forked from bchanot/claude
docs(doctrine): model-agnostic ceiling held by the router guard, finish/merge ask, ask prompts under auto, static rule limits
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@@ -77,18 +77,18 @@ machine. Project facts (this repo's deploy target, its secrets, its data)
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belong in that project's `.claude/settings.local.json`. A global block naming
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one repo feeds the classifier false facts in all the others.
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### `ask` is not a prompt under auto mode
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### `ask` prompts under auto mode
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Verified in-session (LRN-146, re-verified on 2.1.273 on 2026-09-16 with a
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`node -e` probe matching an `ask` rule): with `defaultMode: auto`, Bash rules
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in `permissions.ask` were auto-approved and raised no prompt. The auto-mode
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docs claim the opposite for "content-scoped" rules such as `Bash(git push *)`;
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the observed behavior wins until a probe shows a prompt. `deny` is the only
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tier the classifier cannot lift.
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Measured 2026-11-02 (headless bench under `defaultMode: auto`, then one
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interactive session): a Bash command matching `permissions.ask` raises a
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permission request; in `-p` it is refused. LRN-155 (2026-09-16, a `node -e`
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probe on 2.1.273: `ask` rules auto-approved interactively) is not
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reproduced; its cause is not established. `deny` is the only tier the
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classifier cannot lift.
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So for a destructive command you want gated but still reachable, `ask` is the
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wrong tier. Use `autoMode.soft_deny`: blocked until the user's intent clears
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it. Keep `deny` for what must never run at all.
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`ask` gates a command you approve per call; `soft_deny` gates one the
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classifier clears from your request. Keep `deny` for what must never run at
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all.
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### Picking a tier
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@@ -98,11 +98,9 @@ it. Keep `deny` for what must never run at all.
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| Never runs, and a pattern cannot express it (a read then a send, a prod target) | `autoMode.hard_deny` |
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| Runs when the user asks for it, blocked otherwise | `autoMode.soft_deny` |
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| Runs freely when a condition holds that only the classifier can judge (a local dev container, a package declared in the lockfile) | `autoMode.allow` |
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| Runs after you click, every time | `permissions.ask` |
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| Runs freely | `permissions.allow`, or nothing |
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`permissions.ask` is not on this list on purpose. Under `defaultMode: auto` it
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gates nothing.
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`autoMode.allow` is the exception tier: inside the classifier an `allow` entry
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overrides a matching `soft_deny`, built-in or yours, so word it as narrowly as
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the condition allows. It is also the only tier that can open an interpreter:
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@@ -130,8 +128,7 @@ no separate setting for this.
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- `disableBypassPermissionsMode: "disable"` prevents switching to bypass mode mid-session.
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- Prefer `autoMode.soft_deny` over `allow` for anything touching external systems.
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- `deny` in `~/.claude/settings.json` cannot be overridden by project-level `allow` — deny always wins.
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- Under `defaultMode: auto`, `ask` does not raise a prompt (see above). A destructive
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command belongs in `deny` or in `autoMode.soft_deny`, not in `ask`.
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- Under `defaultMode: auto`, `ask` prompts; a command that must never run belongs in `deny`.
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## Data-loss guardrails (BDR-095)
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@@ -146,7 +143,7 @@ local trace, and the brief had authorized it. What holds now, by tier:
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| Docker volume drops, `system prune`, `compose down -v`, `--privileged`, the docker socket, `-v /:` | `permissions.deny` | Promoted from `soft_deny`: no in-session clearance for data drops. |
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| Git history destruction (`push --delete`/`--mirror`/`:ref`/`--force-with-lease`, `branch -D`, `filter-branch`, `reflog expire`, `stash clear`/`drop`, `clean -f`), `--no-verify`, `core.hooksPath` | `permissions.deny` | A remote is the backup; nothing rewrites or deletes what it holds. |
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| Writing the human-only `gitflow.*` toggles: any `git … config` spelling, section remove/rename, `git -c`, the git config env overrides, Edit/Write of git config files | `permissions.deny` | Claude never flips the mode that binds it. Side effect: the trailing glob also matches the bare read, so Claude cannot read `gitflow.autopush` through `git config`; hooks and `lib/gitflow.sh` still do, and skills read it through `gitflow.sh push-mode`. |
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| Pushing in manual-push mode (`gitflow.autopush false`, or any invalid value) | `hooks/push-guard.sh` (PreToolUse) + `autoMode.soft_deny` | `ask` is inert under auto mode. The hook denies the direct forms; the soft_deny covers scripted, aliased, subshell and sub-agent pushes, and a request in the turn does not clear it: the user types `! git push`. |
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| Pushing in manual-push mode (`gitflow.autopush false`, or any invalid value) | `hooks/push-guard.sh` (PreToolUse) + `autoMode.soft_deny` | An `ask` would prompt, and a click would push. The hook denies the direct forms; the soft_deny covers scripted, aliased, subshell and sub-agent pushes, and a request in the turn does not clear it: the user types `! git push`. |
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| Destructive tool against a local path (variable, `~`, `..`, wildcard, outside cwd/tmp), even as a trace or a rehearsal a brief allows | `autoMode.hard_deny` | A pattern cannot express "the target resolves outside the project"; the classifier can. A sub-agent brief carries no user authority. |
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| `docker rm -f`, bind mount outside cwd; discarding uncommitted work | `autoMode.soft_deny` | Recoverable or user-intended in the turn. |
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