M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
114 lines
4.5 KiB
PL/PgSQL
114 lines
4.5 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- audit.audit_logs: sensitive operations leave a row, rows are immutable,
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-- only owners/admins read them.
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begin;
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select plan(12);
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insert into auth.users (id, email, email_confirmed_at) values
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('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local', now()),
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('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local', now()),
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('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local', now());
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-- AR-1 B: the owner needs a live aal2 session, the target a verified factor.
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insert into auth.mfa_factors (id, user_id, factor_type, status, created_at, updated_at)
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values (gen_random_uuid(), '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'totp', 'verified', now(), now());
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insert into auth.sessions (id, user_id, aal) values
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('a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'aal2');
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select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '', true);
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select private.assign_platform_role(null, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'owner');
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-- 1. Bootstrap is audited as a system action
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select results_eq(
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$$ select actor_user_id, action, resource_type, target_user_id, metadata ->> 'role'
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from audit.audit_logs where target_user_id = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' $$,
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$$ values (null::uuid, 'platform_role.granted'::text, 'profile_role'::text,
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'00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid, 'owner'::text) $$,
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'bootstrap grant logged with null actor'
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);
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-- 2. RPC grant and revoke are audited with the actor
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set local role authenticated;
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select set_config('request.jwt.claims',
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'{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated","aal":"aal2","session_id":"a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}', true);
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select public.grant_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin');
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select public.revoke_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin', 'rotation');
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reset role;
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select results_eq(
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$$ select action, actor_user_id, target_user_id, metadata ->> 'reason'
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from audit.audit_logs where actor_user_id = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'
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order by occurred_at, action $$,
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$$ values ('platform_role.granted'::text, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid,
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'00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a'::uuid, null::text),
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('platform_role.revoked'::text, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid,
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'00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a'::uuid, 'rotation'::text) $$,
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'grant and revoke logged with actor, target and metadata'
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);
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select is(
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(select count(*) from audit.audit_logs a
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join public.profile_roles r on r.id = a.resource_id
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where a.target_user_id in ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a')),
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3::bigint,
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'every fixture audit row points at its profile_roles row'
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);
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-- 3. Append-only, even for the privileged owner session
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select throws_ok(
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$$ update audit.audit_logs set action = 'platform_role.tampered' $$,
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'42501',
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null,
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'audit rows cannot be updated'
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);
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select throws_ok(
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$$ delete from audit.audit_logs $$,
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'42501',
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null,
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'audit rows cannot be deleted'
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);
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-- 4. log_event validates its inputs
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select throws_ok(
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$$ select private.log_event(null, 'Bad Action', 'profile') $$,
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'23514',
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null,
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'action must match <domain>.<verb>'
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);
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select throws_ok(
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$$ select private.log_event(null, 'export.requested', 'profile', null, null, null, '[]'::jsonb) $$,
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'23514',
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null,
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'metadata must be a JSON object'
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);
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-- 5. Read access: owner yes, plain user no, anon no, nobody writes through the API
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set local role authenticated;
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select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated"}', true);
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select is(
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(select count(*) from audit.audit_logs
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where target_user_id in ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a')),
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3::bigint,
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'owner reads the audit log'
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);
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select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b","role":"authenticated"}', true);
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select is((select count(*) from audit.audit_logs), 0::bigint, 'plain user reads nothing');
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select throws_ok(
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$$ insert into audit.audit_logs (action, resource_type) values ('x.y', 'z') $$,
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'42501',
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null,
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'authenticated cannot insert audit rows'
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);
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select throws_ok(
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$$ select private.log_event(null, 'x.y', 'z') $$,
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'42501',
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null,
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'authenticated cannot call log_event'
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);
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set local role anon;
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select throws_ok(
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$$ select * from audit.audit_logs $$,
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'42501',
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null,
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'anon cannot read the audit log'
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);
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select * from finish();
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rollback;
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