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faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-25-rust-r5-6-active-security.md
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Security audit: R5.6 fingerprint switch, activated (9e87016)

Mode audit, fresh and blind. Scope: git diff 59521dc 9e87016 (31 files, all present at HEAD), branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, working tree clean before and after. Contract: .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-25-rust-r5-6-rehearsal.md (S1-S8 + Clarification 2026-10-25) and the owner's activation brief. No file modified except this report; no network beyond semgrep's rule download; no service key, no Supabase, no transfer tool, no pnpm format.

SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 31 files
BLOCKING:
  (none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
  - [LOW] rebase-exact-equality-no-sheet-id (pre-existing, R2) — crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43
  - [LOW] registry-and-declaration-check-public — crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:44, :103
  - [LOW] snapshot-assets-outside-fingerprint (pre-existing trust model) — crates/core/src/domain/archive/snapshot_rules.rs:79
  - [LOW] caller-built-export-input-trusted (pre-existing, documented) — crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:205
  - [LOW] new-lint-allow-in-test-file (not a security suppression) — crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8
PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 31 files → 0 findings; checklist 8 checks → 0 findings in scope (+1 guardrails WARN outside the diff); alias-path review 14 checks → 0 blocking, 5 LOW

Tooling

  • semgrep 1.168.0, pinned packs, --metrics=off: 129 rules run on the 31 changed files, 0 findings, 0 errors.
  • Guardrails scanner (~/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py --domain api,supabase): 0 FAIL, 1 WARN, 1 MANUAL. The WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, species_select_active) is in a file outside the diff: out of scope, not counted. MANUAL not reported.
  • Hermetic tests run in the main tree (no file written outside target/):
    • cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features cli --locked: r5_6_switch 14/14, sheet_fingerprint 11/11 (incl. nesting_is_bounded_with_a_controlled_error), pdf_import 4/4, pdf_compare 16/16; lib unit the_registered_pair_holds_one_way_for_its_sheet_only 1/1.
    • vitest packages/core-wasm/tests/r5-6.n-1.test.ts 2/2 and apps/app/tests/unit/r5-6.switch.test.ts 2/2 (BUILD_STAMP accepted, module current).
    • bash scripts/import-equine.sh --check (compare-only, read before running): legacy-import 6 files 0 differences, draft 12 files 0 differences.

Checklist (STEP 3), scoped to the diff

Check Result
Hardcoded secret / token / key / auth URL none (added lines grepped; the hex values are public fingerprints)
SQL by concatenation none (no SQL in the diff)
Unsanitised render (innerHTML, eval, raw) none
Sensitive endpoint without authz N/A: no endpoint, RPC or policy in the diff
Stack trace / internal path to the user none new. facade.rs:56 maps LoadError::Fingerprint to invalid_sheet with the refusal's Debug text (a recomputed hex or a serde reason about the page's own bundle), no path, no secret
Secret / PII in a log none (no log call added)
Tracked .env / credential file only .env.example tracked
Guardrails scanner run, nothing in scope (see above)

Anti-gaming (STEP 4): no new nosemgrep, nosec, eslint-disable, @ts-ignore in the diff. One new #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)] heads the new test file crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8. It is the shared header of 20+ integration test files (the core's no-I/O and no-panic lints, which tests that read fixtures must relax), not a security-rule suppression: reported LOW, not blocking.

Alias paths attacked (the brief)

  1. equivalence crate-private. fingerprint.rs:72 is pub(crate). Its one non-test caller is LoadedSheet::recognises_historical_stamp (loaded.rs:169). The wasm crate references no fingerprint item (crates/wasm/src grep empty).
  2. One decision point. Every alias decision goes through recognises_historical_stamp (loaded.rs:163-171): build_sheet_snapshot (snapshot_rules.rs:62-64, behind archive.snapshot ops.rs:361-363), rebase_report_on_sheet (rebase.rs:43-46, reached by session.rs:89 draft restore and session.rs:127 import), sheet_line (compare/lines.rs:350-358). The only other reader of TRUSTED_ALIASES in src is the generator (pipeline.rs:185), which writes the descriptive list into sheet-ref.json; that list is never read back for a decision (declared.aliases is only passed to check_declared, loaded.rs:199-204).
  3. Forging the private verified state. verified_fingerprint (loaded.rs:75) is a private field; from_bundle is the only constructor (loaded.rs:121-151), LoadedSheet derives neither Deserialize nor Default, struct-update syntax is impossible outside the module, and unsafe_code = "forbid" applies to core and wasm (workspace lints, Cargo.toml:55, both crates [lints] workspace = true). Clone copies the state with the document, which the recomputation then re-proves. The wasm SheetHandle keeps its LoadedSheet private (crates/wasm/src/lib.rs:27), so a page cannot mutate it.
  4. Recomputation at the decision. The predicate requires a verified value, verified == reference.document_sha256, the registry pair (sheet_id, alias → verified) in one direction, and document_fingerprint(&self.document) == verified now. A mutated pub document or reference, a cloned sheet re-pointed to another sheet id, a v0 sheet, or a stamp the registry does not bind all return false (tests a_mutated_document_or_reference_never_keeps_the_alias, the_historical_value_on_another_sheet_id_is_not_recognised). A bundle with another sheet id and the genuine document verifies but never matches the registry (entry pinned to the equine id); a bundle with the equine id and other content verifies to another value the registry does not bind. Granting the alias therefore needs the genuine content (SHA-256 preimage otherwise).
  5. Injectivity of the fingerprinted form. The value hashes the typed reading serialised back. Checked for collapses that would let two behaviours share a value: no #[serde(skip)] or flatten in sheet/schema.rs; skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none" (lines 169, 176) round-trips; the untagged enums (SheetView, Geometry) carry distinguishing fields. The app consumes the same typed document, so text-only differences the reading erases are never behaviour.
  6. v0 / v1 and direction. No block = v0, unverified, no privilege (check_reference returns Ok(false), loaded.rs:196-198); an unverified v0 sheet carrying the canonical value still rebases an old report and its direct export is refused (SheetMismatch, test the_direct_export_on_an_unverified_v0_sheet_with_the_canonical_value_is_refused). The registry is consulted only as alias → canonical, so a v0 (rollback) sheet never recognises a v1 stamp. check_declared refuses a declared value that is a registered alias or not 64 lowercase hex (fingerprint.rs:112-118).
  7. null and malformed blocks. present_block (loaded.rs:46-50) turns an explicit null into a shape error; DeclaredFingerprint is deny_unknown_fields with required convention and aliases (loaded.rs:52-57); a string block and an unknown key are refused (tests). A misspelt key on the non-strict BundledRef only downgrades to v0: fail-closed, no privilege.
  8. Aliases never from a report, archive or bundle. Archives cannot carry one: SheetSnapshotRef and the snapshot are deny_unknown_fields (archive/snapshot.rs:42, 59); the archive reader keeps strict equality between snapshot and report stamps (archive/read.rs:116-119, unchanged).
  9. Export input strict. assert_exportable (pdf/write/input.rs:204-210) is unchanged by the diff: strict sheet id and stamp equality, no registry. The alias only reaches an archive through the core-built snapshot of a verified sheet.
  10. report:compare. The alias line prints both raw values truncated to 12 chars through esc (compare/lines.rs:366-376); same_sheet still requires the sheet id; the bin reads the seed's block through the same present_block and from_bundle verification (bin/report_compare.rs:40-44, 66).
  11. canonical_json depth. Bounded at MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH = 128 with CanonicalError::TooDeep (fingerprint.rs:132-154), above serde_json's parse limit (127 nested containers accepted), so every parsed bundle fits and a value built in code beyond it errors instead of overflowing the stack. Tested at 128 / 129, arrays and objects.
  12. Recomputation cost. In the predicate the recomputation is the last conjunct, after the registry match: a forged or unknown stamp costs a string compare, only the registered historical stamp triggers one recomputation (one per export snapshot, rebase or compare line). The load recomputes once per SheetHandle when a block is present (page runtime, runtime.ts:322, and each import worker, handler.ts:48), O(document), 302,794 B for the equine draft. Not attacker-amplifiable: the bundle is build-time, a report triggers at most one recomputation per call. The 14 switch tests (loads, imports, exports) run in 0.81 s in a debug build.
  13. Seed artifacts. Only draft/sheet-ref.json and draft/report-migration-map.json change. document.json (sha256 27c7383c…), assets/horse.svg (0ea5202f…) and equine_draft.sql (c5a24312…) hash identically at 59521dc and HEAD. The committed block is consistent: value 12d78872…, convention v1, alias 27c7383c…, which is the registry entry and the old file-bytes hash. The migration map changes only its documentSha256.
  14. Oracles, goldens, N-1. 0 files changed under crates/core/tests/oracles, crates/core/tests/pdf, apps/app/tests/fixtures, packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1. The new crates/core/tests/fixtures/r5-6/pre-switch/{sheet-ref,report-migration-map}.json are byte-identical to the 59521dc seed files (sha256 2c0716f1…, 4139c51d…), so the redirected historical tests read the real pre-switch inputs and cannot mask an anatomical change. Exact-equality semantics are unchanged and documented as no proof of content (fingerprint.rs:13-18).

Reported findings (LOW, non-blocking)

L1. Rebase exact-equality branch has no sheet-id check — crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43. Pre-existing since R2, unchanged in meaning: a report of another sheet id stamped with the current sheet's value skips the rebase. The new alias branch does check the sheet id. Hint: add report.sheet.sheet_id == sheet.reference.sheet_id to the equality branch in a later step (behaviour change, owner decision).

L2. Registry and declaration check stay public — crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:44 (TRUSTED_ALIASES), :103 (check_declared). Neither grants anything by itself and no consumer misuses them today (integration tests and the generator need them), but a future crate consumer could rebuild an alias decision from the registry without the recomputation. Hint: #[doc(hidden)] plus a doc line, or move the tests in-crate and make both pub(crate).

L3. Archived drawings are outside the document fingerprint — crates/core/src/domain/archive/snapshot_rules.rs:79 (snapshot_assets(sheet)). A hand-made bundle with the genuine document but other SVG texts would archive them under the historical (or the canonical) stamp. Pre-existing trust model (the bundle is trusted for what it declares, fingerprint.rs:15-18); the alias adds no privilege the canonical stamp did not already have. Hint: bind asset hashes into the document or check asset_hashes against the texts at load, if the threat model ever includes non-build bundles.

L4. Caller-built export input trusted for its self-consistent report and snapshot — crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:205. A page script can hand the export any matching pair; the registry is never consulted there and every reader decides again on import. Documented residual, unchanged by the diff.

L5. New lint allow in a test file — crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8. Shared test-file convention for the core's I/O and panic lints, not a security suppression.

SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS