42 KiB
Rust in the Faunosteo monorepo
Status: plan R0 (foundation, validated 2026-10-13), R1 (the Step 8 worker,
validated 2026-10-13) and R2 (the domain core, delivered 2026-10-14 on
feature/rust-r2-domain-core, awaiting the owner's validation). Rule and
roadmap: RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md (rule "Rust by default", Part III
boundary rules, Part IV the worker, Part VI phases R0–R5, Annex B R0 scope,
Annex C owner amendments). R0 shipped the toolchain, the workspace skeleton,
the worker's sandboxed child, the browser module loader and seven
experimental proofs; R1 ships the worker's job loop and sweeper for the
avatar pipeline (STORAGE.md §3); R2 moves the application's domain rules
into crates/core and switches the application to them (§8).
1. Toolchain: native on the development machine, reproducible in Docker, never on the VPS
Three environments, three roles (owner decision of 2026-10-13, review Annex C addendum). The development machine is a self-hosted Ubuntu server (native, not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless.
| Environment | Role | Rust |
|---|---|---|
| Ubuntu development machine, native | daily development (cargo check / test / build / clippy / fmt), the browser module build, every check before a merge (pnpm check:all) |
user-level rustup in ~/.cargo and ~/.rustup, channel pinned by rust-toolchain.toml |
| Docker on that machine | the Supabase stack, the worker's sandbox tests and seccomp derivation, integration tests, the application and worker images, and the reproducible run of the same Rust scripts through the builder image | inside images only |
| Production VPS | runs images; never compiles | none |
1.1 Native toolchain (the primary path)
Everything lives in the user's home: no global package, no sudo. Checked on
2026-10-13 (Ubuntu 26.04.1, x86_64): build-essential (gcc 15, the C
compiler that builds the worker's vendored libwebp), libc6-dev,
pkg-config, libssl-dev and strace were already installed; no system
package is missing.
# once: rustup, the user-level installer (https://rustup.rs); ~/.bashrc and ~/.profile source ~/.cargo/env
rustup show # from the repository: installs 1.99.0 + rustfmt + clippy
rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown # browser build of crates/wasm
cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version 0.2.129 --locked # = the wasm-bindgen crate in Cargo.lock
cargo install cargo-deny --version 0.20.2 --locked
rustup show run inside the repository installs the channel of
rust-toolchain.toml (rustup auto-install), so cargo here is always
1.99.0 whatever the default toolchain of the machine. Non-interactive
shells (editor tasks, git hooks, agent shells) skip ~/.bashrc and start
without ~/.cargo/bin on PATH: the scripts source scripts/rust-env.sh,
which prepends it when cargo is not found.
| Piece | Native | Builder image | Pinned by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rust 1.99.0, edition 2024, rustfmt, clippy | rustup show (auto-install) |
FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm + rustup component add |
rust-toolchain.toml |
wasm32-unknown-unknown |
rustup target add |
RUN rustup target add |
same channel |
wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129 |
cargo install --locked |
same | wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129" in Cargo.toml; scripts/wasm-build.sh refuses to run when Cargo.lock and the CLI on PATH differ |
cargo-deny 0.20.2 |
cargo install --locked |
same | deny.toml |
| worker builder (musl, libwebp) | not native: sandbox tests run in Docker only | crates/worker/Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24, build-base) |
same channel |
Commands (root package.json; every Rust script is one file run natively
or inside the builder image):
pnpm rust:check # scripts/rust-check.sh, native: fmt --check, clippy -D warnings (all targets),
# cargo test (core, wasm, worker unit tests), ts-rs export, cargo deny licenses/bans/sources
pnpm wasm:build # scripts/wasm-build.sh, native: crates/wasm → packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored), sizes printed
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh: the pre-merge gate (§4): rust:check, types drift, wasm:build,
# pnpm check, application image, worker:test, worker:image started read-only
pnpm rust:check:docker # the same rust-check.sh inside the builder image (reproducible run)
pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same wasm-build.sh inside the builder image
pnpm rust:builder # builds faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 once (about 6 minutes cold)
pnpm worker:test # Docker only: crates/worker/Dockerfile stage test, 16 sandbox tests + seccomp derivation
pnpm worker:image # Docker only: runtime image faunosteo_worker:dev (distroless/static:nonroot)
bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo <anything> # any cargo command in the builder
cargo check | test | build | clippy | fmt # the inner loop, from the repository root
The native target/ (git-ignored, .dockerignored) and the builder's named
volumes faunosteo_cargo_registry / faunosteo_rust_target are two
separate caches; neither invalidates the other.
1.2 What stays in Docker, and why
- The worker's sandbox tests (
crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs) are gated by thetest-hooksfeature: a nativecargo testcompiles that target empty and runs the worker's unit tests only. The seccomp allowlist is derived bystraceon the musl static binary that ships, inside the Alpineteststage, and glibc would need other syscalls (brk,mprotect,futex): running the sandbox natively would either kill a legitimate decode or prove nothing about the shipped binary.pnpm worker:testis the only path, and the worker keeps running in its container. - The Supabase stack, the application image, the worker image and the
integration tests on them:
pnpm db:start,docker build -t faunosteo .,pnpm worker:image. - The builder image stays as the reproducible alternative (same compiler, same tools, a clean environment) and as the reference a future runner uses; it is not needed for a compile or a test on the development machine.
Exposure change, stated for the record: a native build runs the build
scripts and proc-macros of the dependencies under the user account (the
builder container ran them with the repository mounted read-write, so the
difference is the rest of the home directory). Mitigations in place:
--locked everywhere, deny.toml [sources] limited to crates.io with
unknown registries and git sources denied, cargo deny check licenses bans sources in every check.
2. Workspace
Cargo.toml workspace (resolver 3), pinned [workspace.dependencies], lints, profiles
rust-toolchain.toml channel 1.99.0, components rustfmt + clippy
rustfmt.toml edition 2024, max_width 100
clippy.toml disallowed-methods: std::time::*::now, std::fs::*, std::env::var* (the core)
deny.toml licences allow-list, bans (duplicates warn, wildcards deny, path deps allowed), sources
.cargo/config.toml wasm shadow stack 1 MiB (explicit), TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR = packages/core-wasm/types
crates/core faunosteo-core: lib, no I/O (lint), serde + serde_json + url (Zod's .url())
crates/wasm faunosteo-wasm: cdylib facade over core (wasm-bindgen)
crates/worker faunosteo-worker: bin + lib (image, libwebp-sys, seccompiler, rlimit)
packages/core-wasm runtime (lazy, poison, recovery), Node source, generated types (committed), N-1 reader, tests
Lints: unwrap_used, expect_used and disallowed_methods are errors in the
libraries (tests allow them explicitly at the top of the file); unsafe_code
is forbidden everywhere except the worker (libwebp FFI, each block with a
SAFETY comment). Dependencies are optimised even in debug builds
(profile.dev.package."*") because the sandbox tests decode 4096² images
under a 10 s CPU limit.
2.1 Boundary rules in code (review III.3)
faunosteo_core::facade::call(op, json) -> jsonandcall_with_sheet(sheet, op, json): one operation name, one JSON text in, the outcome envelope out ({"ok":true,"value":…}or{"ok":false,"kind":…,"detail":…[, "found":<number>]}), never a panic on content. The operations of R2 are listed in §8.2 (crates/core/src/ops.rs).faunosteo_core::json:js_number(f64)prints floats as ECMAScriptNumber::toString;to_js_pretty/to_js_compactproduceJSON.stringify(v, null, 2)/JSON.stringify(v)byte for byte (proof §5.2). Every facade output goes through them.faunosteo_core::domain::js: the JavaScript and Zod semantics the contracts depend on (JSON.parseduplicate keys, a lone surrogate escape refused aslone_surrogate(L1, §8.7),.int()asJsInt, UTF-16 lengths, the id / region / colour / sha256 / base64 / uuid / URL patterns, optional fields absent and nevernull, nullable fields required). Fields are declared in the Zod schema order (D-R11).cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features tswrites the TypeScript types topackages/core-wasm/types(committed; the drift gate ofcheck:allfails on any change).packages/core-wasm:CoreRuntime(browser-safe) and the Node source (@faunosteo/core-wasm/node); a fresh instance is a new glue module record (cache-busting import), never the trapped one (§8.3).
3. The worker (R0 sandboxed child, R1 job loop)
faunosteo-worker is one static musl binary with subcommands dispatched by
a plain main (no async runtime, no thread), so decode installs its
sandbox in a single-threaded process. R1 (Step 8) adds the keyed parent:
run polls claim_avatar_jobs through PostgREST every 2 s, downloads the
quarantine object, feeds it to a decode child, uploads the 512 × 512 WebP
at the final key, commits the row (complete_avatar_job with the lease
token), deletes the quarantine object, and sweeps (expired uploads, the
purge queue, quarantine leftovers) every 10 minutes. Modules: config (env,
secret newtype that no Debug output prints, JWT expiry), log (JSON lines,
field allowlist, child stderr escaped and cut at 200 bytes), keys (strict
four-segment key shapes validated before any URL), backend (trait, closed
BackendError), http (ureq 3 on rustls + ring with the bundled roots, 30 s
global / 5 s connect timeouts, no redirect, P0001 bodies → closed
refusals, the Storage API's HTTP 400 + statusCode 404 → 404), decoder,
job (the STORAGE.md §3.4 mapping), sweep (§3.5), watchdog (per-stage
deadlines, exit 21 on overrun; Broken child → exit 20), run
(WORKER_ONCE, --check). Library choice recorded against the review's
Part V list: ureq instead of tokio + reqwest, hand-written JSON lines
instead of tracing, a 25-line base64url decoder instead of base64: the
loop is sequential, nothing needs an async runtime, and the keyed process
keeps a smaller dependency tree (34 → 84 crates, aws-lc-rs absent, no
cmake on Alpine). The decode child's traced syscall set did not change with
the parent's TLS code (§5.4 re-run at R1: the same seven). Image 11.6 MB
(8.7 MB at R0: ring + rustls). Tests: crates/worker/tests/job_loop.rs (11,
fake backend + fake decoder) and the module unit tests run natively; the
real-stack end-to-end runs through pnpm e2e:avatar (STORAGE.md §6).
The sandboxed child, unchanged from R0:
decode: refuses a non-empty environment; checksThreads: 1in/proc/self/status; disables core dumps (PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0,RLIMIT_CORE 0: a dump would hold the uploaded photo);RLIMIT_AS512 MiB,RLIMIT_CPU10 s soft / 12 s hard (soft = hard made the kernel SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC,KillProcesson anything else, with argument filters:tkill/tgkillmay only send SIGABRT to the child's own pid (never a signal to the keyed parent or a sibling),mmapmay not mapPROT_EXEC; then reads ≤ 5 MiB on stdin, sniffs the format (JPEG, PNG, WebP), decodes withimage::Limits(sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF orientation,resize_to_fill512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) throughlibwebp-sys(C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes inexit_codes.rs(10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time error maps to a content code (unsupported_type,decode_failed,dimensions,resource_limit), so no upload can produce a broken-environment code.- the parent side (
spawn::Spawner, used by the tests now and by R1):env_clear, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit (Produced,Rejected{code}for the content codes (exit_codes::is_content_rejection, an explicit list),Broken{code}when the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the upload; no content can produce it),Signalled{signal},OutputOverflow,Timeout,Failed). The parent never decodes:webp_check::inspectparses the RIFF container only (chunk allowlistVP8X,VP8,VP8L,ALPH; the encoder's structure enforced: optionalVP8Xfirst, optionalALPHonly in an extended file, exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; anyEXIF,XMP,ICCPor unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw (LRN-044). run --check: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which variables are set, the linked libwebp version, refused below 1.6.0, the JWT expiry of the service key); exit 0 when startable or when no worker variable is set at all, 2 on a partial configuration.runstarts the loop (STORAGE.md §3.2 for the variables).version: binary, workspace and libwebp versions.- test hooks (
--features test-hooks, never in a release build): fixtures generated in memory (no binary in git),--no-seccomp(rlimits only, prints theSECCOMP-MARKERline for the strace derivation),--violate(getcwdafter the filter),--flood,--alloc-gib n,--spin,print-allowlist.
Image: crates/worker/Dockerfile, stages build (release, static),
test (sandbox tests and scripts/derive-seccomp.sh on the release
profile with the test-hooks feature, so the binary under test differs
from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only), runtime
(gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot, USER nonroot, ENTRYPOINT /faunosteo-worker, CMD run --check). Measured 2026-10-12: image 8.7 MB (one static
binary), run --check exits 0 with --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true.
4. Checks before a merge, and the workflow files (prepared, no CI active)
No CI/CD runs on the forge today (2026-10-13): no runner, no secret, no
registry. The YAML files under .gitea/workflows/ are kept as prepared
material for that separate decision; a green workflow is never claimed
until one has actually run on the forge. Until then the gate is local:
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh, stops at the first failure
Stages, in order: scripts/rust-check.sh (native), the ts-rs types drift
(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types
must be empty: a modified or a new type file both fail, whatever the git
configuration), cargo deny check advisories
(warn-only: out of the blocking path by design, review VIII.3, but printed
here because no nightly job runs yet; needs the network), scripts/wasm-build.sh
(native), pnpm check (typecheck, tests including the core-wasm proofs on
the module just built and the pgTAP suite on PGlite, lint, build), the
application image, pnpm worker:test (sandbox tests and seccomp derivation
on the musl binary), pnpm worker:image started once with --read-only --cap-drop ALL. The local Supabase stack is not required; pnpm db:test
is the real-stack complement after a change under supabase/.
Workflow files, each mapping onto those stages so a future runner calls the same scripts:
ci.yml(push on main/develop, pull requests): jobrust(builder image,scripts/rust-check.sh, types drift,scripts/wasm-build.sh), jobcheck(module built the same way, then the Node pipeline), jobdocker(application image, workerteststage, worker runtime started read-only), jobsupabase(real stack, pgTAP, generated types diff).rust-advisories.yml: nightly and manualcargo deny check advisories, out of the blocking path on purpose.release-images.yml: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm (pnpm audit --prod) advisories gates run first in a job without secrets; a named ephemeralbuildxbuilder (--builder, no silent fallback) with its own cache builds the images; the registry token reaches the login step only, into a per-jobDOCKER_CONFIGunderRUNNER_TEMPcreated before any step and removed by a literal path; digests read from the build metadata;actions/checkoutpinned to a commit. Theif: github.refline is not a boundary (push access and the token's scope are; a dedicated release runner label is the Step 27 operation). It would pushfaunosteo_app:<sha>andfaunosteo_worker:<sha>and print their digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
Target of the future CI/CD step (planned, not yet built; recorded so the scripts stay compatible): tests on every push and pull request, Rust and TypeScript checks, PostgreSQL/RLS tests, Docker builds, security checks, branch verification before a merge, image publication only in an explicitly authorised workflow.
Not measured: the forge runner's cache behaviour, cold build times and the
workflow syntax (job-level env, GITHUB_ENV path) have never run. The
builder image build took about 6 minutes cold on the development host; both
image builds reuse BuildKit cache mounts (faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,
faunosteo_target_musl).
5. R0 proofs (2026-10-12, development host, Docker 29.8 rootless, kernel 7.0)
Each proof is a permanent test; the numbers are what the run produced.
5.1 Panic strategy on wasm32 (packages/core-wasm/tests/panic.test.ts)
- A Rust panic reaches JavaScript as
WebAssembly.RuntimeError(unreachable): the module is panic = abort,catch_unwindcannot be used there. - Exhausting the 1 MiB shadow stack (2 000 000 frames of 128 bytes) traps
(
RuntimeError) instead of corrupting memory. - After a stack-exhaustion trap, the next call on the same instance fails in
the allocator (
memory access out of bounds, deterministic). After a plain panic the same instance still answers, with a stack pointer that was never unwound: the dangerous case. Rule for R2: no instance is reused after any trap; a fresh instance is a new module record (the wasm-bindgen glue caches its instance in a module variable, and the ESM cache returns the same module for the same URL:loadCore()imports with a cache-busting query; in the browser the glue must be a static asset imported the same way, or the core runs in a Worker recreated on trap).
5.2 Serialisation contract (tests/serialisation.test.ts, crates/core/tests)
- Byte equality with
JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2)onreport-v3.demo.json,report-v2.full.json, the 296 KB equinedocument.jsonand the 84 KBreport-migration-map.json, plus a number corpus (1523,1715.4285714285713,0.85,1e+21,1e-7,0.000001,-0→0,123456789012345680000,5e-324,1.7976931348623157e+308). - Finding:
serde_json's default float parser is a documented fast path that can be one ULP off; the first run printed1715.428571428571and123456789012345670000. Thefloat_roundtripfeature (enabled inCargo.toml) fixes it; the module grew from 187 KB to 225 KB raw. - Optional fields absent, nullable fields
null, unknown keys ignored,unresolved: falserefused; the currentReportZoneSchemaandSheetRefSchema(Zod 3,@faunosteo/domain) parse what the core writes.
5.3 musl static binary with libwebp (crates/worker/Dockerfile)
Builds on rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24 with build-base; libwebp-sys 0.14.4
compiles its vendored libwebp with cc; WebPGetEncoderVersion() reports
1.6.0 (logged by run --check, test
the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough). The runtime image carries the one
static binary.
5.4 seccomp allowlist, derived and proven (crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs)
- Derivation (
scripts/derive-seccomp.sh, strace over png, jpeg, webp, a 4096 × 4096 JPEG and a 3000 × 3000 PNG, after the marker): exactlyread write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom. musl's mallocng used neitherbrknormprotect; nofutexin a single-threaded decode. The allowlist is that set plus the abort path (rt_sigaction,rt_sigprocmask,getpid,gettid,tkill,tgkill,exit). - Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (
png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox,inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits(4096²), dimensions 32 px and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty environment refused,--violate→ SIGSYS 31,--flood→ output cut,--alloc-gib 2→ SIGABRT 6 underRLIMIT_AS,--spin→ parent deadline,--spin→ SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative proofs of the argument filters:--signal-parent(tkillto the parent) and--mmap-exec→ SIGSYS; aniCCPbomb of 300 MB inflated → a content rejection, never a broken-environment outcome). - Findings: with
RLIMIT_CPUsoft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill; the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode exceeded 10 s of CPU in an unoptimised debug build: dependencies are optimised in every profile.
5.5 CSP with 'wasm-unsafe-eval' (docker/csp-proof/run.sh)
Served packages/core-wasm/pkg through nginx:1.31-alpine with
docker/nginx.conf plus the exact Content-Security-Policy of
DEPLOY.md, loaded by headless Chrome for Testing 156:
| Header | Result |
|---|---|
production (script-src 'self') |
FAIL WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(): Compiling or instantiating WebAssembly module violates the following Content Security policy directive because 'unsafe-eval' is not an allowed source of script in the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'" |
script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' |
OK 0.1.0 (module instantiated, core_version() answered) |
The keyword allows WebAssembly compilation only: an inline <script>
variant stayed blocked under both headers. nginx serves .wasm as
application/wasm out of the box.
5.6 Served size and instantiate time (tests/size.test.ts)
faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: 224 713 bytes raw, 85 396 bytes gzip-9 (with
float_roundtrip; 186 805 / 72 917 without), instantiate 2.7 ms in Node 24.
The D-R13 budget (600 KB compressed) is asserted by the test from R0 on.
5.7 Runner caches and build times
Not measurable from this host (no forge runner here). Recorded instead: builder image cold build about 6 minutes; worker test stage cold about 2 minutes, warm under 30 s with the BuildKit cache mounts; the wasm build under 10 s warm. The first run on the forge records its own numbers here.
5.8 Native toolchain run (2026-10-13, Ubuntu 26.04.1, rustup 1.29.1, 16 cores)
Same proofs, native toolchain (rustc 1.99.0 (b940084d7 2026-09-28),
cargo 1.99.0, clippy 0.1.99, rustfmt 1.10.0-stable, wasm-bindgen 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2), compared with the builder image runs above:
| Measure | Native | Builder image (R0) |
|---|---|---|
cold cargo build --workspace --all-targets (libwebp compiled by gcc 15) |
31.5 s | not timed at R0 |
| cold wasm release build | 4.3 s | under 10 s warm |
scripts/rust-check.sh warm (fmt, clippy, tests, ts export, deny) |
32 s | 2.2 s warm volumes (same script, same results) |
| cargo tests | core 10 + 2, worker unit 9, core with ts 14 + 2, all green |
identical counts |
| committed ts-rs types | unchanged after the export | unchanged |
faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm raw |
224 777 B | 224 713 B |
| gzip -9 | 84 924 B (gzip), 85 390 B (the vitest measure) |
84 927 B / 85 396 B |
| sha256 | 2d559a6b…bb3a |
451d49c1…a752 |
| core-wasm proofs | 14 passed, instantiate 3.9 ms | 14 passed, 2.7 ms |
The 64-byte difference and the distinct hashes come from the source paths
embedded in the panic locations (/home/<user>/Documents/faunosteo/…
natively, /w/… in the builder): the module is not bit-reproducible across
build roots without --remap-path-prefix, which R0 does not set. The
builder image is the reference when two builds must match byte for byte.
cargo deny prints the same warnings in both environments
(license-not-encountered for six allowed licences, duplicate miniz_oxide
and syn): policy warn, not failures.
6. Reproduction
pnpm rust:check # §2, §5.2 (cargo side), native
pnpm wasm:build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run # §5.1, §5.2, §5.6, native module
pnpm rust:builder && pnpm rust:check:docker && pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same, reproducible in the builder
pnpm worker:test # §5.3, §5.4 (tests + derivation in the build log)
pnpm worker:image && docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL faunosteo_worker:dev # §3
CHROME=<chromium binary> bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh # §5.5 (playwright-core on NODE_PATH)
CHROME=<chromium> PLAYWRIGHT_NODE_MODULES=<dir> bash docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh # §8.5, the R2 image
pnpm check:all # everything above but the CSP proofs, in one command
7. What stays hypothetical after R0
- Follow-ups from the R0 security audit, owned by R1 unless stated: base
images pinned by digest in the three Dockerfiles (today by tag, as the
existing
Dockerfile); a verification decode of the child's output in a second sandboxed child (the RIFF check validates the container, not the bitstream); the shared BuildKit cache mounts of the CI builds (the release workflow already uses its own builder);actions/*@v4tags inci.yml(pre-existing practice) to pin by commit at Step 27. - The browser-side fresh-instance mechanism is built at R2 (§8.3): the glue is a Vite asset imported with a query per instance, one spare record imported in advance.
- HTTPS from the worker: R1 links
ureqwith rustls and the bundledwebpki-roots(distroless has no CA bundle; none is needed), but every run so far targets the local stack over plain HTTP on the Docker network; the first managed (HTTPS) target proves the roots. - The forge runner's cache and timings (§5.7), and the workflow files themselves: no runner exists, none of the three workflows has ever run (§4).
- The allowlist is x86_64; an aarch64 host would need its own derivation
(
target_archselects the seccomp architecture, the syscall numbers come fromlibc).
8. R2: the domain core in Rust, used by the application (2026-10-14)
Plan and contract: .claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-13-rust-r2-domain-core.md
(revision 2 after three plan challenges). The application's domain rules run
in crates/core, reached through crates/wasm and packages/core-wasm;
React, the DOM, the forms, Zustand and supabase-js stay TypeScript.
8.1 What runs in Rust, and who calls it
| Former TypeScript | Rust (crates/core/src) |
Application consumer |
|---|---|---|
| sheet document schema (Zod, strict) | domain/sheet/schema.rs |
SheetHandle load (useSheet), snapshot gate, publish check |
validateSheetDocument (21 rules), isPublishable, createEmptySheetDocument |
domain/sheet/{validate,check,create}.rs |
sheet.check → publishSheetVersion (packages/supabase), snapshot integrity |
buildSheetIndex (closures over Maps) |
domain/sheet/{index,index_data}.rs, SheetHandle |
useSheet → SheetIndex (precomputed tables, no call in a render) |
| report v3 / v2 / identity / migration map (Zod) | domain/report/{v3,v2,identity,migration_map}.rs |
every op that takes or returns a report |
migrateReportV2ToV3, readReportDocument |
domain/report/read.rs |
draft restore, import |
rebaseReportOnSheet (gated, D-R12) |
domain/report/rebase.rs |
draft restore, import |
snapshot / branding / labels / envelope schemas, buildSheetSnapshot, assertSnapshot, readArchiveDocument (gated, D-R12) |
domain/archive/* |
export (archive.snapshot), import (archive.import), draft restore (archive kept beside the draft) |
services/zoneInteraction.ts (click decision, 7 reducers, collectVertebrae, syncVertebrae) |
domain/editor/zone.rs |
EditorRoute click chain, ObservationPickers, zone chips |
FindingsTreePicker.toggleLeaf (Finding builder) |
domain/editor/finding.rs |
ObservationCard → findings picker |
VertebraPicker toggle / all / none |
domain/editor/vertebra.rs |
VertebraPicker tap handlers |
store newReport, emptyObservation, add / remove / move |
domain/editor/report_ops.rs |
reportStore actions (answer { ok }) |
persistence draft / archive parsing |
domain/session.rs (restore_draft) |
reportStore.restoreDraft (quarantine on content kinds) |
engine readReportArchive (layered part) |
domain/session.rs (import_archive) |
HomeRoute import after the engine's byte scan |
8.2 Facade operations (crates/core/src/ops.rs, facade.rs)
Free (call): sheet.check, report.new, report.add_observation,
report.remove_observation, report.move_observation, vertebra.select;
R0 proofs kept: core_version, pretty_json, sheet_ref, report_zone.
On the session's sheet (SheetHandle.call): index_data, zone.click,
zone.add_sides, zone.remove_at, vertebra.initial, vertebra.sync,
finding.toggle, draft.restore, archive.import, archive.snapshot.
Closed failure kinds: invalid_json, invalid_shape, unknown_op,
internal, invalid_sheet (handle), invalid / unsupported_version /
rebase_failed (restore), incompatible_version (with found) /
no_attachment / invalid (import), unknown_annotation, unknown_zone,
unknown_node, invalid_index, invalid_count (editor); the runtime adds
core_unavailable. Input contracts are exported as TypeScript types.
8.3 Runtime in the browser (packages/core-wasm/src/runtime.ts, apps/app/src/core/)
- Lazy: the glue (10 KB) and the module are Vite assets (
?url), never in a route chunk; nothing is fetched beforeready(). Callers: the editor (useSheet), the new-report submit, the PDF import./login,/app/*, Mon compte and Home never request it (proven, §8.5); Home and/newread the sheet availability from the bundle alone. - Synchronous calls once ready. A
WebAssembly.RuntimeErrorpoisons the instance: the call answersinternal, the instance is dropped, a fresh one is created from the compiled module kept in memory and a glue record imported in advance (no network needed), at most 3 times per page; calls made meanwhile answercore_unavailable. Sheet handles carry the instance generation and are rebuilt from the retained payload, never called on a dropped instance. - A load failure (CSP, network, old browser) gives
core_unavailable; the editor and the new-report page show the notice with "Réessayer" (the retry clears the runtime,useSheetand provider caches), never redirect, never read or write the draft. - Two builds:
pkg/ships (no trap export, checked byscripts/wasm-build.shand a test),pkg-proofs/carries the trap exports for the tests. Both carryBUILD_STAMP(hash of the Rust sources); the vitest global setup ofcore-wasm,appandsupabaserefuses to run on a missing or stale module (pnpm wasm:buildfirst).
8.4 TypeScript deleted, kept, frozen (census)
- Deleted at R2:
apps/app/src/services/zoneInteraction.tsand its suite (13 cases ported tocrates/core/tests/editor_rules.rs), the Finding builder ofFindingsTreePicker, the selection rules ofVertebraPicker, the store's report construction and list rules, the Zod parsing inpersistence.tsandsheets/provider.ts, the domain re-exports ofservices/sheetIndex.ts,hydrateReport, the publish gate'sassertPublishablecall. - Kept TypeScript, each with its constraint (review II.2 class C): display
helpers over core data (
zoneLabel,describeZone,zoneTrees,unresolvedFindings, the findings picker'smatches/isLeafSelected/countSelectedUnder, the vertebra grid extent and chip state, import message lines,isIdentityComplete,pickLabel=pickLocaleLabel); form glue (D-R7: identity, texts, comment, severity and free-findings assignments,FreeTextFindingInputtrimming, the practitioner prefill schema ofpractitionerCache.ts); storage adapters (persistence.ts, quarantine writes);isObservable(a type guard); theSheetIndexclass (reads precomputed tables only); the runtime and its sources (Vite asset URLs, dynamic import). - Frozen TypeScript, still used, never extended:
packages/domain(PDF engine andapps/app/scripts/compare-reports.tsuntil R4, pipeline until R5),packages/pdf(byte scan and writer, R4),packages/anatomy/render(canvas and engine, R3). Thereport:compareCLI reads the sheet with the frozen domain (apps/app/scripts/compare/sheet.ts). - Census:
grep -rn "@faunosteo/domain" apps/app/srcreturns nothing, enforced by ESLint (no-restricted-importsonapps/app/src).
8.5 Proofs and tests (2026-10-14)
- Cargo: 135 core tests (contracts byte-equal to the Zod output on the curated and legacy sheets, the demo report and the three frozen archive envelopes; the ported domain suites; 49 editor cases, 84 report and archive cases and 765 Zod verdicts frozen from the TypeScript; 26 conformance fixtures; the 612 legacy leaves), 32 wasm + worker unit tests.
- Node: 906 tests (
app313 on the real core,core-wasm25 incl. the runtime, trap, size and measurement tests,supabase39 incl. the publish gate on the real core,domain262 incl. the oracle generators,pdf137,anatomy130); the 39 step6 goldens and the seed golden unchanged. - SQL:
supabase/tests/011_sheet_conformance.sqlgenerated from the fixtures (cargo drift test), PGlite 12/12 files, real stack 446/446. - N-1: the Zod schemas of develop
1a7ee7d(packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1) parse every draft and archive the core-fed application writes; the three frozen envelopes are deep-equal to the R2 exports. - CSP on the real image (
docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh, Chrome for Testing 156, DEPLOY.md header): with'wasm-unsafe-eval'a report is created and a zone click is applied by the core with no script or wasm violation; without it the browser refuses the module (script-src wasm-eval), the editor shows the notice, stays on/editorand leaves the draft byte-identical;/login,/app/accountand/request neither the glue nor the module (15/15). Recovery after a forced trap checked in the browser on the dev server and the production build; real traps on the proofs build in Node. pnpm check:all: green in 2 min 17 s.
8.6 Measurements (development machine, Node 24, Chrome 156)
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| shipped module | 1,044,559 B raw (native), 340,154 B gzip -9 (budget 600 KB); before the by-reference deserialisation of the security follow-up: 1,180,153 B raw / 372,275 B served by the image; after L1 (no rewrite pass, §8.7): 1,040,784 B raw / 339,933 B gzip -9 |
| glue | 10,171 B |
| load (compile + instantiate) | 6 to 8 ms |
| sheet handle + index data (bundle 0.5 MB) | 22 to 27 ms (TypeScript parse + index on the same input: 12 to 15 ms) |
zone.click |
0.03 ms |
draft.restore (demo report) |
0.26 ms |
archive.import (demo envelope, 184 KiB) |
2.4 ms (TypeScript layered read, without rebase: 1.0 to 1.1 ms) |
archive.snapshot |
0.4 to 0.5 ms |
| linear memory after the editor path | 4.1 MiB |
| app image | 104 MB (wasm stage: the Rust toolchain stays in the builder) |
Pages without the core load nothing more than before R2; the sheet pages
fetch about 351 KB more (glue + gzip module) once per session. JSON inputs
are deserialised by reference (T::deserialize(&Value)): the imported
attachment is never copied as a whole value (its strings are copied once
into the typed contract), and one deserialiser instead of two keeps the
module smaller. Operation inputs (parse_input) keep the parsed value alive
while their strings are copied out: a transient, linear peak on inputs the
application itself builds.
8.7 Behaviour differences (declared)
- L1 (owner decision 2026-10-14, BDR-051): a JSON text that escapes a
lone UTF-16 surrogate is refused whole with the closed kind
lone_surrogate, never altered (TypeScript kept the surrogate; a Rust string cannot hold it, and the U+FFFD replacement delivered first was refused). serde_json rejects the escape like any other error andjs::parse_jsonclassifies the failure with a strict escape scan, run on failures only. A draft goes toosteo:quarantine:draftverbatim with the existing quarantine notice; an archive kept beside a draft goes toosteo:quarantine:archive; an import is refused withhome.import.error_lone_surrogateand the file is not modified; an editor action on a report holding one (only a pasted malformed text can bring it) is refused withcore.action_failedand the report is left as it was; the publish gate reads it asinvalid_shape. Keeping such a string byte for byte would need a JSON reader of our own and a lossless string type across the contracts (rejected for R2, the refusal leaves that door open: nothing is lost). Invariant of the boundary: callers passJSON.stringifyoutput only, which escapes a lone surrogate as\uXXXX; a raw JavaScript string handed to a wasm-bindgen&strparameter would be re-encoded with U+FFFD before the core sees it. Thepretty_jsonproof op reads with serde_json directly and refuses such text asinvalid_json. - Drafts and the attachment's report are written in contract order instead of insertion order (D-R11); values unchanged, the N-1 reader parses them.
- An unreadable draft or archive is set aside under
osteo:quarantine:*with theeditor.draft_quarantinedalert, instead of being dropped silently; a draft rebased with unresolved items keeps its raw text underosteo:quarantine:draft-pre-rebase. An unreadable draft goes there with the archive kept beside it, both or neither. A slot already holding another text is never replaced. Owner rule of 2026-10-14 (maintenance B): no session text is removed or overwritten implicitly when a save or a set-aside fails. Such a text stays in place and is held: nothing is opened over it (RestoreResultheld: an unreadable draft, its companion archive, an unreadable archive, or the original of a draft to rebase), and the editor shows the resolution panel (download an exact copy, delete permanently or open the adapted version after a confirmation, retry). A new report or an import refuses to start (reason: 'held', alert, then the panel) while such a text is held, and first reads through the core any draft this page never opened: an unreadable one is set aside before the new session replaces it, a readable one is replaced as before. The draft mirror is written only when the report changes (an unrelated store change never removes it); a refused write keeps the previous text and shows theeditor.save_failedbanner until a write succeeds. - A core that cannot load leaves the editor on the degraded notice (before R2 a failed sheet chunk left it on "loading").
- Home and
/newno longer load the sheet into memory on mount. - Inputs the interface never produced get typed errors where the
TypeScript would throw or corrupt a list (
invalid_indexon a move past the end,invalid_countbeyond 65,535 vertebrae,unknown_*). - A click on an existing spine zone no longer writes an identical observation back (the value is the same).
- The publish gate throws
SheetPublishErrorwith closed kinds (invalid_shape,not_publishablewith the same message as before,validator_unavailable), never a raw ZodError. - Superseded by item 3 (maintenance B, 2026-10-14): an unreadable draft that cannot be set aside shows the resolution panel, no longer the engine notice.
8.8 Residual risks
- The import reads up to the 16 MiB attachment cap inside the long-lived instance (linear memory never shrinks) until R4 moves the reader into a terminated Web Worker.
- No React error boundary: every core entry point catches, but an uncaught error elsewhere still blanks the page (unchanged since before R2).
- The CSP proof runs Chromium only (no Firefox or WebKit build on this machine): the owner's manual run of the image on other browsers and the phone covers Safari and Firefox.
- The module grows with each phase (340 KB of the 600 KB budget at R2; the
urlcrate's IDNA tables are part of it): R3/R4 must keep measuring. - The quarantine slots (
osteo:quarantine:*) keep verbatim copies of drafts (practitioner, owner and animal data) until the tab closes, the same exposure asosteo:draftitself (sessionStorage, tab and origin scoped); nothing clears them on a new report, by design (they exist to survive it). They have no interface yet: the practitioner cannot see or download a set-aside text, and it disappears when the tab closes (owner decision 2026-10-14: follow-up, not part of the maintenance fix). - "New report" from Home replaces the tab's readable draft without asking, as before R2 (a single draft per tab, the PDF is the saved copy); the maintenance fix only guards texts that are unreadable or held.
- Base images by tag, the new
rust:1.99.0-bookwormincluded (digest pinning is the Step 27 follow-up of R0). - The documented CSP refuses the footer's external credit logo
(
img-src), an older matter seen by the proof.