
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# Python egress: lib/seo-data/safe_fetch.py pins every fetch (sitemap, linkgraph,
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# rendercheck, drift). It is NOT done for shell `curl`, which cannot pin without
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# `curl --resolve`; those paths keep this literal-local check only. Stated, not
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# silent — see lib/seo-data/README.md (safe_fetch).
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set -uo pipefail
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_die() { echo "url-guard: $1" >&2; exit 2; }
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# Whole-string charset guards: C locale + POSIX `case`, the same shape as
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# fetch.sh:25 _label_safe. Newline-proof and locale-independent, unlike a
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# per-line grep. No `$` or backtick inside the patterns, so nothing expands.
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_host_charset_ok() ( LC_ALL=C; case "$1" in
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''|[!A-Za-z0-9]*|*[!A-Za-z0-9.-]*) exit 1 ;; esac )
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# Authority + path + query. Excludes $ ` \ " ' ; | ( ) * ! space and newline —
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# none of which a real sitemap URL needs, all of which a shell reads.
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_rest_charset_ok() ( LC_ALL=C; case "$1" in
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''|*[!A-Za-z0-9._~:/?#@=\&%+,-]*) exit 1 ;; esac )
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# Literal local/private/metadata targets. This is a LITERAL check, not a DNS
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# one: it stops the obvious, not a hostname that resolves inward.
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_host_is_local() ( LC_ALL=C
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# `nocasematch` not ${1,,}: the lowercase expansion is bash 4.0+, and macOS
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# ships bash 3.2 as /bin/bash — there it raised "bad substitution" and the
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# subshell exited 1, i.e. "not local", so EVERY local/private/metadata host
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# was allowed through. Keeps the no-fork property the lowercase form had.
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# Safe because the charset guard has already run — the string is
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# [A-Za-z0-9.-] by here, and LC_ALL=C keeps the folding ASCII-only.
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shopt -s nocasematch
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case "$1" in
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localhost|*.localhost|*.local|0.0.0.0|broadcasthost) exit 0 ;;
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127.*|10.*|169.254.*|192.168.*) exit 0 ;;
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172.1[6-9].*|172.2[0-9].*|172.3[01].*) exit 0 ;;
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metadata.google.internal|metadata) exit 0 ;;
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*) exit 1 ;;
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esac )
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_reject_local() { _host_is_local "$1" && _die "local/private target refused: '$1'"; return 0; }
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check_host() {
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_host_charset_ok "$1" || _die "host charset (allowed A-Za-z0-9.-): '$1'"
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_reject_local "$1"
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printf '%s\n' "$1"
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}
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check_url() {
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local rest host
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case "$1" in
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https://*) rest="${1#https://}" ;;
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http://*) rest="${1#http://}" ;;
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*) _die "scheme must be http or https: '$1'" ;;
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esac
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_rest_charset_ok "$rest" || _die "url charset: '$1'"
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host="${rest%%/*}"; host="${host%%\?*}"; host="${host%%#*}"
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# user@host hides the real target: https://trusted.com@127.0.0.1/ hits .0.0.1
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case "$host" in *@*) _die "userinfo in authority (confusion vector): '$1'" ;; esac
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host="${host%%:*}" # drop :port before validating the host
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_host_charset_ok "$host" || _die "host charset: '$host'"
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_reject_local "$host"
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printf '%s\n' "$1"
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}
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case "${1:-}" in
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host) [ $# -eq 2 ] || _die "usage: url-guard.sh host <hostname>"; check_host "$2" ;;
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url) [ $# -eq 2 ] || _die "usage: url-guard.sh url <url>"; check_url "$2" ;;
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*) _die "usage: url-guard.sh {host|url} <value>" ;;
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esac
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